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ABSTRACT
THE LITTLE LADY THAT COULD: SMALL LATVIA REJOINS THE EURO-ATLANTIC
COMMUNITY
Sandis Sraders
Old Dominion University, 2017
Director: Prof. Simon Serfaty

When the Cold War abruptly ended, Latvia found it necessary to find a new place in the
international community. Its smallness, weaknesses and sensitivities as well as historic
experiences made the task urgent because it needed a protector and a broader community to
belong to. Like a needle in a haystack, finding these would prove challenging, primarily because
not many options existed. First, only one community, the Euro-Atlantic community, could satisfy
Latvia’s willingness to escape Russia’s unwanted dominance. Second, as a small state, Latvia
had little influence over international affairs.
This research focuses on several distinct aspects of Latvia’s objective to offset its
weaknesses and sensitivities through the Euro-Atlantic integration. First, it outlines Latvia’s
weaknesses as a small state. Second, from the Eastern European perspective, it identifies
commonly shared Cold War experiences of the Baltic and Visegrad states as compared to the
experiences of the United States and former Soviet territories that were incorporated into the
Soviet Union. Third, it focuses on the foreign policies of major powers such as the United
States, the Russian Federation, and major European powers and regions. The study assesses if
the Euro-Atlantic integration processes allowed Latvia to remedy its small state weaknesses.
Lastly, using mostly qualitative but also quantitative methods, the study provides insight
as to whether the international integration process had an effect on Latvia’s security, democratic
consensus and sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Small states must cope with their limited
resources and overwhelming international challenges to pursue their interests and viability.
These aspects are considered profound preconditions for small state survival, and thus the
framework and methodology presented can be applied to other small states.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION AND HYPOTHESES

In general histories, Latvians are known as people who love to live in peace, indulge their
hard-working traditions, and enjoy their bond with their land and nature. Not in all historic
periods, however, could the country exist as Latvians wished. Quite frequently and for
significant periods the Latvian lust for peace was obstructed by Swedish kings, Polish emperors,
German noblemen, Russian tsars and communists. Last, but not least, the recent five decade
occupation period under the Soviet Union almost led to Latvians becoming a piddling drop on
the Baltic littoral.
Since Latvians as a nation survived and the last occupier collapsed, Latvians had given
another possibility to enjoy their work and traditions on their own land. The history has taught to
Latvians that some things, such as their own statehood, can never be taken for granted. The past
experience has aggregated to the recognizable fact that Latvia cannot withstand large power
superiority.
As an independent country, Latvia has lived through two short independence periods.
Even when both are combined, they are yet shorter than the most recent Soviet occupation
period. First, an independent and sovereign Latvia grew out of the Russian civil war and
revolution on November 18, 1918. Soon after the declaration of Independence Day, Latvians
fought against combined German-Russian military regiments until 1920. Latvians did well to
protect their independence, which regretfully turned out to be short-lived.
Around two decades later, two major powers signed the secret clauses of the Molotov
Ribbentrop-Pact on August 23, 1939, which was to open Latvia to Soviet and German
occupations for more than five decades. There was nothing Latvia could do. And there was no
power in hindsight that would help. Small states were quite feckless without strong alliances or
guardians of their independence aspirations. Only on May 4, 1990, could Latvia declare itself
independent from the Soviet Union. That was when the transition to Latvian statehood could
start.
There were some profound lessons that Latvians had learned from the war experiences
with the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire. Latvia always found itself in a historic
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predicament that has derived from its inability to resist large foreign powers. During the five
years of World War II, Latvia was occupied even three times by the Soviets, by the Germans,
and the Soviet again in 1940, 1941, and 1944 respectively. Latvia’s inherent inability to
withstand overwhelming military force indicated the unfortunate fate of small, non-aligned states
in Europe.
Subsequently, Latvia as well as the other small European states, desperately looked for
protection and a geopolitical asylum. That was still the best way to escape intimidation by large
powers after independence was restored in the 1990s once more. The historic predicament of
Latvia and other small states is well explained by Thucydides, who saw relations between states
where the strong do what they want while the weak suffer what they must. Hence the luxury of
choice existed only between equals in power, and it was broadly recognized that Latvians alone
could not uphold their newly regained independence and statehood.
In the 1990s, few choices existed. Latvians had to look for options to avoid the repetition
of their historic predicament. Thankfully since the beginning of the Cold War other European
states had shared similar objectives at a time when the United States was ready to embrace
Europe to avoid future conflicts. Broadly shared in the West, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
explicitly noted that “more than an end to war, we all want an end to the beginnings of all wars.”
The shared objective was expressed by a person who had seen myriad atrocities even before the
dawn of the Cold War descended over Europe. The West was exhausted from the European
history frequently going mad with few choices, all bad.
Since the willingness existed to deter conflicts and institutionalize cooperation, the West
corrected what was wrong with the past. They urged the European Union and organized NATO.
European integration aimed at creating an affluent and stable partner for the United States, but
NATO was built for the defense of a Euro-Atlantic partnership.

Sadly, not all European

countries could join the club at the outset. As a warning for the rest, Stalin prevented
Czechoslovakia from joining the West early. Latvia, geographically located even further east,
was incorporated into communist shackles.
The Cold War pitted the West against the East for five decades. The West primarily
focused on the containment and the eventual defeat of the communist regime. The East did the
same. Nevertheless, the objective of building the European continent whole and free was never
abandoned. When the Soviet Union approached its imminent final destination, the European
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Union and NATO were still enduring, and the next steps for the future of Europe and EuroAtlantic cooperation, were debated.
Given Latvia’s past experiences, membership in the Euro-Atlantic institutions was seen
as not only desirable, but necessary for the country’s survival. Nevertheless, the postwar period
heralded new questions about the future of the West as well as the compatibility of Eastern
Europe with the West. For the newly independent countries after the communist empire
collapsed, many of them with miniscule populations, weak economies, and a limited pool of
leaders, there was a need to consider opportunities and constrains.
Moreover, the Soviet legacy had left a bad mark, which required rapid transition. Small
European states had to be especially vigilant to offset their inherit sensitivities and vulnerabilities
in face of potentially rising challenges. Latvia, among others, still resided in the shadow of the
former superpower.
The Baltic States never hid their willingness to join the Euro-Atlantic community. In
relations with NATO, the former Estonian President Lennart Meri colorfully described the
security cooperation the Baltic States were desperately seeking with NATO, since for them
“security was seen like a virginity: you're either a virgin or you're not. You either have security
or you don't.”1 While no country could account for absolute safety, the pronouncements of the
Baltic leaders indicated the utter sense of insecurity and discomfort with Russia in the region.
When Latvia was invited to start accession talks with NATO, it was also concluding the
EU accession negotiations. On that occasion, in 2002, Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga
remarked that “it was not just a year which could be symmetrically read from both sides. It was a
moment when states, small and large, from East and West, deleted the last remnants from World
War II on the Europe’s map based on the legality and equality of all.”2 From the Baltic
perspective, the failure to join NATO was seen as imminently resulting in re-imposition of the
Russian domain, while a possibility to join the EU was seen as an end to the soviet economic
deprivation and social injustices.

1

Lennart Meri, “Meriisms,” City Paper’s Baltics Worldwide, (1994): accessed on 03/17/2016,
http://www.balticsworldwide.com/quotes/merisms.htm.
2
Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, “The speech of the President of the Republic of Latvia,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Latvia (November 18, 2002): accessed on 03/19/2019, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/aktualitates/zinas/runasraksti-intervijas-prese/16951-valsts-prezidentes-vairas-vikes-freibergas-runa-valsts-svetkos-pie-brivibas-pieminekla2002-gada-18-novembri.
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Yet, in order to gain access to these communities, the country needed to undertake
significant transformation. Latvia could not be a burden for the community it aspired to join. It
needed to undergo certain adaptation process to adhere to the EU and NATO principles.
Regardless of the opportunities presented by the world order, there was a clear need for Latvia to
adapt its own foreign and domestic policies to the new environment. Deeply rooted in historical
experiences, Latvian foreign policy after 1991 aimed at escaping negative external influences by
becoming a member of the Euro-Atlantic community. That was the main objective. This
perspective was and still is shared by many other small countries that found themselves in a
perpetual necessity to escape, remedy, and mitigate negative externalities as a precondition for
viability.
David Vital writes on a global power structure “that deprives small states of the option of
using force in a way that larger starts can. There is a general agreement that small states would
seek out multilateral organizations and alliances to ensure their security and achieve foreign
policy goals.”3 The post-Soviet and newly independent states had a choice for such security,
economic, and political asylum between two different communities, for “East was East, and
West was West, and never the twain shall meet.”4 The Baltic States were historically on the
border of both communities, and some of these countries went East while others chose to go
West. It was a matter of national priorities and perceptions. For Latvia, the Soviet experience
pre-determined the choice to escape the past which it emphatically did not want to face again.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the scope of the international system decidedly
changed. The system was no longer bipolar. The Soviet Union had collapsed, but its heir, a
weakened Russia, was reborn. It was no longer the superpower it once was, but its vast
resources, territory and even population, as well as its nuclear capabilities, enabled it to evolve
into a considerable regional power which ominously viewed the expansion of the zone of
Western influence.
As a staunch opponent of NATO expansion, Russia firmly and adamantly opposed the
integration of the Baltic States into the Euro-Atlantic structures. Even if American foreign policy
did not offer an immediate re-integration of Central and Eastern European countries in the West
3

Jeanne A.K. Hey, Introducing Small State Foreign Policy, in Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign
Policy Behavior (Boulder London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003), 4.
4
Rudyard Kipling, “The Ballad of East and West, ed. Edmund Clarence Stedman, A Victorian Anthology, 1837–
1895,” Clarence Stedman (1895): accessed on 03/18/2016, http://www.bartleby.com/246/1129.html.
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after the Cold War, the possibility was kept open. Although viewed as less belligerent relative to
Russia, membership in the European Union also demanded robust adaptation and reforms to
match the European Union’s standards.
It took almost 15 years for the Baltic States to become members of Euro-Atlantic
community. All three states joined both, the EU and NATO in 2004. Because the Baltic
integration in the Euro-Atlantic structures has been seen as a success, it is worth examining the
decisive aspects of such an outcome. Moreover, it is necessary to assess how dual membership
allowed to offset Latvia’s military, political, economic, social, or cultural sensitivities and
vulnerabilities.
One of the most crucial moments to turn to the West was the breaking of ties with the
East. After the communist empire collapsed, Latvia had to pursue significant domestic economic,
political, and social reforms. Moreover, the domestic reform process had to adhere to democratic
principles, but a new diplomatic service was needed to create opportunities for international
cooperation. The reorganization of Latvian domestic and international structures to adhere to
Western standards was a way of promoting cooperation with the West.
Inside Latvia, even the remaining former communist leaders thought that returning to
Russia was a romantic idea. Considering Latvia’s past, this notion was not widely shared and
was easily dismissed on behalf of bringing Latvia in the Euro-Atlantic community. But meeting
the new institutional requirements demanded a tenacious shift of democratic institutions and
political culture.
Latvian leaders had to mobilize foreign and domestic policy assets to pursue the
necessary adaptation. During the adaptation process, Latvia had to consider its inherent
characteristic, since it is a small state. The ability of small states to survive in international affairs
depends on three aspects: first, its physical location and territorial vulnerabilities; second, its
administrative and social coherence and political and decision-making stability; and third, the
nature and extent of its economic vulnerability.5 It was possible to escape Russia’s dominance,
but there was no way to change Latvia’s geography. Thus, the Latvian political system had to be
reshaped in a manner to keep society coherent and the belligerent neighbor unprovoked.

5

Vaughan A. Lewis ed., “Studying Small States over the Twentieth into the Twenty-First Centuries,” in The
Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience (Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), xi.
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Henry Kissinger has “referred to small states with obvious contempt dubbing them as the
tyranny of the weak.”6 To Russia’s irritation, some small states that broke away from Moscow
became rapidly successful and affluent. As a result, even after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
Russia has consistently tried to strengthen its clout in the “near abroad” to not let the breakaway
countries go. To compensate, most small post-Soviet states were tempted to utilize international
opportunities by joining the EU and NATO.
Considering Latvia’s geopolitical uniqueness, past experiences, and physical properties,
this dissertation aims at examining the Euro-Atlantic integration process to remedy Latvia’s
sensitivities and vulnerabilities as a small state. The author will analyze what made it possible for
Latvia to join the Euro-Atlantic community and how did Latvia offset its sensitivities and
vulnerabilities during the integration process.
Latvia joined the Euro-Atlantic community in 2004. The integration experience raises a
question about the necessity for small states to have their own foreign policy or strategy for
external interaction. Since small states alone cannot affect international affairs, it is possible to
conclude that small state choices are pre-determined by larger states. Thus, the first hypothesis
is: Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration was determined by major international powers.
Since some countries can play more salient roles than others, the second crucial question
about Latvia’s path to the Euro-Atlantic community derives from the foreign policy analysis of
major powers. When the Soviet Union was gone, Russia still remained a nuclear power which
could not be ignored. Any state, notwithstanding its international position, would be reluctant to
challenge Russia considering its vast geography, inherent resources and potential to project
power.
Since there was a significant Russian opposition to the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic
community, but especially NATO, there was only one country that could negate the Russian
opposition and offset the regional geopolitical struggle in favor of the Baltic States. That power
was the United States. Resulting from the arguments above, our second hypothesis is: American
foreign policy alone explicitly determined the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community.
To verify this hypothesis, the author will analyze and contrast American, Russian,
European and Baltic international cooperation vectors. The outcome of the analysis will outline

6

Iver Neumann and Sieglinde Gestohl ed., Small States in International Relations (University of Washington Press/
University of Reykjavik Press, 2006), 16.
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the effects of major power bargains, the importance of regional cooperation within and beyond
the Baltic Sea region.
American foreign policy in Europe was embraced by some and rejected by others. When
it comes to the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community, the EU played as significant a role
as NATO. After all, one of the most crucial milestones was for the candidate countries to adhere
to democratic standards. But the EU responses to Baltic accession to the EU or to NATO were
different in different parts of Europe.
The Visegrad countries shared different reciprocal interests than the Nordic States, for
example, with the Baltic States. Since the security paradigm plays a profound role for small
states, economic and security interest convergence in Europe. Some countries were willing to
build a whole and free Europe based on the same values as the United States. Some were
interested in enlarging the Euro-Atlantic community as a possibility to forge stronger economic
cooperation.
To investigate Latvia’s post-Cold War situation, the author proposes a third hypothesis:
Political support for Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration depended on shared identities and
interests within Europe. To test this hypothesis, part of the research will focus on how common
identities that emerged within the Warsaw Pact organization and the Baltic States during the
Cold War affected common or divergent policies in the post-Soviet space. The author will argue
that commonly shared security interests made Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic strong
political supporters of the Baltic integration in NATO. On the other side, the Nordic countries
were vigorously pulling the Baltic States in the EU economically, politically, and institutionally
even if their interests to see the Baltic States safe were the most important.
The fourth milestone of Latvia’s integration in the Euro-Atlantic community was the
domestic adaptation to EU and NATO standards when the opportunity for membership emerged.
The transition process to adhere to the requirements for membership in the Euro-Atlantic
community was aimed at offsetting Latvia’s domestic sensitivities and vulnerabilities.
Therefore, from the normative perspective, since Latvia joined the EU and NATO in
2004, it is possible to assume that the institutional adaptation did offset all Latvia’s domestic
sensitivities and vulnerabilities. To test this assumption, the author proposes a fourth hypothesis:
The institutional adaptation efficiently offset all of Latvia’s major small state sensitivities and
vulnerabilities. Since no country can be absolutely secure, or match the profile of any
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community completely, the author anticipates some areas where Latvia must yet work further to
adhere completely to the standards of the Euro-Atlantic community.
To answer the four questions above, the author will organize the research into five parts.
The first chapter will examine the existing literature on small states in international relations and
the Euro-Atlantic community. With regard to the latter, the author will outline the major debates
about the endurance and enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community. With regard to the
former, this first chapter will analyze what has been written about Latvia specifically since the
end of the Cold War, both as a small state in the context of its EU and NATO membership.
The chapter will single out salient international aspirations in Latvia, emphasize major
concerns that small states share in international affairs as well as to illuminate major arguments
that determined the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community. The author anticipates that
there is a limited literature about the integration of small states in international structures as a
way to offset their sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Therefore, the research about Latvia’s path to
the Euro-Atlantic community will not be only a story about Latvia rejoining Europe, but also a
contribution to the studies of small states.
The second chapter will examine Latvia’s vulnerabilities and sensitivities. The first part
of the chapter will review Latvia’s domestic vulnerabilities and sensitivities. The focus will be
on major small state sensitivities and vulnerabilities adjusted to the unique situation in Latvia.
The second part of the chapter will focus on the static aspects that small states must consider
internationally. The major focus will be placed on the realist and liberal schools of thought.
International choices that countries make are determined by the learning process. The
third part of the chapter will therefore review Latvia’s regional distinctiveness and uniqueness
from the perspective of social theories. Since more profound attention is attached to different
roles played by countries in international affairs, social theories will be instrumental in
explaining Latvia’s contemporary orientation.
The third chapter will analyze events in Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, and
Poland in 1981. The focus of this chapter will be placed on several important aspects that
brought the Visegrad countries to revolt between 1956 and 1981. The shared Soviet occupation
experience is what brings the Central and Eastern European countries closer together. Moreover,
their shared experiences makes them strong supporters of the Euro-Atlantic community. The
dissertation will provide arguments why Russia, the heir of the Soviet Union, is so feared in
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Central and Eastern Europe. Myriad economic, social, cultural traits were deprived with military
and political means in Visegrad in no different way than it was for the Baltic States.
The fourth chapter will focus on foreign policies of major powers, especially in the postCold War period. American foreign policy trends in Europe will earn significant attention since
it was the instrumental source of NATO as a security platform with Europe. Since Russia has
denied Latvia’s independence several times, its foreign policy in the post-Cold War era deserves
attention. Analyses of American and Russian policies will outline several important cases,
including the Russian military presence in the Baltic States until 1995, as well as Russian and
Latvian ethno-political issues and political-economic issues.
On the regional level, the author will focus on the policies of major European powers.
The founding states of the European Union and the Central European and Nordic countries will
be the primary subjects for the analysis. This chapter will compare and contrast different foreign
policy strains and interests that were instrumental for Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration.
The fifth chapter will be devoted to Latvia. The chapter will assess Latvia’s military,
political, economic, social, and cultural sensitivities and vulnerabilities before and after EU and
NATO membership. To accomplish this objective, surveys on specific issues related to security,
political, economic, social, cultural, and language issues will be conducted, based on quantitative
data in distinct areas. Some statistical analysis will also be applied to determine how EuroAtlantic Latvia really was and is right now. Regression analysis will be used for such
conclusions since it allows to illuminate latent correlations. Moreover, opinion surveys from the
Baltic States will provide arguments about social coherence and fragmentation on specific issues
related to the present state of opinions on Euro-Atlantic relations. Here special attention will be
devoted to ethno-political and ethno-cultural relations.
To accomplish his research objectives and answer his major questions, the author plans to
apply mixed research methods. Qualitative research methods will be predominantly used to focus
on several historic and geographic cases which are important from the empirical and normative
perspectives for the study. The research methods will include discourse and content analysis,
historical representation, case studies, and process tracing. The author aims at obtaining case
specific information about the nature of the subjects of the study, change in international
environment and order, interaction between different actors within different levels of analysis, as
well as policies, values, opinions, behaviors, and social contexts inside and around the subject of
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the analysis. On the other hand, quantitative research methods, such as regression analysis, will
efficiently supplement the qualitative side of the analysis.
The crucial task of this dissertation is to describe how policies of major powers were a
precondition for EU and NATO membership. The concluding part of the dissertation will be
devoted to tracing Latvia’s journey in a comparative perspective. It will be possible to assess to
what extent the integration process has allowed offsetting Latvia’s domestic sensitivities and
vulnerabilities and in which areas Latvia has to continue domestic transformation.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction
As is the case with many other small states, there are few studies about Latvia. Small
states might simply not be as interesting as major powers, institutions, multinational
organizations, interests groups or any other influential actor in international affairs. Additionally,
it may be assumed that there is little rationale for studying small states with miniscule global
impact. So, why should we study small states in general or any one in particular?
Research about any particular small state might be of interest to its society, the narrow
region to which it belongs, or to specific foreign policy analysts. Latvia is one such example. The
country deserves attention, as it affects larger countries. From a regional perspective, most
studies relate to how small Baltic States shape relations with Russia, and vice versa as Russia, if
not a universal global power, is a salient regional power. And, the Baltic States might serve as
indicators for Russia’s policy changes. Thus, research about Latvia could add novel perspectives
to regional affairs.
To determine the value of this research, it is necessary to evaluate what has already been
written and analyzed about small states in general, the broader community that Latvia aspired to
join, and the debates within Latvia about its regional impact since regaining its independence
after the Cold War.
The Euro-Atlantic community has been broadly analyzed. It was a blend of two major
institutional networks. One network was the United States-led NATO and all the member states
the organization brought together. The other network was the European Union (EU)-based
community and all the member states it brought together.
There might seem to be a very strict dichotomy between the two networks that formed
the Euro-Atlantic community. Some might argue that only those states that belong to both
organizations should be considered members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Nevertheless,
belonging to one or the other institutional network should be enough to be considered a member
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of the community, for the values that each of the organizations share are the same or at least
compatible.
The second part of this chapter will present the literature review on small states. A special
focus will be devoted to the reasons small states have caught the attention of international
analysts. In terms of Latvia, it is worth assessing the domestic debates about Latvia’s
international objectives and its perspectives after the Cold War.
The literature overview will contrast major arguments about small states in international
relations with the debate in the West about the future of the Euro-Atlantic community and how
Latvia saw itself on the outskirts of Europe. The comparison of these arguments will include
discussions about small states in international relations with the special focus on Latvia as a part
of the Baltic Sea Region.
The Debate about the Major – the Euro-Atlantic Community

It is broadly conceived that on major strategic and international questions Americans are
from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand each other less
and less.7 Europeans and Americans might not share a common view of the world and could
have diverging views on all questions of power - its efficacy, its morality, and its applicability,
among others. The reason for different interpretations of power could be rooted in the fact that
Americans hold an abundance of power while Europeans are a niche power.
Even if there is discord in terms of the desirability and application of power, it is not
necessarily so that American and European interests diverge in the same way. In fact, different
views on how power is perceived by Europeans and Americans make them complementary.
When they act together, their common interests can be better upheld. The overarching question is
how Americans and Europeans direct their commonly shared power within the Euro-Atlantic
community.8
American and European interests converge in many areas: the prosperity of Europe keeps
America affluent, the stability of a democratic Europe helps strengthen American values, and the
security of war-weary European states helps protect America from the risks of another global
7
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war in Europe.9 Furthermore, the United States and the EU have also grown into the largest
international markets and are one another’s closest trading partner.10
The United States had the ability to “return home” in 1919 and in 1945. Nevertheless,
during the Cold War, Americans built Europe in such a way that it became an extended part of
the United States. America had become a major power in Europe, where its economic presence,
political influence, and military weight were larger and more significant than those of most EU
member states.11
When the Soviet Union collapsed, there was a need for change in Europe. The United
Kingdom could have stayed apart from Europe with only 30 percent of its combined exports
going to France, Germany, and the Netherlands, 15 percent going to the United States with a
potential for increase, and 40 percent of its exports being delivered to the North Sea basin.12 In
the meantime, France could have developed two types of relationships-with Europe through the
European Plain with Germany, or a regional alliance with Turkey, Italy, and energy-rich Algeria
and Libya.13
A British-French alliance could have been an option if the Marshall Plan had not been
launched. Whatever the prospects for France and Britain, post-Cold War Germany depended on
its capacity to reinvent itself and to keep the European plain together. Unlike France and Britain,
German interests were located in the East. Therefore, the unification of Germany and Europe
became two essential objectives for Germany. The German perspective was endorsed by the
United States in the same way that the Marshall Plan was launched in the aftermath of World
War II.
Even if there were options for France and the United Kingdom to adapt their different
strategies, a common European strategy offered a better perspective. When the bipolar system
was gone, there was a need to remedy inherent instabilities; Europe was unprepared to attend to
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security issues that required credible amounts of military force, whereas American leadership
and power were indispensable.14
All these preconditions, shared on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, indicated the continued
relevance of the complementary institutions built during the Cold War-NATO and the EU. The
transatlantic alliance was the best insurance for security. The EU was the best way to ensure
stability and cooperation. The endurance of the Euro-Atlantic community nevertheless depended
on the United States’ interest in staying.
When the sole unifier of the Euro-Atlantic community – the Soviet Union – was gone,
retrenchment, isolationism, or self-containment of the United States was not an option. The past
lessons were not as distant as it might have seemed. The United States had won World War I, but
it lost the peace; Allies won World War II and were immediately engaged in protracted conflict.
When the Cold War was over, the preservation of peace required for the United States to stay.
Peace in Europe also meant peace in the United States, for no more was the Atlantic
Ocean a natural obstacle to warfare spreading to the United States. In fact, those were the new
inroads. The world had changed, so had technologies, transportation, and thus the geopolitical
landscape.
To maintain its global power status and security, the United States could not afford
retrenchment.15 It was also in the interest of Europeans for the community to endure. The
opposite would mean a loss of what had been gained – affluence, stability, and security. Those
were all luxuries to which the Western Europeans had become accustomed for quite some time.
The over-arching post-Cold War question was how to keep the Euro-Atlantic alliance
together and prepared for new tasks. The answer could be found by resolving two questions
about the network that had kept the Euro-Atlantic alliance tighter. First, with the unifying enemy
gone, what should be NATO’s future roles? And, secondly, Europeans had to agree on how the
EU should proceed considering the presence of defeated hegemonic power on the outskirts of
Europe. For major transatlantic allies there were obvious reasons to seek adaptation.
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Some argued that with the bipolar international structure gone, NATO had lost its
purpose and, thus, its future.16 On the other hand, others argued that the future of NATO was a
matter of transformation and adaptation to new security challenges. Each side was partially right
and the evolution of NATO was the subject of much discussion.
In the immediate post-Cold War years, skeptics argued that the Soviet Union was the
essential glue that had held NATO together. In the same way as the Warsaw Pact was disbanded,
so should NATO. It was broadly argued that the West had lost its military unifier. Thus, the only
solution was to create a new political structure. But even such solution, it was argued, would
transcend the West into an artificial institution or a power merely on paper.17
Time passed and NATO transformed, but the skepticism about NATO’s future was not
dismissed even by the time the United States was crafting an alliance for an invasion in Iraq in
2003. Seen as more of a choice than a necessity – or a unilateral extension of the narrow conflict
into the broader war – the American march to Iraq outlined some limits for Euro-Atlantic
cooperation.
Europe was divided in its support of Iraq and of NATO’s capability to contribute its
powers to common action. Again, some argued that NATO had become just an irrelevant multilateral bureaucracy whose time had passed in the face of unilateral and bold American foreign
policy.
If the United States could not find utility in NATO, then it could just become a military
pact of diminished geopolitical relevance. Subsequently, NATO was seen by some experts as an
organization soon to become defunct, even if new members were aspiring to join it. The accord
between major members and major institutions was crucial. The alliance had to forego the test of
viability, lost original purposes, and adaptation to new potential risks.18 The search for solidarity
and applicability would test whether NATO’s best days were in the past.19
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NATO skeptics might have been partially right. Apart from the Article V, there was little
NATO could seemingly offer in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. Russia was still a
nuclear power, but it was severely weakened and circumscribed. China was on the rise, but it did
not project any immediate military threats to the Euro-Atlantic alliance. In the meantime, interethnic and multi-cultural conflicts were far from gone in Europe.
The foremost critics failed to grasp the role of NATO as a peace-maker and peace-keeper
between its allies in Europe. NATO, for many decades, had delivered peace. Some experts
viewed the United States as a peace subsidy for the alliance members.20 Within the alliance,
there is no principle or article that would exclude conflicts between the members from erupting.
Nevertheless, such countries as Turkey, Greece, France and Germany had been living in peace
despite regional and historical grievances.
Apart from its military function, NATO had evolved into a cooperation platform where
institutional framework contributed to the political dialogue, mutual respect and peace. The
alliance, in the same manner as the EU, contributed to the liberal peace and the emergence of the
democratic community.21 NATO was strongly embedded in European-like affairs, institutions,
and organizations while it had to undergo transformation to adapt to emerging security
challenges.22
Therefore, the NATO community was presented as a club of democratic nations where
the political side of the alliance was elevated. The attitudes of major decision makers were
reshaped on both sides of the Atlantic. In making the case for NATO enlargement, Madeleine K.
Albright defined NATO as a community of interest and the free nations of Central and Eastern
Europe that both preceded and outlasted the Cold War. Former NATO Secretary General Lord
George Robertson stated that the members shared common values at the time when those basic
values were under threat virtually all around the world. The former Czech dissident, and later
president, Václav Havel noted that NATO should urgently remind itself that it was first and
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foremost an instrument of democracy intended to defend mutually held and created political and
spiritual values; it must see itself not as a pact of nations against a more or less obvious enemy,
but as a guarantor of the Euro-Atlantic civilization. Former NATO Secretary General Manfred
Wörner once emphasized that NATO has always been a community of values and a community
of destiny among free nations. NATO was united by common interests, not threats, noted former
NATO Secretary General Javier Solana in 1999.23
When the Soviet Union was gone, the post-Cold War euphoria lost, and new tasks were
faced by the West, it was necessary to reinvent the principle that was expressed by the first
NATO Secretary General Lord Ismay to keep the Americans in, the Russians out, and the
Germans down. In practice it meant the unification of Germany by making it a member of
NATO. The Russian question also depended on how Moscow saw itself vis-a-vis the West.
When President George H. W. Bush heralded the new mission for NATO to create
Europe whole and free in 1989, the incorporation of both parts of Germany into NATO took
place. In the meantime, reshaping NATO as an organization from military to more political
entity was a way to soften the geopolitical shock in the Soviet Union of Germany’s impending
unification and entry into NATO.24 Apart from outright German incorporation, additional tasks
lie before the alliance.
In his memoirs, James Baker, former U.S. Secretary of State, recalls informing Soviet
Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze about NATO’s awareness of the political constraints
Russians faced and the alliance’s task to adapt to a new, radically different world.25 Significant
political efforts were devoted to comforting the changing adversary when Germany’s unification
took place. It was broadly conceived that Russia had to be a part of the new security structure in
Europe.
By successfully selling an updated NATO to Russia, Americans could uphold their
foothold and reciprocal interests in Europe. Therefore, Americans shared significant concern
about Mikhail Gorbachev’s vision of a “common European home” – a home where there was no
place for the United States.26
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There was a genuine willingness, recalls Robert Zoelick, an aide to Secretary of State
Baker at the time, to “play off Eastern Europe against Moscow, if Gorbachev will try to split the
alliance.”27 Without the American presence, the Western institutions alone were ill prepared to
enlarge or sustain the zone of stability built during the Cold War years.28 But without these
institutions, America could not ensure its presence in Europe. The EU and NATO could not be
sustained without the United States, Russia could not be balanced without NATO, but Germany
could not be balanced without the EU.29 The institutional base of the Euro-Atlantic alliance was
essential for France and Britain to embrace the future Germany with ideas proposed by Lord
Ismay in the past.
With the unofficial NATO enlargement “germanwards,” no immediate further
enlargement could take place. The West had to assist the Russians in digesting what had
happened. Therefore, the immediate task was to urge former Warsaw Pact adversaries and
present allies, not to push for membership too hard, too hastily, and too openly. It was a sobering
message to aspiring members.
Even before the Warsaw Pact was disbanded, some Czech, Polish, and Hungarian
leaders, like Václav Havel, from his prison cell, Adam Michnik as an opposition member, and
György Konrád had been writing about the role of a political dissident, giving political advice to
opposition movements, or promoting a new Central European identity.30 The urge to join the
Euro-Atlantic was evident.
The attempted August coup of 1991 in Russia only elevated the fears of instability and
resurgent imperialism. Therefore, less than a year later, on May 6 of 1992, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, and Poland officially declared their desire for quick NATO membership.31
Since their first meeting in Visegrad, Hungary, in 1991, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and
Hungary coordinated their actions to achieve common foreign policy goals. In response, together
with Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, they were invited to establish liaison offices with NATO.
The West adapted an all-inclusive approach to accommodate Russia but the United States was
27
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urging the Visegrad Group to not to bang on the NATO’s door” too early, staunchly, and
swiftly.32 The United States could not immediately accommodate the interests of all parties when
the international security environment was yet fragile and changing.
Uncertainty and fragility of the security situation in Europe was precisely what drove
Central and Eastern Europe towards the Euro-Atlantic community. The debate about the open
door policy was in the air. It was argued that there was a need for a firm stance on the condition
of enlargement, and how NATO could protect new democracies in the East.33 The policies of the
new NATO could affect the institutional capacities to achieve transparency, integration, and
negotiation among NATO’s members-assets that could be mobilized to deal with new security
missions.34
Owing to geographic proximity to the Visegrad countries, as well as post-Cold War euphoria
slowly transcending into hysteria, German Defense Minister Volker Rühe started investigating
NATO enlargement as a means for extending stability eastwards. Moreover, the Germans did not
see stability in the East as their only objective.
It was argued that the extension of the EU and NATO was the final step to complete the
unification of Germany.35 United States Senator Richard Lugar was one of the early proponents
for NATO enlargement. In his words, NATO needed to go “out of area or out of business.”36
Meanwhile in Russia, since Boris Yeltsin’s rise to power, Andrei Kozyrev, Russia’s
foreign affairs minister at the time, was labelling the 1991-1993 period as a romantic foreign
policy era. Staunch emphasis inside Russia was placed on rapprochement with the West and
ridding the Russian Federation from the anti-Western communist elements. In terms of erupting
conflicts in former Yugoslavia, Moscow could not make up its mind on participation, but
regarded NATO and the United States as allies. The new pro-Western regime in Russia went as
far as to state on August 26, 1993, that the Eastern European countries could join any alliance
they deemed necessary.37
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Thus, NATO enlargement could, in theory, become a reality. Western pundits did not
waste time arguing the merits of NATO expansion to the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland.
It was argued that the expansion of the transatlantic alliance would stabilize democracy, uphold
economic reforms, revert authoritarian backsliding, and curb nationalism from surging.38
The emerging intellectual thought did not prescribe a significant role for Russia within
the potential NATO expansion context, for it was seen as too big, too powerful, too unique, and
too unstable to be accommodated at the time. In the meantime, the Ukraine was outlined as an
area that should remain independent from Russia’s geostrategic influence. The West argued that
eventual enlargement to Ukraine would be reciprocally beneficial for Russia and the West alike.
At the Brussels NATO Summit in 1994, President Bill Clinton announced that the
alliance can do for Europe’s East the same as it did for Europe’s West: prevent a return to local
rivalries, strengthen democracies against future threats and create conditions for prosperity to
flourish.39 The All-Inclusive Partnership for Peace (PfP) was announced at the time as a
milestone for NATO, and a marker for eventual membership.
The initial evolution of NATO enlargement caused discomfort in Moscow. Nevertheless,
the announcement of PfP was seen as a foreign policy victory as a means to postpone NATO
enlargement, aimed at admitting some states and excluding others. Moreover, the initial concept
for the new NATO, proposed by RAND experts Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F.
Stephen Larrabee, was seen implicitly or even explicitly as playing the Baltic countries and
Ukraine off Moscow by considering them for NATO membership sometime after the Visegrad
Group.40 It was broadly conceived inside Russia that the West should not risk fabricating an
enemy out of Russia just to have a post-Cold War rejuvenation for NATO.
As the West was taking more decisive steps, the debate about Russia’s Western
cooperation prospects changed. Western experts were arguing for NATO to expand in Central
and Eastern Europe. Washington was pressing Moscow to avert some of its arms deals with
China. The United States was pursuing disarmament issues in former Soviet republics. As a
result, owing to growing domestic opposition against the foreign minister’s Kozyrev’s doctrine,
Moscow’s attitude incrementally changed.
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While Russia was still generally indifferent to NATO enlargement, radical nationalist
players, like Vladimir Zhirinovsky, emerged. In 1993, Zhirinovsky’s ultra-nationalist political
party scored 24 percent support in national elections. He overtly declared that NATO
enlargement would help him be elected President of the Russian Federation.
Thus, NATO’s potential enlargement was positioned as a way to awaken nationalistcommunist-imperialist forces inside Russia, strengthen opposition against the West, and cut
Russia off from further cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community. One of the reasons for
Russia’s contempt was the absence of Western assistance- à la Marshall Plan program for
Russia.
Nevertheless, PfP initially was seen in Russia as an alternative to NATO enlargement.
For Kozyrev, it was an opportunity to highlight his foreign policy success with the West. As the
agreement was offered to everyone, including Russia, debates inside Russia on how to perceive
PfP and the West took four distinct strains.
The first stressed that PfP was a foreign policy achievement, for it allowed Russia to be
involved in constructing common security space with NATO while the enlargement was
postponed. The second group viewed PfP as a policy imposed on Russia by NATO. As a result,
Russia’s status was marginalized, which suggested that Russia should opt-out from PfP and forge
stronger ties with China. The third group stressed the necessity of equal partnership with NATO.
PfP was seen as too ambiguous without any leverage over decision making, an inability to
contribute to NATO’s decisions, and a downgrade in status. The fourth group welcomed PfP,
viewed as the first step toward a more salient status.41
In response, the West accommodated some Russian concerns. They managed to upgrade
Russia’s status by including its input in the NATO decision-making process. Nevertheless, it was
made clear to Russians that PfP was not a stop, but a stopover, for future enlargement. Thus, the
initial Russian foreign policy achievement could be considered void. Late in 1994, Russia turned
down PfP, and Yeltsin announced a Cold Peace with the West and launched a military campaign
in Chechnya. Diverse interpretations about cooperation in Bosnia also contributed to growing
cleavages between Russia and NATO.
The initial NATO-Russian cooperation brought ambivalent results. The opposition inside
Russia against NATO was growing stronger, particularly beginning in 1995. Even those who
41
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favoured closer ties with the West had to oppose NATO, thus, jeopardizing closer ties with the
West, which Yeltsin’s special ties with President Clinton did not alleviate.
In the meantime, there was little Russia could do to contain NATO’s enlargement. Russia
was economically weak. It depended on Western financial aid and access to global markets. It
was a nuclear power, but, without an immediate external adversary, the role of its military was
marginalized. Moreover, politically, Russia desired to join the G-7. Therefore, it depended on the
West for many of its foreign policy goals.
Despite the deteriorated mood, there was a debate about how to improve cooperation with
NATO. Russia wanted NATO enlargement to slow down and take place in the 21st century.
There was a desire for additional strategic guarantees to refrain from incorporating the Baltic
States and Ukraine into NATO. If the enlargement took place, Russia wanted strategic
guarantees to avoid the deployment of additional military in Central and Eastern Europe. Finally,
only if there was a genuine, strategic NATO-Russia partnership, the opposition against NATO, it
was assumed, could decrease.42
What Russia was initially seeking was probably highlighted in Ukraine. The initial
foreign policy was embedded in the Declaration of the State Sovereignty of Ukraine, adopted in
July of 1990. The Warsaw Pact was disbanded and the Soviet Union was gone. Therefore,
Ukraine upheld an all-inclusive, all-European security architecture. Owing to the post-Cold War
disorder and “security vacuum,” Ukraine supported a dialogue between the Western security
structures as well as the post-Soviet structures.
Furthermore, it welcomed PfP as a platform for cooperation and dialogue where Ukraine
participated along the same lines as formerly neutral Austria, Sweden or Finland. It endorsed the
dialogue with NATO as well as Russia’s cooperation with NATO within PfP, or any other
format. Ukraine viewed the inability for Russia and NATO to find a common ground as a
genuine security challenge.
In the meantime, Ukraine pointed to Russia’s subtle task to maintain respectful relations
with its post-Soviet neighbours. It had to act in a manner to avoid new geopolitical division.
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Policies of taking sides or choosing alliances were in conflict with how Ukraine saw its security
within the all-European security cooperation context.43
Furthermore, Belarus was participating in the signing of the dissolution of the Soviet
Union treaty with Ukraine and Russia. After the disbandment of the Soviet Union, it had an
opportunity to define its foreign and security policy. Like Ukraine, it acknowledged the need for
cooperation and emergence of a security structure that would be genuinely unifying.
Nevertheless, Belarus emphasized the importance for the United States to avoid
overstepping the Cold War geopolitical borders by coming as close to Russia as the Baltic states.
Because of the geographic proximity and economic and security dependence, a separate or
neutral alliance with Russia was seen as possible.44
Through Polish eyes, the possibility of joining multi-lateral organizations with small and
medium-sized European states was a matter of secure existence and national development;
despite no longer being bipolar, the world was divided between rich and poor, secure and
insecure, stable and volatile areas.45 The pivotal point of 1989 marked the return of Poland, and
the other Central and Eastern European states, into a “grey area,” located between the affluent,
secure, and seen as selfish West and the unstable and unpredictable East.
To avoid Poland’s pre-1939 predicament when it was left at the mercy of two revisionist
powers, Poland was anxious to overcome the negative fragility of its post-Cold War status by
joining NATO and all other Western organizations at whatever cost. Military integration,
however, did not constitute Poland’s primary motivation to reintegrate with the West. The main
reason was the absence of immediate, tangible threats from its neighbors. With Germany, the
Czech Republic, and Slovakia, relations were fairly warm, while with others they were at least
normal. For these reasons, Poland could examine four security options.
First, it could overcome its historic ghosts by signing bilateral security guarantees with
Russia on equal grounds. The validity of this option, however, must not be based on historic
memory, wishful thinking, or political declarations. It was argued that Russia’s internal reforms
and stability, which Poland, or any other country, could not influence, should be relied upon. On
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the contrary, Russia’s military campaign in Chechnya, its willingness to recreate military ties
with the Commonwealth of Independent States, its insistence on a military presence in Caucasus,
its involvement in all conflicts in the nearest proximity around its borders, a new and quite
revealing defense doctrine, as well as a growing influence of the military-industrial complex,
were derailing such cooperation options by default. Second, Poland could stay neutral and rely
on its own capabilities for self-defense. Third, Poland could investigate the possibility of
building a regional defense system-NATO-bis. It would be comprised mainly of the states in the
“grey zone” (former Soviet Union states in Central and Eastern Europe). Fourth, the integration
in the Euro-Atlantic community would include NATO, the Western European Union, the
European Union, and other institutions. This objective would entail Poland’s synergic
convergence with the affluent, secure, and stable West.
Owing to past experience, Poland’s foreign and defense strategies pivoted toward
NATO’s membership. However, before enlargement took place, the United States and NATO
wanted to accommodate Russia. Thus, PfP stayed all-inclusive and open to anyone. After 1995,
however, Poland managed more rapid integration within the collective defense system, with the
United States, Germany, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and Denmark all adamant
supporters in bringing Warsaw into NATO.46 When inside NATO, it was conceived, Poland’s
stability would contribute to the mutual cooperation with Russia.47
While some countries saw PfP as an upgrade in status, some viewed the agreement as a
downgrade. In a meantime, Romania saw it as appropriate as it could be. Maybe because of
historic legacy, Romania acknowledged that a transformation path was needed to catch up with
the Visegrad Group, seen as more apt for NATO’s membership. The PfP agreement, was,
therefore, seen as a step toward NATO membership, as well as a precondition for modernization
of Romania’s armed forces and adaptation for peace-keeping operations.
Furthermore, the agreement was broadly viewed as a stabilizing factor in the region.
While Romania was complaining about the arrogance of a bipolar system, it was delivering
stability. With the bilateral system gone, instability had to be tempered by new cooperation.
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Apart from enhancing regional stability, Euro-Atlantic cooperation allowed Romania to improve
its relations with neighbors like Hungary.48
In comparison to Romania, the view from Lithuania looked distinctively different. It was
broadly acknowledged that the historic experience, cultural, social, and economic trajectory
discern Balts from Russians. Lithuania’s international aspirations took a similarly distinctive
character. The special role of Lithuania is outlined in the work that describes how Lithuania rejoined Europe. The very fact that the road to Europe includes the reference to the year 1009,
which is the earliest documentary in which Lithuania was mentioned in German chronicles, is in
itself telling.49
The very fact that small states could do little to affect their future contributes to historically
broad animosity and psychological insecurity. It was broadly conceived that size and geography
were key prospects for independence and national security for Lithuania.
It was acknowledged that the Baltic States could not escape Russian problems without
becoming members of the Euro-Atlantic community. Therefore, escaping dependence on Russia
required adopting the opposite strategy as what was conceived in Belarus. Thus, memberships
first in NATO, then in all other structures where Russia would not be a member, were adamantly
sought.
There was a fear that the Baltic States, after admitting Central European countries, might
be isolated and left at the mercy of Russia’s neo-imperial or neo-communist domestic political
interests. Owing to a vast domestic political and social support, all possible cooperation models
with the West were embraced.
The 1994 Brussels NATO Summit, when PfP was announced, was seen as a way to keep
“Russia happy, but Eastern Europe hoping” in Lithuania.50 Some Baltic leaders saw NATO as
the solution to all Baltic security concerns. For example, former Estonian President Lennart Meri
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compared PfP with “a bottle of used Chanel perfume: nice to look at, but empty.”51 In 1996, the
three Baltic presidents promised to make any sacrifice to achieve membership in NATO.52
Tallinn, Riga, and Vilnius separately, and the Baltic States all together, could not provide
for their own military security. Regional cooperation among the three would not suffice either.
On the part of the Baltic States, the historic hostility and future unpredictability of Russia were
seen as impediments to any bilateral security agreement with Russia. The West became the only
asylum and the model that pushed Lithuania forward and the remaining two in a healthy
competition with Lithuania to keep up with the required reforms for NATO enlargement.
In comparison to debates about NATO enlargement in Central and Eastern Europe, EU
enlargement was less debated as it was seen as less menacing outside and inside of Europe. The
reasons were the benign character of the EU and Europe relative to Russia. So EU enlargement
triggered fewer debates. Nevertheless, the journey to the EU was not simple for countries that
wanted to join it. Even if EU expansion was less debated in terms of security, European
integration showed a significant reciprocity with the debate about NATO enlargement.
It was strongly argued that whichever expansion took place, the EU or NATO must
follow each other’s footsteps.53 This was especially true for the Baltic States. As Russia did not
oppose the Baltic entry into the EU, the region’s convergence with EU’s acquis communitaire
and institutions was seen as a way to bring the most unsafe, most anxious and most unstable
regions first into the EU, then, owing to possible softening of Russia’s opposition, into NATO as
well. In some western countries, EU membership was seen as a compensation for no-NATO
membership. In the Baltic States it was “all or nothing – the EU could not become an alternative
to NATO.”54
On the other hand, the first NATO enlargement was potentially viewed as a trigger for
the nationalistic, neo-imperial political groups in Russia. Harsher Russian policies towards the
Baltic states could have derailed or postponed NATO membership indefinitely. Russia, since the
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announcement of PfP and enlargement to the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary, never
disguised such a stance. Therefore, some NATO member states like Denmark emphasized that
the the first NATO enlargement was potentially a “sell out” of the Baltic States.
In the meantime, the first enlargement could not include the Baltic States because they
“did not have votes” among NATO’s members while, for example, Poland could muster
sufficient support. NATO enlargement was a political decision based on consensus and Baltic
membership within NATO was simply unpopular.55
NATO does not have a multi-step program or a comprehensive, normative, set of
institutional criteria for EU membership. In fact, NATO’s normative package is rather shallow.
But the new NATO membership principles are of vital importance for EU membership. Thus, the
Baltic prospects for joining the EU were seen as a step toward both.
Foreign policy interests alone were not sufficient for EU membership. The post-war
legacy still haunted the European leaders and societies - the memory of post-war darkness, piles
of rubble and humanitarian loss affected the German collective sense of guilt for the atrocities
caused by the Nazi regime and to proceed as if they had not happened.
While the war had changed national borders in Europe, the new order in Europe
depended on societies. For example, Poland had become a place where millions Jews died when
first Hitler then, later, Stalin and his heirs, created criminal regimes up until 1968.56 Bilateral,
multilateral, and social German and Polish rapprochement depended on the ability of leaving the
past behind and opening new chapters before them for future cooperation.
The natural history of destruction and oppression inevitably linked many nations, while
tearing others apart. Europeans were looking for means to avoid previous mistakes. States and
nations were looking for security enhanced by a military, affluence enhanced by common
markets, and moral rebirth brought about by the past wars. Military, economic, and moral
arguments were said to support the European unity but no European country could support all
three areas alone.57 Thus, Europe’s future, in spite of its past, depended on its ability to find
common grounds for cooperation.
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In search of such goals, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik marked an early paradigm change in
Europe early when West Germany engaged its Eastern part and Eastern Europe on the basis of
cooperation, not confrontation - a regional détente. Nevertheless, such policy raised questions
about the German role in Western Europe. The German media dubbed journalists who
precariously followed what was happening inside Germany as “the critical abroad” (Das
krisische Ausland).
The dangers of German nationalism were discussed in Le Monde and The Times by
journalists in London, Paris, and Washington. Leaders in Western capitals found that it paid to
revive fears of an over-mighty, reunified Germany in order to better discipline the West.58 On the
other hand, rumors about any potential of German revival only enhanced Moscow’s power in
Eastern Europe as the German bogeyman served to revitalize Soviet domination over the
Warsaw Pact countries.
When the moment for the German unification finally came, the first response was an
attempt by Margaret Thatcher to slow it down. German unification was explicitly feared to slow
down détente with Gorbachev and a Germany was presented as a very dominant nation.59
Thatcher had a hard time accepting the speed of German unification, which demonstrated how
the balance of power was shifting in Europe.60
Secondly, François Mitterrand’s meeting with Gorbachev in Kiev in December of 1989
and the elevation of German-Polish territorial disputes also indicated France’s willingness to
slow down the unification and keep the status quo as long as it was possible. The “old Europe”
was cautious to accept new political designs in changing Europe.
On the other hand, during his visit to Germany in May of 1989, President Bush took care
to emphasize the country’s pivotal role in Europe. Terming Germans “partners in leadership;”
Americans gave an indication that the “traditional special” relationship with Britain was
becoming less special.
The international community was focusing on what was happening in the heart of Europe
while the heart of Europe had a capacity to reshape future trends. France and Britain have always
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shared a different perspective on how to deal with the European powerhouse, as Germany was
dubbed by Dean Acheson in 1948.
While such terms as Mitteleuropa seemed to have died along with Hitler in 1945, a
Czech, Milan Kundera, in his 1983 essay on “The Tragedy of Central Europe,” gave new
currency to the term. The idea was carried further by an East German, Erick Honecker, and an
Austrian, Kurt Waldeheim, who spoke about the dangers of nuclear war in Mitteleuropa which
they considered their home (Heimat Mitteleuropa).
They all emphasized the consequences of adversities that contributed to the division of
Germany and Europe alike. To relieve its precarious status, the Federal Republic had to buy out
its “faults.” But the unification of Europe even before the opportunity came was seen as a
remedy for the fragile security situation in the middle of Europe.
In the East, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) welcomed economic assistance
from its Western brother, but only to the extent that it did not go beyond the unification goals.
Owing to the bipolar clash of two belligerent ideologies, the two parts of Germany were forced
to stay apart. Nevertheless, to relieve humanitarian pressure in some instances, a disguised
ransom allowed some families to be united and some East Germans to flee to the West. Such
humanitarian exchanges signified the actual German cohesion, but options for political
convergence were, nevertheless, residing in Moscow.
Owing to the political shifts in Kremlin, ideas about Central and Eastern Europe were
inevitably enhanced by Gorbachev’s policies. Political, economic, social, and revolutionary
change could start taking place. The change in Europe, however, depended on a few major
powers. Europe was still a product of two revisionists like Germany and the Soviet Union or
Russia that sought a change in the post-Cold War Europe. The other three powers were the
keepers of status quo like France, the United Kingdom, and the non-European power - the United
States.61
Inside Europe, the most important factor for change was Germany itself, but not because
it was a nuclear power like France and Britain. It was essential for geographic reasons because of
its location in the middle of Europe. Without a unified Germany, the unification of Europe in
whatever format was seen unacceptable by major powers. Only when all major powers were in
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accord, could there be a moral the moral rebirth of Germany: its soldiers as part of the EuroAtlantic army, and its economy as part of the EU economy.
If such was a road to whole and free Europe, what stood in front of unification? After all,
the task had been conceived at the outset of the Cold War by Dean Acheson, Konrad Adenauer,
Alcide de Gasperi, Jean Monnet, and Robert Schuman – the collapse of communism, the rise of
democracy in Eastern Europe, the mellowing of Soviet power and the retreat from an external
empire and the end of Europe’s division.62
A review of the years between 1919 and 1939 teaches that, notwithstanding its many
false starts and exaggerated dead ends, European thought had acquired a significant and largely
irreversible reality.63 Only a united Europe could proclaim an alternative, rather than an
incitement, to the distractions of ideology and the intemperance of nationalism.
First, the West Germans themselves had to overcome the comfortable affluence which
they West Germany had lived for five decades.64 There was an urge to overcome strongly shared
feelings among political parties and ordinary voters alike that East Germany was an ugly but
necessary keystone in post-Cold War Europe.
German unification bore a significant opportunity and danger for the European unifiers.
Integrating two economically antagonistic systems was a challenge that could influence Europe’s
integration. If Germany succeeded to overcome challenges from within, it would face external
pressure to integrate the rest of Europe from without.65 If Germans failed, the re-integration of
Europe would literally stall.
On September 8, 1987, a joint communique by Erich Honecker and Helmut Kohl
acknowledged that despite the fact their country was divided, their shared goal was to achieve
peace, respect the needs of their people, accept the Helsinki Accords as an important measure of
détente, and resolve any security problems with confidence building measures.66
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A little later, Honecker’s speech on October 7, 1989, showed that he was still a prisoner
of the rigid security structure in Europe. “The enemy,” he said, “is presently spreading lies about
the GDR to a hitherto unknown extent while emphasizing that the forty-year existence of the
republic also amounts to defeat of German imperialism and militarism.”67 Honecker appealed to
Cold War ideology, although the regime had softened and evolved past Stalinism into a more
Gorbachev-like era.68
Pointedly on the same occasion, Gorbachev mentioned the radical transformation inside
the Soviet Union where “democratization, openness, constitutional state, free development of all
ethnic groups and their equal participation in matters of the entire country, dignified living
conditions, and guarantees for creative potential” were becoming the guiding international
principles.69
Just a month after Honecker’s and Gorbachev’s speeches, Willy Brandt noted in West
Berlin, “Berliners and Germans belong together in a moving, exciting way, and it is most moving
when divided families unexpectedly and full break into tears when they finally came together
again.” On November 10, 1989, Brandt emphasized that much depended on the Germans
themselves – to prove capable of coping with the winds of change that were blowing over
Europe.
Seeing tremendous challenges emanating from his reform projects, Gorbachev reversed
his policy position. On January 30, 1990, he emphasized the two Germanies, the four major
powers, and the necessity to carefully consider the turbulence of the European process without
fundamentally questioning the German right for unification.70 Even if Gorbachev wanted to
contain change, there was little the Soviet Union, or any other power, could do at the time.
The keys to German unity were in Germany. The historic legacy was swiftly mitigated by
efficient leaders who made values prevail over history. German leaders had developed such a
tradition in the past. The head of the German Bundesbank, Wilhelm Vocke, was expunged by
Konrad Adenauer in 1957 when the Bundesbank became too independent. Adenauer called
Vocke the “overcooled ice box” when the bank formed a coalition with his most influential
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cabinet members and defied the Chancellor’s political orders.71 The bank had to be an extended
arm of the government, not the opposite, emphasized Adenauer.
Similarly, as financial decisions had to be made about German unification, Karl Otto
Pöhl was de facto ousted by Helmut Kohl when economic and financial arguments were placed
ahead of German unity. Pöhl’s opposition to an even exchange rate of the Deutschmark for the
Ostmark was seen as the Bundesbank’s opposition to German and European unity. Thus, Kohl
“somehow 'forgot' to tell Pohl of his decision to exchange virtually worthless and inconvertible
East marks into universally respected D-marks.”72 On the occasion, the novelist Günter Grass
noted that “everyone who does not pledge ‘Yes’ to unity is out; even the guardian of the West
German currency, Pöhl, who had expressed reservations at the outset, finally approved “unity on
credit”.”73
Sacrificing the D-mark was the only way to sell German unity in Europe, where France,
Britain, and Italy were welcoming the introduction of a new currency union at the expense of the
D-mark. Moreover, in so doing, Kohl’s government gave East Germans an incentive to remain at
home (Heimat) and Europe a possibility to build its own home with monetary union.74
In addition, economic assistance from the Federal Republic after unification provided
about DM600 billion ($324 billion USD)75 over the following four years, mostly to improve
infrastructure and cleanse environmental waste left behind by East Germany’s heedless,
inefficient, and energy- intensive communist manufacturing.76
A significant share of the Federal Republic’s financial assistance was also spent on
supporting household incomes to avoid westward migration. Financial assistance was possible
due to increased taxes in Western Germany. But increased spending in favor of unification
placed significant strains on its and by the end of 1994. Germany’s public sector’s debt
approached 60 percent of GDP, a harsh increase from 56 percent in 1989.
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The financial and economic assistance at the outset of unity was tremendous. There was
little dissent about what needed to be done. Unification opponents were dismissed in the same
manner as the heads of the German Bundesbank had been before. Nevertheless, the unification
task was far from complete. A more challenging task was to transcend the US-style income
levels and Mexican-style productivity; the fifty-year communist control had led to a shattered
consciousness and a spiritual separation as impediments to speedy economic recovery, recalled
Horst Teltschik, Kohl’s foreign affairs advisor until 1993.77
East German firms, having been part of the communist economy for five decades, were
unable to restructure themselves. Privatization of state property and change of business cultures
were the most significant challenges faced by the private firms.78 Nevertheless, assistance from
the West stimulated the consumption in the East. Several years after unification, Germany
witnessed steeper economic growth. Western assistance came as an impetus for recovery in the
East, but the Eastern consumption stimulated the Western economic performance.
Meanwhile, in Europe, before the communist collapse, the Soviet dilemmas revolved around
relinquishing the burdens of empire without destroying the prospects for economic cooperation
with the East. On the other hand, major European powers like France and Germany were still
ambiguous when the moment came to support a stable transition to capitalist democracy in
Eastern Europe. The alternative was for Germany to consolidate Eastern Europe under its
leadership.79 In the same way as Soviet and Western counterparts were exploring various
political alternatives to defeated Germany between 1945 and 1955, so were the East and West
Germans now.
At Potsdam in July, 1945, Churchill played with an idea about Adenauer’s Germany
under Russians. In response, at the outset of the Cold War, Adenauer did all he could to
consolidate the Western German state. Between Stalin’s death in 1953 and Germany’s NATO
membership in 1955, there was dissent inside Adenauer’s political camp; some politicians
embraced the idea of neutrality for a united Germany. Nevertheless, after the inclusion of West
Germany into NATO, Adenauer declared that freedom and independence were achieved and that
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Germans could contribute in the future to the goal of uniting Germany under principles already
achieved.80 Owing to political partition between Bonn-Berlin-Moscow, Germany became a
geographically divided centre of Europe.
The opportunity to revert and continue along the lines anticipated by Adenauer came
several decades later, but depended on the same capitals. Kohl’s first crucial step was to gain
Gorbachev’s assent to withdraw troops from the German lands, but that, of course, came at a
cost. Bonn had to promise massive aid programs, including all the costs for the reallocation of
Soviet troops. As a response, the Soviets accepted the German right to remain a NATO member
without any deployment of foreign troops on German soil.81 The exchange of money for political
concessions was reminiscent of the case with Austria when it “bought” its Cold War neutrality in
1955.
When the unification of Germany seemed to be complete, other factors promoted further
subnational cooperation. Influential regions, like Germany’s Länders, were playing a substantial
role here. For example, Baden-Württemberg had envisioned the eventual formulation of a
genuine united states of Europe arranged into dozens of confederated, autonomous regions,
completed with a European constitution and regional and communal councils.82 Such a paradigm
not only undermined the exclusive monopoly of nation states to make decisions individually, but
became a driving force in promoting European integration.
The case of Baden-Württemberg did not stand alone. Regions along Germany’s Eastern
border like Bayern, Sachsen, Bradenburg, Macklenburg-Vorpommen, and Schleswig-Holstein
also maintained interests. They shared a border with the former Warsaw Pact countries, and had
a genuine interest in gaining access to Eastern markets as well as in cheaper energy resources
through enhanced competition, transportation networks, improved environmental standards on
their borders, access to education, especially through language exchanges and more
supranational cooperation in innovation and energy. But, most importantly, they had an interest
in stable Eastern borders.
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The divisions in German, French, and British foreign policies seemed to pull Europe
apart, German Länders were inviting closer cooperation with the former Warsaw Pact countries;
there were two options for Europe. One was the consolidation of Eastern Europe under German
leadership. The other was the unification of Germany and Eastern Europe and Europe, as argued
George H.W. Bush in 1989.
While there was dissent, ambiguity, and ambivalence that pulled major powers apart, the
European Economic Community offered to unite Europe by locking Germany with the other
member states into political union. The treaty which Margaret Thatcher called “a treaty too far”
was an initiative of the European Commission, led by Jacques Delors.83
The Maastricht treaty transformed the economic union into a political one where
monetary agreement pointed to the total abandonment of the D-mark and the creation of new
institutions that would control the defense and foreign affairs of the union. In addition, deeper
integration prospects were spelled out to consolidate the political unity. The solution was
endorsed by the United States, as had been the case during the Marshall Plan reconstruction.
Despite the fact that the treaty and the initiative introduced new political commitments at a time
of economic, political, and social uncertainty in Europe, it provided major European powers with
the means to accommodate Germany into unified Europe.
France was pleased to see Germany locked into the EU’s institutional cage, which
probably only the French understood. EU unity was insured by the United States-led NATO,
where Germany was firmly incorporated. As a result, the enhancement of the transatlantic link
pleased Britain, too.
Moreover, the unification and the immediate post-Cold War years set important European
trends. Immediately, however, no further enlargement could take place. Germany and the
European major powers had spent too many financial, economic, and political resources - it was
now time to digest and prepare for the next steps. In Latvia, there was hope that the trend
continues and eventually reaches the Baltic States. There was a hope that those same Western
values now in West Germany would eventually reach Riga, too.
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The Debate about the Minor – Small States and Latvia
International relations have been a state-centered discipline. Since the peace of
Westphalia in 1648 and the emergence of nation states as the primary actors in international
affairs, the focus of analysis has been on a comparison of diverse states – large and small, or
weak and powerful. Most experts have been interested in major and powerful actors. Thus, the
debate about small states emerged as a residual category with the tendency to surge as the
number of small states grew.
Before World War I, the debate was solely about major powers, and, for many of them,
their empires. Such world order was apparent between the unification of Germany until the run
up to World War I when major powers had incorporated inside their polities most small states.84
Some authors mention that in the run up to the war, there were six major powers (Germany,
Great Britain, France, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Italy). The rest could be viewed as “small”
powers with Denmark, Turkey, and Sweden the most notable exceptions as middle powers.85
Therefore, a small state was defined by what it was not, assuming it even existed, or as an
impediment to large and middle powers.86
A few new states emerged during the interwar period. That includes Latvia. Many
authors have questioned the viability of small states when the world order was based on
Wilsonian principles embodied in the League of Nations and embedded in the universal
preservation of small states.87 The interwar order offered novel foreign policy possibilities for
small states.88 Nevertheless, small and micro states had to rely on their own capabilities to
withstand external pressure.
Such world order defined perspectives and constraints for national policies based on
neutrality, or active or defensive strategies. The emergence of interwar Europe and the onset of
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World War II illuminated the fact that small states alone cannot withstand overwhelming
international pressures. When non-aligned, most small states were at the mercy of major powers.
World War II confirmed the weakness and fecklessness of small states in the face of major
powers.
Around 1945, the post-war world was based on different principles. The order was
determined mainly by two superior powers and the balance of power principles.89 The post-war
period divided the world into two ideologically different poles.90 The structure was rigid,
especially at first. Nevertheless, some powers managed eventually to rise as middle powers.
For example, in the 1960s France rose as a European nuclear power or a power that could
keep a finger on the nuclear trigger of major powers.91 The Fifth Republic shaped French-British
and French-German relations with consequences on the rise of a united Europe as a salient
power. During the Cold War, small and weak states were grouped around two major polities or
their fate depended on the policies of major powers.
At the pinnacle of the Cold War, a great power was able to assert its will against a small state,
while a small state was not able to do the same against a great power.92 In the same way as major
powers as ascending and descending powers, the distribution and emergence of small states have
been a historic process. Major powers called all the shots internationally. Middle powers were
invited to participate and contribute to the bargaining process of major powers, but small states
were not involved in great power games.
However, one profound trend happened after World War II and during the Cold War.
There was a significant increase in the number of small states. The UN membership enhanced
the legitimacy of even the smallest international members. Owing to de-colonization trends and
the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there were more than 40 additional states at the UN in the
1950s and 50 in 1960s while almost 30 additional states joined the UN from 1990 to 1995,
Latvia was one of them (See Figure 1).
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With the bipolar order ended, there were new discussions about small and large states and
their powers. The definition of size and power had been a point for endless debates. From the
normative point of view, all states are equal before the law. From the political perspective, they
are far from equal. In fact, all states are unique. Thus, sovereign equality between states has
hardly existed before. Moreover, small and weak states have been viewed as an unimportant
category in international relations or one that is an impediment to, or unnecessary reason for,
struggles among great powers.
Many authors have argued that the right to self-determination promoted by the UN
Charter was precisely the reason for the surge of numerous small states, as well as cause for
significant governance problems for major and middle powers.93 However, no group or no small
power alone hindered the designs of major UN powers. Discussions were, instead, about aspects
related to the extent to which small states depended on major powers.94
It was broadly conceived that small states could escape the pressure of major powers by
entering into alliances with major powers or convincing them that the neutrality of a small state
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could be beneficial.95 The roles of small states depended on changes in international trade,
transport, security, foreign policy or culture and ideology, for example. By utilizing intensified
communication channels, small states could convince larger countries that the use of force
against them could favor their adversaries or while their neutrality could be beneficial.
Scandinavian countries in general, and Switzerland in particular, have often been
described as the neutrals in Europe. Remaining neutral was admired by those that were forced to
take sides or, more frequently, simply comply. The ability to remain a neutral state was explored
by Hans Mouritzen who analyzed the ability of small Nordic countries to stay neutral. The
process was called the Finlandization - the politics of a weak country whose regime feels
compelled to make some concessions to a powerful neighbour in order to preserve more
important elements of its independence.96
The same author has proposed a theoretical approach to adapting a neutral course when
external conditions for small states change. At a time when tensions between the stronger powers
increase, the risk of pre-emptive, more assertive action against small states increases, depending
on a value ascribed to each state. In order to forestall the danger of pre-emption, the state must
signal its non-committed course between the two poles (strategy of non-commitment or
neutrality) that will be more effective if supported by a credible level of strength and military
preparedness.97
Such possibilities for small states were challenged at the outset of World War II. Hitler’s
expansion plans in Europe explicitly included Switzerland, to be swallowed by the German
Reich.98 A small state, Switzerland was facing overwhelming force, no less than larger France or
Poland. Furthermore, Scandinavian countries found themselves in the same predicament as
Switzerland as they were sandwiched between the German Reich and the Soviet Union.
The theory might suggest that early concessions could avert aggression. Just before the
German invasion, Danish Foreign Minister, and later Prime Minister in the Danish wartime
government Erik Scavenius proposed “to anticipate the minimum Germans would accept and
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offer this voluntarily, so as to create goodwill, than to eventually have further, possibly greater,
concessions squeezed through a nose.”99
Yet, Denmark’s policy of pre-emptive appeasement only encouraged the German
invasion. When Denmark could no longer accept surging demands from Nazi Germany, it
reversed most of the concessions, and Denmark was soon overrun as a result of being in the path
of the Reich without a sufficient military deterrent.
Soon thereafter, Hitler turned against Norway which, facing overwhelming military
force, was forced to cave in. Since Norway discovered oil resources only after World War II, its
economic significance was not sufficient for potential allies to support it militarily, or for Hitler
to regard it as an economic asset. It was neither sufficiently militarily strong nor strategically
important to avoid its annihilation by the major power.
In the case of the Soviet invasion in Finland, the narrative is different. When Hitler and
Stalin were crafting the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, Finland was not part of the Soviet plan.
In the same way as Lithuania was given to Stalin unexpectedly late, Finland was added to the
Soviet playground belatedly.
As a result, Moscow had poor intelligence and weak military plans and preparedness to
occupy Finland during the Winter War.100 In addition, Finland’s topography and willingness to
fight played a crucial role. Severely cold conditions were as familiar to the Russians as they were
to the Finns, but the severe Soviet military losses salvaged Finland’s neutrality during the Cold
War years.
Finland’s neighbour, Sweden, was located between Norway and Denmark, with the
Soviet Union close to the north. As a result, Sweden had developed four scenarios. Three were
directed against a potential Soviet invasion, and one, possible rather than probable, was aimed at
the German Reich.
When one of the first three scenarios materialized and the Soviet Union indeed attacked
Finland during the Winter War of 1939, Sweden politically downplayed its military involvement
by describing itself as a non-combatant, rather than as neutral.101 Furthermore, since Finland
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reached peace accords with Russia, and subsequent neutrality by 1944, Sweden could further
discard the first three strategies and opt for defense against Germany.
Learning from Norwegian-German and Danish-German lessons, Sweden quickly
mobilized its domestic production resources with firms like Husqvarna, Ericsson, and Volvo.
Apart from quick and sound improvements in naval capabilities, Sweden rapidly developed its
own domestic aircraft design and production company, SAAB (Svenska Aeroplan
Aktienbolaget).
It made Swedish defense strategy more efficient and the country could stay militarily
non-committed since it did not procure military equipment from abroad.102 Apart from building
its own military-industrial complex, in early 1942 Sweden launched large-scale mobilization by
recruiting 300,000 men; there is evidence that this move might have deterred Germany from
“liquidating” Sweden.103
What allowed Sweden to incrementally adapt to changing external conditions were not
just its geographic location and the wartime experience of its neighbors. Wartime Germany
relied on Sweden for about 40 percent of its supplies of iron ore – one of the most contentious
issues in the war. As a result, Sweden’s foreign relations could be succinctly explained as
maneuvering on the margins since there was a strong opposition from the United Kingdom and
the United States regarding the Swedish trade.
Sweden’s trading policies were closely tied to its foreign policies. It was the “doublenegotiation” – a delicate balancing, sometimes blackmail and brinkmanship, aimed at taking care
of both wartime parties without upsetting any of them.104
Sweden proved itself to be compliant as it efficiently switched its support to the winning
party notwithstanding the moral ambiguities. During the German invasion of Denmark and
Norway, it faced a number of hard decisions as to when to give in, and by how much, to German
demands and expectations. Only after a series of German defeats in 1942 and 1943 did Sweden
withdraw most of previous concessions.105 By then the Swedes were already making more
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concessions to the likely victors. For example, as a sign of reciprocal courtesy, in 1946 Sweden
did not hesitate to extradite Baltic and German refugees to the Soviet Union.106
Around the Swiss borders before the start of World War II, conditions were changing
more rapidly. Thus, mobilization efforts in Switzerland were effective and swift. Civilian
institutions General Guisan was elected army chief on August 30, 1939, to maintain the security,
independence, and neutrality of Switzerland, for defending the economic interests of the country,
and for insuring its economic survival.107
That openly signified that the days as usual were over. Switzerland quickly mobilized
around a 435,000-man fighting force out of a population of 4.2 million. It was a significant
accomplishment even if the Swiss army was not highly mechanized. The military strategy was
based on sound anti-tank infantry and mass resistance organized around natural obstacles inside
the country.
The result was that the Swiss neutrality and national interests depended on how “the new
might of Germany would express itself.”108 If Germany could show itself as magnanimous,
understanding and willing to respect Swiss interests, there was no reason to change the policy
course. Thus, Swiss authorities maintained friendly relations and permitted Germany to run
substantial trade deficits even when the war was obviously shifting in favor of the allied powers.
Even before World War II, Swiss compliance toward German wishes was evident.
Switzerland conceded to such financial pro-German concessions as the extradition of the
Czech gold reserves to the German Reichsbank by the Governor of the Bank of England.109 By
not withdrawing from financial cooperation, Switzerland was no less a participant of the
appeasement than Paris or London. As a result, Switzerland became too important to be
swallowed by the Blitzkreig, the extremely swift and highly synchronized German attacks by air
and land elsewhere in Europe.
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Switzerland could also prove itself beneficial for the German Reich more broadly. A
focal point for political and financial transactions, it was important for the Reich’s military,
political, and economic edifice. There is evidence that corporate headquarters even in the United
States and the branch plants in Germany stayed in contact with each other, either indirectly via
subsidiaries in neutral Switzerland, or directly by means of modern worldwide systems of
communications.110
Furthermore, between 1940 and 1944, the Swiss military industrial complex provided
arms and ammunition valued at 633 million Francs to the Axis countries such as Germany, Italy,
Romania and Japan, and similar goods (later) to the Allied countries including France, the United
Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Norway for a value of 57.5 million Francs.111
Switzerland exported arms to such neutral countries as Sweden and Finland, too, but the value of
the Reich’s military imports highlights the intensity of the cooperation.
The cases of Sweden and Switzerland prove that neutrality for a small state depends on
several crucial conditions. One, however, is especially salient. Even if a small state can prove
itself to be an asset, without a strong military there can be no neutrality. That is why, even in
1990, when the Cold War was over, the question about the abolition of the Swiss army was
turned down by a vote of 2:1 with the highest turnout since the introduction of the women’s right
to vote in 1971, where the voter turnout was 69 percent.112 One of the three largest Swiss banks
before the national referendum organized an exhibition in honor of General Guisan, the general
in charge of the heady days of 1939.113 The Swiss population did not take its neutrality for
granted since it upheld the prospect for strong military service.
The Swiss neutrality is an evolving historic phenomenon that has reached a “myth of
almost religious sanctity behind which citizens could live in a political introversion” and
“reversed foreign policy patterns.”114 Similarly, Sweden’s military-industrial complex is a part of
the strong national economy and international defense affairs to this day. Despite both countries
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maintaining a degree of neutrality, they still had their own distinct policies that indicated at
strong contingency prospects in case external forces had neglected their wishes.
On occasion, some small states that were endowed with the necessary attributes could
stay neutral, most small states were forced or compelled to take sides. Therefore, the debate
about the role of small states during the Cold War was insignificant or limited to few outliers.
More attention was devoted to numbers and properties that could be transcended into immediate
power. Some debates, nevertheless, were aimed at questions of quality of power.
Such states as Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland and Iceland could keep their pride not
because they were large and capable major powers but because they could be the most just,
organized or moral.115 Thus, multiple small states were depicted as essential actors in specific
issue areas like the financial sector (Switzerland and Luxembourg), the oil sector (OPEC
countries), or moral and normative issues (Scandinavian countries). Smallness and greatness,
therefore, were not criteria to be applied to size or systemic level only, but to distinct areas where
even small states could challenge the clout of major powers.116
Despite the fact that small states might look like a doomed category in international
affairs, always exposed to the goodwill or pressure of major powers, Peter Katzenstein’s pivotal
work on Small States in World Markets showed that small states, owing to the efficiently
acquirable democratic consensus, could not only survive but even thrive.
They could turn some of their domestic properties into niche power capabilities to better
serve their domestic interests. The work was significant because it was not about systemic
vulnerabilities and sensitivities resulting from large states decisions. The narrative was about
small Western European countries - the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, Switzerland and Austria
– that managed to offset negative external conditions by adapting domestic institutions and
interest groups to respond to changes in international markets. While there are responses small
states can craft to offset negative market conditions, the work implicitly implies that there is little
small states can do in the face of military threats.
Until the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, there had been no other
significant research that would challenge Professor Katzenstein’s general conclusions. The first
literature that questioned the new roles of small states was devoted to Scandinavia, which had
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been previously neutral against the Soviet Union. If still neutral, then against whom? That policy
dilemma absorbed Sweden or Finland, for example. Since the end of the Cold War, the
enhancement of small state domestic interests were broadly sought within international
organizations. Liberal cooperation was widespread and the military realm had gone out of
fashion for a while.
It was argued that the decisions taken by small countries depended on domestic structural
interests.117 Moreover, there has been some research devoted to explaining how easy it was for
small and large countries to satisfy their combined interests even when their societies were
heterogeneous.118 The work argues that man-made political boundaries of states should dovetail
with the economic interests and market possibilities of a group.
Thus, the emergence of new small states or the federalization of larger ones could be a
result of market forces. Such arguments were rooted in a quantitative analysis by computing the
optimal size of a state in theory, and explaining the phenomenon of a country size in reality.
Here, again, the debate fails to explain the impact of military power while more focus is on
markets.
International trade, political affairs, social affairs, and diplomatic interaction were all
becoming more dynamic. As a result, the need for a strategy for small states gained prominence.
119

One side argued that, by having a strategy, small states could better guide their domestic

societies. The other side held that a strategy from the past might be outdated for challenges of the
present. Consequences of modernity were that it became harder to discern security from danger
and risk from trust in a highly dynamic environment.120 Therefore, there was a risk that domestic
societies might be misguided by charting a rigid national path in terms of strategy or foreign
policy of a small state.
Despite the fact that the future of small states does not look promising in a more complex
and modern environment, institutional frameworks, markets or alliances designed to best pursue
international opportunities were viable options.121 Small states could be more mobile and
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versatile. Therefore, they may be better able to adapt to current challenges than larger countries.
Small states could act like dynamic speedboats while large states will always resemble huge,
clumsy, resource-endowed tankers. In theory, it should be easier for small states to adapt to
changing international environment if in practice domestic structures can be resiliently adapted.
The literature suggests that even the Baltic States have applied different methods to reorient their
domestic structures and pursue interests.122
However, from the perspective of security, little has changed. On the outskirts of Europe,
neutrality at the outset of the first independence proved to be delusional for Latvia. The
experience of the Scandinavian and Swiss “neutrality ghetto” only underlines such a stance.
Thus, past experience has a significant effect on the domestic debates about the future of Latvia.
During the first independence period between 1919 and 1939, Latvia chose neutrality.
When the independence was restored in 1990s, neutrality and absolute sovereignty were
perceived as something negative, even menacing, in Latvia.123 It was not a question of whether
Latvia needed a strong partner but, rather, who would be that partner. A few options were
broadly debated.
When the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended, many small states ran the risk
of becoming hostages of their own history. The changed conditions affecting foreign policy in
small states in Europe enabled and necessitated the creation of grand strategies.124 In the same
way as the Cold War “neutrals” were forced to choose allies when external conditions changed,
the post-Cold War era compelled small states to craft their own strategies for new military
alliances.
In the unipolar world, small states’ security policies had to be cooperative either in the
form of joining a security institution or in an ad hoc coalition.125 For Baltic States the
overarching question was how to avoid becoming occupied again. Since the research is aimed at
assessing Latvia’s path to the Euro-Atlantic community, it is necessary to understand how the
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path to two institutions, the EU and NATO, were perceived. Instead of just aligning with the
unipolar power, the United States, the Euro-Atlantic community offered something more.
The EU offered more than just an entry into the common market. In terms of the EU
integration, the benefits or outcomes must be assessed with consideration to limited human and
institutional resources. Every state, but especially small states, will craft different strategies
toward the EU.126 Small states will each be differently endowed and motivated in terms of their
European integration. Even though there are some elements within the EU that provide certain
protections to counter the negative aspects of their small size, the EU treaties and the range of
policy areas can work against the smaller members. Every member state must share its
sovereignty with other member states. With the EU enlarging, the scope of influence and the
range of opportunities for small states expand even if every single member must consider the
obligation of sharing some national autonomy.127
For Latvia, being incorporated into the communist empire for five decades meant having
a different experience and interests than the Nordics toward the EU.128 These five decades had
“provided alliances, hierarchy, leadership and identity” when the presence of a strategy was
indifferent, if not even damaging, to a small state like Latvia.129 Even if Latvia was free to make
independent choices, it still had to consider boundaries imposed by major powers. Moreover,
Latvia did not have any international experience, but the EU could provide the institutional base.
The EU could eliminate some of the domestic weaknesses inflicted by the Soviet occupation.
The development of strategy had to be appropriated by other aspects, not just
mobilization of domestic resources.130 Since Latvia was looking for defense guarantees against
Russia, the absence of a tangible security strategy or a firm stance by the EU was broadly
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considered.131As a non-military alliance, the EU could never offset Latvia’s security concerns in
the context of Russia’s influence over Latvia.
This prospect gains a special currency when seen as a potential neo-imperial or neocommunist power in the East. Russia still had guardianship ideas about the territory of the former
Soviet Union.132 The EU could remedy Latvia’s domestic vulnerabilities and sensitivities related
to markets, but not those regarding military security.
Vulnerability and sensitivity surrounding potential threats on the eastern border of Latvia
were perceived no less ominously than in Germany before the unification. Owing to the collapse
of the communist empire, Germans could push the western border eastwards through unification,
then enlargement. In the meantime, there was little Latvia could do in terms of changing its
geopolitical situation, even after the Cold War was over. Russia was there to stay. The question
was who would form future partnerships with Latvia.
The anxiety in Latvia stemmed from the sense of inescapability from the Russian
domination. Thus, NATO was seen as a remedy for Latvia’s security anxieties as they related to
Russia. The EU was seen as a way to end Latvia’s anxieties in all areas with the exception of
military security. While the priority was NATO, both organizations were seen as vital security
guarantees for the Baltic States.133 Precisely because NATO was anti-Russian, it was seen as a
remedy for security, economic and social threats. The EU, on the other hand, was seen as a
vehicle to end communist deprivation and a means for future socio-economic enrichment.
Even if Latvia, and the other two Baltic States, saw the integration as an utterly profound
security matter, there were no illusions that, in the immediate future, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania could become part of the Euro-Atlantic community. At the outset of independence and
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just after the German unification, the West argued that the strongest must join first. Otherwise,
the enlargement would not take place at all.
The Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary became the first to be considered for NATO
membership.134 It still depended on adherence to democratic principles. The Czech Republic was
ahead in terms of democratic reforms, Poland was on its footsteps and Hungary was making
sound progress. In the meantime, Slovakia disqualified itself for its lack of reforms. Since Prime
Minister Vladimir Meciar’s return to power in 1994, the pace of economic and political reforms
had actually slowed.135
From the perspective of the West, the first NATO enlargement process was seen as an
opportunity to relieve military, political and economic pressure in the reciprocal Russia-West
relationship. For example, a secure Poland, integrated into the West, was seen as more likely to
be less anti-Russian and more interested in cooperation and bridge-building than an insecure
Poland caught in the age-old geopolitical no man’s land between Berlin and Moscow.136 Even
Russians could concur with the enlargement idea in Central Europe.
Conversely, the enlargement to include the Baltic States was seen as a menace for
strategic reasons by Russia. Furthermore, many in the West did not see any strategic value in the
Baltic States. These obstacles included Russian sensitivities (incorporating former Soviet
republics would touch a very sensitive political nerve in Moscow), minority issues and border
disputes (a large Russian-speaking minority and unresolved border issues between Russia and
the Baltic States), defensibility or indefensibility of the Baltic States and Kaliningrad’s Russian
military presence.137 Before and after the first NATO and EU enlargements, the Baltic States had
to place heavy emphasis on the idea that they could be partners, not problems on the outskirts of
Europe.138
From the perspective of the Baltic States, the first NATO enlargement, which excluded
them, was seen as an invitation for Russia to forge its foothold in the Baltic littoral. Secondly,
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Central Europe, after the first enlargement, was seen as the Baltic voice inside NATO.139 The
first enlargement caused ambiguity in the Baltic States.
In these times of uncertainty, there was a need to survive the period until the next NATO
enlargement. It was argued inside Latvia that it might have 10 to 15 years from the signing of
PfP to foment its security within NATO before it was in serious jeopardy.140 The strong sense of
domestic insecurity drove the Baltic States to sign PfP with NATO even before the integration
forerunner, the Czech Republic, did so in March of 1994.141
Given the salient role of NATO for the Baltic States, all memberships in Westernoriented organizations were seen as steps closer to NATO, then the EU.

The remaining

organizations, like the UN, the Western European Union (WEU), Council of Europe, and the
Organization for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), became instrumental for the Baltic
Euro-Atlantic integration efforts.
The UN provided an important cooperation framework for Latvia for two major reasons.
First, like all post-Soviet or newly independent states, for Latvia UN membership was
instrumental to its international recognition. The second argument regarding Latvia’s domestic
transformation could be legitimized by its adherence to international norms, especially in areas
where Latvia’s political issues were of a regionally sensitive nature. 142
The WEU had descended into quiescence, giving way to NATO. It was no longer the
European arm of NATO, neither was it the defense arm of the EU. Therefore, from the
perspective of the common defense community, the adherence to NATO principles for the Baltic
States was the priority. The United States-led NATO was an indispensable power capable of
reinventing the strategy of containment and deterrence against Russia, while major European
powers were seen as sometimes too divided on the matter. Moreover, the WEU had focused
more on the European defense dialogue, rather than any practical defense structure.
Thus, Latvia was willing to quickly adapt to NATO. Here, the first criteria that defined de
facto adaptability to membership was acknowledged by all NATO member states – the two
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percent spending rule and politically stable state. 143 The Baltic States promised early to increase
their defense spending. Latvia, in particular, promised to raise its defense budget to two percent
by 2003.144 The European security and defense identity had to mean something in terms of not
just what Europeans said, but also what they did.145
The EU and NATO were priorities for the Baltic States. The rest of the organizations
were effectively upholding interests that the institutional backbone of the Euro-Atlantic
community could not, or did not yet, do. In the aftermath of the Cold War, the OSCE played a
stabilizing role since some European states had favored a return to extreme or nationalistic
policies.146
In relations with Latvia, the OSCE refuted Kremlin’s allegations about human rights
violations. The former President of Latvia recalls Max van der Stoel, the former High
Commissioner on National Minorities, as being a constructive partner on issues related to
language, human and minority rights.147
Even though van der Stoel was vilified and lamented in the Latvian press, he turned out
to be an efficient facilitator of disputes between Latvia, Russia and the international community.
Through intensified dialogue offered by OSCE, Latvian could justify Russia’s allegations about
Latvia’s ostensible extremist policies as false.
For similar reasons, Latvia joined the Council of Europe in 1995. It was one of the first
Western organizations joined by Latvia. In terms of membership and working principles, it
entailed multiple members and was more flawed than the EU or NATO. The organization
involved Latvia in European-wide dialogue where the adherence to international organizations,
rules and human rights principles were broadly debated.148
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Apart from international organizations, which could expand whenever members reached
a consensus, different regions in Europe were playing a major role in Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic
integration process. After the enlargement in 1999, Central Europe was politically lobbying the
Baltic entry into NATO. Owing to the surge of cooperation and trade, Northern Europe was a
strong lobby for Latvia’s admission in the EU. As non-members, Sweden and Finland could do
little in terms of the Baltic-NATO integration despite their interests in seeing the Baltic States
more secure and stable.
For Russia, closer cooperation with the Baltic States meant a step toward the Nordic
States and a step closer to the core of Europe. Similar to German Länder, some Russia’s regions
were vociferous advocates for closer links with Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania or Poland.149
Nevertheless, the cooperation prospects were contested by Russia. Centralization of power in
Kremlin meant less power to regions. The Kremlin incrementally prevailed over the regions. The
Baltic States became an initial litmus test for Russia’s ability to become a European or Asian
power in Europe.150
For the Baltic States, the immediate challenge was how to better involve in the Baltic Sea
Region’s affairs. From the economic and security perspective, Scandinavian countries, as well as
German and Polish regions, were closely integrated with broader European structures. They
could become strong lobbies for securing the Baltic States into the EU and NATO.
Nordic countries, as non-members of NATO, were stronger advocates for the Baltic
integration in the EU, but less so in terms of NATO. Denmark, a member of both, was
instrumental in keeping the Baltic dual-integration package on the table and avoiding the
political separation of the Baltic States. Finland and Sweden had supported Estonia becoming an
EU member first, but Poland supported Lithuania becoming a NATO member. Latvia was in the
middle and its situation was less clear.151
The unifying factor became the shared Baltic discord with Russia on many issues, since
there was a general disagreement on what good neighboring relations mean. While Russia saw
the Baltic States becoming NATO members as a menace, Latvia and the others saw Russia’s
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unfair meddling into the integration process as a poignant neo-imperialistic resurrection. If
Latvia saw good trade relations as a remedy for interstate conflicts, Russia viewed its economic
leverage as a right to intervene in order protect the rights of Russian-speakers. If Latvia saw
keeping Latvian transit assets in the possession of Latvia or Western companies, the opposite
was true for Russia.152
These, and other examples, have haunted Latvian-Russian relations for years. Language and
ethnicity issues have been a salient point of discord for all sides. Language status, educational
systems, citizenship rights, naturalization and integration processes, political processes and
media have all served as leverage for political pressures and destabilization of Latvian domestic
politics since its independence. 153
The Baltic States were anxious about whether Russia would employ outdated and out-offashion means of military influence while the immediate adaptability to NATO standards was
out of the question. The slow pace of reforms of the national armed forces called into question
Latvia’s compatibility with transatlantic structures. If Latvia wanted to position itself as a
partner, it had to be ready to fully participate in NATO’s international missions. It had to be a de
facto contributor and a partner, not a de jure member and a burden.154
Considering the precarious security situation in the Baltic States, where Latvia probably
was the weakest link for multiple reasons, international experts emphasized the importance of
pragmatic dialogue and the absence of elevated and hysteric rhetoric with Russia. Latvia had to
fix its domestic problems without making Russia an adversary. To avoid confrontation with
Russia, it was argued, it was better for Latvia to be absent from some international talks.
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While both sides had their own rationales, international experts always alleviated Latvian
concerns and refuted most of Russia’s allegations.155 This international advice has served as the
justification for unpopular domestic reforms by goading Latvian elites to undertake them. The
case with Slovakia had shown that without reforms there could be no membership in NATO or
the EU. Therefore, Latvia had to expunge such communist legacy as corruption in the legal
system, the public sector and administration.156
The literature on Latvia’s transition outlines such challenges as the establishment of a
stable political system, the need for a currency reform, curbing of inflation, transition to liberal
markets, privatization and economic restructuring, the establishment of a government revenue
and taxation system, promotion of independent financial institutions and agricultural reforms.157
Those challenges are the legacy of the five decade Soviet occupation.
What the Soviet Union had managed rather quickly, had to be undone even faster. The
case with German unification vividly showed that the task was not easy, especially in terms of
changing social practices. Moreover, Latvia also faced time pressure. If reforms were delayed,
Russia might have asserted its influence over Latvia. What distinguished Latvia from East
Germany was the absence of the affluent Western part. Thus, the transformation in Latvia
required a stronger social coherence and zealous willingness to change.
Conclusion
The existing literature on small states is scarce and focuses on only a few aspects related
to small states in international relations. Very few works describe how international affairs (as a
process) shape domestic structures, apart from research related to international markets and
trade. Furthermore, there is no literature on how ethnic and social relations could be shaped
through international interaction and by international organizations. In this area, Latvia and
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Estonia could offer some novel solutions. In terms of economic restructuring, Estonia, in
particular, serves as a pertinent example in post-Soviet studies.
The literature about the Euro-Atlantic community is broad and succinctly outlines the
major trends in post-Cold War Europe. A salient part of the debate is devoted to Europe with the
Soviet Union gone and the bipolar struggle recast, at least initially. Russia pivoted back to the
old geopolitical struggle when it unwillingly accepted Central European NATO membership and
staunchly opposed Baltic membership.
Many authors have argued that with the bipolar system gone, the Euro-Atlantic
community could be disbanded, too. But then it would have meant the return to the period
between 1919 and 1939 when peace was reached, but not sustained. Upholding the Euro-Atlantic
structures was a way for the revisionist powers to maintain peace, and for keepers of the status to
prolong cooperation dividends. The Euro-Atlantic institutions proved instrumental in keeping
major powers involved, while the major powers were sustaining those institutions.
Cooperation between the EU and the United States reached a point where the
abandonment of the relationship would have brought more bad than good for everyone, including
Russia. American foreign policy has decisively extended NATO’s lifetime. Of course, without
adaptation and transformation, it would be impossible to meet novel challenges.
If Bosnian conflict had not gained traction between 1991 and 1995, NATO’s future role
might have been in question. It is possible to draw parallels with the Korean War in 1950 when
NATO, from the transatlantic treaty, grew into a military organization with shared
responsibilities among allies. The post-Cold War process could have been viewed in parallel
with those events in 1950s.
The completion of conflict in Bosnia with the Dayton Accords in 1995 marked one more
important turn in transatlantic designs. It was the moment when cleavages between Russia and
NATO (and the United States) started to grow. When the first NATO enlargement took place in
1999, the alliance was dropping bombs on Kosovo, the Baltic States were implicitly endorsed for
NATO membership during the Washington NATO Summit, but Russia launched the second war
in Chechnya. It was a low point between Russia and the United States.
There was a significant discord between Russia and NATO on views about security
designs in Europe. Latvia, to the irritation of Russia, was a staunch supporter of NATO’s mission
in Kosovo. Together with NATO members, it also participated in the peace-keeping and peace-
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making missions. After Kosovo, NATO leaders affirmed that the alliance would not prevent
Latvia from being a potential future contributor and member.
While the NATO-Bosnia mission showed that there are prospects for cooperation with
Russia, the NATO-Kosovo affair in 1999 showed that NATO and Russia could be just one step
away from a military conflict. If there was a debate among experts on what the world order
would look like, Russia’s rhetoric, actions, and policies strongly signaled that realism and
geopolitics were far from gone.
The views of newly independent states, like Belarus, the Baltic States or Poland
illuminated the caveats for the emergence of world order where all states, small or large, would
be respected on the same terms. As the Baltic States did not want the historic predicament to
reoccur, their choices and their voices were quite straight-forward. And forward west it was.
Considering what has been written about small states, the Euro-Atlantic community, and
Latvia’s anxiety to join the West, it is possible to conclude that there is no, or only implicit,
literature on how the Euro-Atlantic integration allows remedying inherit sensitivities and
vulnerabilities through the institutional adaptation of a small state. A particularly important
aspect would be how the “Russian factor” affected transformation in multiple areas.
For example, in the case with ethnic minorities, Latvia’s position was always to attain
membership first. Citizenship, human and language rights to Russian-speakers would be debated
thereafter. On the other side, the ability for Latvia to solve those domestic challenges was an
instrumental issue affecting the Euro-Atlantic integration. It would be valuable to review
whether there was any significant change in terms of ethno-political transformation before and
after the enlargement took place in 2004.
Furthermore, Latvia’s political system is unique. Left or right wing political parties in
Latvia mean Russian or Latvian. The left is socialist, and therefore conceived as communist. The
right is liberal, and therefore seen as freedom. In the meantime, there is little liberalism in the
Latvian rightist movement and limited social welfare-state traits in the Latvian leftist camp.
The political system is rather divided along ethnic lines in the same way the communist
party in Latvia when ballots for or against Latvia’s independence were cast in the 1990s.
Considering the necessity to assume the post-modernist, non-nationalist identity, it would be
valuable to review whether there has been a transformation of the political system.
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Second, the Russian-speaking challenge has haunted Latvia since the collapse of the
Soviet Union. While some Kremlin politicians have overtly noted that Russians abroad are just a
means for Moscow to gain leverage over other countries, they can actually be seen as a
genuinely friendly, patriotic and participatory group in Latvia. As a result, the society in Latvia
would be based on democratic consensus that is essential for small states to overcome external
challenges.
The Russian economic leverage in its nearest proximity is also important. There is some
research on the prospects and limits for economic cooperation between Russia and Latvia.
Nevertheless, as Russia has always played the economic card for certain political ends, there are
very few who have questioned the role of Russian political-economic businesses in Latvia.
For example, Russian energy interests in Latvia as a transit region are salient. With
economic interests also come political interest groups. It would be worth examining how Russian
political-economic interests have influenced Latvian energy-market liberalization in terms of EU
integration or if the Latvian political system has overcome the marriage of politics and economy.
All the questions above would allow us to look at how the Euro-Atlantic institutions
alleviate or remedy some of the inherit vulnerabilities and sensitivities of small states. The fact
that there are two distinctly different groups in Latvia does not speak to democratic consensus as
proposed by Professor Katzenstein. If the social consensus in Latvia could be acquired or upheld
through Euro-Atlantic integration, then the existing work on democratic consensus would gain a
valuable addition.
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CHAPTER III
A SMALL STATE, LATVIA

Introduction
Latvia has experienced two relatively short independence periods. First, it rose as an
independent state in the aftermath of World War I and the 1917 Russian revolution. This moment
of independence was short lived, however. As a prelude to World War II, the MolotovRibbentrop Pact outlined a security block “running from the Pacific clear to Rhine where the
Baltic States were turned over to Russia, to all intents and purposes; and Poland became an
island in a huge sea.”158
Positioned between two revisionist powers, Latvia was left at the mercy of their
intentions and evolving international system. Potential alignment with the United Kingdom, or
France or even the United States across the Atlantic might not have altered the sequence of
events. Like the other Baltic States, as well as Poland and the other Eastern European countries,
Latvia was sandwiched between rivaling superpowers. There was no power or alliance strong
enough to stop them before World War II. The outset of the war marked three occupation periods
for Latvia. Within five years alone, the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union again
denied Latvia’s independence. These events made it necessary to question Latvia’s
vulnerabilities and opportunities in Europe’s periphery.
Before the war started, Latvia and the other Baltic States had sought a common security
alliance. Nevertheless, their own regional interests created cleavages in security designs. Broader
Baltic, Baltic-Polish, Baltic-Scandinavia or Baltic and Central European military alliances might
not have changed the evolution of events either. Nevertheless, pre-war regional military
arrangements might have enhanced resistance against the occupying powers. Furthermore, the
way the Russian Federation viewed the Baltic States when the Soviet Union had collapsed might
have been different.
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Notwithstanding few alternative courses of action, the delusional fantasy of escaping the
consequences of World War II by declaring neutrality ended with the loss of Latvia’s
independence in 1940. The first independence period was remembered as one of affluence and
strong statehood. Therefore, the loss of independence carried the seeds of rebellion against the
occupiers.
Several painful lessons were learned by Latvia during the war and the subsequent
occupation period. It made Latvians question whether they could be powerful enough to
withstand external pressures alone. Latvia, together with other small states, was cast in the
uncontrollable spiral of events conducted by major powers. Therefore, one of our research
questions is: what are the vulnerabilities and opportunities of small and weak states in
international affairs?
Following 51 years of occupation, it was necessary to reorganize and reinvent the country
after the complete restoration of independence in August 1991. The sense of insecurity indicated
that non-alignment could potentially lead to another security calamity. Therefore, there was a
need to seek security alliances. As a result, Latvia had to consider which of the existing alliances
would be the most appropriate. Moreover, Latvia had to make non-provoking foreign policy
choices vis-à-vis major powers.
The essential question for Latvia to consider was what factors influenced and constrained
its adamant choice to reintegrate with the Euro-Atlantic community in 2004. Within only 13 to
14 years of independence, Latvia managed to reorganize, reorient, reform and even reinvent
itself to make independence irreversible by joining the Euro-Atlantic community.
To answer the question, it is necessary to investigate the underlying factors that made it
appealing and possible to join the West and secede from the East. Therefore, this chapter will
outline Latvia’s inherent domestic, international and regional conditions. Those are all important
sources of sensitivity and vulnerability and reasons for seeking membership in the Euro-Atlantic
community.
Non-aligned Latvia: Vulnerabilities and Opportunities
Small states are defined by what they are not, or by their intrinsic weaknesses, when
compared to larger states. When non-aligned, their international limitations are rooted in
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domestic physical, economic and military capabilities.159 Their vulnerabilities and sensitivities
mostly derive from geographic location, domestic political efficiency and economic character.160
According to David Vital, perspectives for small, non-aligned states to respond, mitigate
or offset negative externalities will depend on psychological, administrative and economic
resources available for national defense. Thus, it is worth analyzing how Latvia compares in its
nearest proximity with other regional powers from all those perspectives. It will allow us to delve
into deeper analysis on what are the essential Latvia’s vulnerabilities and sensitivities.
The first and foremost commonly used measurement of a small state is its relative size
(population and territory). First, Latvia can be equally compared to its closest neighbors to the
north and the south, Estonia and Lithuania. The Baltic States altogether can be classified as small
states when compared to their neighbor, the largest country in the world, the Russian Federation.
When combined, the three Baltic States approximately equal Belarus, Latvia’s neighbor to the
southeast. Altogether, they are still smaller than Poland, to the southwest, Finland, to the north
and Sweden to the northwest.
Population size is the second measurement of the size of a country. Economically
developed small states are said to have a population of 10 to 15 million people, while
economically underdeveloped small countries have a population of 20 to 30 million.161 Latvia,
with a population of 2.5 million in 1994 and 2.25 million in 2004, classifies as a small
country.162 Moreover, the cumulative population of the Baltic States amounts to 7.7 million.163
All three Baltic States together still do not meet the 10 to 15 million benchmark for economically
wealthy small states.
A third indicator of a small state is the size of the economy. According to the World
Bank, the aggregate GDP output for Latvia in 1994 was $5.7 billion, but in 2004 it grew to $14.4
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billion.164 By comparison, the aggregate GDP for Estonia in 2004 was $12 billion, $22.6 billion
in Lithuania, $23.1 billion in Belarus, $196.7 billion in Finland, $253.5 billion in Poland, $381.7
billion in Sweden and $591 billion in the Russian Federation.
The GDP per capita rate for Latvia in 1994 was $2,327, and $6,345 in 2004.165 According
to the World Bank, the GPD per capita reached $8,850 in Estonia, $6,707 in Lithuania, $2,378 in
Belarus, $37,636 in Finland, $42,442 in Sweden, $6,640 in Poland and $4,102 in the Russian
Federation. In a comparative perspective, Latvia can be considered as a small economy with
relatively low value-added output.
Military properties, as the next milestone for the comparison, are important for small,
non-aligned countries to ensure national defense against external threats and domestic instability.
In most instances, small, non-aligned states face resource constraints in providing for both
external and internal security objectives.
The military spending of a small, non-aligned state can be a criterion for comparison. In
1994 and 2004 Latvia spent 0.8 percent and 1.3 percent of the annual GDP, respectively, for
military. In comparison, Estonia spent one percent in 1994 and 1.5 percent in 2004, Lithuania 0.4
percent and 1.4 percent, Poland 2.4 percent and 1.8 percent, the Czech Republic 2.3 percent and
1.8 percent, and Hungary 2.1 percent and 1.5 percent.166
Since the Baltic and the Visegrad states share similar security objectives, stemming from
similar historic experiences, their defense spending patterns ought to be similar. To overcome
non-alignment caveats, small states must improve their ability to contribute to common defense
to be considered as valuable allies by major powers.
Notwithstanding the aggregate Baltic military spending, all three Baltic States together,
or each of them separately, are miniscule military powers. Since the Russian invasion of Georgia
in 2008 and that in Ukraine in 2014, the three Baltic States have the fastest growing military
budgets. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia increased spending on new defense equipment to $390
million in 2016, from $210 million in 2014.167 In comparison, the United States in 2016 has
granted Israel a military aid package worth $38 billion for the next 10 years, equating to $3.8
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billion a year, or $10 million a day.168 It means that Israel in a little bit more than one month
spends the same amount on military as the Baltic States in a year.
In international affairs every state is unique, but interstate relations are based on one
major principle. The most important aspect is the capacity of any country to transcend domestic
assets in power. The classification of small states, or any state in international affairs, in most
cases is derived from the power the country can project. In all European languages, as in the
international relations field, states are traditionally referred to as “powers” (French puissance,
German Macht, Russian derzhava, Spanish poder etc.).169
Power relations in international affairs play a crucial role. Neither the realist nor the
liberal school of thought deny the importance of power in interstate relations. There can be a
preponderant or a hegemonic power, and great, global or regional powers, but small powers, as a
residual category of the debate to which Latvia belongs, are simply classified as small states.
In terms of their power, small states are usually defined by what they are not. The
shortage of resources, and, consequentially, power, will determine their inherent sensitivities and
vulnerabilities. Latvia, with little doubt, is a small state and a small power. Therefore, there are
multiple aspects that it must consider.
Before going into deeper analysis about Latvia, in order to prove that small states are not
always doomed, we should examine several cases that might suggest some optimism.
Notwithstanding their size, some small states have developed significant niche powers. For
example, some small states are norm setters, some are niche economies and a few can serve as
development models, while a number of small states will excel as norm interpreters.
For example, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and Iceland have each, separately and
together, strengthened global codes of appropriate behavior referred to as “norms.”170 Some
countries, like Singapore, Taiwan, Malaysia and Hong Kong compensate for their limited sizes
by developing niche economies and integrating into international markets.171 Some countries,
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such as Singapore, have managed to develop as a governance model for other small and large
states.
The Singapore development model is not only appealing because of its ability to
overcome and end the British colonial influence in Southeast Asia. The model has a significant
influence on economic growth perspectives, as well as human rights perspectives stemming from
the domestically respected order and law.172 Larger countries tend to respect the voices of such
states in international affairs.
Using unorthodox methods, some small states have managed to withstand pressure from
large states, despite their limited power, based on a favorable international opinion. Iceland, for
example, managed to extend its territorial fishing zone at the expense of the United Kingdom.173
In 2008, Iceland ignored requests to respect financial liabilities for the British and Dutch
depositors in Icelandic banks.174 After the economic and financial crisis of 2008, Iceland used
international courts to justify its interests in face of overwhelming international pressure,
especially form the United Kingdom.
Furthermore, Malta acted as a power broker when its prime minister adopted a maverick
diplomatic strategy to receive development assistance from the United Kingdom in 1971 and
1972 in exchange for political loyalty. It is important to acknowledge that small states must be
innovative and original. In the event that they use traditional interaction methods, their fortunes
will traditionally depend on overwhelming powers.
However, other small states should not misinterpret these instances. In most cases, small
states will be cost takers, not price setters. No small state can, in itself, constitute a major target
of great power policy, but, instead, can be one that is secondary to a more important objective.175
Small states are typically not involved in the shaping of major decisions. However, most
decisions made by major powers will have the capacity to determine the future for small states.
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As a consequence, larger powers tend to treat small states as unimportant or insignificant
players in international affairs. Only when small states are instrumental in achieving certain
objectives will major powers spend their resources on influencing decisions of smaller players.
However, even major powers will pledge a relevant or limited amount of their assets, the least
costly means for achieving foreign policy objectives.
For example, if the process of exercising military pressure against a small state can be
raised high enough, then other, less costly means of achieving the major objective is preferred.
Small states must therefore be ready to address external pressure by mobilizing domestic
resources. In order to meet the challenges of an insecure international environment and
globalized markets, a certain level of national solidarity and harmony on basic policy issues has
to be in place.176 For all small states, domestic coherence is the best answer to changing external
conditions. However, not in all instances can a solitary society offset external pressures. Thus, it
is worth assessing the domestic conditions that make Latvia sensitive and vulnerable.
Human Capital
The coherent idea of the state, its institutions and even its territory can all be threatened
as much by the manipulation of ideas as by the wielding of military power.177 The resulting
effect for small states is to be more vigilant when considering all known and unknown risks that
major powers can utilize for their benefit.
Major security contradictions can include those between defense and security, individual
security and national security, national security and international security and violent means and
peaceful ends.178 Thus, several landmarks must be investigated to depict the vulnerabilities and
sensitivities of a particular small state. In comparison with large countries, the weakness of a
small state stems from limited human and administrative resources, economic shortfalls and
insufficiency of resources for security and national defense.179
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The first and most common landmark for small states is their inability to follow and be
involved in most regional and global processes due to limited administrative capacity and human
resources. As a result, small, unaligned countries will be more circumscribed when it comes to
harnessing information, even about a region to which they belong. To mitigate such risks, which
come from this lack of intelligence, small states need to rely on their larger regional partners.
Liechtenstein, for example, has in the past relied on cooperation with Switzerland for
diplomatic representation, public services and other crucial cooperation forums.180 This is one
way to overcome the diplomatic risk of non-alignment.
Non-aligned Latvia, due to economic constraints, was forced to close its embassy in
Washington in 1923 and 1927, and its embassy in Stockholm from 1923 to 1925.181 As in the
case with Lichtenstein, closer cooperation with another state to offset the shortfall might have
been helpful to better harness domestic resources for Latvia in the interwar period.
Small, unaligned states will have to reallocate a larger share of domestic resources to
sustain an administration which is no less important for domestic public services than it is for
international relationships. International or regional organizations, such as the EU, for example,
can allow for small states to overcome their physical size constraints in some instances.
When aligned with international structures, small member states can gain a presence on
the ground, collect relevant information and wield influence in places where they have no
embassies.182 At the same time, small states alone can still use their diplomatic network to pursue
strategic objectives. Alignment with international organizations can boost administrative
capacities of smaller countries.
Larger countries also have broader and more comprehensive diplomatic networks that are
important in assessing and harnessing information about international political, economic, social
or cultural affairs. As a result, larger countries have more detailed and timely information. After
all, the major function of diplomatic corps is the gathering of intelligence.
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The United Kingdom is an especially relevant case. In 1965, the number of British
diplomats in a single small foreign country was larger than the number of diplomats deployed in
Britain. While the British deployed 19 diplomats in Finland, the Finns had a capacity to deploy
11 representatives. That same year, Austria deployed seven diplomats in London, while Britain
appointed 19 servants in Vienna. Elsewhere, the ratio was 14 Belgians in Great Britain and 22
British in Brussels, and while Greece appointed 15 representatives, London sent 25 of them.183

Latvia in this case is not different from any other small country (Table 2.1). Only with
equals in size, such as Estonia and Lithuania, could Latvia match in terms of numbers of foreign
diplomats deployed in each of the respective countries. As diplomatic networks are instrumental
in gathering crucial intelligence, small states have to rely on international institutions or special
relationships with larger countries to offset administrative shortcuts.
In most instances, larger countries have more sophisticated information about the region
to which a small country belongs, than the small regional country itself. There is little doubt that
more informed states tend to utilize their intelligence advantages. While small states alone have
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severely circumscribed diplomatic networks, the EU provides small member states with
opportunities to multiply their influence well beyond what their relative size would allow.184
As the functions for small states are not limited to sustaining diplomatic relations only,
their abilities to channel information and coordinate actions between international and domestic
levels will also face certain limits. The principal constraints, due to human resource limits, lead
to the inability to harness the support of civil society and the private sector, and some inability to
balance the bargaining powers of larger countries.185 Such circumstances will severely impact
not only diplomatic relations, but also commercial, political, social or cultural prospects.
In terms of international interaction, Latvia is far from adapted. A decade after Latvia
joined the EU, it is among the EU laggards like Hungary and Greece in terms of success with
transferring national preferences to EU directives and regulations.186 All three countries are listed
as the least successful facilitators of national interests within the EU. Latvia ranks second to last,
with only Hungary being a bit worse. In terms of facilitation of national interests in the
international environment, Latvia has massive room for improvement.
Inability to interact internationally determines the opportunity to qualify for high valueadded service provisions, research and development options, sound business partnerships and
beneficial cross-border projects. With limited aggregate resources, smaller states face difficulties
with engaging in large-scale and knowledge-intensive initiatives.
Research and development components, however, can be a crucial precondition for
developing an effective economy that can equalize an economic playground for small and large
states. As a result, small countries must place significant emphasis on the development and
utilization of the human factor. In almost every case, a well-educated society can be a solution
for overcoming very great obstacles as well as limited population size.187
Sound governance makes small states no less competitive. The ability of small states to
respond to challenges stemming from the external environment depends on their capacities to
organize the administrative processes, mobilize and consolidate domestic groups and build
sufficient bureaucracies. Small states can sometimes enjoy the advantage of having all major
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leaders, interests groups and heads of business structures in one room to sort out major decisions
in a rapid manner.
Yet, there are also risks of groupthink, vested interests and rent-seeking principles in
major decision-making, and the risk of the interests of certain groups being preferred over
others.188 The factor that clearly stands out is the importance of political leadership, which is in
turn often galvanized by high levels of pressure from interest groups and a high level of demand
for performance in negotiations.189 The successes of any leader will depend on multiple criteria,
such as experience and knowledge, strategic thinking and charisma, personality and work ethic
and language skills and personal conviction.
In some instances, Latvia’s experience has shown that the challenges of statehood can be
offset with a high level of social resilience. There are few cases where a country was able to exist
for multiple decades as a legal international body while the society withstood a foreign
occupation siege, as was the case with Latvia from 1940 until 1991.
The individual and institutional coherence outside Latvian borders could uphold the
statehood idea in times when the country was de jure subject in international affairs while de
facto it was a part of the Soviet Union. Since the occupation of Latvia in 1940, the diplomatic
institutions and the community abroad were the only resources to preserve and uphold the idea of
Latvia’s independence should the issue arise.190
The preservation of the Latvian statehood and institutions, however, was heavily
dependent on the individual willingness to bear necessary sacrifices in the name of Latvian
statehood. For example, the first Latvian ambassador to the United States, Anatols Dinsbergs,
assumed his official duties only when the Latvian embassy in Washington was officially opened
in 1991. After spending 53 years in the United States as the Latvian envoy, only then could he
return back to Latvia.191
During the occupation years, Dinsbergs, together with other Latvian expatriates, was
actively involved in preserving the statehood principles and upholding the communication
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channels with the United States. When independence was restored, he submitted his resignation
letter to the sovereign Latvian government in 1992. His duties in this official capacity lasted for
only two years, but he spent a lifetime as an envoy in the pivotal state representing a non-existing
government.
Throughout the occupation period, the Latvian society was under Soviet political,
economic and social control. On the domestic level, there was a need for the society to withstand
the communist oppression. The Kremlin’s Politburo used the communist party as a tool to
assimilate Latvia into broader Soviet designs by dissolving Latvian culture and language.
Latvian society resisted and, remarkably, nationhood was preserved. After Stalin’s death
in 1953, there was a group of young, energetic, idealistic and native Communist Party members
in Latvia who sincerely believed that communism might succeed in Latvia if those sent from
Russia would learn to communicate in Latvian.192
Soon thereafter, Khrushchev showed the limits of the post-Stalin communist thaw to the
Latvian “national communists” by purging them from the communist structures. From the
perspective of the Baltic people, the defining element of the Russian rule was the “russification”
of the country. It was aimed at breaking down the Baltic resistance by decisively stamping out
any move toward independence and suppressing the expression of the Baltic culture by forcing
the primacy of Russian culture.193
To eliminate any kind of Latvian, Lithuanian or Estonian language or cultural exposure,
the Soviets used all kinds of methods to dissolve the Baltic resistance rooted in culture and
language. One of the most common features was the elimination of opinion leaders. The onset of
the Soviet occupation marked imprisonment, exile or outright execution of many ethnic
Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians, while Russians and other Russian-speaking people from
abroad were transferred to the Baltic countries.194
Russification and the ethnic assimilation of Latvians were designed to erode potential and
existing resistance. In 1934 in Estonia, and in 1935 in Latvia, there were 8.5 percent and 10.6
percent, respectively, ethnic Russians, while in 1989 there were only 52 percent Latvians and 62
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percent Estonians left living in each country, respectively, as the consequence of the
Russification.195
The Soviet legacy in the Baltic States, particularly in Estonia and Latvia, is very much
felt in their current relations with Russia. For example, 30.3 percent of the population in Estonia
are Russian-speakers and in Latvia the number is 33.8 percent.196 It has left significant impact on
social cohesion, institutional traditions and leadership perspectives.

The ethnic and cultural minority is not evenly spread across Latvia (See Figure 2.2). The
contemporary legacy of the past communist policies in the Baltic States is Russia’s self-declared
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foreign policy obligation to protect the rights of Russian speakers.197 The Baltic States still
remain in the zone of Russian special interests. Therefore, all policies related to ethnic minorities
in the Baltic States must be crafted with special care and caution to avoid growing cleavages
between two linguistic groups living in Latvia.
There is always a risk that the Russian-speaking minority can be mobilized to intimidate
and reassert Russian influence; four out of 10 Kremlin-controlled TV channels are translated in
Latvia and receive 20 to 30 percent of the daily audience (news broadcasted in Russian), and
there are at least 40 organizations with a 1.5 million EUR annual budget representing the
interests of Russian-speakers from within.
In addition, Kremlin-sponsored agencies oversee the Compatriot Policy in Latvia from
without. There are even political parties that overtly support a Russian-speaking, anti-Latvian
electorate.198 As a result, the existence of two linguistic communities has contributed to the
emergence of different institutional arrangements that impede domestic social cohesion. The
existence of two different linguistic communities in Latvia creates a risk of further institutional
and social fragmentation.199
The geographic spread of the Russian speakers corresponds with the geographic
distribution illuminated in the table. The 2012 referenda in Latvia showed that 24 percent of
citizens would support constitutional amendments to include Russian as the second official
language in Latvia. 200
It also means that not all Russian speakers would support fragmentation of the society.
With around 35 percent of the population in Latvia being Russian speakers, almost one out of
three would support keeping Latvian as the country’s only official language. They support
Latvian statehood and institutions built in accordance with Latvian cultural instances.
The Soviet legacy also left a significant mark on human capital in all three Baltic States.
Estonian Prime Minister Mart Laar commented that, for the people who worked in the Soviet
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environment and based their entire career not on honest work but on lies and deceit, it was very
hard to adapt to demanding liberal market reforms.201
Latvian politicians shared the same skepticism about the value of inherited skills from the
Soviet educational system, stating, “the higher educational achievements rate of Russians in
particular has created psychological problems for most Latvians. The anomaly derived from
misreporting of qualifications on census forms, especially by Russian officers’ wives who
considered some insignificant diploma as the equivalent of university degree.”202
In conclusion, small states should be concerned with population size. However, that is far
from being the only factor. Small states must consider education as their priority. Sound
educational systems can uphold institutional coherence, cultural significance, socio-economic
conditions and democratic consensus. Small states must rely on well-educated society as the
primary remedy for economic and military sensitivities and vulnerabilities.
Interaction, Networks and Trade
Social, economic and educational anomalies contributed to the collapse of the communist
empire. Under liberal market conditions, the Soviet economic output was no longer desirable,
and the biased progress and educational data served only propaganda purposes. The departure
from the backward socialist model and the return to normalcy was very much desired to halt the
degradation of the Baltic societies.
It demanded that individuals change and adapt new socioeconomic principles that
sometimes placed many people outside of their comfort zone. Reintegration in a new economic
space required individuals, companies and state institutions to adapt to new liberal market
principles. The expansion of the Latvian diplomatic network well illustrates the future region in
which Latvian interests were residing. After the breakup of the Soviet Union and the restoration
of Latvia’s independence, there was a need to restore diplomatic representations to uphold
Latvia’s return to new geographic, political, economic and social spaces (See Figure 2.3).
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From the start, it was evident that Latvia’s primary interests were in Europe, but also with
the United States and Russia. Apart from bilateral cooperation, there was a need to uphold
freshly regained independence, as well as support security and regional cooperation interests in
pivotal international organizations. Latvia thus delegated representatives to the United Nations in
1991, as well as to other international bodies, such as the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), to ensure international recognition.
Latvia also opened a permanent representation to the EU in 1992 and to the European
Council in 1995 to promote cooperation in Europe. Latvia was represented in NATO as early as
1994 to promote future security interests. It opened a permanent representation in the World
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1998 to adhere to international trade principles.203
By formalizing institutional cooperation with individual countries and international
organizations, Latvia outlined its international interests. However, it still could not overcome the
status of a non-aligned state because its reentry into the Euro-Atlantic community depended on
adherence to the standards of Western organizations.
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To uphold international cooperation and administrative capacity at home, small states
must overcome different impediments stemming from the absence of administrative leadership,
non-existing or minor private sector and a fragile or immature civil society. Small states must
primarily ensure that their domestic institutional frameworks reflect their capacities and interests
for broader international cooperation. The most obvious fact about small states is that their
foreign policy is governed by the policies of others.204
The second most common feature for small, unaligned states to consider is their
economic sensitivity and vulnerability. In all situations, short of outright military conflict, this is
the weakest spot in the small power’s armor.205 Retaliation against stronger powers in such
circumstances is ineffective and ruled out due to discrepancies in trade volumes between small
and large actors.
There is little a small state can employ to offset external economic pressures. The market
size for small countries will always be less attractive. They will not be able to use open access to
their domestic markets as a bargaining chip. On the contrary, larger states can use the access to
their economically rewarding markets as leverage, in addition to other options such as
withdrawing preferential trade agreements, economic pressure on officials, unilateral removal of
negotiators from influential positions and obstruction of economic dialogue. They can even
employ divide and conquer tactics where middle-income countries convince their smaller
counterparts to obey larger states.
Small, non-aligned states are internally more sensitive to changes in international
markets. It is harder for the small states to promote uncompetitive companies at home or abroad
due to resource scarcity. With few exceptions, they will seldom be able to perform as
entrepreneurial states and share resources and knowledge for the benefit of the private sector.
They will also face certain constraints in protecting the domestic sector from negative
externalities. The private sector can, in many instances, favor protectionist policies over market
liberalization, but these will, in most cases, trigger political pressure and economic retaliation
from the large market participants. Although autarky might seem to be a fortunate end to the
predicament, market closure and domestic entrenchment are the least likely of all the economic
strategies available to small states. Only entirely undeveloped and non-developing states can-in
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principle-opt out of foreign trade, and only then if they are prepared to bear the social and
political consequences of such stagnation.
Small developed and developing states are very dependent on world markets, and
protectionism is therefore not a viable option.206 The inescapability of economic change suggests
that small states must apply reactive and flexible policies, ensure corporatist compromises,
uphold domestic political stability and promote resource mobilization to overcome severe
change. The freedom of action has been circumscribed by economic forces over which states
have even less control as international economic activity surges. 207
Miniscule economic size and limited resources suggest that small states might develop
fewer economic sectors that depend heavily on imported resources and/or foreign markets. To
offset limited inherent resources by importing supplementary production resources, and to satisfy
domestic demand and consumption needs, small, unaligned states must export and import
extensively. The resulting impact is increased dependence on foreign actors, which can reach
asymmetrical dimensions and, therefore, is the primary source of vulnerability and sensitivity.
Furthermore, small states must consider the fact that larger countries can abuse trading
relations. Asymmetrical interdependence can be used by larger market players for political ends.
Economic cooperation is essentially beneficial if it is free from bureaucratic control and there are
inherently peaceful ties between countries to sustain commercial relationships.208
States in their commercial activities must consider both stability of markets and political
and social relationships with their trading partners. Small states with limited output capacity and
few industries will focus on specific markets and areas, and their exporting capacity may often
be easily absorbed by a single foreign market. Limited industrial output and specialization areas,
as well as fewer trading partners, suggest higher vulnerability and sensitivity risks.
Larger countries with multiple exporting industries might have more options to offset
domestic economic losses within one sector by redistributing resources among others. One
industry can compensate for losses in another sector. Rapid changes in export markets that occur
for economic or political reasons can be more detrimental to smaller countries because their
recovery capacity is more constrained.
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Latvia is a relatively new participant in international trade. Its economic integrity in
international trade has been limited to two independence periods. In the inter-war years, Latvia
managed to develop strong trading links with major European economies (See Figure 2.4), with
more than half of its two-way trade absorbed by Germany and the United Kingdom alone. Major
Latvian export items up until 1937 were wood and wooden products, as well as agricultural and
farming produce, while Latvia depended on imports of textiles, cars, tobacco and coal and oil
products.209 It is possible to conclude that the trade was relatively diversified.
Conversely, while the Soviet market was large and offered a significant consumer base, it
was based on backward economic planning. The rigidly centralized economy resulted in
overproduction or shortages of consumer goods, which were already of poor quality.210 The lack
of innovation and adaptation pre-determined the faith of the communist model. There was no
economic exchange with the Western markets. The Berlin Wall, erected in 1961, obstructed any
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cooperation to offset the backward economic performance in the Soviet Union, relative to the
rising West.211

The Soviet collapse in 1991 was an opportunity for Latvia to reformulate and reorient its
economic relations. Aspirations to join the Euro-Atlantic structures were made evident at the
outset of Latvia’s independence. Geopolitical changes also introduced changes in Latvia’s
trading patterns (See Figure 2.5).
Until 1994, Russia remained Latvia’s largest trading partner, with the highest volumes of
trade exchanged across the Latvian-Russian border. Nevertheless, in only three years, Germany,
the United Kingdom, Sweden, Lithuania and Finland became Latvia’s largest trading partners.
By 2004, the United Kingdom, Germany, Sweden, Lithuania and Estonia had surpassed Russia
as its main export markets, with Russia remaining the third largest import market.
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The Russian population of roughly 145 million made it an attractive export market for
Latvia.

212

After the restoration, the Latvian economy was weak, and the country faced

immediate trade restrictions with the West. The economic integration of the Baltic States into the
broader communist market still made Russia an important export market for Latvia (See Figure
2.6).
Some industries, nevertheless, due to the lack of competitiveness and consumer appeal,
were doomed to go bankrupt. For example, in 1996, Latvia sent its last portion of minibuses to
the Russian market, which were popularly known in the Soviet Union under the brand name
“Latvija.”
In 2012, the former minibus factory was turned into a museum where visitors could enjoy
the opportunity to have a glance at the 15 most modern minibuses as symbols of the
backwardness of Soviet production.213 The same fate visited the producers of train and tram
railcars and tire producers, among other uncompetitive production areas that were parts of
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broader communist economic planning.214 Lada could not become Mercedes just by driving on a
road, because all products depend on how well developed the knowledge base of an industry is.
Latvian canned fish products were among the most salient export goods to Russia.
Nevertheless, these were severely affected by the Russian financial and economic crisis of 1998,
with a fivefold drop in value from 25 million EUR in 1996 to five million EUR in 1999 and
2000.
To mitigate such vulnerabilities to further Russian market fluctuations, the Latvian
foreign ministry launched a new policy in 2000 aimed at re-directing Latvian fish exports to the
EU market.215 The 1998 Russian financial and economic crisis caused bankruptcies of fishreproduction enterprises that failed to reorient exports to alternative markets. Economic fragility
and potential instability of the Russian market must be considered by Latvian exporters. In
addition to the canned fish, there is the possibility that other Latvian exports, such as consumer
products with short preservation periods, can be abused for political gains.
Since 1999, Latvia has launched and expanded exports of spare parts for electrical
machinery to Russia. Not only is it an indicator of the opportunity to produce high value-added
products in Latvia, but it also illuminates Russian interests to utilize economic capacities offered
by neighboring Latvia.
Besides parts for the electrical machinery, since 1999, Latvia has also started exporting
parts that are used by the metallurgy industry, materials used for jewelry production and
materials used for popular underwear in Russia.216 Similar positive trading patterns have been
evident in the pharmaceutical industry. Exports of medicaments to Russia have been relatively
stable even during the Russian economic crisis of 1998.
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As suggested by the theoretical literature about small states, Latvia is not an exception
and heavily relied on imports of resources that it did not have, or had in insufficient amounts
(See Figure 2.7).
There are several products that Latvia has ceased to import from Russia such as the
caprolactam, which is used for nylon production. A similar trend was followed in other
industries, such as imports of motor vehicles.217 These imports halted just after the financial and
economic crisis of 1998, which started in Russia but later spilled into the Baltic States.
The explanation for the rupture of imports in some industries is found in the 1998
financial and economic crisis from which some Russian industries never recovered. At the same
time, the demand for Russian-made products was not strong due to their poor quality. For
example, Soviet-made Lada cars simply ceased to be competitive with Western-made cars. Thus,
Latvian demand after the opening of trade markets for some import items declined to nothing.
Imports of such items as ammonium nitrate (used in agriculture) have experienced market
fluctuations and, in some areas, have experienced an increase in activity. Thus, spruce woodchip
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and produce is one of the items that have been imported from Russia since 1998. Latvia has also
started importing pine and birch wood and woodchip produce, as well as such items as liquefied
propane (used as a substitute for increasingly expensive petrol).218
Some Latvian economic sectors show further interests in extending cooperation with
Russia, especially in areas where Latvia is in short supply of local resources or where its natural
riches do not provide for growing demand. As in the case of exports to Russia, there is a need for
small states to apply extra vigilance and potential resilience measures in the case of importing
relations. Special attention must be devoted to areas where Latvia does not have the option of
substituting imports, such as the energy sector.
Imports of natural gas from Russia are especially salient and carry the most risks for
Latvia because of the lack of alternative supply sources due to limits in the country’s natural gas
transportation infrastructure. Latvia is similarly vulnerable in terms of electricity, but there are
alternative suppliers. Latvia is sufficiently connected with the Estonian and Lithuanian electricity
markets and can also procure additional energy from the Scandinavian Nordpool spot electricity
stock exchange.219
One of the most common resources used in co-generation of electricity and heat by the
state JSC Latvenergo is natural gas. It accounts for approximately 50 percent of the overall
energy output for the company, which provides 90 percent of the aggregate electricity in
Latvia.220 Yet, the electricity and heat produced by the company using natural gas is not evenly
distributed through Latvia.
The electricity, produced from gas supply centers such as the capital, Riga, and suburbs
around it. In 2004, the consumption and distribution of Russian gas in Latvia was 25 percent for
production-industry needs, while 75 percent was delivered for production of electricity and heat
to Latvenergo and other municipalities and households.221 Apart from these crucial energy
dependency aspects, the political aspects of the natural gas market in Latvia must be assessed
with additional scrutiny.
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The Russian gas retail company Gazprom remains an influential interest group in Latvia and the
Baltic States. Even the European Commission sees Gazprom as an influential political adversary,
which jeopardizes market liberalization principles preferred by the EU by proposing and
promoting bilateral cooperation based on long-term contracts with clients.222
The overall European infrastructure allows Gazprom’s gas exports to 16 European
countries, while its market share in all three Baltic States has been 100 percent.223 Disparities in
size, resources and influence place the Baltic States in an unequal bargaining position. Even with
and within the EU, Gazprom can influence the debate enough to use gas as a weapon of choice
for powerful energy companies.224
In addition to a disguised political influence in Europe, Gazprom has applied strategies
where gas prices for some EU members, or especially for potential candidates, can be three times
higher than for non-European ones.225 This means that the energy company can be utilized for
political gains by awarding “obedient” clients with lower gas prices.
Therefore, Gazprom’s efforts to acquire shares of national gas distribution companies and
crucial transportation infrastructure after the Soviet collapse were met with different strategies in
the Baltic States. The acquisition of shares of the Baltic national gas companies depended on
how well each state embraced the liberal market principles.
In Estonia, Gazprom acquired Eesti Gaas shares during the first years of sovereignty,
from 1990 until 1995. In Latvia, Latvijas Gāze was privatized by Gazprom in the second stage of
state building from 1995 to 2004. Lithuania resisted Gazprom until it became a EU and NATO
member state in 2004.226 As a result, by 2010, gas prices in Lithuania were three times higher
than those paid by Latvian and Estonian consumers.227
No matter what strategy Gazprom used to acquire the Baltic national gas companies,
there was in each case a resistance to sell the controlling package to Gazprom overnight.
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Therefore, the acquisitions of Baltic energy enterprises were coordinated through loyal or
subordinated firms.
For example, Gazprom cooperated with Itera Latvia in the early 1990s and 2000s with
coordinated negotiations with the Latvian government.228 Covert agreements, lack of
transparency and the presence of vested interests in place in Latvia and Estonia made it possible
in due course for Gazprom and its partner to reach their objectives and acquire the controlling
packages of Estonian and Latvian gas distribution assets. The acquisition of those companies by
Gazprom was necessary to avoid future market liberalization.
Moreover, the Russian control over the Baltic energy transportation assets was
instrumental in feeding Russian economic-political interests groups in Latvia. Even if Gazprom’s
gas price for Lithuania was higher than that for Latvia or Estonia, the gas transportation and
distribution fee in Latvia made the price for natural gas the highest in the EU.229
Furthermore, some political-economic interest groups with ties to the gas industry are led
by former KGB elites. For example, the head of Itera Latvia, Juris Savickis, was employed by
the communist military and secret service from 1972 until 1991.230 Therefore, the gas business in
Latvia still serves as a base for groups that Latvia should consider a security impediment.
Moreover, Latvia is particularly vulnerable because of large supply and demand
disparities between Latvia and Gazprom. The share of natural gas sold to Latvia by Gazprom in
2004 was only 0.78 percent of the total amount of Russian natural gas exports.231 Such
asymmetrical dependence suggests that Gazprom’s economic loss by halting gas exports to
Latvia would be meaningless.
At the same time, Latvia might witness major electricity and heat shortages in the capital
and its periphery, apart from bankruptcies of a few major enterprises. To mitigate risks stemming
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from the energy imports, it is necessary to diversify resources used for energy production. In the
Baltic States, Gazprom and subordinate companies demonstrate strong resistance and opposition
against any kind of market liberalization prospects. Therefore, natural gas imports carry immense
open-ended risks for Latvia.
Latvia’s future economic outlook suggests a reorientation to alternative markets, away
from the former Soviet economic area. The first reason for such a trend is an insufficient
consumption capacity in the CIS compared to the EU countries. A second reason is the economic
instability of the CIS (primarily stemming from crises in Russia).
Latvian exports from the CIS were higher than exports to the EU-15 until 1994. With the
economic and financial crisis in Russia and the CIS countries, Latvia’s exports to the CIS after
1997 decreased and did not return to their 1993 level until 2005 (See Figure 2.8).

Also, the aggregate import volume from the CIS was higher than from the EU-15 until
1994 and remained constant almost until 2003. It must be noted that the Scandinavian countries
were left outside the trade analysis (one of the most salient trading partners for Latvia). The
geographic proximity of Latvia to the CIS and Russia should have at least theoretically suggested
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more favorable conditions for economic cooperation. Nevertheless, Latvian trading dynamics
suggest that future improvements of the Latvian socio-economic conditions reside in Europe.
Small, unaligned states must consider economic weaknesses that can be exploited by
larger powers for political gains. In the face of large economic offensives, small states can
change their political orientation if the coercion for the society becomes unbearable. Small nonaligned states must consider the fact that such weapons can always be applied.232
The result of economic pressure will depend on the importance of the sector under attack,
availability of alternatives, the importance of the political issue at stake, the relations between
government and governed and the tenacity with which each party pursues its course.233 The art of
exploiting economic disabilities for political ends therefore rests on the ability to evoke
sufficiently strong internal pressure or even to create a sufficiently powerful domestic force to
operate as an ad hoc ally.
By impoverishing the population, or making its day-to-day existence ever more difficult,
some countries can alter their attitude to their government, or policies, or both, and upset
political arrangements within a state. Considering that Latvia has a fragmented society along
ethnic lines, and a society that wants to tap into the Western affluence, Latvia must consider
measures to offset possible economic and political vulnerabilities.
Military Capabilities
Beside economic and population limits, small states must also consider their military
capacity larger countries. The strategic significance of small powers emanate from various
political, geographical, economic and military factors that are not always easy to identify or
disentangle.234 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the constellation of power in Latvia’s
proximity was reshaped, but the attention from Russia never shifted. Thus, military capacities
still played an important role even when the application of power seemed to be out of fashion.
One reason for small states to be concerned with great power clashes has to do with the
essential assets they might hold in great power games. Large states might be willing to use their
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military power not only for the protection of their own territory but also for the protection of the
territory of a third state because of its relevance to their own security.235 Small states might need
their own international strategy to mobilize domestic resources or explicitly adhere to security
interests of larger countries.236
On the other hand, because power and security struggles cannot be distinguished reliably,
national security policy cannot rest on the relatively clear and straightforward principles that can
be derived from either in isolation.237 Small states will always have to maintain a sense of
adaptability to the changing external environment. Economic pressures against a small state can
be translated ultimately into security terms. Certain resources, such as minerals, but especially
fuels, are no less essential to industry and agriculture than to armed forces.238
Small countries are primarily concerned with their viability, but their access to sufficient
military capabilities depends on their economic potential. In 1914, there was no need for large
scale investments to equip an army. The war required an infantry to be equipped with almost
universal and fundamentally simple equipment used by all armies. More importance was
attached to numbers, natural obstacles and the territory of a state. As the war continued,
however, and new technological advances emerged, the military requirements rapidly changed.
This trend has continued and even increased ever since.
Prices for the best equipment on the market at any time are much more significant than it
was for the apparel and armaments used during World War I. As a result, what might have been
appropriate for the defense of small, non-aligned states in the past might be obsolete in the
present. Keeping up with the dynamics of the military industry for small states, due to their
resource constraints, becomes a challenging task. Therefore, the protection of a greater power
should be sought if political and geographic circumstances warrant it.239
Furthermore, a single major defeat for a small state can mean the loss of the most
valuable parts of the country-if not all of it-and the loss of any prospect of a victory with the
nation’s own resources. Greater powers have larger territories and populations, which puts them
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in a strategically advantageous position. They can push the perimeter of conflict from its vital
population, economy, supplies or decision-making centers.
Conversely, smaller countries, at the outset of a military intervention, can lose a fight for
strategically important assets and, as a result, a war. Even the smallest losses can lead to the
inability to retaliate, rehabilitate, or push back enemies’ forces. Even guerilla or partisan units
can be weakened in no time due to lack of supplies, coherent regional management and
centralized coordination.
Second, a smaller country must await the enemy at the gates, at the outer limits of its vital
centers, invariably so when it is alone. The biggest challenge for small countries is a strategic
surprise, for which a contingency plan is not in place. After significant losses in battle, prospects
for recovery and retaliation can be bleak. All pre-emptive means for security must be mobilized
and applied before an attack. It makes defense highly demanding from a socio-economic
perspective.
Considering the myriad difficulties in ensuring sufficient contingency measures, small
states tend to employ the best military deterrent possible. A small, non-aligned power, at least in
so far as it is involved in, or anticipates, conflict, has the most profound reasons for attempting to
offset limited numbers, limited supplies and limited maneuverability by acquiring weapons of
the highest fire-power, mobility and operational efficiency. Such security objectives are desirable
for any small state, but they carry implications for greater countries, too.
In search of superior military capabilities, small states attract the attention of the greatest
powers. Considering these circumstances, larger powers will use preventive measures, which can
be economically harmful. They will try to compel or coerce smaller countries from obtaining
weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, not all small states will be economically fit to acquire
and sustain such defense capabilities.
For example, nuclear forces are primarily oriented toward preventing war because, in a
nuclear-armed system, a philosophy of live-and-let-live among powers becomes the only
practical alternative to the high risk of annihilation.240 It might seem that the nuclear deterrent
could be a viable option for small states, too.
After all, the stronger the capacity to resist and maintain an independent political course
and the greater the damage a state can inflict on enemies in the event of attack, the more
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restricted the greater powers are in their own political and military movements.241 Nevertheless,
there are several downsides that small states must consider when contemplating the development
and application of nuclear military capability.
First, the actual application of nuclear weapons might be a delusional security guarantee:
insistence on the pursuit of what appears to be the national interest may lead to defeat, and even
to self-destruction. Small states, because of their limited territory and human resources, can
inflict significant damages on their own territory and population by attempting to stop
conventional military campaigns with weapons of mass destruction. A nuclear response against
conventional warfare on a small state’s territory can only worsen the situation.
Second, small states must maintain a profile where the others are convinced that the
application of nuclear weapons is always credible under the appropriate circumstances. For
example, if Czechoslovakia would have had a nuclear arsenal in 1938, the United Kingdom and
France might have been more vigorously involved in dissuading them from using the military
capability. On the contrary, Poland at the outset of World War II, when facing total annihilation,
might have found the application of nuclear force justified.
If small states opt for nuclear military capabilities, they must consider several important
consequences. First, to avoid economic pressure and isolation, there is a need for a strategic
partner. The case of the United States and Israel is illustrative. The state of Israel is a crucial
United States ally in the broader Middle East and North Africa. It is also essential for Israel to
maintain the strategic support of the United States. Regional security and relative stability as
well as game-changing technologies are some of the important products that support the vital
interests of both countries.242
An alternative example might be nuclear North Korea. A communist state, operated
under a one-man dictatorship with all the accompanying socio-economic consequences. It is one
of the most isolated countries in the world with a rigid state-controlled system where the
philosophy of self-reliance has destroyed economy.243
Military strategies for small states will depend on the security environment to which they
belong. Also, geography for small states plays a dominant, if not the dominant, role in
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international affairs. States will not be able to choose their neighbors in the same manner as
humans cannot choose their parents. 244 Where the danger of conflict is remote-for geographical
reasons, or because of the general political circumstances at the time-the sensitivity of even the
smallest states to quarrels with their great, nominal enemies is likely to be small.245 Thus,
military strategies and investment policies will depend on inherent security perceptions.
Latvia is a small and weak state. Such aspects as the shortage of human resources, small
territory, few and small amounts of indigenous resources, the fragile and small economy,
political stability risks and military weakness makes it a sensitive and vulnerable country.
Therefore, it will always face certain risks that stem from unique regional circumstances.
The fact that Latvia was independent for only 35 years before it rejoined the EuroAtlantic structures, is telling regarding its international possibilities. The small size and weakness
of Latvia keeps it unable to offset Russia’s economic influence (especially in the energy sector),
as well as the political influence exerted by strategically important enterprises.
Moreover, Latvia’s options to acquire democratic consensus are also limited. There are
two significant ethnic groups in Latvia. The coherence of the society therefore depends on
multiple aspects. Latvia, as a small state and a weak power, must seek out alliances to uphold its
statehood internationally. All in all, future prospects for Latvia depend on the ability to wisely
restructure policies domestically. Only then can the country hope to be less vulnerable
internationally.
In conclusion, Latvian regional interests are primarily based on interaction with European
powers, but mostly with those from the Baltic Sea region. As a result, at the outset of
independence, Latvia made an effort to establish closer links with major European and Western
institutions. The immediate political association was the choice, then the rearranging of the
economic and political relations required incremental and tenacious domestic adaptation efforts.
Latvia had to analyze the scope and intensity of its trade. As a result, it could identify
potential sensitivities and vulnerabilities that stem from market changes or political aspects. It
also had to consider the effects of a small population, a miniscule economy and a small military.
Small states face a dilemma in which their small numbers create a path of dependence in
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economic and military fields. As a result, small states are forced to consider the world around
them.
Conclusion
Latvia’s fortune has always been determined by greater powers. It has been a small
power with limited resources. Thus, Latvia has never been able to demonstrate significant power
in international affairs. Only when Russia did not have the capacity to control events around its
borders, during the Russian revolution and during the breakup of the Soviet Union, could Latvia
become independent, to the disappointment of Moscow. In the interwar and postwar periods, the
destiny of the Baltic States was influenced by the distribution of military power in Europe.
Henceforth, Latvia was forced to remain incorporated into the Soviet Union.
Notwithstanding the painful historical experiences, Latvian domestic and foreign policies
had to be crafted with caution. An escalation of security risks and eroding relations with Russia
were detrimental for Baltic integration into the Euro-Atlantic community. On the domestic level,
Latvia had to depart from nationalist policies, as well as assume post-modern polity that was
rooted in liberal-democratic principles. Moreover, Latvia had to accomplish these tasks
considering limited endowments and ethnically diverse society.
In conclusion, Latvia must not provoke excessive external reaction from Russia, but it
must not remain complacent in its economic, political and social dominion. Cautious reform
process is necessary. Russia’s hinterland did not promise economic stability, modernity or
affluence in the long term. Even if the post-Cold War promises better future for Latvia, it still
must consider inherent limitations, administrative and human resources, vulnerabilities and
sensitivities that derive from international economic, political and social interaction as well as
limited military capabilities.
Latvia has managed to partly offset some sensitivities and vulnerabilities that stem from
small numbers, international ranking and social traits. By joining a security alliance, Latvia could
offset its miniscule military capabilities. The EU integration and the socio-economic realm
would suggest that integration and adaptation prospects can offset market related challenges. In
the end, the integration in the Euro-Atlantic community does not promise to remedy all Latvia’s
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sensitivities and vulnerabilities. Thus, some areas must be challenged by Latvia itself, even if the
integration process can implicitly promote positive change.
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CHAPTER IV
THE SURGE OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: 1956, 1968, 1981

Introduction
The geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union turned
international affairs into a bipolar competition for power and influence during the Cold War.
Power and dominance can be achieved through two distinct strategies: one can be based on
appeal, while the other option is coercion. Individual states that were incorporated into each of
the rivaling blocks share different experiences since each of the bipolar zones were built on
different principles.
Those principles were upheld and guarded by the military power but the geopolitical
shifts and changes in alliances were affected by the principles for which each of the blocks stood.
States within each of the blocks could exert milder or harsher opposition depending on the
capabilities of second-tier allies, could challenge action of the major power or contribute to
changes within each of the blocks. In the case of the American and Soviet zones of influence, it
is possible to discern areas where each of the powers were comprehensively involved and how
they differed.
In the United States, World War II is generally known as “the good war” in contrast to
some of the “bad wars,” such as the genocidal Indian wars.246 Even during the Cold War there
were cases that still haunted American foreign policy makers, such as Vietnam. During World
War II, however, Americans, on the part of the allied powers, including the Soviet Union, helped
to defeat Nazi Germany. As a result, the United States became instrumental in defeating a
nefarious regime in Europe.
On the other hand, when the tables turned and the United States became enemies with the
Soviet Union following the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, Americans were
instrumental in deterring another, no less nefarious, regime from further expansion through the
Cold War. The overarching question is whether the United States remained good and benign as it
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viewed itself in the framework of World War II. After all, it adamantly endured for five decades,
defeated communist values and upheld those that it found important.
An example is Latin America or the Western Hemisphere, where the United States policy
had been based on two major principles since before the Cold War. The Truman Doctrine
became a powerful part of American foreign policy, aimed at the comprehensive deterrence of
communist expansion worldwide. That also included the Western Hemisphere around America’s
borders.
Furthermore, the Monroe Doctrine had, before the Cold War, been an American foreignpolicy milestone aimed at keeping European powers away from the Western Hemisphere.
Invoked in December 1823, the doctrine warned European nations that the United States would
not tolerate further colonization or puppet monarchs in its neighborhood.247 Before the Cold
War, Americans had explicitly upheld the principles of the Monroe Doctrine.
For example, the United States Marines were sent in 1904 to the Dominican Republic, in
1911 to Nicaragua and in 1915 to Haiti to keep Europeans out as an ostensible impediment to
American economic interests. In other words, one doctrine was aimed at upholding politicalsecurity interests while the other was aimed at enhancing economic interests. It is difficult to
ignore the strong reciprocity of both for the United States.
During the Cold War, however, there were two distinct periods of American foreign
policy continuity and change. In the period from 1954 until 1970, cases like Guatemala in 1954,
the Dominican Republic in 1965, and Paraguay stand out as examples where American political
and economic interests were robustly defended in accordance with those same doctrines.
The second timeframe is from 1970 until the end of the Cold War. The salient policy
change came when Jimmy Carter’s administration did not aim to deter communism, focusing on
upholding economic interests instead. Washington was also vigorously upholding human rights
principles in the Western Hemisphere. As a result, Carter changed the political landscape,
causing considerable repercussions for the next president to revert to the decade-long hardcore
realpolitik. At the outset of the Cold War, the hardcore political cohort was undoubtly calling all
the shots in Washington.
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For example, in Guatemala, the United States was quick to plot the Central Investigation
Agency (CIA) subversion in order to counter a communist surge and to defend American
commercial interests in 1954. In 1951, popularly elected Colonel Jacobo Árbenz Guzmán had
furthered democratic reforms but at the same time he encouraged labor organization and decreed
an agrarian law reform.
One of the results of his policies was the expropriation of 71 percent of the land of the
United States-owned banana producer, the United Fruit Company.248 Moreover, Árbenz
appointed communist members to his government. As a result, he was irreversibly turning his
political establishment into an ominous foreign policy target for the United States. Americans
were determined to do what it took to “avoid one more Soviet bitch settling in Guatemala” and
“challenging American hegemony in the area,” recalls retired Marine Corps Colonel Philip
Roettingers.249
An alternative to Árbenz’s regime was found in a secret government that enjoyed the
support of the United States. Washington’s objective in 1954 became to install nationalist Carlos
Castillo Armas, the leader of a CIA-planned insurgency, as president of Guatemala. When the
subversion was successfully completed, American foreign policy shifted toward support of
Armas to uphold the status quo.250
Branded as “the operation success,” the CIA plot carried significant casualties for
Guatemala. The American-supported regime in Guatemala was authoritarian and ruthless toward
the local population. So, the regime was despised. However, the policy principles of the Truman
and Monroe doctrines clearly stand out in this instance since American economic and political
interests were at risk.
The reason for intervention in the Dominican Republic in 1965 was Lyndon Johnson’s
fear that the military coup on April 24 in support of Juan Bosch, who had been deposed as
president in 1963 by the United States, could lead to “another Cuba” crisis since Bosch was seen
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as too closely allied with Fidel Castro.251 As a result, Trujillo’s candidacy was preferred by the
United States over Bosch’s government.
To support Trujillo, Johnson sent approximately 30,000 Marines to quell the coup in
support of Juan Bosch. American foreign policy was subsequently driving the rising generation
of educated and patriotic young Latin Americans to an embittered and hostile form of
communism, like that of Fidel Castro’s in Cuba. Americans deposed democratic change in the
Dominican Republic in favor of an assumed anti-communist authoritarian figure twice, in 1963
and in 1965. Since American economic interests were less at risk, this is an instance where
Americans explicitly stood against ostensible communist expansion.
The perfect scenario that Washington sought in Latin America was seen in Paraguay.
From 1954 to 1989 Alfredo Stroessner’s authoritarian, anti-communist regime ardently
embraced the Truman Doctrine. As a result, Paraguay received political support, legitimacy and
invaluable military, economic, and financial aid.252
In response, Stroessner offered troops for the intervention in 1965 in the Dominican
Republic and in 1968 in Vietnam.253 For such policies, Paraguay was handsomely rewarded
during the Cold War. Nevertheless, Stroessner’s policies significantly severed Paraguay’s
democratic and institutional traditions and human capital capacities. For five decades the country
was ruled by a single person. As a result, it was difficult for the next leaders to deviate from
strongly established authoritarian practices since the country was shallowly, poorly and
illiberally institutionalized.254 Therefore, Paraguay turned out to be ill equipped to embrace any
substantial regional or international cooperation when the Cold War was over.
The dynamic of American foreign policy toward the Western Hemisphere had never been
as clearly expressed as in the mid-1970s. At that time, the policy appeared to change from
support of the repression of human rights and authoritarian leaders to actively seeking ways to
improve human rights practices of the most egregious violators.255 Until then, Washington’s
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policymakers had been quick to abandon the ethical issue in favor of the realpolitik or
hegemonic control principles.256
Two important aspects were instrumental in the American foreign policy change in the
Western Hemisphere. The first was Jimmy Carter’s less decisive support of pro-American
dictatorial forces. The second was the changing international economic landscape. The 1973
global oil crisis imposed significant economic strains on economies in the Western Hemisphere.
The result was that in Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama conciliation on the part of political
leaders headed off full-scale political crisis. In countries like Nicaragua, Guatemala and El
Salvador the traditional elites to the social rebellion responded with a ruthless repression. 257
In response, Washington denounced the ruthless leaders and their principles. Thus,
humanitarian principles were prioritized over economic and political interests. Such policies
were unprecedented and turned out to be difficult for Carter’s nemesis-Ronald Reagan-to
overturn.
At the outset of the election in 1981, he had already vowed to exercise more
determination and strength in the Western Hemisphere. Capitalism, Reagan believed, had been a
powerful weapon in the ballet with communism.258 Nevertheless, Americans felt the
consequences of the global oil crisis. Money had placed additional strains and made it
increasingly hard to spend more in the Western Hemisphere since there was a substantial surge
in the American foreign debt. Therefore, economic impediments had curbed American
capabilities to impose stringent policies in the Western Hemisphere. The result was that
Americans had to limit their involvement in favor of other priorities.
The result in Chile was that a coup, executed by Pinochet on September 11, 1973, to
overthrow popularly despised President Salvador Allende, was not coordinated by the CIA.259
There had been an American effort to stage a coup that would prevent Allende from taking office
after winning the presidential election in September 1970. However, local circumstances
prevented it, as he was still popular in Chile. Nevertheless, Washington pushed for a coup that
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failed. In 1970, instead of kidnapping Chilean military Commander in Chief René Schneider,
insurgents ended up wounding and killing him.
The objective of the coup was to destabilize the political situation in Chile. Instead of
undermining Allende’s position, the CIA’s plot actually strengthened it, as the population rallied
around Allende. At the outset of his reign, Allende was popular, while the American opposition
was seen as ominous, since it had meddled into the domestic affairs of a foreign country.
As a result, Allende had political capital that allowed him to push for reforms and
enhance his political position. He nationalized domestic economic assets and severed American
commercial interests. In response, the United States imposed financial sanctions and covertly
supported Allende’s opposition.
The result of Allende’s domestic reforms and nationalization efforts in Chile was the
deterioration of socio-economic conditions. His policies resulted in shortages of food and basic
consumer goods, causing the first “march of empty pots and pans” protest, organized by Chilean
housewives.260
To protest the nationalization attempts, Chilean truck drivers went on strike in October
1972.261 In a country where distribution chains were not very well developed and barely
profitable firms provided the necessary transportation services, this was a profound issue.
Chilean discontent and opposition was growing. Not long thereafter, the first military attempt to
overthrow Allende took place, but failed.
Although it appeared to be a lost cause, the failed military coup quickly mobilized an old
Chilean military cohort in order to execute a more comprehensive and better-planned coup on
September 11, 1973. Only then was Allende ousted and executed. But the coup was organized
without United States involvement.
The head of the Chilean military, Pinochet, launched a notoriously atrocious military rule
in Chile. In October 1976, President Carter repudiated the allegations that the U.S. overthrew the
elected government and helped to establish a military dictatorship in Chile.262 The United States
denied planning and executing the Chilean coup in 1973.
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In Nicaragua, the advocates for change won a significant victory in 1979. The result was
that the Sandinista National Liberation Front overthrew Anastasio Samoza Debayle’s
dictatorship, which had been despised in the country since 1961. Before the ouster, Carter’s
administration wanted to incrementally facilitate the departure of politically declining Samoza
and pursue the installment of the Sandinistas. After the overthrow, Samoza fled to Paraguay,
where he was soon killed. One of Washington’s hardliners, Jeane K. Kirkpatrick, criticized
Carter’s policy, comparing the overthrow of Somoza with the loss of Iranian Shah at power.263
When Reagan came to power, he described Nicaragua under the Sandinistas as a “Soviet
ally on the American mainland.” Therefore, he explicitly sided against the Sandinistas’ leftist
government. Reagan tried to subvert the Sandinistas but failed. From 1981 to 1984, Reagan’s
administration increased pressure by providing funding to the Sandinistas’ adversaries, the
Contras. The administration also rebuffed calls for mediation and negotiations from Western
Europe and Nicaragua alike.
Before the reelection in 1984, Reagan and his administration seemed to embrace the
congressional ban on support of the Contras but continued to illicitly finance efforts by the
Contras. Further conflicts with the Sandinistas were escalated by imposing trade and financial
restrictions and by persuading Congress to resume financial aid to the Contras, which was
abrogated when Republicans lost control over the Senate in the 1984 mid-term election (mainly
due to Iran-Contras financial scandal). From 1986 until the inauguration of George H.W. Bush in
1989, Reagan held less and less leverage over events in Nicaragua.
In the same time span, similar events were taking place in El Salvador where Farabundo
Martí’s National Liberation Front (FMLN) was emulating Nicaraguan Sandinistas. Moreover,
the FMLN supported Sandinistas in Nicaragua, and vice-versa. When Reagan left office in 1989,
deteriorating economic conditions around the Western Hemisphere caused decreases in trade and
investment. Sandinistas still held power in Nicaragua, and the FMLN still waged guerilla war in
El Salvador. Reagan’s avowed exercise of bold determination and increased strength against
assumed communists did not bear fruit in the Western Hemisphere. This was due in part to the
United States’ primary focus on the Soviet Union and, thus, limited resources for bolder policies
in the Western Hemisphere.
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The legacy of America’s past interaction has a significant effect on the Pan-Americas
relations. What was important, however, was the fact that the United States never expanded its
borders at the expense of Guatemala, Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, Chile, El Salvador or
Nicaragua. Furthermore, since Latvia was firmly incorporated into the Soviet Union, it had
limited options in terms of cooperating with the United States. Thus, Latvia did not have the
same experiences as countries in the Western Hemisphere.
However, American policies in the Western Hemisphere were used by the Soviet Union
as a warning to abstain from meddling in Soviet affairs. When the Cold War was approaching its
end, Shevardnadze was deflecting attention from Soviet crackdowns in the Baltic by pointing to
the American involvement in Panama.
He explicitly noted that, “the comparison between Panama and Lithuania was not
necessarily appropriate since Shevardnadze regarded Lithuania as part of his country.”264 Since
Soviets perceived their occupied territories in a different way, it comes as no surprise that
experiences of the occupied countries were different from those in the Western Hemisphere.
In the same way that there were distinct policy patterns that created an anti-American stance in
the Western Hemisphere, there was much that Latvia shared with other countries incorporated in
the Soviet Union.
This chapter aims at answering one important question: what were the shared experiences
of many forcefully incorporated countries in the Soviet Union that contributed to the surge of the
Euro-Atlantic community. The Baltic and Visegrad states were the Soviet satellites and occupied
parts of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. As the Soviet Union had used its power against
those same countries, they were tempted abandon the Soviet Union and join the Euro-Atlantic
community. During the Cold War, the trend for the Euro-Atlantic community to implicitly or
explicitly grow was evident.
For shared reasons, most post-Cold War newly independent states found themselves
pitted against any further alliances with the Russian Federation, the heir of the Soviet Union. The
author argues that the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Prague Spring of 1968 and Poland in
1981 serve well to explain the dynamic of the Western surge and the dwindling of the Soviet
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appeal and influence. Explicit and implicit Cold War experiences made most countries willing to
distance themselves from closer political alliances with the Russian Federation.
A Road to Hungary, 1956
Political fracturing of the Soviet Union started early. Milovan Djilas was a famous
Yugoslav politician who assisted Josip Broz Tito in establishing a partisan resistance against
Nazi clout in South-Eastern Europe. After World War II and at the outset of the Cold War, Djilas
became the vice-president of the Federal People’s Republic of Yugoslavia, the second-highest
ranking politician after Tito. He was involved in bridging the growing gap between Moscow and
Belgrade and Stalin and Tito, from 1945 to 1948, which later broke Yugoslavia’s ties with the
Soviet Union’s Cominform.
In 1948, Tito took his own approach to Yugoslav communism, which was no less heavy
handed than Stalin’s. Nevertheless, it was a significant move in the Soviet Union at the time
because, as Djilas recalls, famous Stalin’s aphorism determines the policies for the future: “This
war is not in the past; whoever occupies a territory also imposes upon it his own social system.
Everyone imposes his own system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise.”265
Tito, to the irritation of Stalin, represented a possibility for change and deviation within
the Soviet block. There was an intermediate phase before the Leninist one, in which everyone in
the party was free to hold his own opinion so long as he respected the rules of discipline and,
later, the Stalinist phase, in which the present, past or future actual or potential opponents
confess to crimes that have not been committed.266
What was important in Tito’s instance was not the drastic overall change of the Stalin and
Tito communist regimes. In their own ways, the Yugoslav and Soviet regimes were repressive
toward ideational, idealistic, economic, class, political or any other disguised or overt opponent
against their communisms. The only difference was the experimental possibility for the
Yugoslav workers to self-manage in state-run enterprises.
Yugoslavia was still a communist state and, consequentially, Stalin’s ally. The Soviet
Union possessed an overwhelming military force in Europe to outnumber even the United States
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military might at the time, notwithstanding military capabilities of the West European countries.
The Yugoslav departure represented the possibility of deviating from Stalin’s ideological path,
which was seen as a menace to communism in Eastern Europe.
To uphold the regime, Stalin could not allow backsliding and loosening of his terror
inside his communist party or outside the Kremlin. Tito projected exactly such challenges. In
Europe, the slightest sign of national independence among communists was condemned as
Titoism and punished with rigged show trials and death.267
There were countries in Europe that were uniformly hostile against Moscow and
suspicious of Soviet intentions, like Hungary, Czechoslovakia (initially, in part) and Poland. The
hostility and shadow of distrust was reasonable. Stalin’s intent was to impose the Soviet will by
forging communist clout in the Visegrad region. The division of Europe was underlined by the
overwhelming Soviet military presence on the European hinterland, outnumbering the Western
military might by 1:12.268
As Stalin had argued, the military clout gave him an opportunity to impose social order in
Central and Eastern Europe. In 1946 the world was startled to discover that there no longer
existed any army that could withstand the Soviet forces.269 It gave Stalin the opportunity to
impose his own political order-an order that was broadly despised for its atrocious character.
The East and the West were henceforth pitted against each other at the border stretching
through neutral zones of Germany from Lübeck and Austria, from Linz all the way to the
People’s Republic of Albania to the Mediterranean. At Yalta and Potsdam, Stalin made explicit
his insistence that these territories between Russia and Germany, if they were not to be wholly
absorbed into the USSR itself, must be run by friendly regimes “free of fascist reactionary
elements.”270
The world became divided into two camps: the countries where a communist party was in
power; and all the others, which were dubbed capitalist even if a labor party was in power, even
if most of the enterprises were owned by the state and even if the equalization of incomes was
carried further than in the socialist homeland. Stalin did not have other options-communist
parties had to rule the “friendly-brotherly” republics. There was no power that could hinder
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Stalin’s political force in Hungary, in Czechoslovakia or in Poland. From within the Soviet
Union, however, there was a domestic resistance that, of course, varied from country to country,
from satellite to satellite.
In Hungary, the Budapest municipal election of 1945 had already made it clear that there
was no communist appeal in the country; they were consistently defeated by old liberal, social
democratic and agrarian/smallholder parties.271 The Polish Communists in the so-called “Lublin
Committee”’- set up in July 1944 by the Soviet authorities so that they would have a ready-made
government to put in office when they reached Warsaw-could hardly claim a mass base.
On the other hand, the polish Peasant Party of Stanisław Mikołajczyk accounted for some
600,000 members in December 1945. In Czechoslovakia, because of the 1938 Western Munich
Agreement betrayal, the country was less ambivalent about the Soviet allegiance. London-based
exiled president Edvard Beneš overtly expressed his position to Molotov in 1943 that, “in regard
to issues of major importance, we would always speak and act in a fashion agreeable to the
representatives of the Soviet agreement.”
The Soviets initially were seen as liberators from the truly heavy-handed Nazi regime in
some countries. For example, Visegrad countries were cast in Hitler’s light by the MolotovRibbentrop Pact, to profoundly atrocious implications. While retreating, eager to make the most
of their days in power in Prague, Nazis took the time to jump out of their cars in relatively quiet
suburbs, break into basements where women, children and elderly people were hiding, and shoot
them all.272
Nevertheless, even in Czechoslovakia, notwithstanding Hungary and Poland, the
imposition of the communist foothold carried growing resentment against Stalin and
communism. It is difficult to imagine a regime less popular than that of Adolf Hitler, but his
closest ally for two years and his fiercest enemy until his death, Joseph Stalin, managed to form
just that. As popular resentment and internal opposition grew, so increased the scope and the
depth of Stalin’s purges.
The leader of the smallholders/peasant party in Hungary, Béla Kovács, was exiled to
Siberia for espionage against the Red Army.273 The rest of the smallholders/peasants were
271

Ibid, 131-137.
Heda Margolius Kovály, Under a Cruel Star: A Life in Prague 1941-1968 (New York: Helmes and Meier, 1986),
44.
273
Judt, 136.
272

103
purged from the parliament as conspirators. In Czechoslovakia, Foreign Minister Jan Masaryk,
who enjoyed overwhelming domestic popularity as a symbol of the cultural values and
humanistic traditions of the country, was blatantly thrown out of his office window. Those who
knew him denied the possibility of suicide.274 His father, Tomáš Masaryk, was a famous
Czechoslovak democratic philosopher and politician who adamantly supported inclusion of all
minorities in federal, multinational and democratic institutional designs.275
In the blatantly rigged Polish Parliamentary elections of January 1947, the Communistled “Democratic block” obtained 80 percent of the vote, and the peasant party just 10
(Mikołajczyk fled Poland in fear of execution as he was labeled as both anti-Nazi and antiSoviet).276 During Stalin’s regime, potential opponents became targets not just for what they did,
but also who they were. All means to forge the power were justified.
Unhesitant acceptance of communism in Czechoslovakia was rooted in the absence of
illusions about the West after the 1938 Munich Agreement. Nevertheless, an evolution of events
within the communist block proved that the Soviet socialism promises were delusional. The
break with the democratic socialist principles was made before Stalin by the founder of the
communist party, Lenin.277
Therefore, communism became a tool for social oppression and, therefore, could turn
against the bourgeoisie as well as ethnic groups. Well, this is exactly what was to happen. The
public pronouncements about Rudolph Slánský’s Trotskyite/Titoite-Zionist conspiracy, sabotage,
espionage and treason included references that the sabotage was staged by 14 people, 12 among
them Jews.278
The politically motivated trial and subversion of Slánský’s government was induced by
Antonín Josef Novotný to further a Stalinist-style rule from 1953 to 1968 in Czechoslovakia.
Novotný was poorly educated and his career had shown little promise until he displayed a flair
for fabricated evidence during Stalinist purges.279
The Stalinist political opponents, real and named, were incrementally eliminated by
politically motivated covert pressure, followed by overt terror and repression. That was the only
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way to keep societies obedient and the empire together. Stalinist political and social terror
consequentially tightened the screws against the deviation from the communist economic model,
where the collective prevails over the private. The promised workers’ revolution did not come.
Therefore, internal political strengthening was necessary. The Soviet economy soon became
focused around political expressions and less around addressing social needs.
Overwhelmingly heavy industrialization destroyed private initiatives promised by
Slánský, sought by the Hungarians and cradled by the Poles. The will of Moscow’s political elite
was imposed on Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. The Kremlin’s policies were alienating
local societies from communism’s promises. Several aspects that contributed to the growing
social discontent were shared but not necessarily distinctly equal in each of the Visegrad states.
The communist rule was imposed from the top and subsequently ignored demands for
subsistence and the social needs of the rest of the society. The Hungarians, for example, were
looking for “socialism with a human face,” something that was not anti-socialist, but was antiSoviet and anti-Russian.280 When Hungarian aspirations could not be met, the elimination of
proponents took place.
Quelling of the Hungarian aspirations during Stalin’s reign caused tremendous
humanitarian losses. It is estimated that Hungary, between 1948 and 1953, lost about one million
people through arrests, prosecutions, imprisonments or deportations (of a total population of less
than ten million).281 The humanitarian toll signifies the popular resistance against what Stalin had
contemplated for Hungary.
Moreover, as a nation with distinct traditions, Hungarians were willing to see their
customs blooming, rooted in the myths of “the land of the gypsy, dashing horsemen, beautiful
and hot-blooded women, paprika, rich and spicy food, full-bodied wines and Tokay.”282 There
was a sense of national uniqueness and distinctiveness that contrasted the communist humdrum.
Hungarian society was willing to merge popular customs with economic designs. The
backbone of the Hungarian economy had been small farmers, shopkeepers, restaurant owners
and artisans. Henceforth, the collective Soviet farm-kolkhoz-workers (skilled and unskilled,
writers, accountants, factory managers, directors and secretaries) became powerless units, none
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able to regard themselves as a historic unit with its own interests to defend.283 They could no
longer sustain their businesses under the collectivization and industrialization pressures.
The Soviet society was organized not for happiness, comfort, liberty, justice, personal
relations or making discoveries, but for combat and oppression of others.284 In stark
juxtaposition, the Hungarians were the nation of their own-descendants of Mongol followers of
Attila Hun (former adversaries to the Russian tsars) who eventually flourished in a Christian
kingdom to be later occupied by the Turks in 1526 and liberated by the Hapsburgs in 1686 to
reluctantly accept Vienna’s Hapsburg dominion.
Their distinct heritage and language, their restless opposition to foreign domination and
their love for discoveries made Hungarians nothing but opponents to Soviet dominance.
Hungarian discontent was deeply rooted in cultural and national oppression. In the novel “1984”
by George Orwell, it was stated that, “if you want a picture of the future, imagine a boot
stamping on a human face-forever,” eloquently describing Hungarian freedom being stamped out
by Stalin’s boot since 1948.
On the other hand, Czechoslovakia was among the most adamant supporters of
communism among the contemporary Visegrad countries at the outset of the Cold War.
Nevertheless, down the communist path, Czechs and Slovaks changed sides to become the most
ardent opponents even though they initially saw communism as something they could embrace.
The explanation lies in the fact that Eastern European countries had not experienced the full
horrors of Stalinism and Leninism. The Nazi crimes were still in their minds.285
Czechoslovakia had one of the most advanced economies at the outset of the Cold War.
Therefore, the Soviet Union had to work hard to destroy the economy and to change public
opinion, which was not initially hostile. No matter how Czechs and Slovaks loved the smell of
recently plowed soil, fresh air and a clean breeze, they, especially the economically more
advanced Czechs, also understood the inefficiency of their small farms.286 Therefore, the
communist collectivization efforts found initial appeal in Czechoslovakia.
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Moreover, the Czech language belongs to the same language family as Russian (Western
Slavic language with a strong Latin and German influence).287 In terms of language, there was a
potential for milder opposition. Nevertheless, at the outset of his reign, Stalin brought to
Czechoslovakia limits to self-expression and strong censorship, which severely constrained
cultural expression, social reciprocity and freedom of the media.
The fear of self-expression and communication in general spurred the general fear of
communism. Orwell, in his novel “1984,” proposed that, “If you want to keep a secret, you must
also hide it from yourself.” Families and even their children could potentially unveil real,
potential, or perceived “secrets.”
Censorship and social oppression on all levels strongly contributed to the growing terror
and opposition of all that communism brought to Czechoslovakia. Students and youth,
intellectuals and opinion leaders, play-writes and film-makers, journalists and novelists, all
became targets and at the same time a disguised opposition against the communist influence, all
under the radar of the communist watchdogs.
Furthermore, the economic model of the Soviet Union was not sustainable. Initiated by
Stalin himself and continued by his heirs, the collectivization and rigid economic planning were
the seeds for the demise of the Soviet empire. Poor economic performance was evident in large
industrial centers. Owing to large-scale industrialization, the countryside was empty of economic
activity but small farmsteads in distant rural areas could compensate for food shortages. There
was nothing industrial centers could offer in exchange.
The private micro-farms and enterprises, covertly encouraged by Khrushchev himself,
were increasingly successful compared to collective kolhozs and sovhozs. By 1965, 66 percent
of the potatoes consumed in the Soviet Union and 75 percent of the eggs came from private
farmers. In the Soviet Union, as in Poland or Hungary, socialism depended for its survival upon
an illicit capitalist economy to whose existence it turned a blind eye.288
Small gardens had become not only the primary sources for subsistence, but a social
tradition-a way of living and surviving within the communist bloc. The industrial output created
by the Soviet economy was not demanded by, nor necessary, for anyone, except for those
responsible for multiyear plans.
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Since private entrepreneurs were deprived of capital and forced into factories, private
initiative was doomed. Zdeněk Mlynář, a Czech communist studying in Moscow in 1950,
recalled poverty and backwardness where huge villages in remote areas consisted of wooden
cottages, transportation infrastructure was deliberately destroyed and the grain harvest was below
the level of the last peacetime period harvest under tsars.289 The Soviet Union at the outset of the
Cold War looked like the Potemkin village-disguised by a veil to hide its inevitable failure.
There was nothing that could potentially revert the deteriorating situation politically.
In Yugoslavia, the insufficiency of Titoism had been tested by history. There, the workers
were given the early right to self-organize in 1948. In other countries, the seize of freedom and
individual property just after the war for the sake of “understood necessity,” for party discipline,
for conformity with the regime, for the greatness of glory of the Fatherland or for substitutes that
were so convincingly offered, could be justified.290 But in the long-term perspective the
deprivation and inefficiency could not be ignored. Only where the living standard was raised
could the revolutionary ardor of the masses be cooled down.291 Władysław Gomułka, the
Secretary General of the Polish Communist Party, well understood that.
At the outset, he openly criticized plans for land collectivization in Poland and was
publicly associated with talk of a Polish national path to socialism.292 He was seen as a menace
by loyal Stalinists in the Polish communist establishment. Therefore, Gomułka was replaced by
Bolesław Bierut and reduced to Administrator of Social Assurance in 1948. In 1951, he was
arrested.
After the October Revolution of 1956 in Poland, Gomułka became Bierut’s nemesis since
he was liberated from imprisonment in September 1954 after Stalin’s death. Gomułka was
relinquished to mitigate Polish social discontent. With oppression, he succeeded in keeping
Poland obedient, but then he was forced to grant several concessions to Poles.
Despite the fact that the Polish rebellion in 1956 was quelled, its most notable outcomes
were private peasant ownership of about 80 percent of the land, the independence of the Roman
Catholic Church, liberal cultural policies and the legitimization of most of Poland’s national
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symbols.293 Despite the fact that the immediate social unrest was contained, underlying pressures
were not resolved.
Meanwhile, the broadest and the most comprehensive rebellion against Stalinist-type
oppression came to Hungary. After the Polish uprising was unsuccessfully quelled, there was a
multitude of regional and international events that brought Hungary closer to the revolution of
1956. To better outline the pre-conditions or factors that contributed to the Hungarian heroic
uprising, it is necessary to understand what happened after Stalin’s death from March 1953 until
the Hungarian revolt in October 1956.
It might seem a very short period, but the dynamic nature of events hinted at fissures and
a changing character in international affairs. The Tehran, Potsdam and Yalta conferences and the
surge of the 1947 Truman Doctrine during Stalin’s era alluded to the dwindling of European
political influence and the surge of American power.
Taken from the United Kingdom, the custody for Greece and Turkey was assumed by the
United States to deter communist expansion there. The Soviet boycott of the UN on June 27,
1950-when the Security Council cast the vote in favor of the allied military intervention in the
Korean peninsula-illuminated tremendous reciprocity between remote and proximate events,
institutions and power, and between diplomacy and capabilities. The Korean vote and war
proved that confrontation between communism and capitalism was going to be played out
practically, not ideologically. There was little Americans and Russians could agree on while they
obviously shared reciprocal contempt.
On May 15, 1955, 10 days after the formal incorporation of West Germany into NATO
and the abolition of the Allied High Command in the Federal Republic, the Soviet Union
announced the formation of its own Warsaw Pact. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania,
Bulgaria, Albania, East Germany and the Soviet Union formed an alliance of “friendship,
cooperation and mutual assistance” under a unified command.294
Hitherto, Soviet wartime treaties with France and Britain were abrogated and the Soviet
Union further assumed full sovereignty over East Germany. The fault line between the two
Germanies grew broader and deeper. NATO Allies and the Soviet Union were growing into two
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increasingly consolidated yet separate, rivaling blocks. Only some countries had the luxury of
assuming neutrality.
Postwar Austria, a birthplace of the most notorious Nazis, including the Fuhrer himself,
would actually be treated as a victim that had been occupied by Nazi Germany, rather than as an
integral part of it.295 Thus, the Soviets and the Allies could agree on neutrality in Austria, which
would imply the strict requirement for Austria to abstain from NATO membership.
Nevertheless, the price tag for this neutrality was handsome. After having extracted about
100 million United States dollars from its zone of occupation in Eastern Austria, the neutrality
accord required buying out Soviet economic interests for an additional 150 million dollars.
The acceptance of the Soviet terms made it possible to grant neutrality to Austria with an
official inauguration at the Geneva Summit in 1955 (the first meeting since Potsdam between the
United States and the Soviet Union leaders, Eisenhower and Khrushchev). With the prompt
withdrawal of the Soviet military from Austria, pluralism and free-market economics were
flourishing there.296 Austria’s ability to assume neutrality carried implications for the communist
block, too.
On the regional level, the result for Hungarians was the ability to cross the common
Austria-Hungary border and then the common Austria-West Germany border.297 The route was
also used by a few foreigners as inroads into the Soviet Union. The vast differences between the
West and the East, between Austria and Hungary, were already vividly seen before the
Hungarian revolution in the communist part of Europe where people were frosty, unfriendly and
suspicious; streets were empty of cars, but filled with military vehicles and some shiny Pobedas
driven by communist party apparatchiks, the landscape contained huge piles of bomb rubble and
the horizon was dominated by hideous new gray cement buildings and ugly memorials to “Soviet
liberators.”298
The Soviet Ambassador to German Democratic Republic tactfully advised Moscow in
December 1959: “The presence in Berlin of an open and, to speak to the point, uncontrolled
border between the socialist and the capitalist worlds unwittingly prompts the population to
make a comparison between both parts of the city, which, unfortunately, does not always turn out
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in favor of Democratic Berlin.”299 In contrast, Western Europe, with the reconstruction
assistance offered by the Marshall plan from 1948 to 1951, was robustly recovering
economically, socially and culturally. Quality of life disparities between the East and the West
were growing rapidly.
On the international level, it was nevertheless hard for the former European colonial
powers to break their ties with the past. The political recovery was harder than the one offered by
the Marshall Plan. In some instances, post-imperial implications in Western Europe affected
lives in Eastern Europe, too.
Apart from vital economic interests, British former imperial glory did not allow Anthony
Eden to accept the possibility of losing the Suez Canal to Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser.
There were a few bilateral meetings held by both leaders that illuminated poor body language,
hinting at the incompatibility of Egypt’s political trajectory with the will of Eden.
A secret plot to seize the Suez Canal and overthrow Nasser was therefore planned under
the leadership of the Brits in close alliance with the French and the Israelis. Without going into
more detailed scrutiny about the motives that drove the Suez crisis in 1956, it is important to
assert that it was played out almost in parallel to the revolution in Budapest.
Some things may never be certain, but the involvements of the British government and
MI6 in goading the Hungarians to fight in order to tie up the Soviet Union in the streets of
Budapest while the United Kingdom, France and Israel invaded Egypt, is important to
consider.300 On the other side of the Atlantic, the U.S. was ill-equipped and clueless about the
coming of events and composition of powers around the Suez Canal.
The outcome of the affair placed a strong trump card into Khrushchev’s hands. He
shamed the allies and forged stronger ties with the Arabic side of the Middle East, Egypt in
particular. The Soviets promised the buildup of the Aswan Dam in Egypt, something that
Americans refused to do after some political bargaining failures with Egypt. It further allowed
the strengthening of Khrushchev’s foothold in the Arab world. On the other hand, the Suez
offered a veil for Khrushchev to disguise Soviet actions in Hungary in 1956.
Eisenhower, caught by the British and French surprise, hit the two countries where it hurt
most. The United States was selling the British and the French economic assets to impose
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stringent financial constraints. On top of financial and economic constraints, the Suez crisis
precipitated decolonization and the shrinking of the British Commonwealth. The Sudan (in 1956)
and Malaya (in 1957) were the only among the former colonies that still respected their ties to
Britain.301 After the Suez crisis, the only option left to France was isolationism. Thus, the
construction of a united Europe became more urgent and necessary.302
Despite the fact that the Suez crisis created some cleavages in transatlantic cooperation, it
forced Europeans to urgently seek closer cooperation based on a common European market. The
Suez affair created cleavages in transatlantic partnerships and ostensibly spurred a Hungarian
surge in 1956, but it contributed to the unification of Western Europe.
The French foreign minister Christian Pineau records Adenauer as saying that, “France
and England will never be powers comparable to the United States ... not Germany either. There
remains to them only one way of playing a decisive role in the world: that is to unite Europe. We
have no time to waste; Europe will be your revenge.”303
The Suez crisis was not the only issue for which the Eisenhower administration was not
ready. The absence of United States intelligence made things worse in Hungary. “The Voice of
America” and “Radio Free Europe” strongly encouraged Eastern European countries to stand
against the communist power and take their faith in their own hands. The initial allied liberation
promise was taken seriously in Hungary.
When the actual rebellion against communism broke out, there was no assistance from
the United States or Europe (which was busy with Suez anyway). Radio pleas coming from
Hungary during the revolution made the tragedy even more painful and shameful for the West:
“Any news about help? Quickly, quickly, quickly!”304 Those were the final words before the
final Soviet crackdown on Hungary in 1956.
Before the revolt, the broadcasts encouraged rebels to aspire for everything, while
something would have been better than nothing at the time. Even during the actual fighting in
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Budapest, “Radio Free Europe” kept encouraging its Hungarian listeners to keep fighting for all
they sought and more, regardless of whether those goals were realistic.305
American intelligence agencies were responsible for “Radio Free Europe” media content
without having actual knowledge of the state of affairs in Hungary in 1956. In the 1950s, the
CIA did not even have an active program in or toward Hungary. It was assigned the lowest
priority among the satellites of Central and Eastern Europe.
The last significant precursor to Hungarian revolt came from Moscow. The Communist
politburo well understood that the Stalinist policies were not sustainable socially, economically
and consequentially, politically. Stalin’s death also caused a struggle for power within the
communist establishment in Kremlin. The critical reality of Stalin’s past was felt at the historic
Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February of 1956.
During the congress, Khrushchev denounced Stalin’s rule, hinting at substantial changes
in international communism. The resulting change within the Kremlin’s political establishment
was the uncertainty that led to further fracturing of the communist leadership into political
groups. A collective leadership was proclaimed split between Stalin opponents, like Molotov and
Mikoyan, and their younger rivals, party apparatchiks and “yes men” to Stalin, like Georgy
Malenkov, Nikita Khrushchev and Nikolay Bulganin.306 There was a vicious struggle for power
in Moscow that escalated after the congress.
Lavrenti Beria, head of the secret policy and second in charge after Stalin, was
denounced, tried and executed. The two groups that rose out of the congress developed ideas
about the future of communism. They were seeking something in between Stalin’s ideology and
the communist lines of Tito. “Titoism” introduced some decentralization in decision-making and
allowed experiments with factory and some worker autonomy. “Stalinism” impoverished society
under the absolute rule of a local party autocrat who was paranoid and all-powerful.307 Such
fractionalization created dissent not only in Moscow, but within most of the communist republics
and satellites. Political changes were imminent in Visegrad countries, too.
In search for socialist legality, which would replace Stalin’s excess, Hungarian
communist leaders were summoned to Moscow in June 1953. Mátyás Rákosi, Gábor Péter, Ernő
Gerő, Tamás Kádár represented a diehard Stalinist cohort.
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At the meeting, in front of younger and more progressive communists, Hungarian elites
learned that Rákosi, a well salted Stalinist, would be replaced by more moderate Imre Nagy (a
convinced communist who had opposed the collectivization of agriculture and who had a look of
a man who enjoyed his food and his wine).
Nagy’s political influence and connectedness in Kremlin were evident in Hungary, as he
could obtain news before officially announced.308 But the meeting in Moscow represented
unprecedented change, which was hard to digest for the Stalinists and impressive for Hungarians
to watch. Moreover, it was proof that Khruscehev was looking for compromises, alternatives to
Stalinist diehards.
The meeting was especially embarrassing for Stalinist Rákosi. The comrade was lectured
and shamed for economic mismanagement. The anti-Stalinist sentiment was unleashed during
the meeting in Moscow. Even Molotov, a hardline Stalinist, took the floor to criticize Rákosi’s
know-it-all attitude and wave of repressions that engulfed Hungary.
One of Rákosi’s Stalinist comrades, Kádár, seemed to embrace Moscow’s dictate and
instructions but later became more moderate. The reshuffling of the Hungarian leaders by
Moscow impressed Hungarians. Even the hardliners could be moved around the posts as
Moscow pleased. And it was Moscow that prepared the invitation list for the Hungarian-Soviet
meeting of 1953.
The obvious next step for Nagy was to remedy the failing economy, which was based on
heavy industrialization, elimination of private property and agricultural reforms that left the
country bereft of even the most rudimentary consumer goods. He wanted socialism to succeed in
a country he loved. During the next two years, Nagy did just that.
He promised to put “a human face” on communism and succeeded quickly. Life became
better, food was plentiful, the worst of the terror was over and some freedoms in the arts were
permitted again. Hungary was inevitably becoming a regime that was close to unacceptable for
Moscow. The most obvious reason was the fragility and tectonic power shifts within the Soviet
Politburo. Hungary’s initial success challenged the political designs in Moscow.
The Soviet secret police chief Lavrenti Beria was executed in December 1953. He was
one of the staunchest supporters of Nagy. Before, Imre Nagy was involved in forging the secret
policy branch in Hungary. Georgy Malenkov was groomed to be Stalin’s heir. In 1955, Nikita
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Khruschev succeeded in ousting Malenkov. He was a more moderate communist member in
Moscow, and another of Nagy’s patrons in Kremlin.
As Hungary was rapidly changing, Rákosi was stepping up his criticism about the new
course. His pleas resonated in Moscow. Khrushchev had his own problems with the Stalinist
Soviet generals, not all of whom were eager to bury Stalinism along with Stalin.309 Once
Malenkov, one of Nagy’s patrons, was demounted, Nagy promptly lost his government, party
and academic positions (at Rákosi’s insistence, of course).310
In a similar vein as with Rákosi in 1953, the departure of Nagy was announced in
Moscow. Shaming and blaming in Kremlin was reminiscent to what his nemesis had experienced
just two years prior. This time, the Stalinist values and the deviation from the communist
ideological course dominated the discourse.
The departure of Nagy was not left unnoticed by Hungarians. Even though Nagy was a
communist and adamant Muscovite, Hungarians liked him because he spoke the language
Hungarians understood. He also sought economic and political change, and was something of a
lone ranger surrounded by scheming, wily “real” communists. Despite the severe downgrade in
his status, Nagy was allowed to stay in Hungary.
He was, therefore, publicly visible to Hungarians as an alternative to hardcore Stalinists.
Moscow thought such a decision would be sensible. If Rákosi caused problems, he could also be
replaced. During his time as prime minister, Nagy had released Stalin’s prisoners. Among them
were the church members.
Until Stalin’s death, one of the most notorious show trials was that of Cardinal József
Mindszenty who, having been drugged and tortured, confessed to leading an “anti-state”
conspiracy for which he was sentenced to life imprisonment.311 The church was not a close Nagy
political ally, but it did stand in stark opposition to the nationalization of the church’s property.
The Catholic Church was less a Polish-type national unifier than a supporter of the private
property rights in Hungary.
During his tenure, Nagy introduced an intellectual revolt that inspired intellectuals, but he
never managed to forge a strong alternative political cohort with Stalinist dictum. In fact, at his
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departure, he left behind unorganized political cohorts and groups, which were not Stalinist, nor
Nagy’s compatriots.
What was obvious, though, was their uniform willingness to see Rákosi out and Nagy
back in. In Hungary, the Petőfi intellectual and revolutionary circle held debates on the most
controversial of social issues, some of which were broadcasted into the streets by
loudspeakers.312 Despite the fact that there was a genuine willingness to crush the circle in 1956,
Moscow was afraid of sparking another round of protests to parallel those in Poznan, Poland.
The Poznan Uprising was suppressed at the cost of 74 deaths and 575 severely injured. It
constituted a much higher death toll than any of the future Polish disturbances.313
The post-Stalin discontent in the post-Nagy period was making its way to Hungary, too.
Sensing risks of social unrest, Rákosi was replaced by Ernő Gerő, just another Stalinist thug, for
the sake of having a different person in charge of the Hungarian communist party. The move did
not satisfy the Hungarian appetite for change.
Students demanded the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungary, the cancellation of
further reparations payments to the Soviet Union, the return to power of Imre Nagy and free
elections. Such fragile but surging social unrest prompted the march of 300,000 protesters
through the streets of Budapest on October 23, 1956.
The members of the government briefly watched the protesters in dissent. Opening fire
on demonstrators might have triggered more violent demonstrations. The fear of using force
doomed those in power. The communist party and government in Hungary became as helpless as
the monarchy of France had been in 1789 or the Russian czar in 1917.314
Intellectual, student and other demands quickly resulted in a rapid escalation of the social
unrest. Crowds tried to seize control of radio stations, others marched to newspaper offices and
still others to the giant statue of Stalin. The last group, with immense effort and the help of a
passing truck carrying a welder and his tools, finally succeeded in toppling the statue of Stalin.
They left behind on the top of the rose marble plinth only two giant bronze boots.
In the meantime, student delegations were barred from entering buildings and
broadcasting their 16-point demands on Radio Kossuth.315 The situation quickly got out of hand.
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Flocking behavior in Hungary was encouraged by nationalistic slogans and debates. The secret
police and the security forces either attempted to vanish into civilian clothes or barricaded
themselves in their headquarters to defend their lives.
The same day, protesters gathered in front of the Parliament to demand Nagy’s return. It
was past midnight when the audience, made up of party members and non-members alike,
chanted slogans like: “Vissza a pártba!” (return Nagy to the party). The situation in Budapest
rapidly deteriorated and ended with casualties. Security teams fired random shots into groups of
insurgents. Access to the strategic sites was hindered by demonstrators and the secret police
alike. There was chaos in Hungary.
Seeing the state of Hungary, Moscow had made up its mind. Russian troops entered
Budapest and moved to secure every important point in the country on October 23, 1956. In the
meantime, Nagy’s immediate concern was to quickly put together a government that contained
enough “real” communists to satisfy the Russians and enough “reform” or “liberal” communists
to pacify the rebels in the streets.
The situation was already out of hand on both sides. Gerő was not capable of reversing
the situation because the Hungarians were already on the streets, while, for Nagy, things had
simply gotten too far out of control. Tanks, armored personnel and planes in the sky
demonstrated overwhelming Soviet force.
Nonetheless, Budapest was not ready to conform. The descendants of Hingis Hun were
ready to put up a fight, which is exactly what they did. Hungarians in the streets used “Molotov
cocktails” as the welcome-drinks for Soviet tanks. The techniques the young people, many of
them schoolchildren, used to destroy tanks were amazing.
In response, Russians used heavy artillery at the least sign of resistance. The Russian
assumption that demonstrations with brute force could be easily quelled proved false. The effect
was like the clumsy bear (tank) entering a nest of wasps (Budapest filled with freedom fighters).
The government was unable to persuade the Hungarian army generals to end support of the
insurgents.316 The country was bereft of institutions, which could be effective in restoring peace
and political control, as well as consolidating society.
After violent shootings in front of the Hungarian parliament, the truce was granted on
October 28. With the Hungarian Army just standing by, the war between the mighty Soviet army
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and the incredibly brave and ingenious insurgents had come to a standstill.317 The Soviet military
vacated Budapest streets. It seemed for a moment that the brave Hungarians had accomplished
what “Radio Free Europe” had suggested.
To restore political stability, there was an immediate need for new political leadership
and social order in Hungary. Nagy was the only potentially credible political leader on the scene
to sort things out and to adapt the regime to better favor national interests. But Nagy turned out
to be ill-equipped to do so.
On October 28, with insurgents talking to officials, including Nagy himself, the
coordination phase began with a heroic salutation and a cease-fire. It continued with the creation
of a new government, which included a couple of non-communists like Zoltán Tildy and Béla
Kovács, four centrist Kádár supporters, and two Nagy reformers, but concluded with the
restoration of a multiparty system, restoration of the National Guard composed of police, army
and insurgents, and the Soviet declaration to withdraw military forces from Budapest. It seemed
like the dream of a communism with a human face was becoming reality. That might have been
the case if only Imre Nagy could appease and accommodate ideologically different groups in
Budapest.
Insurgents did not hesitate to display their hatred and contempt toward communist
offices, symbols and people. Nagy pleaded for the end of the violence, well aware of how it was
infuriating Mikoyan, Suslov and the Soviet generals still residing in Hungary.318 But there was
nothing to stop it. Radical Nagy allies carried a warning about his waning popularity. Hungarians
wanted the “real” Nagy to stand up and were concerned that he was just a Soviet puppet.
Imre Nagy was sandwiched between the two groups. One demanded the restoration of
order and compliance with the communist principles while the other demanded more of the
impossible. Social-political groups were pressing for their own inherit interests. Soviets had
implicitly accepted the Hungarian uprising outcomes-if only Hungary could settle itself to avoid
challenging the Soviet Union.
The pressure to take sides led Nagy to write his historic speech, “In the interests of
further democratization of the country’s life, the cabinet abolishes the one-party system and puts
the country’s government on the basis of democratic cooperation between the coalition parties as
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they existed in 1945.”319 By the time the speech was delivered, Stalinist Hungarians had already
fled Budapest. The speech was seemingly approved by Mikoyan and Suslov beforehand. The
revolution seemed victorious!
Indeed, the Soviet declaration published in journal “Pravda” on October 31 stated that
there was a genuine willingness to withdraw Soviet troops from Budapest. Official archives also
prove the authenticity of such information. It meant that the Soviet Union contemplated treating
Hungary in the same manner as Austria, Finland or Yugoslavia. It would have further meant the
end of Europe as we knew it after the Hungarian revolution on 1956.
Nevertheless, on the top of the burst, Imre Nagy announced that Hungary had demanded
its release from the Warsaw Pact on October 31. Hardly anything was more certain to trigger
anger among the Russian military than the violation of the Warsaw Pact. Hungary did not intend
to be another Poland held in a looser leash.
After lengthy discussions with Poland’s Gomułka, who had recently quelled mutinies in
Poznan, Khrushchev reversed his decision. On the morning of November 1, Nagy was awakened
with the news that the Soviet troops had crossed the Soviet-Hungarian border. On that November
day the Soviet Union reversed its course for Hungary.
Henceforth, Nagy’s pleas for assistance at the UN were not heard. The Suez Canal crisis
dominated international discourse. Soviets had a free hand to do whatever they wanted in
Hungary. After ruthless shelling of the city, and more skillful purges in the Budapest streets, the
Soviet Union had toppled Nagy’s government. Imre Nagy was later captured and executed.
János Kádár announced a new “Revolutionary Hungarian Worker-Peasant” government
through radio broadcast.320 The Soviet Union harvested its short-term fruits, but planted seeds for
the long haul to keep the union together. They had proved to the world that the communist
empire could only be held together with the turret of a tank. What happened in Hungary before
and after the November policy reversal perplexed not just Hungarians. There was significant
dissent inside Kremlin too. The departure from Stalinist-Leninist principles proved to be harder
than Khrushchev initially thought.
Nevertheless, a new ideological communist model was born: Kádárism or the strategy to
assure the Kremlin authorities that there was no Hungarian (national) model, merely a limited
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practical solution to local difficulties.321 It was nevertheless different from Stalinism or Titoism.
Kádárism was later baptized as the “goulash communism.”
It provided solutions to economic and social challenges. With Kádárism, Moscow
pretended that everything was in order in Hungary. Kremlin ignored the incremental and mild
reform process in Hungary. The Soviet Union chose to turn a blind eye on its most crucial
problems-an ailing civilization.322
Prague Spring, 1968
The revolution and protests of 1956 were the legacy the Soviet Union carried until the
Prague Spring of 1968. Reasons that led to Prague were different than those in Hungary. The
social unrest that came to Prague in particular and Czechoslovakia in general was derived not
only from within but also outside the country-and not only Czechoslovakia, but the whole Soviet
Union.
The Czech and Slovak discontent had similar roots as Hungary with the Czech and the
Slovak socio-economic grievances being ignored. Czechoslovakia had not escaped political
purges either. Karol Bacílek (the first secretary of the Slovak party, who was later replaced by
Alexander Dubček) explained to the National Conference of the Czech Communist Party on
December 17, 1952 that, “the question as to who was guilty and who was innocent was in the
end to be decided upon by the party with the help of the National Security Organs.”323 The
Slánský trial proved that the latter fabricated the evidence for the former to organize show trials
and purge political opponents.
For people who were employed by the communist party, there was limited space for any
leeway. “Whoever is not with us is against us,” ran the slogan. Both one belonged, body and
soul, to the Party, or one was considered a traitor.324 Stalinist-style purges continued until his
death, and beyond.
In the early 1950s, there were 100,000 political prisoners in Czechoslovakia (a nation of
13 million) while “administrative liquidators” quietly shot without publicity or trial all “regime
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opponents.” Political consolidation in the Soviet Union in general, but in Czechoslovakia in
particular, was more robust than in other Visegrad countries.
Initial Czechoslovak economic well-being or better standing inside the Soviet Union
allowed for stricter political controls and the postponement of economic reform. Nevertheless, as
the economy deteriorated, social pressure on political elites grew. Some comrades from the
Slánský’s cabinet, like Trade Secretary Rudolph Margolius, were more and more often
approached by random citizens asking for help.
Older people, former tradesman or self-employed, who had their shops confiscated, were
looking for pensions and other jobs. In some cases those in power could assist. Nevertheless, the
roster of the needy was growing. At some point even the mighty at the top who genuinely wanted
to, could not assist. Economic pleas for help inside Czechoslovakia could be resolved only by
introducing a more ruthless regime without destroying the communist edifice.
Economic problems were blamed on political elites. The cynical execution of Rudolph
Slánský, for example, was a result of accusations of over-billing Moscow for Czech products.
The over-billing in the Czech case was, however, an established Soviet practice, as the
prosecutors well knew. A way of funneling cash through Prague to the West for the use in
intelligence operations. After most of Slánský’s ministers were tried and executed, his nemesis,
Antonín Novotný, imposed a stringent regime over Czechoslovakia by tightening the communist
grip even further.
A thaw took place in some Soviet countries. But the absence of any reforms and the
opposing Stalinist principles drove even the most influential Czech and Slovak comrades crazy.
For example, reliable, unheroic, unimaginative Muscovite, the Czechoslovak President Klement
Gottwald, who was convinced that Stalin’s path to communism was the correct one, had long
disguised his opposition against the regime with heavy drinking.325
In 1948, Gottwald was seen as the communist who would lead Czechoslovakia into a
wonderful new world.326 Nevertheless, the economy was crumbling and social anxiety was
growing while the regime was drifting further toward Stalinism. The elites, the country, and the
society were further submerging into poverty, deprivation, and desperation.
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While Czechoslovakia remained Stalinist, the world around it was changing. With new
technological tools, such as satellites and inexpensive erasable videotape, television was making
communication much more global. It was thrilling because for the first time in human experience
the important, distant news of the day became immediate.327
The international community could obtain news faster and thus became more
knowledgeable than when de-colonization took place. France ended its colonial adventures in
Indochina by losing the war for Vietnam against Ho who, beforehand, had lived in Paris under
the pseudonym Nguyen O Phap (“Nguyen who hates the French”). The Vietnamese despised the
French.
The United States substituted for France in Vietnam. The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of
1964 gave broad congressional approval for expansion in the Vietnam War. Henceforth, the
American military surge was internationally despised, even by its allies. During his 1967 New
Year’s message, De Gaulle spoke of “the detestable unjust war” in Vietnam, in which a “big
nation” was destroying a small one. Notwithstanding the French hypocrisy, there was an
international resentment against the expanding American power and presence abroad.
Transatlantic alliances seemed to be in crisis.
In the meantime, Europe was economically booming. The post-war economic growth
differed slightly in its timing from place to place, coming first to Germany and Britain, and then
a little later to France and Italy.328 Western European countries witnessed unseen economic
activity and unprecedented prosperity in the three decades following Hitler’s death.
Cars, clothes, baby carriages, packaged foods and washing powder all became available
in a bewildering variety of shapes and sizes and colors. There was also a tremendous shift from
industrial production (which became increasingly effective) to services and tertiary sector jobs.
Endorsed by the European economic growth, France was leading the political debate in
Europe. The Atlantic Alliance was born of a European crisis of confidence; and the Atlantic
crisis of confidence now promoted European unification.329 Similar to the aftermath of the Suez
crisis, Europe was consolidating under De Gaulle.
Europe, especially France, grew as a post-colonial middle-power between the United
States and the Soviet Union. France embraced a German partnership as the focal point for the
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European consolidation. At their first meeting at Rambouillet in September 1958, De Gaulle and
Chancellor Adenauer came to a personal agreement underlining the terms of such an entente: in
return for complete support of France for German claims, Germany would support France’s
positions toward NATO and Europe.330
The growing welfare and political standing also contributed to bold social change.
European societies started challenging the conservative postwar values for better, or at least
novel, ones. In other words, the new Europe started challenging the old one, the young were
challenging the older generation. European youth wanted to be different. They wanted to decide
their own lives and futures culturally, socially, economically and politically.
The expansion of culture and alternative values took place. For example, the expansion of
American pop-culture coincided with the explosion of American rock music. Working-class
teenagers, for whom jazz had never held much appeal, were immediately attracted to the
American revolution in popular music: driving, tuneful, accessible, sexy and, above all, their
own.331
The American economic expansion and way of living was very much admired, especially
by the young, in Europe. The British novelist J.B. Priestley described the process in 1955 as
‘admass’ or Americanization-adoption in Europe of all the practices and aspirations of modern
America. The growing prosperity and consumption patterns in Europe, promoted by the growing
advertising sector, were seen as the American way of life.
Above all, American culture in Europe was efficiently introduced through the nearly
unrestricted movie industry. Within a very short time, jeans, motorbikes, Coca-Cola, big hair
(male and female) and pop stars had spawned locally adapted variations across Western Europe.
The frivolous side of the 1960s-fashion, pop culture, sex-were not be dismissed as mere froth
and show. It was a new generation’s way of breaking with traditions of the older generation, the
gerontocracy (Adenauer, De Gaulle, Macmillan and Khrushchev).332
In 1965, when the Students for Democratic Society (SDS) called for a Vietnam antiwar
demonstration in Washington, many, including some in the old pacifist movement, complained
that SDS had failed to criticize communists.333 Peace movements rose and were socially
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different. For example, marijuana-smoking and peace-demanding youth introduced a new social
cohort labeled hippies. The name itself was a symbol of goofy brilliance much appreciated by
young militants, but few others.
Hippies, pacifists and anti-war, anti-oppression, freedom-oriented movements were
organizing sit-ins and spontaneous protests against war, oppression and violence. The war in
Vietnam was one of the most obvious focal points for youth of the time. The new movement
despised all violence, be it war in Vietnam or the communist atrocities in the East. The youth
henceforth became a new social group that brought forth new political demands.
The Soviet atrocities were not lost on the anti-violence, anti-war and anti-oppression
movements. Between 1956 and 1968 Marxism in Europe lived and thrived in a state of
suspended animation, but Stalinist communism was in disgrace, thanks to the revelations of
1956.334 Europe, for example, not only represented the bipolar clash between communism and
capitalism. It also brought to attention different variations of socialism within Western and
Eastern European states. Demands for more social security and care mobilized youth around
Europe.
The student dormitories in Nanterre, France, had harbored clandestine student
movements, which opposed the exclusion of youth from decision-making, growing economic
deprivation, and inequality. The first protests in the Nanterre dormitories broke out in January
1968 when squatters, who refused to pay rent, were expelled.
For different reasons, the same thing was happening in Italy and Germany. In 1963, Italy
was governed for many years by the center-left coalition. Until 1966, the Federal Republic was
led by the “Grand Coalition” of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats. The youth
challenged those political establishments in Europe, which, from the perspective of the young,
were incrementally imposing unfair social practices on the younger generation.
The young men and women in the European student crowds were overwhelmingly
middle class. They all were eager to protest against the political establishments, but in every
European country they had different motivations. The Parisian bourgeoisie itself-Fils à Papa
(daddy’s boys)-was fighting armed powers on the streets while their parents were watching from
cozy balconies. Youth and students were protesting against rigid institutions and a political
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culture that excluded the youth. The young were the ones that challenged European institutions
to undertake reforms.
For example, France was run by a tiny Parisian elite, socially exclusive, culturally
privileged, haughty, hierarchical and unapproachable. In Italy, the protests were organized by the
youth and the students, but the discontent was rooted in the absence of access to transport,
services, education and, above all, housing.
In 1966, students at the University of Strasbourg published a paper, “On the Poverty of
Student Life,” which stated, “The student is the most despised creature in France, apart from
priest and policeman.”335 In the United Kingdom, students started out by demonstrating against
the war in Vietnam and moved on to local issues such as the size of government grants for
education and control over universities.336
The youth radical intelligentsia of the 1960s in Germany accused the Bonn Republic of
covering up the crimes of the founding generation.337 Little about the post-1933 history was
taught in West German schools. In Italy in 1968, students protested inadequate facilities and
carried a long red flag from building to building on the campus of the University of Rome once it
reopened after being closed for 12 days in mid-March due to violence. The same year, Spanish
students were protesting against an openly fascist regime that sanctioned a mass for Adolf Hitler
in Madrid.
Youth protests were evident in other parts of the world as well. In Brazil, armed violence
that killed the protesters in the opening months of 1968 failed to keep students from protesting
the four-year dictatorship. In Japan students were violently protesting the presence on their soil
of the United States military machine engaged in Vietnam.
Young women in the Mexican student movement of 1968 shocked Mexican society by
carrying signs saying “Virginity Causes Cancer.”338 Apart from that, there were multiple sit-ins,
demonstrations, protests and expressions of free thought carried out on multiple American
campuses. Despite being geographically distant, some student movements reciprocated and
endorsed fellow student rebellions abroad.
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Student movements were also surging in Eastern Europe. By fall 1967, Czech writers
were openly demanding more freedom of expression and students from Prague’s Charles
University were demonstrating in the streets.339 Student dormitories were sheltering free thought
and youth protest movements. The surge of new ideas and new movements were without doubt a
menace for the Soviet system.
Stalinist inertia was aimed at repressing such ideas, not merely in terms of basic
education of the Soviet man, but even in the useful and applied sciences, which were gravely
handicapped by the lack of freedom of discussion.340 The challenge for the communist camp was
to contain the influence of the youth, which was, nevertheless, beyond its Eastern European
regional clout. It was the international student movement that had found inroads into the
communist camp.
For example, Soviet oppression was well reciprocated in college campuses in Chicago.
The anti-war demonstrators carried banners labeled “Czechago,” referring to Chicago as the
Prague West.341 It was not because the conditions or objectives of student movements were
shared between the United States and Czechoslovakia. It was because the protests pitted the
youth against the power.
Incidentally, police suppressing protests in Chicago gave the same answer to protesters as
the Soviet army in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The student’s question was: “Why are you here?”
The police officer’s answer was: “It is my job!” Students and socially excluded groups
demanded more lawful rights, and the social surge had become international.
In 1963 in the United States, an estimated 930 civil rights demonstrations were carried
out in 11 southern states, resulting in 20,000 arrests, while the young generation around the
world was watching these David-and-Goliath tactics.342 In the United States, the Nobel Prize
winner Martin Luther King, Jr. was rallying a civil rights movement. He compared himself to
Moses, who led his people out of slavery, but died on a mountaintop in Jordan in view of the
Promised Land.
After King’s death, surges of protests broke out in multiple American cities. In the hope
of calming Black America, Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act. Apart from that, workers
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demanded more social protection, equality, higher salaries and shorter working hours. It was not
a novel thing for European or American politicians to consider. Such demands were nevertheless
impossible to meet for the Soviet Union, which was experiencing embarrassing economic
performance.
The contagious effects of the social and youth movements were what communist leaders
feared most. International protests had gained traction inside the Soviet Union, too. Khrushchev
was perplexed and his dissent had two major results. One was the intrusion of Western values
and their growing appeal within the communist block.
The other was Khrushchev’s own demise: in October 1964 protestors were irritated at
policy failures and the autocratic leadership style, but, above all, it was Khrushchev’s
inconsistencies that made Kremlin uneasy.343 Thus, Khrushchev was ousted and powers were
changing hands in Kremlin.
Moreover, Soviet communism was losing the competition against Maoist communism. In
October 1961, in competition for global influence, Moscow closed its embassy in Albania, the
Beijing’s European locum. And Cuba was turning its back on the Soviet Union. Trials of the proSoviet officials at the beginning of 1968 appeared to symbolically distance Cuba from the Soviet
Union. Castro seemed more interested in China than in Russia, which from the point of view of
the new Left, was the correct choice.344 Fear was mounting in the face of cultural and ideological
challenges to communism. In the past, leaders like Lenin had always worried more about his
critics than his principles; his heirs were no different.
In addition to the cultural-ideological realm, small states showed an increasing potential
to stand up against greater powers. The Six-day War illuminated Israel’s overwhelming military
superiority over the Soviet allies, the Arab countries. Israel was acting on its own, without the
assistance from the United States and without consulting France. De Gaulle publicly expressed
distaste toward Israel and Jews. Like many secular Jews of his generation, he found himself
wondering if his Jewish identity and his relationship to Israel should not play a more important
part in politics.345
Inside the communist block, the Polish Jews strongly supported Israel. At some point
there was no difference between Polish Jews and Poles themselves because supporting Israel was
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a way to oppose Moscow. The same political stance, as a way to oppose Kremlin, was shared in
countries like Romania, Albania, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Moreover, Cuba’s bearded Fidel
Castro was much admired among the youth for the courage he showed against two major powers,
the United States and the Soviet Union. The possibility of small states defying larger powers was
unprecedented in recent history.
Within the communist block, the next challenge was imminently approaching. As in the
case with Hungary, the seeds of Prague Spring came from Poland. And as in the other
communist states, there was a debate about the future of the Polish nation and culture. In
practice, there was a disagreement about how to best preserve the nationhood.
Political realism until the late 1970s (as in Wielopolski’s “Organic Work” before 1863)
emphasized the priority of national survival until better times while political idealism (as in the
interwar Piłsudski-ite self-confidence) stressed the open aspects of the Polish struggle for
independence and the psychological aspects of national will.346 The ideas converged at some
point.
The ideological stance was rooted in identity. Polak-Katolik (Pole-Catholic) undeniably
has a deep Polish socio-psychological dimension.347 Such explanations will inevitably bind
Polish nationalism with catholic principles. The political realism and political idealism have a
capacity to outline the path for national preservation to some extent; there were other reasons
that brought demands for a reform to Poland.
Domestic fracturing and social cleavages surged between political cohorts and workers as
well as between workers and students in 1968. In neither case was the social discontent rooted in
Polish nationalism or religious traits. The rebellion was more of a consequence of the ongoing
international student rebellion.
On March 8, several hundred University of Warsaw students staged a demonstration and
marched to the rector’s office shouting, “No studies without freedom!”348 The response from the
Polish militia was to oppress the student riot. Men, dressed in civilian uniforms but wearing the
red and white of the Polish flag armbands and carrying clubs, along with 200 police officers,
chased and beat students. The police arrested those who tried to flee.
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Overwhelmed by the brutality, around 20,000 students immediately marched in protest in
Warsaw. They were clubbed by police once again. The brutality of the regime created a
momentum that young Polish anti-Soviet intellectual dissidents like Jacek Kuroń and Karol
Modzelewski could never have dreamed. Soon thereafter a student movement, consisting of
young polish communists, the children of the country’s elite (three of them were children of
government ministers), was born.
Students were engaged in riots in the name of independence and freedom. And every
demonstration was promptly greeted with a brutal counterforce. Therefore, power structures and
military units in Poland were very much despised and thus were quickly rebranded as the Nazi
secret police-Gestapo.
The other social cohort that showed its discontent on the streets was workers. Their
demands were easier to comprehend and to meet by the government. Fortunately for the
communists in Poland, demands of the students and workers were different and, therefore, could
be juxtaposed. In 1968, students had a motto, “There is no bread without freedom,” recalled
Eugeniusz Smolar, a student activist and the son of an influential party member. For workers it
was the opposite, for the bread always comes first.
To quell the student riots, the government closed factories early. They labeled students as
the fifth column in the country and pitted Polish workers against Polish students. For some years
to come the government was able to contain protests because either workers did not support
students or intelligentsia or students would not support workers.
When the immediate protests of 1968 were eliminated in Poland, the Polish students,
impressed by the events in their neighboring country, carried signs that said, “Polska czeka na
swego Dubczeka!” (Poland awaits its own Dubček!).349 It might just be the case that the postNovotný leadership in Czechoslovakia was already doomed by the explicit events and slogans of
neighboring Poland.
In general histories of Czechoslovakia, to say nothing of broader accounts of postwar
Europe, the Cold War, or the history of Socialism, the replacement of Antonin Novotný by
Alexander Dubček as First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party on January 5, 1968,
is routinely noted as the start of the Prague Spring. It was the moment when the dark forces
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represented by Novotný’s Stalinist old guard were vanquished by the supposed light of Dubček’s
humane socialism.350
The other important precursor to the Prague Spring was the abolishment of censorship
and the introduction of the free media in March 1968. However, more openness introduced new
political challenges. By 1967, as Dubček later recalled, a direct clash between communist
functionaries impatient for further reforms and those believed to be holding progress back had
become inevitable.351
The confrontation finally came out into the open at the Fourth Writers’ Congress, at
which former Stalinists like Milan Kundera, Pavel Kohout and Ivan Klíma publicly joined forces
with non-party writers such as Václav Havel in opposing censorship, however discreet the
technique.352
Broader social discussions on daily life, culture, economy and politics surged thereafter.
Communism was challenged in all public forms, overtly through cultural works and covertly
through social debates, or vice versa. In 1956, the truth was still whatever served the needs of the
party. The party meant comrade Novotný and his allies, inseparably bound by their crimes.353
For Stalinists, if patterns did not correspond with facts, then facts could be made to tally
with the pattern.354 In 1968, however, social groups gathered to discuss communist crimes, rising
youth violence, and social and economic problems. Individuals were gathering for the sake of
discussions because they provided a unique opportunity to voice the myriad challenges of the
time. These opportunities contributed to social cohesion. The social unity that emerged in
Czechoslovakia was associated with Dubček. He was welcomed by the two ethic groups of the
same state, Slovaks and Czechs.
Society did not hide its sympathies. Every morning on the once-dreaded staircase of the
Central Committee building, women were waiting with homemade cakes, children were giving
their teddy bears for good luck and no one missed seeing Dubček on television.355 It seemed like
good fortune and optimism had finally come to Prague.
350

Mary Heiman, “The Scheming Apparatchik of the Prague Spring,” Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 60, No. 10
(December, 2008): 1717–1734, 1719.
351
Alexander Dubcek and Jiri Hochman, Hope Dies Last: The Autobiography of Alexander Dubcek (Kodansha
America, 1993), 112.
352
Heiman, 1727.
353
Kovály, 165.
354
Berlin, 22.
355
Kovály, 181.

130
Thousands of people in Prague, especially the young, had taken to the streets on February
15 to celebrate the Czechoslovakian hockey team’s victory over the undefeated Soviet team in
the winter Olympics in Grenoble, France. It was a widespread belief that if Novotný had stayed
in power, somehow the Czechoslovakian team would not have been allowed to win. From that
moment on, it seemed that cheering crowds never left.
There was a growing belief that with Novotný nothing was possible. The shortages of
consumer goods and inefficiency of production were taking their toll. Beforehand, the popular
will to reform the economy and the agricultural industry, and to establish private enterprise to
better serve consumption needs, was never met. The situation for the old political guard
deteriorated even more when the press took Novotný himself under scrutiny.
He and his son, it was revealed, used a government import license to obtain Mercedeses,
Alfa Romeos, Jaguars, and other Western cars in order to impress women.356 Such hypocrisy
among the highest Stalinist echelons severely undermined political credibility, or what was left
of it.
Since Khrushchev, who was Novotný’s patron, was deposed, there were no influential
communist political figures to bolster Stalinists like Novotný in Czechoslovakia. Witnessing the
deteriorating situation, Brezhnev suggested that Novotný sort things out on his own. Moscow
had turned its back on Novotný and accepted Dubček (and, therefore, reforms).
The social dissatisfaction with the regime was a sufficient catalyst for Dubček to purge an
old guard from power and replace it with more progressive young party members. Thus, social
change came even faster. Political shifts resonated well in the cultural realm, and vice versa.
Hitherto, rigid censorship and communist party ideology were replaced with stinging
playwrights, poetry and literature.
As a result, some communist republics became anxious. On top of Albania’s and
Romania’s oppressive Stalinists, East Germany’s Walter Ulbricht (a hostile, vain and senile old
man), Bulgaria’s Todor Zhivkov (considered dull and possibly stupid357) and Poland’s
Władysław Gomułka were becoming concerned about the potential Czechoslovak effect on their
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regimes.358 Very recently student movements and protests were crushed in Poland, France, and
Germany. However, in Prague, there was an optimism. It was the place to be.359
The cultural surge, based on free media, activities of dissident groups and reform-minded
writers, challenged communist principles. On top of that, Prague witnessed an influx of foreign
tourists. All jazz clubs and hotels were overbooked. Suddenly, a Prague student who had never
seen the rest of the world, bearded and in Texasski jeans too stiff and too blue to fit, felt like a
part of a liberating world youth movement.360 Like the other international youth movements,
Czechoslovaks were demanding reforms.
In Czechoslovakia, demands for reforms came primarily from youth and intelligentsia.
Such magazines as “Literarni Listy” included articles written by famous play writer Vaclav
Havel and philosopher Ivan Svitak about slow pace of reforms in Czechoslovakia. Freedom of
the press challenged Stalinist political structures. The student paper “Prague Weekly” carried an
article written by Ivan Svitak demanding the opening of the Masaryk case.
Comrades, previously involved in Stalinist-type purges, feared that their criminal roles
would be revealed. While the victims of communist crimes were interviewed on the television,
many involved in committing crimes, such as the vice-president of the Supreme Court Jozef
Brestansky, committed suicide. There was a sense in Prague and in Moscow that things were
getting out of hand.
There were some efforts to sort out the politically fissured environment. After the Cierna
meeting in July, when Dubček appeared to have comforted Brezhnev about the situation in
Czechoslovakia, 19 pro-Soviet communists covertly sent a letter to Moscow. They encouraged a
Soviet military intervention to reverse the presumed counterrevolution, which, according to their
estimate, would take place after the Slovak Party Congress on August 23.
At the same time, in Prague, multiple social groups and opinion leaders were pushing
harder for reforms. Anti-Stalinist reformers were embracing social demands while hardcore
communists resisted. Dubček sided with the communists but he was not decisive enough to
quickly contain social change and restore political and social order. It was not his objective to
abandon Moscow as Nagy had done more than a decade before. During the Slovak Party
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Congress, Dubček wanted to work out a memorandum to reassure the Soviets. But he had run out
of time.
Three days before the Soviet invasion, Dubček had a secret meeting with Hungary’s
Kádár, who might have wanted the reform in Czechoslovakia to succeed for the same reasons as
Germany’s Ulbricht, Bulgaria’s Zhivkov and Poland’s Gomułka wanted so badly for the uprising
to fail. Nevertheless, Kádár was risk averse. He did not want to bring Hungary out of step with
Moscow for the experience 12 years before. He was probably aware of the plans to invade that
Kremlin had made for Prague already.
In any case, Dubček failed to grasp Kádár’s subtle but desperate message and warnings.
The politburo had decided to contain cultural uprising in Prague, impose censorship and uphold
communism in Czechoslovakia.361 On August 20, when the Slovak Party Congress was taking
place, Premier Minister Oldřich Černík announced that the armies of the Warsaw Pact had
crossed the republic’s border. The Czechoslovak military was ordered to abstain from resistance.
The Soviets had contemplated a scenario in which Czechoslovaks, seeing the Soviet
military approaching, would oust Dubček. Nothing similar happened. There was no alternative
candidate nor government and, moreover, Dubček was very popular. The Czechoslovakian
government under Dubček did not come close to imposing the terrors seen under Novotný or
Hitler. The Soviet army was seen as the occupying, not the liberating, force. Instead of the
anticipated glorious liberation, Kremlin had to arrest Dubček’s government and thus become a
villain.
After the Prague Spring and the ousting of Dubček, there was a need for at least an
interim government that would be acceptable for all parties. The pro-Soviet Ludvík Svoboda was
inaugurated as the Czechoslovak president. He was a compromise figure for Czechs, Slovaks,
and the Soviets.
Moscow wanted to use Svoboda as a focal point for funneling stricter policies and
reversing social change. But the ageing Soviet general proved to be harder to control than the
Soviets originally thought. On no account did Svoboda cooperate with Moscow. The popular
demands for Dubček to return were surging in Czechoslovakia. Svoboda resembled what was
happening in Prague. Therefore, Nagy’s scenario for Moscow was not feasible.
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First, Moscow tried to work out an accord with Svoboda. The president countered threats
by threatening suicide, as there were no alternatives to Svoboda’s interim candidacy. The only
condition that would allow for a compromise was the release of Dubček and his fellows for
negotiations in Moscow.
The political situation of post-Prague Spring significantly undermined Moscow’s image
within and outside the communist empire. There was a need for settlement and Moscow turned
out to be more needy than Prague. The Soviets offered nothing to Czech and Slovak elites except
for a protocol that guaranteed understanding and support in directing society in Czechoslovakia.
The accord was forced down the throats of the captive Czechoslovak leaders while their country
was occupied by Soviet tanks.
Media made news about Prague immediately available everywhere. The Prague atrocities
were broadly condemned inside the Soviet Union, too. A young Czechoslovakian student, Jan
Palach, in protest of the Soviet occupation, committed self-immolation. In April 1969, in the
Latvian capital Riga, a Jewish student, Ilia Rips, set herself on fire to draw attention to the Soviet
treatment of Dubček.362 In Poland, students were engaged in protesting Soviet oppression in
Czechoslovakia, but their public outbursts were stamped out by the authorities. Even
Yugoslavia’s Tito and Romania’s Ceaușescu denounced the invasion as “a great mistake,”
spurring protests in Belgrade and Bucharest.
There were ripples of protests that went so far as to reach the heart of the empire. In
August 1968, in the Red Square Pavel Litvinov (grandson of Stalin’s foreign minister) and
Larissa Denial (wife of the imprisoned Soviet novelist) were among those who publicly
condemned the Soviet actions. Only in Stalinist countries, such as East Germany, Bulgaria and
Albania, was the Prague Spring portrayed as the fight against Nazi intruders.
In Czechoslovakia, as in the case with Hungary, everyone was eager to show unwelcome
military regiments the Moscow direction. Despite the fact that social and economic problems
were growing in Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union chose to resolve democratization efforts with
military means. Just after the events in August 1968, Czechoslovakia turned from one of the
most welcoming allies into a significantly belligerent opponent of Soviet principles. Prague
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Spring showed that communism is a civilization that plays fasts and lose with its principles and
is thus a dying civilization.363
Solidarity in Poland, 1981
The Hungarian legacy of 1956 and the Czechoslovak lessons from 1968 were carried
forth in the events in Poland in 1981. Poland was nevertheless different from Hungary or
Czechoslovakia. It simply was a larger country and greater power within the Soviet bloc. It takes
more than three Hungaries and around three Czechoslovakias, separately, to match the
population of Poland.
No matter how mighty was the Soviet Union, even a preponderant power must face its
limits in certain situations. Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 were facing military
annihilation from without and similar challenges were seen in Poland. The proletarian masses
were eager to satisfy their demands through trade unionism, the immediate struggle for improved
living conditions.364
The Soviet fear of a potential external influence and the non-intervention Helsinki clauses
of 1975 were taken seriously by Henry Kissinger and his successors. Nevertheless, Soviet
leaders on the other side were faced with growing and ultimately uncontrollable circles, clubs,
networks, charters and individuals, all demanding merely that their governments stick to the
letter of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and to fulfill their obligations when it came to human
rights.365 Such domestic challenges were coming to Poland, a country that could not be crushed
in the same manner as the smaller Hungary or Czechoslovakia.
The mutinies of the 1980s and the imposition of the military rule in Poland were
enhanced by several important international events. One important factor again came from the
broader Middle East. In 1973, the Yom Kippur’s or Arab-Israeli war took place from October 6
to October 25.
The conflict consolidated oil exporting Arab countries into a common oil exporting organization
and therefore substantially changed the global economic landscape. All major economies heavily
depended on cheap imports of fossil fuels but the price after the war substantially increased.
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From one side, the Soviet Union was among the beneficiaries as it was a top exporter of
oil. On the other hand, the West and Poland were suffering from rising oil prices. The economic
conditions incrementally severed Eastern Europe and stagnated the Western part of Europe.
The growing costs of primary energy needs inflamed initial international financial and
economic uncertainty. Between 1946 and 1971, countries operated under the Bretton Woods
system. Most countries settled their international balances in United States dollars. In return,
Washington promised to redeem other central banks’ holdings of dollars for gold at a fixed rate
of $35 per ounce.366
On August 15, 1971, President Richard Nixon announced that his country was
unilaterally abandoning the system of fixed exchange rate.367 The United States decided to
abandon the gold-dollar peg and have its own independent monetary policy. This caused
financial and economic uncertainty in Western and Eastern Europe. Both parts depended on
dollar currency reserves. More uncertainty increased the fall of national currencies in Europe, but
increased the price of a dollar. All imports, denominated in dollars, became more expensive.
In Poland, Edward Gierek’s regime was responsible for a major economic crisis that
stemmed from excessive foreign debt ($20 billion in hard currency alone by 1980).368 The debt
was not Gierek’s fault alone. It was a result of the absence of reforms and adaptation of the
Polish economy to domestic and external consumption requirements. The budget deficit was the
result of economic mismanagement.
First was the failure to use imported Western technology to optimal effect. Second was
the delusional investment priority that favored some prestigious heavy industry projects. And
third was the fanning of excessive expectations in an accelerated consumer boom of 1972 to
1974 by subsidizing production.
Poland was not unique in the Soviet Union. Low quality economic products were not
necessary, nor were they desired by anyone. The primary necessities embedded in domestic
demand were ignored. Poor economic performance had to be supplemented with imports from
abroad.
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Despite the fact that the economic faults were not Gierek’s alone, he was the one to be
blamed for the economic mismanagement. In the early 1970s, the following joke was widespread
in Poland: “Question: What is the difference between Edward Gierek and Wladyslaw Gomułka,
Gierek’s predecessor? Answer: There is no difference, only Gierek does not yet realize it!”369
There had been several cases in the past when Poland’s workers had demanded reform,
but they were always ignored. It is no surprise that on the back of Poland’s Solidarność
(solidarity) flag stands five numbers: 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976 and 1980. These numbers were
symbols of mounting, unresolved demands and oppression.
It was written in the worker’s newspaper “Po Prostu” in 1955, “We are people who
cannot stop meddling with all that happen around us. We are a group of disconnected. We want
more things, better things, wiser things.” At the beginning of the 1980s, Gierek was absolutely
disgraced as the prime minister of Poland. Socio-economic conditions were the reasons for
political disarray.
He no longer could disguise the deteriorating economic situation with subsidized imports
from abroad. Nobody from abroad was ready to subsidize Poland. Price increases for basic
consumer goods and shortages of primary commodities led promptly to social discontent.
The position of ordinary workers, as illuminated by the newspaper “Po Prostu,” well
highlighted the mood of the ordinary citizens in Poland. Hitherto, economic performance and
the resulting inability to satisfy workers’ demands led to the unraveling of mutinies and
reshuffling of political elites.
There was a need for political change, which inevitably took place. The army as a
political player was highly respected in Poland as a patriotic, national force. With the growing
demoralization and near collapse of the civilian rule in 1981, the Polish civilian communist
leadership found it necessary to tie the army down by co-opting Wojciech Jaruzelski, a Polish
army officer, into key positions.
First, it was as a chairman of the Council of Ministers and then as the first secretary of
the communist party, in February and October, respectively. He was then the only leader who
could restore order. Notwithstanding the hopes of the civilian elites, Jeruzelski refused to save
Gomułka in 1970 and Gierek in 1980. He was loyal to the communist system, not to
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individuals.370 As a result, Jaruzelski rose as the Kremlin’s man in Poland because he had
excellent contacts with Brezhnev’s military-political team.371
The Kremlin welcomed loyal leaders in Poland. In the run-up to the military rule in
Poland, Jaruzelski received undivided political support from Kremlin. One of the reasons for the
support was the absence of alternative candidates. As the leader of the military, Jaruzelski played
an even more profound role. Additional strains on the Red Army were imposed in 1979. The
Polish army as a separate unit was the only military force to quell social riots in the country since
Moscow had decided on war in Afghanistan.
Indeed, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in December 1979 imposed significant strains
on the military. The Politburo member Yegor Ligachev acknowledged that after Afghanistan,
there could no longer be any question of applying force in Eastern Europe.372 Nations were
challenging Moscow not only in Eastern Europe. Muslim populations in Central Asia were
rapidly growing. European Russia, as it seemed to its leaders, was under demographic threat
from its internal minorities. This fact was acknowledged by ailing Brezhnev in February 1981.
The trouble that had been brewing in Poland for decades was not ethnic, nor nationalistic
in character. The workers’ movement was defending socio-economic rights in Poland. The work
of Solidarity is solely devoted to defending and extending the well-being of its members, their
families and the community in which they live. Of a population of 36 million in Poland,
something like 10 million belonged to Solidarity (if workers’ dependents are considered, then 80
percent of Poles were associated with Solidarity).373
Solidarity was born as the social movement aimed at protecting workers’ rights by
restructuring the Polish social and economic system. The roots of Solidarity were in another
organization that was broadly loathed by Kremlin-an official protector of workers’ rights,
Workers’ Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotnikow (KOR).374
KOR summoned the most crucial demands from workers, organized them and presented
them to the communist party officials. Among the flagship concerns were services and resources
to workers who lost their jobs, necessary medical or legal assistance and support to family
members of workers who were incarcerated.
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The movement extended pressure on the communist structures for reforms. Therefore, its
leaders became objects for political oppression. It is no surprise that Jacek Kuroń, the initial
leader of KOR, found himself often imprisoned for the inconvenience he caused. Frequent
incarcerations of KOR’s leaders made the workers’ organization leaderless. With the memory of
1956 and 1968 firmly in mind, Kuroń insisted on the continued commitment to a socialist system
and reiterated the need for Solidarity’s acceptance of the party’s leading role. No one wanted to
give the authorities in Warsaw or Moscow an excuse to send in the tanks.375
Despite the fact that KOR might have seemed a neat and institutionalized substitute for
Solidarity, it lacked long-term vision, leadership and decisiveness. Solidarity in this case had
more to offer. It carried a sense of history that was vividly remembered by most Poles.
For example, youngsters in Bydgoszcz plastered the city with small posters and slogans
reminding people of Katyn, the forest in which Polish military officers were slaughtered by
Stalin’s secret servicemen after the Soviet occupation of Eastern Poland in 1939. The right-wing
political cohort carried an idea of the national sovereignty and freedom from Russian
domination. Workers had been oppressed for a long time and their demands had been
systematically denied. Their discontent was thus growing but KOR failed to absorb even the
basic ideas and strategies that were essential for Poles-national independence and Catholicism.
Conversely, Solidarity could embody all that KOR failed to absorb in one person. Its
surging leader Lech Wałęsa matched Solidarity’s profile well. He was a very tough, determined
working class representative, afraid of no one, as he said, but of God himself. He was equipped
with an uncanny sense of how far he could push communist elites.376
He was an electrician working at Lenin Shipyard and a father of six. He was a determined
catholic whose crucifix over his sweater and his children’s ballpoint pen were visible on TV
screens during the most important signing and negotiation of accords with the Polish communist
elite. Less as a sole administrator (Solidarity’s management was strongly rooted in unanimity),
he was a symbol who was imprisoned multiple times and therefore represented a restless bout
between the deprived Polish workers’ cohort and the communist elites.
Considering the circumstances of the time, there was a need for a spark. It came from the
Catholic Church. On June 2, 1979, Pope Saint John Paul II visited his native Poland. He was a
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Pole himself, Józef Wojtyła, born in Karol. His visit to Poland carried an unprecedented
opportunity for public gatherings. Poles started believing in the prospect for change and a better
future. Even though economic conditions were appalling, national optimism was blooming.
Poland was baptized as the workers state so it is no coincidence that the most vigorous demands
for more optimistic change came from the working class.
The first peaceful strike broke out in Gdansk in August 1980. It was a non-violent
protest, accompanied by prayers that the communists would abstain from using military force.
The negotiations between Polish communist leaders and workers were transmitted on
loudspeakers. Wałęsa demanded concrete answers point by point when he interrupted sharply the
communist negotiator’s Mieczysław Jagelski’s introduction, “Let me begin by making some
general points.” Wałęsa’s popularity grew, as did the strength of the movement. Workers
coherently, but adamantly, presented their demands to the communists and the party caved.
In the aftermath of the first workers’ victory, some prisoners were released. The
concessions unleashed a wave of protests in major productions plants on Poland’s Baltic coast.
The Kremlin’s contempt was played out in the nearest proximity of Poland as a military training
in September 1981.
It was a warning before more stringent measures would be imposed. The 16-month-long
confrontation period between the Communist State and Polish society, represented by Solidarity
and the Roman Catholic Church, became an internal conflict in December 1981.377 The church
acted as a mediator to avoid violence. The confrontation period leading to the imposition of
martial law marked the departure of the discredited civilian rule and imposition of heavy-handed
military rule. Arrests and pressure on the civilian movement ensued, but it did not deliver any
results.
Beforehand, even the communist party had acknowledged the need for change. The rigid
and dismal economic performance was not sustainable. The introduction of the military rule,
authorized by Moscow and led by Jaruzelski, marked Poland’s enforced attachment to the
communist structures and principles.
Conversely, the Polish society had pivoted toward another path. High birth rates had
produced an extremely young society (about two-thirds were under 35 in 1981) that had not
experienced wartime and Stalinist atrocities. Its dominant features were an incredible
377
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hodgepodge of political naivety, material envy, personal cynicism and unrealistic comparisons
with the West.
The incompatibility of rigid old-school communist rule did not fit the aspirations of the
young Polish society. Even political changes inside Kremlin represented the kind of change that
had erupted in Western Europe before. The departure of Brezhnev, whose protégé was
Jaruzelski, and forthwith Andropov’s and Chernenko’s quick rotation in Kremlin, multiplied the
effects of the already announced thaw.
They all were old men who left power as a result of bad health or death. For Jaruzelski,
the option to hold power in Poland became limited. His patron, Brezhnev, was out of office. And
the social change in Poland was already on the way. Theoretically, Jeruzelski was in power.
Practically he could only observe events in Poland.
In 1985, the soviet world would be run by younger men who had few options other than
to address the problems of corruption, stagnation and inefficiency that plagued the Soviet system
from top to bottom.378 The case of Poland proved that communism is a civilization that is
incapable of solving the problems it creates and, thus, is a declining civilization.379
Conclusion
The cleavages between the Soviet Union and its Western adversaries grew from the
outset of the Cold War until the moment the Soviet Union collapsed. The profound difference
between the United States and the Soviet Union was that Americans never went beyond their
borders. They did uphold their economic, political and military interests in the Western
Hemisphere, regarding it as their playground.
They supported preferred regimes and they considered economic interests, but they also
managed to live with some limitations of their power while considering the interests of
indigenous populations in Latin America. The overarching factor, however, that kept the Soviet
Union together was blunt military force. The Warsaw Pact was a political defense organization
aimed at the West, but its members, like Hungary, Czechoslovakia or Poland, could not stay
secure from internal military internal coercion.
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The task of holding the defense pact together was becoming harder with each rebellion.
After the oppression in 1956, Kremlin had to grant disguised concessions in order to
accommodate the population in Hungary. Consequentially, Budapest introduced one more type
of communism, Kádárism.
It was milder than Stalinism and Titoism. Hungarians were allowed to deviate from some
of the rigid principles in economic and social realms since there was a blind eye to covert private
initiatives. Budapest pretended to believe, and Moscow pretended to believe in Hungary.380
János Kádár had provided a discreet opportunity to distance his country from the rigid and
ineffective economic planning without challenging the political edifice of the Soviet Union.
Owing to the leadership shifts in Moscow and Budapest, individuals played a significant
role up to the revolution and the resulting changes in the country. Leaders in the eyes of the
society were symbols of distinct values. Before the Hungarian surge, Stalinist and anti-Stalinist
cohorts were pitted against each other after Khrushchev “secretly” denounced Stalin’s legacy.
The sharpest Stalinist contrast inside Hungary was Imre Nagy. He carried overt
democracy, individuality and cultural and economic symbols that made him different from
hardcore communists in Hungary. Since he did not impose anything, did not explicitly take sides
and therefore could not guarantee strict order, he could not uphold strict conditions and
guarantee solid political coalitions.
With too much political pluralism, the political and security situation in Hungary
deteriorated. In Hungary, Khrushchev proved that the deviation from the Stalinist principles
would be more difficult than initially thought. If accepted, Nagy’s policies would have
inaugurated the demise of the Soviet Union in 1956.
Since Stalin’s death, the consequences of the thaw were felt in the arts and letters even in
Latvia. Some formerly forbidden terms like “gulag archipelago” were allowed again, some
industrialization projects were relaxed, diminishing an immigration of non-Latvians, and some
hardline Stalinists were ousted from power.
Some Latvian nationalists like Eduards Berklavs (the protégé of Imre Nagy) argued for
the reversion of Russification as he saw an opportunity for a political change. After the Budapest
experience, Khruschev did not take any risks. He deflected nationalists and installed Arvīds
Pelše, a well-salted Marxist-Leninist, as head of the Latvian communist party (the protégé of the
380

Judt and Snyder, 222.

142
Hungarian compromise Stalinists, like Kádár).381 Kremlin tried to avoid all further risks of
repeated mistakes.
The Prague Spring of 1968 was the product of the same universal errors that led
Hungarians and Poles to challenge the communist system in 1956. Moreover, from 1956 until
1968 there was an unprecedented surge of youth and civilian rights movements internationally.
Those same movements challenged the omnipotence of the United States and the Soviet Union,
notwithstanding Europe. Owing to Nazi atrocities, Czechoslovakia was initially more welcoming
toward communism. Nevertheless, there was a genuine will to refine Stalinism in a manner that
could be acceptable for Moscow.
The Czech and Slovak reformers of 1968 turned out to be naïve. They tried to propose a
model where Czechs could be a model of Marxism so that they would teach the West as well as
Moscow a thing or two.382 They turned out to be too naïve, as they overestimated their
capabilities to reform a system so broadly despised.
An external surge of youthful optimism, intellectual thought, demands for new rights and
a push for unprecedented reforms were unacceptable reform drivers to Kremlin. Afraid of
change, local Stalinists played an essential role in convincing Kremlin of these dangers to the
“fraternal brotherhood.” As a result, Brezhnev completed what Khrushchev had started in
Hungary-fraternal assistance in the form of military oppression to avert what had already
happened in Budapest.
The Prague Spring carried severe consequences for the Soviet Union. Moscow turned out
to be politically entrapped. First, there was no Kádár-like middleman in Czechoslovakia. Dubček
and his political cohort had to be returned to further perform Kádárism or anything that would
not challenge the system. Prague Spring marked a change in Czechoslovakia. All illusions about
the common good and a communist legacy were further dissipated. The Warsaw Pact project was
still intact, but Kremlin continued to lose allegiance and the last appeal, political, social, cultural,
and universal.
Poland in 1956 and in 1968 was a focal point for everything that was happening inside
the rest of the Warsaw Pact. The Poznan uprising in 1956 led to Budapest. Student mutinies in
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Warsaw in 1968 were played out more comprehensively in Prague. Poland itself was very much
different, as it was not a small state.
Indeed, Poland was a significant actor that could not be easily oppressed in the same
Khrushchev-Brezhnev manner as Hungary or Czechoslovakia. Moreover, internal challenges
made Soviet capabilities more strenuous since the Soviet intrusion in Afghanistan significantly
impaired the Red Army’s military capabilities.
Moreover, economic pressure inside the Soviet Union was growing. Since Gomułka and
Bierut, there were few adjustments made. As a result, deprived social movements had
incrementally consolidated into larger comprehensive civilian organizations that inevitably
became an overwhelming political challenge for the Soviet Union. Eastern Europe’s hard
currency debt stood at $6.1 billion in 1971, grew to $66.1 billion in 1980 and reached $95.6
billion in 1988.383 The speed of the economic downfall was stellar. Economic deficiencies could
no longer be hidden or disguised.
Poland, however, became a different story from Hungary or Czechoslovakia. The first
profound difference was that it was not squashed militarily from without. It was always an
internal clash after which intellectuals, students and workers did finally find common ground in
1980. A civilian movement-Solidarity-became a well-organized and nonviolent mass movement
aimed at reforming Polish economy and polity.
The church, national idealists and realists, workers, intellectuals and youth were merging
into a mounting opposition. At the time when martial law was imposed, a group of young
economists at Warsaw School of Planning and Statistics, led by Laszek Balcerowicz, was
already drawing plans for an autonomous private business sector freed from central planning.
This, and other proposals, were intensely debated among “unofficial” Poles and abroad. The
imposition of martial law only accelerated the surge of the opposition and of a dwindling Soviet
influence.
The Visegrad and the Baltic States were different in two profound areas. The Baltic
States were never a part of the Warsaw Pact. Instead, they were firmly incorporated into the
Soviet Union. Overall, this fact does not diminish the possibility for military oppression. The
second factor bears more significant consequences for the day.
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During the five-decade occupation of the Baltic States, the Soviet Union placed titular
nations under the Russification siege. When the Soviet Union collapsed, restoration of ethnic
groups, bound by unique languages in all three Baltic States, became a superb challenge. In all
other areas, there was much commonality.
One of the major reasons for the repulsion against the Russian Federation is its
historically oppressive character. During the Soviet occupation, it was hard for Kremlin to adopt
policies that would be respectful toward diverse ethnic groups residing in the single union. The
Russian majority, as a result, pitted Hungarians, Latvians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Estonians and
Lithuanians against themselves.
Since ethnic Russians or genuine Soviet citizens were dominating other inherently
different groups, the otherness became a strong base for the surging opposition against all
Russians or Soviets. The objective of all the Soviet minority groups became to break away and
become liberal, individual and unique. Private economic production within the union was no less
an expression of individual culture than social traditions and ideational traits.
This search for independence was never disguised. Bill Clinton recalls meeting a
protesting Latvian at the Lincoln memorial in 1968, one of many from the “captive Baltic
nations” who was a member of the liberal national student movement and the students for a
democratic society.384 She noted that one day the Baltic States will become free from Soviet
totalities. At the time, Clinton thought of the woman as three bricks shy of a full load. He later
learned that the vision for the Baltic States to gain freedom was not that surreal an idea after all.
In Latvia, intellectual thought and social aspiration were not so different than they were in
Czechoslovakia.
Cultural strongmen like Adam Michnik in Poland, Václav Havel in Czechoslovakia, or
the Hungarian liberals of their generation shared lifelong experiences with communism.385
Russian literature and language were mandatory subjects for students. Thus, the local
intelligentsia became a significant intellectual realm for the preservation of national uniqueness.
In the Baltic States, among the most popular and influential poets were Estonians Hando
Runnel (born 1938) and Juhan Viidig (1948-1995), Latvians Ojārs Vācietis (1933-1983) and
Imants Ziedonis (1933-2013), and Lithuanians Vytautas Bložė (born 1930) and Sigitas Geda
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(1943-2008).386 All the intellectual leaders represented generations that shared a familiarity with
the Stalinist atrocities and Soviet crimes in the Baltic States.
Their literary works carried disguised ideological and practical opposition to
communism. The soviets remained a symbol of the old regime and the old ideologies helplessly
tied to isolation from reality.387The Soviet ideology and culture was a fertile soil for the surge of
adverse culture inside most of the captive ethnic groups.
Strong cultural, ideational and intellectual opposition were also strongly contributing to
the emergence of civilian movements. In Poland, Solidarity brought together workers,
intellectuals and students based on common nationalistic and religious sentiments. As a result,
Poland managed to weld together all groups in a unified front against the communist clout.
Despite the fact that religious matters were less embraced in the Baltic States,
incremental unification of Latvian, Estonian, and Lithuanian civilian societies took place no
differently than in Poland. The first was based on environmental degradation concerns. The Balts
started to organize intellectually based on these concerns.
The second was based on the perception of Soviet crimes against Baltic ethnic groups. As
a result, protests and mutinies started to emerge. The third was when societies stood up to attend
national events that were forbidden by the Soviet authorities. As a result, large-scale protests
took hold. Similar sentiments were shared by Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians and Poles. For these
reasons, their common understanding of security converged and the opposition against the new
Russia emerged.
As a result, the Euro-Atlantic community by Eastern Europe was seen as an asylum.
First, the Atlantic partnership was essential to avoid further military oppression. It was seen as a
stronghold for security among its members. The United States-led NATO was seen as the
essential security guarantee and the liberating force.
The European partnership was more benign, but culturally inclusive. The economic and
political expressions clearly stated that the objective for Europe is to remain unified and diverse
at the same time. The adherence to both communities required that something be present that was
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long desired by the Visergad states. It was democracy for which some countries like the Russian
Federation and Central Asia were not ready then and are not ready even now.388
Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland separately and together set in motion certain
processes that were bound to evolve into uprisings in the Baltic States, too. There were profound
aspects that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania shared with Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Poland. In
Eastern Europe, respect for national differences became their unifying factor. The key unifying
factor for Eastern Europe became the opposition against Soviet military force. That was the only
factor that kept the Soviet empire together until it imminently collapsed.
Such union could not naturally last for long. On December of 1991, the presidents and
the prime ministers of Russia, Ukraine and Belarus-the core Slav states of the Soviet empire-took
it upon themselves to meet near Minsk and denounce the Union Treaty of 1922, in effect
abolishing the Soviet Union.389
The so-called Belavezha accords de jure abrogated the empire that had been dying since
the death of Stalin in March 1953. Hungary was de facto lost in 1956, as was Czechoslovakia in
1968, but the accelerated disintegration took hold in the events of the 1980s in Poland. The
Baltic States took over the relay in 1985 when they explicitly started challenging the Kremlin’s
rule.
The de-Stalinization of the Soviet Union showed significant limits that small states must
consider. The newly independent states that came out of the Soviet Union indeed recalled their
memories of the events of 1956, 1968 and 1981. Those same memories even today unite the
Visegrad and Baltic States in the post-Soviet era against the heir of the Soviet Union that turned
out to be a sick, declining and dying civilization.
History plays different roles in different regions, but around the Baltic borders only
Russia can change the perception of its civilization to one that is different from the Soviet Union.
It has not been successful thus far. Conversely, since before and after the death of Stalin, the
Euro-Atlantic community has surged. Only those countries delineated themselves from the
cooperation with the community are latently excluded. For shared reasons with the Visegrad
states, Latvia was staunchly approaching the Euro-Atlantic community once it was possible.
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CHAPTER V
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY

Introduction

The Euro-Atlantic community is twofold. On one side of the Atlantic is the United States.
On the other, there is a union of willing major European powers and their followers. The
community has existed since the American landings on June 6 in 1944, the so called D-Day.
It is clear that lacking any of the partners from both sides of the Atlantic, the community
would not exist. That alone makes the United States presence in the community indispensable as
is Europe’s. The American presence in Europe is a result of reciprocal interests on both sides of
the Atlantic. Binding interests that the transatlantic partners shared before and after D-Day were
varied. The range and scope of transatlantic cooperation were uneven. However, from the
beginning even Latvia, together with the other Baltic States, has been a part of the evolving
story.
There were some strategic interests Americans already had long before D-Day.
America’s interests in free trade, based on neutrality and parity of all were recognized in 1810 in
the Baltic Sea region. A sea power, America “defended the interests of nations trading in peace
from the flames of war” by siding with the allied powers against Napoleonic France.390
With Latvia, however, relations were possible only when the country existed as an actor
in international affairs. It declared independence in 1918, but was occupied in 1940. Latvia
regained independence and rose out of the Soviet Union only in August of 1990. Then it started
looking for new relations and friendships. Those are the two distinct periods within which it is
worth assessing the intensity and change of American foreign policy toward Latvia.
Moreover, since Latvia is a small state in Europe, apart from normative aspects, parity
with the United States is hardly imaginable. Thus, the story of Latvia and United States becomes
part of the story of how the United States approached Europe. D-Day was a pivotal moment
when the United States and Europe had drifted apart before, but based on shared interests came
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together later. Since that day for Europe the United States was a necessity, but for the United
States closer relations with Europe was a choice. Both periods had an impact on Latvia, too. But
there is more than that.
The United States breached isolationism when it entered World War I. Later on, it went
back home to become isolated again until World War II and the ensuing Cold War. During the
Cold War, Latvia was firmly incorporated into the Soviet Union. The United States, however,
since D-Day was actively engaged in European affairs but with Latvia relations were not
possible. Then the Soviet Union collapsed and the possibility for a new world order emerged.
Until then the United States and Europe had become sound partners. There was a reason to
expect that at the moment the Soviet flag in Moscow was removed, new friendships and renewed
partnerships for Latvia with the United States would be an option. The author will further outline
those three periods as salient focal points in the United States and Latvia relations.
Malign: Between the Wars
Shortly before Latvia declared independence in 1918, the United States entered World
War I on behalf of the Triple Entente – Great Britain, France and the Russian empire, joined later
by Italy. The United States presence was crucial. It helped change the trajectory of the ongoing
war in Europe. However, after the war, President Woodrow Wilson did not hold Washington to
wartime and postwar obligations. Wilson questioned the motives and goals of allies that were not
trusted.391 Therefore, the United States maintained a free hand to pursue treaties and postwar
policies where and when necessary and convenient. The initial uncertainty in Europe, and
especially around the Russian borders, also influenced the American stance regarding the Baltic
issues.
The initial American-Baltic policy was indirect and ambiguous. Because of an ongoing
internal struggle for power between Leninists and Bolsheviks inside the Russian empire,
Wilson’s government hesitated between supporting Lenin or his opponents. Nevertheless, the
allied powers recognized the reciprocal importance of peace in the East and in the West. On the
part of Europe, Churchill was ready to issue an ultimatum to the Bolsheviks. The ultimatum
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would order fighting to stop. If ignored, Churchill was even ready to test what could have been
done with arms to enforce peace in Russia.
On the part of the United States, Colonel Edward M. House, Wilson’s favorite aide, and
Robert Lansing, his Secretary of State, attempted to guide Europe. On behalf of the allies,
Colonel House had even suggested omitting Bolsheviks and talking directly to the Russian
people.392 Yet, Wilson was just not ready to embrace his aides or to “commit to Winston
Churchill’s steady attempt by degrees to lead allies into a position by which war with Russia
would be inevitable.”393 The obvious policy discord led allies to nowhere, but Wilson politically
apart from even his favorite aides. Nevertheless, some kind of position toward Russia was
needed.
The fate of the Russian empire to which Latvia had belonged was not clear. Much clearer
were the devastating postwar effects on Europe in general. After the Paris peace conference,
therefore, Washington decided to distribute food aid to Europe , and the ‘Baltic States of Russia’
were ranked among the countries in urgent need of such aid.394 Such steps inched the United
States closer to more explicit policies.
Named after Wilson’s last Secretary of State Bainbridge Colby, the Colby declaration
honored and justified Russia’s territorial integrity. As a result, the Baltic States were recognized
as a part of Russia in August, 1920. It illuminated Wilsonian diplomacy with respect to Soviet
Russia. The note laid out the doctrine of non-recognition of Soviet Russia.395 Colby’s declaration
highlighted Wilson’s choice to work with the unified Russian empire.
The Colby note echoed Washington’s shared concerns with France, Britain, Japan, and
even Germany to potentially split up Russia. Wilson decided to opt for the safest option and side
initially with Lenin’s opposition. As a result, Wilson and Colby laid foundations for political
confrontation in the future with Soviet Russia. Even if there was no military confrontation,
armed standoff and arms race, reciprocal suspicion, mutual misunderstanding, distrust,
ideological hostility, and diplomatic isolation were already evident.396
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By this time, the allies failed to anticipate the demise of the Bolsheviks and the rise of
Lenin to power, contributing to adversarial relations with Soviet Russia. In terms of the Baltic
States, if autonomy were to be granted, they had to be a cordon sanitaire between Soviet Russia
and Europe. All in all, the American position at the time depended on the European stance.
The European position, however, changed. When Lenin rose to power, Soviet Russia and
the Baltic States had to come to different terms. Lenin rose to power out of instability but he had
to stabilize former Russian empire. To do so, Russia had to overcome its fear of the West coming
closer to Russia’s backyard and threatening its “official nationality”, based on orthodoxy,
autocracy, and nationality (Russian language).397 The Russian idea, based on the official
nationality, is the mission that the empire has been inclined to bear. Thus, giving independence
to the Baltic States meant giving up those same principles in the Baltic region.
There was a reason for Lenin to grant such a concession. At home, when the Bolsheviks
were expunged from power and Soviet Russia could stabilize politically, Lenin could commit
Soviet Russia to de jure recognition of the de facto autonomous Baltic States. There was a strong
pre-condition for Lenin to recognize the Baltic States. The Latvian Riflemen were necessary to
Lenin’s domestic political survival. As Lenin was facing his power limits, out of military
constraint and domestic instability risks, he did not have any other option than signing an
armistice with the Baltic States. As a result, on August 11, 1920, the Latvian- Russian peace
treaty came into being, an official recognition of Latvia.
By that time the fracturing Russian empire was seen more as a problem by the United
States. For example, the United States Congress on January 14, 1921, was considering the
question of emigrants leaving the Baltic States. They acknowledged that it is important to
remember the recent land laws in all of the Baltic States where the conditions that gave peasants
a desire to cultivate the land, an opportunity which they had never before enjoyed.
Few of these people were, therefore, leaving the country, and this was seen as the class
from which desirable emigrants could have been drawn. The class of Latvians and Lithuanians
who were leaving were recognized as the people from the slums of the cities and towns and were
seen as undesirable.398 From the United States’ perspective the interest was for conditions in the
Baltic to remain stable and for the “undesired emigrants” to stay where they were.
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The Russian-Latvian armistice became instrumental for the European powers to change
their mind. French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand recognized Latvia de jure as an independent
state in the name of the allied powers on January 26, 1921.399 The long-awaited de jure
recognition of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania came also from the United States on July 25, 1922.
As the tide from Soviet Russia was moving backwards, Europe and the United States henceforth
chose to address each Baltic state separately.
The reciprocity of diplomatic relations and the time gap between the recognition of
Latvia’s independence by Soviet Russia and the United States highlighted the absence of
Washington’s overall interests, both, in Europe and in the Baltic States. It is no surprise that one
of the United States’ diplomats, Adolf Berle, recalls a dinner with Latvian Minister Alfreds
Bīlmanis “which turned out to be a minor celebration of the recognition of Latvia which he had
recommended at Paris nineteen years ago” only on April 9, 1938.400
Back in 1919 in Paris, American pundits entertained ambitions to lead the peace
conference with some defining principles for Europe’s future. Not all European leaders
embraced this American stance. It caused Americans to accommodate David Lloyd George and
Arthur Balfour on such issues as reparations, the future of the Rhineland, the Atlantic Charter,
and the League of Nations, all of which sharply drove Wilson's intentions in one direction.401
The American detachment from the position of the European allies and from some of his
favorite aides made Wilson’s policy isolated from actual conditions in Europe. Wilson declared
his intention to extend American power for the purpose of strengthening its ideals.402 American
universities did not hide their discomfort with Wilson: Harvard described America as being
isolated "in the saddle”, Columbia saw "Americans retiring within their own shell”, Yale judged
that American policy had "degenerated" into isolationism, that was the foreign policy of
"avoidance rather than action."403 All in all, the existing transatlantic cooperation since the Paris
conference had made European allies anxious in front of rising challenges.
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By 1938, American-British cooperation had grown especially strong, but the priorities
they shared were quite different. Roosevelt listened with increasing respect, even if not always
with sympathy, to Churchill’s warnings against the dangers of Adolf Hitler. That was especially
true after the Munich agreement of September 1938, which gave Hitler the Sudeten districts of
Czechoslovakia in return for a promise of good behavior in accordance with the Wilsonian
ideals.404 The agreement was Britain’s Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and France’s
Premier Édouard Daladier attempt to appease Hitler.
After the folly of 1938, Churchill’s pleas for assistance surged; those were eloquent pleas
based on reciprocal sympathies and admiration. They resulted in Roosevelt’s promise to send
“great arsenals of democracy” to Europe. Between the transatlantic elites, there was much
admiration, but little accord, coordinated or practical action.
Sensing security anxiety in Europe, Roosevelt alerted Daladier through the French
Ambassador Maurice de Rothschild that Germany was stronger than anyone believed. Without
the United States, the French and the British would be defeated, he noted. He also overtly
admitted that the American people had gone back to isolationism and refused to get involved in
the coming European conflict. That had been American policy since Paris.
The Americans, despite Roosevelt’s profound personal sympathies toward Britain and
France, could do nothing.405 Since the conference in 1919, Americans and Wilson had generated
international principles, but there was no power in the offing to enforce them. Similarly, since
the Munich agreement of 1938, there was no power in Europe to impose order according to the
existing idealist principles.
When World War II broke out, Americans expected that France would heroically stand
up against Hitler like she did in World War I. Before the war, some efforts were made by the
Americans to close the military gap between France and Germany. However, German
superiority, embedded in economic and military success, led to quick French capitulation.
Across the Chunnel, Churchill assured that if Americans would request all adversaries to
comply, Britain would respect their wishes.406 Britain alone could no longer maintain the balance
of power in Europe. The Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement had tipped the balance in favor of
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Germany and the Soviet Union. The result for the Baltic States was becoming one of Stalin’s
dominions. American leadership, on the eve of World War II could witness what the absence of
defense guarantees meant in Europe - “Russia had taken no commitments for the defense of
Belgium just as France had taken none for the defense of Lithuania.”407
At the time when World War II was changing Europe, the United States chose to extend
the Wilsonian principles to the Baltic States. Acting Secretary of State, Sumner Welles, released
the Department of State’s statement number “354” on July 23, 1940. It denounced the end of
independence and territorial integrity of the Baltic States – Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.
Known as the Wells Declaration, it heralded the United States position to continuously work
with the Baltic exile governments. The United States recognized the incorporation of the Baltic
States into the Soviet Union as illegal.
By officially denouncing the forceful annexation of the Baltic States, Washington left a
bookmark for the future independence of the Baltic States. Yet, Welles still encouraged
Roosevelt to establish closer ties with Stalin and the Soviet Union as the only two superpowers
that could ensure peace in Europe.
After all, the Red Army was the only force capable of withstanding Nazi Germany in the
East. But the United States was the only power to consolidate the West. Wells also concurrently
made Stalin aware that the United States expected good-faith bargaining and adherence to
treaties.408 In 1941 attempts to negotiate the humanitarian aid to Poles and Latvians, the most
severely harmed groups in Eastern Europe,409 were easily rebuffed and ignored by Stalin. Small
nations and states were minor issues when compared to the wartime objectives.
By then Americans were no less interested in peace in Europe than Europeans
themselves. By 1942, Churchill was willing to respect Soviet frontiers as they were when Hitler
and Stalin were allies. In his private letters to Roosevelt, Churchill foresaw abandoning the
Baltic States to ensure Stalin’s acceptance of the Atlantic Charter and an international peace
settlement.
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Stalin had earlier expressed his interest to Churchill in concluding the charter and
liquidating hostile elements in the Baltic States.410 Moreover, the allies were forced to consider
that the Red Army was the only force capable of standing in front of the Nazi regiments alone,
which initially it did.
Even if few in Washington did not feel like throwing the Baltic States to the wolves,
Roosevelt did not object, instead, he initially pleaded for the right of the population to resettle
peacefully.411 Nevertheless, since the Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam conferences, the United States
and Stalin were ominously drifting apart. There was little American and Soviet leaders shared
and, therefore, there was even less they could agree on. Instead of closer partnerships, they were
incrementally becoming belligerents.
In 1919, Wilson had overtly emphasized the need to “think of America before Europe.”
When the day comes, the United States must be ready to help “when the struggle will be over
and the warring nations will be utterly exhausted until they could not possibly threaten the
United States, even economically - then they will desperately seek America’s heeling
influence.”412
Even before World War II, and even more so in its aftermath, Americans had experienced
the follies of living in self-isolation. The evolving events before World War II proved that
Americans were not as isolated as Wilson thought they were in 1919. America’s foreign policy
had been malign for itself and for the allies in Europe.
Benign: the Cold War
Since World War II did not end when the fighting was over, Americans could not retreat
to wait for a moment of healing influence. Instead of just ending all fighting in Europe, there
was a need to avoid all conflicts from erupting in the future. No more could the transatlantic
community be as delusional as it was in the interwar period.
From Latvia in February 11, 1940, U.S. Envoy Extraordinary John C. Wiley reported to
the Secretary of State that the Latvian President had identified “the safest place for a year's
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supply of bread and other food was the farmer's own barn and pantry and that every farmstead
were asked to delegate one man in a uniform with the supply of two shirts or towels and one
good pair of boots.”413
The West-East conflict lasted longer than anybody expected. In fact, the communist half
of Europe woke up five decades later with appalling economic conditions after the communist
edifice crumbled. Conversely, the Western half of Europe enjoyed relative affluence. The
Marshall Plan, an enduring American-European cooperation, contributed to the reciprocal
transatlantic welfare. Since the beginning of the Cold War, American foreign policy became the
containment of communism from expanding in the Western half of Europe or the “defense of
freedom” according to Václav Havel.414
The five decade American strategy of containment, as coined by George F. Kennan in
July of 1947, was the defining loadstar of American international engagement. The concept
gained a legal framework on April 4, 1949 when at the insistence of the United Kingdom, the
North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) was signed. Until the war in Korea, American leaders did not call
NATO as NATO. It might just be an American penchant to call something an organization when
and only when it is believed to be effective.415 Strengthening the collective defense organization
against communist expansion came a bit later.
The sounding of the tocsin for decision makers, and the Western Europeans alike, derived
from the potential Soviet surge in three areas. One was the Soviet atomic test. The second was
the collapse of the nationalist government in China. The third, the communist invasion of South
Korea.416 The United States and the Western European allies were forced to react against the
backdrop of expanding communist clout and belligerence in the East and around the Western
borders.
As a result, the United States adapted the comprehensive containment of communism
policies worldwide. It was Harry Truman who first incorporated the containment principles in
the Truman’s foreign policy doctrine. The first practical task was to deter Soviets from
expanding into Turkey and Greece. Not long thereafter, the Marshall Plan aimed at the
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improvement of socio-economic conditions in Europe. The objective was to avoid communists
coming to power in Europe. American foreign policy took several shapes, but it never deviated
from the defining containment principle.
During Eisenhower’s term, the policy was called “the new look.” It based on
overwhelming “retaliatory striking power” in case of Soviet attack. Despite altering Truman’s
Doctrine, he never abandoned the overarching objective to contain communism. American
makers of foreign policy were forging American and European defense capabilities. Kennedy
and Johnson later adopted versions of flexible response and brinkmanship to contain communist
powers. American foreign policy principles were tied to maintaining a “hard and bitter peace”,
according to Kennedy.
Then the Baltic States were beyond the American reach. For example, notwithstanding
more distant areas inside the Soviet Union, Kennedy’s response to West Germany’s Willy
Brandt’s concerns about Western inaction and the crisis in Western confidence after the erection
of the Berlin Wall was nothing but cautious. He responded by saying that “as grave as this matter
is, there are no steps available which can force a significant change.”417 Trying to take East
Germany by force would have meant starting a war with the Soviet Union.
Kennedy’s successors were not different. They also could not abandon the prevailing
arms race when it was in full swing. What Johnson could do, however, was to build contacts with
the Warsaw Pact countries by sending in the first ambassador to Poland or turning legations into
embassies in Hungary or Bulgaria. Moreover, as Johnson himself recalls, “there was a possibility
for a slow bridge-building process of contact, commerce, and better understanding with millions
of Europeans living under communist rule.”418
At the moment when the Soviet Union seemed to reach parity in terms of nuclear arsenal
with the United States, there came Nixon’s détente. It was still coupling “Kennedy’s tactical
flexibility with Eisenhower’s structure and coherence.” There was little global leaders could do
to abandon the arms race. When relations reached dead ends, telling “the best anecdotes and
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colorful phrases which Soviets themselves had used through all meetings” was a way to uphold
diplomacy.419
Later Jimmy Carter “did not want to abandon American values for the Soviet ones”, but,
as Carter recalls himself, “he served as president during the latter years of the Cold War, when
mutual assured destruction from a nuclear exchange was an overriding factor for American
dealings with the Soviet Union.”420 He did not shy away to emphasizing that even if he saw a
need for a change in American foreign policy, he noted that “he profoundly believed in a strong
defense.”421
Finally, Reagan launched a military surge and completed the containment by exhausting
the Soviet Union in the arms race. Even if Reagan urged in his public speeches to halt the
spiraling of the nuclear race, he was genuinely worried that the nuclear freeze could be directed
only at the United States rather than all superpowers, especially the Soviet Union.422 As a result,
his policy became a massive military surge.
The American foreign policy was a mix of values and force, but it never abandoned the
containment loadstar to sustain those same values that Wilson had proposed for the interwar
period. Even George H.W. Bush’s stance was cautious when the Soviet flag was removed from
the Kremlin flagstaff.
His diary bears a note from September 2, 1991, where Bush senior explicitly used “the
power and prestige of the United States, not to posture, not to be the first on board, but to
encourage Gorbachev himself to move faster on freeing the Baltics.”423 Despite the Wells
declaration, Americans left the Baltics to resolve challenges themselves before America
zealously came to defend new friendships.
Had the Soviet communism been appealing during the five decade occupation, there
would not have been a need to contain it. George Kennan noted that “the Baltic countries should
never again be forced against the innermost feelings of their peoples into any relationship
whatsoever with a Russian state. America acknowledged the ideals that Wilson had proposed.
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Latvians had a right for self-determination, but the right could not be enforced since there was a
risk of all-out nuclear war.
It was recognized that any of the Baltic States would be foolish to reject close and
cooperative arrangements with a tolerant, non-imperialistic Russia, which genuinely wished to
overcome the unhappy memories of the past and to place her relations with the Baltic peoples on
a basis of real respect and disinterestedness.”424 If that was the case then the whole strategy for
containing communism would have diminished, and there would be no secessionist movements
inside the Soviet Union. Since communism was never cooperative, but oppressive, the deterrence
principle was a necessity for the day.
Until Bill Clinton, the Welles declaration remained a bookmark for Baltic independence.
The United States was waiting for the right moment. Reminiscent of what Wilson had said
before, the possibility for the heeling influence and resumed friendships could take place in the
1990s. The Soviet Union was gone, the world was changing, but for the Cold War period and in
the immediate post-Cold War years, the policy toward the Baltic States and Latvia was nothing
more than benign.
On January 20, 1989, George H.W. Bush noted that “a world refreshed by freedom seems
reborn and a day of dictator and totalitarian era is passing. Great nations of the world are moving
toward democracy and through the door of freedom, free markets, and prosperity.”425 Shortly
thereafter Bush delivered a speech in Mainz, West Germany on May 31, 1989. He explicitly
noted the task of build Europe whole and free. After declaring the direction, there was a need for
action.
According to National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, the day when the world
changed was the day when “Baker and Shevardnadze stood up together and denounced the Iraqi
invasion in Kuwait.”426 For Latvians the new order arrived with the declaration of Latvian
independence which Yeltsin recognized in August, 1991. Belarussian, Ukrainian and Russians
leaders declared the Soviet Union dissolved by signing Belavezha Accords on December 31,
1991.
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In response to the extraordinary transformation in Eastern Europe, Bush proposed a $300
million economic aid package which Democrats raised to $500 while the assistance to El
Salvador alone in 1980s had been $4.5 billion. During the first post-Cold War moments,
NATO’s force reduction proposals raised questions about American international leadership.427
When the Berlin Wall moment was in full swing, Americans were trying to make a winwin and complete World War I and II. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker practiced
skilled diplomacy with their counterparts. During the first two years in the administration, Bush
and Gorbachev had held three summits while Baker and Shevardnadze had met even more often
until the Soviet counterpart worrisomely resigned in 1990.
The goal of diplomacy was not about making policy deals. The goal of the meetings was
“to create relaxed setting where the two leaders could get a sense or a feel for one another and
what’s on their minds, and their way of doing business, so they could see where the other was
coming from, ” recalls Bush senior.428 The pinnacle of the policy was reached during the Malta
meeting in December of 1989. Then the major focus was on nurturing personal contacts, less on
seeking policy solutions, and most certainly avoiding temptation to state “we won, you lost.”
Major European leaders embraced the same stance. From the perspective of the United
Kingdom, Thatcher’s argument was not to pursue the Baltic issue in Malta as a possibility to
undermine Gorbachev.429 Before Malta, the French President Mitterrand during his meeting with
Gorbachev had learned that the Soviet leadership “was not ready to give up fundamentals” like
Lithuania. Moreover, the incorporation of East Germany into NATO might have altered Soviet
demilitarization.430
The result was that during his first meeting with Gorbachev in Malta, Bush prepared the
way for Conventional Forces Europe (CFE) talks, strategic and chemical arms reduction
prospects, upheld the prospect for expanded trade relations, and brought up the situation in the
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Balkans, among other issues.431 In the most crucial areas for the Baltic States, however, little
progress was made. Latvia, and the other Baltic States, were not included in the CFE accords. It
was a crucial moment since the Soviet military was present in the Baltic States.
The initial CFE agreements were aimed at reducing land, air, and naval forces in Europe.
The initial agreement included the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.432 It meant that implicitly
Latvia was a part of the agreement since it was still forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union.
Nevertheless, the concluding act of negotiations on personnel strength of conventional
armed forces in Europe, a supplement of the original treaty, did not include any of the Baltic
States.433 There were no timetables and agreements on the Soviet military withdrawal from
Latvia when the final agreement was made on July 10, 1992. Bush was hesitant to work with the
Baltic States too hastily.434 Colin Powell recalls that Americans “gave unintended blessing to the
Soviets to hold on to the Baltics, what is yours is yours and what is ours is ours, and lets stay off
each other’s turf.”435
President Bush observed that, with the Baltic States free at last, and the rash of other
independence declarations, it was a complex situation. There was a problem with the future of
many small republics inside the Russian Federation and other ethnic enclaves in Russia.436
Washington closely observed the power change in Russia. It focused on the containment of the
military since there was an absence of centralized Soviet command.437 Kremlin insiders like
Shevardnadze emphasized the importance of initial American assistance to resolve “nuclear
command and control” issues because “defense minister in the collapsing Soviet empire and
surging Russia did not know what to do and whom to follow.”438
In Washington, there were some reservations about the American burden and Europe’s
future.439 The United States was following the time-worn path, but George H. W. Bush, although
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more experienced in world affairs than most American presidents, never had a vision for the role
the United States could play in the years ahead. He and his secretary of state, James Baker, were
superb problem solvers, not given to long-range planning.440 One of the reasons for such policies
were the immediate challenges that American makers of foreign policy had to resolve in a rapid
manner.
At the time, it was wishful thinking for the Baltic States to witness more attention from
the United States. The Baltic States in the last days of the Soviet Union were the most sensitive
issue. The United States had never recognized that they were a part of the Soviet Union.
Americans were lobbying Russian leaders to recognize the Baltics themselves, as Russians
sought to understand their place in a world without the unifying threat.441 American-Baltic
relations were still based on those same benign principles that Wilson had proposed. There was
no power to enforce them in the Baltic at the time.
There were some additional strains Washington had to overcome at home in order to be
bolder internationally. The public believed that the United States was in a decline because of
“overextended international commitments.”442 Furthermore, the Soviet Union and China were
lagging economically, Europe’s political unity was at odds, and Japan was deficient militarily
and in terms of global appeal. There was evident American willingness to overcome the
“imperial overstretch” which seemed to tap too much of American power.
Just when George H.W. Bush’s presidency was coming to an end, Bill Clinton and Al
Gore were promising to reduce American NATO military contingent in Europe by half.443 Such a
policy might have been reciprocal. The reduction of NATO could have reduced the Warsaw Pact
to nothing. But the unilateral withdrawal of Soviet troops and equipment according to set
timetables began only in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany.444 There was an
uncertainty about the usability of NATO in the new era, and the Baltic States were yet firmly
excluded from all CFE agreements.
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Obviously, there was anxiety in the Baltic States. On September 12, 1991, Secretary of
State James Baker zipped through all three Baltic States. When Baker was stepping out from his
aircraft, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Algirdas Sadauskas was watching his watch and compared
the visit of the secretary with Neil Armstrong’s stepping on the moon. Latvian interim President
Anatolijs Gorbunovs told him “we want to be a nuclear-free zone.” Gorbunovs was not sure what
exactly Soviet/Russian military arsenal was on Latvia’s soil.
Estonian Prime Minister Edgar Savisaar emphasized the willingness to launch the soonest
possible “accelerated divorce” and economic renewal. Baker recalls that he sensed ancient and
national roots that were ready to flourish in the Baltics. It was something different that he had
felt amid looming barracks and scattered sand sacks in St. Petersburg or Moscow just after the
recent August coup in Russia.445
There were sound reasons for the Baltic States to be anxious. There was a postGorbachev silence in Russia.446 Only recently, in January of 1991, at the same time when the
United States was sending half million troops to defend Kuwait, Soviets had used tanks in the
Baltic States to stop them from seceding.447 The possibility for exercising military force
remained undiminished.
The fear of Russian return was in the air because the Russian military regiments were still
in their Baltic barracks. Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians wanted all Russian military to be
immediately removed while Russian commanders insisted that “when a family falls apart, it’s a
private matter that cannot be solved in a day.”448 Since there was no Western –backed agreement
on the Russian military in the Baltic States, ridding Latvia from post-Soviet/Russian military
remnants became a subject for diplomatic struggles and political agreements.
There was a need for the Western assistance to moderate Baltic-Russian relations. The
risk for the Baltic States was to become like contemporary Moldova. Since September 1990,
Moscow was sending troops to protect a congress organized by pro-Soviet activists in Moldova's
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Transnistria region (a strip of land along the east bank of the Dnestr River).449 The secessionist
movement was enhanced by the post-Soviet military remnants under the auspices of the Soviet
General Yakovlev. Russian military remnants in the Baltic States could create similar protracted
conflict which in Moldovan is not resolved yet.
The Bush’s and initial Clinton’s policies were dovish. But the United States Congress
already in 1985 called on the Secretary of State and the President to take all steps to ensure the
withdrawal “of all Russian and other non-native troops, agents, colonists, and controls from the
Republics of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.”450
In 1985, the Republican Congressman from Michigan William S. Broomfield noted that
the United States should not hesitate to call on Mr. Gorbachev “to truly open up Soviet society
and introduce democracy to that closed police state.”451 This was the reaction which the United
States officials extended in response to demonstration in Riga organized by Latvian nationalists
to denounce the Soviet deportation crimes.452 The demonstration in then Soviet Baltic republic
was the largest known peaceful, anti-Communist political gathering in the history.
When the Soviet crackdown on the Baltic independence movements took place in
January, 1991, the United States Congress did not hesitate to react. The Republican Douglas K.
Bereuter came up with a speech before the Congress where he explicitly outlined that with the
American eyes being tied to the Persian Gulf, the Baltic States were “about to feel the heel of
Soviet aggression and oppression.”453
On the same issue, the Democrat Congressman, Steny H. Hoyer, led a delegation and
chaired Helsinki Commission to the Baltic States. He dubbed “the administration engaged in
only half-hearted actions on behalf of Baltic independence, designed more to save President
Gorbachev from embarrassment than to promote the Baltic cause.”454
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After successfully defending freedom in the gulf, Congress urged summoning Soviet
diplomats to stop the aggression in the Baltic States. Just two months after the 1991 crackdown,
the Congress delegation urged to transform words into deeds. The Congress came up with a
resolution asking to establish American presence in each of the Baltic States “by raising high the
flag of freedom” and channeling governmental and private sector assistance directly to them.455
The Congress also proposed and sought support for Baltic States observer status in the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, instrumental in tracking the Soviet troop
withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and Eastern Europe in accordance with the CFE agreements.
The United States Senate went even further. It resolutely called “for the Soviet Government to
immediately begin a withdrawal of Soviet armed forces from the Baltic States and undertake
discussions with Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia to facilitate that withdrawal.”456 The resolution
overtly pointed at the continued stationing of roughly 135,000 post-Soviet/Russian/CIS troops in
the Baltic States. It was a flagrant violation of territorial integrity and political sovereignty.
In the middle of 1992, when Congressmen did not see the necessary clarity and actions in
the military withdrawal, it again emphasized to the President that “Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
cannot be fully free or independent with thousands of foreign troops stationed on their territory
against the will of the people and governments.”457 The note came close to the election and
inauguration of the next President of the United States, Bill Clinton. The statement was
supported by 31 Congressmen. Among them was also the next Vice-President, Al Gore.
When Clinton assumed his duties at the beginning of 1993, Russian military forces were
still in Latvia. Nevertheless, myriad efforts were made to assist the Baltic States. Since Latvia,
and Riga, were the central management of the Russia’s Baltic military district, most military
personnel and infrastructure was located exactly there (compared with Estonia or Lithuania).
On the military withdrawal, Russia had been more than reluctant. It delayed talks about
the withdrawal until February, 1992. Only then Russia belatedly acknowledged that there were
“foreign military forces to be withdrawn from the territory of another state.”458 As an
impediment to the full scale withdrawal the shortage of housing for the Russian military was
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cited in Russia. Furthermore, Russia demanded an extended access to Liepāja, Ventspils, and
Skrunda strategic military bases in Latvia.459
However, due to Russia’s need for Western aid, Russia’s position regarding troop
withdrawal softened in the middle of 1992. Nevertheless, it laid out conditions under which
withdraw of all military remnants would take place. Among them were guarantees to respect the
rights of the Russian speaking population and pensions to the Russian retired officers.
The result was that Russia tied the removal of troops to laws regarding citizenship and
language. That was a disconcerting condition for Latvians. When the relationships reached some
high points in the fall of 1992, Yeltsin even suspended the troop withdrawal using “profound
infringements of rights for Russian-speaking population” as an argument.460
A similar announcement about the suspension of the troop withdrawal followed in spring,
1993. Russian Defense Minister Pavel Grachev mentioned the inability to reach accords on
“sequence, conditions, schedule, and social security for the servicemen” as obstacles. On both
accounts, the Russian troop withdrawal was tacitly continued.

Russia desperately needed

financial assistance which had to be approved by the United States congress.461 Washington
played a key role in this instance.
Since the United States had tied aid to the troop withdrawal, it carried out a $166 million
program to provide housing for retired Russian officers withdrawn from the Baltic States.
Moreover, American makers of foreign policies performed a mediating and facilitating role
between the Baltic States and Russia on this issue until the withdrawal was completed in 1994.462
It helped to soften sensitive diplomatic issues for Latvians and Russians alike.
Diplomacy was no less important than financial assistance to Russia. Clinton, with
assistance from Britain’s Prime Minister John Major, was instrumental in involving soon to be
EU member Sweden to chair and run an EU working group on the Baltic States. This added a
diplomatic pressure weight to that of Washington’s.463 According to Bill Clinton, removing
Russian troops from the Baltic lands was a way to close the Cold War doors.
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According to former Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, it was a litmus test for Russia.
It could become either a European power or a threat to Western values. Russian conduct toward
the Baltic States showed the true nature of Russia's commitment to international norms and
principles.464 Moreover, Washington’s and Stockholm’s efforts played a role in convincing
adamant and well-salted nationalists in Latvia to concede in order to complete the Russian
military withdrawal.
At the end of 1994 Bill Clinton stopped in Riga to celebrate the withdrawal of the
Russian troops from Lithuania and Latvia. It was a move which Americans had helped to speed
up by providing large numbers of housing vouchers for Russian officers who wanted to go
home.465 In a moving ceremony in front of Riga’s Monument of Freedom Clinton was greeted by
around forty thousand large crowd waving American flags.
Latvians cheered for Clinton’s persistent efforts to secure the withdrawal of the still
occupying Russian soldiers.466 In the meantime, Clinton’s daughter Chelsea was buying flowers
in the colors of the American flag in Riga’s central market. It was a symbolic appearance for
most Latvians, and not just culturally, at least in Latvia. The United States assisted to uphold
Latvia’s sovereignty, and it became independent from Russia’s military.
The inability to remove Russian troops would indicate the restoration of Russian rule in
the Baltic States. It would signal a return to the imperialism with which Russia threatened
Europe for centuries and an unacceptable shift in both the European and global equilibrium.467
Bill Clinton heralded the possibility for new friendships and partnerships. Congress urged for
early cooperation with the Baltic States, the administration in charge of the White House was
benign before. Events in Europe, however, required closer American involvement to uphold the
Wilsonian values.
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Redemption: NATO Refined
In the aftermath of the Russian troop removal from Latvia, there were still challenges that
had to be resolved. The communist past had “provided alliances, hierarchy, leadership and
identity.”468 Since the Soviet Union was gone, nothing similar existed. Moreover, one of the
most crucial arguments for NATO enlargement, and subsequent American involvement, was
closing a geographic gap between unified Germany and Russia. The objective was to deny a
possibility for either to expand.
There was a need “to eliminate once and for all the strategic vacuum in Central Europe
that in the twentieth century had tempted both German and Russian expansion.”469 Thus, it was
argued, NATO expansion must not be delayed and it should not be driven by whipping up
Russian hysteria that could eventually become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
By American pundits, the immediate and imminent enlargement was not driven against
any state, but was rather a historic process of constructing a stable, secure, and more truly
European Europe.470 However, in the end, NATO enlargement meant something profound for
any country that joined the alliance. For the United States it is the most solemn of all treaties: a
bilateral defense treaty that extends the United States’ security umbrella to a new nation.471 The
vaulting question was if NATO was still necessary and applicable in the new era.
The coming events in Europe hinted that NATO in Europe was probably more necessary
than ever. Bush senior, during his departure from the office and meeting with Bill Clinton,
depicted the Balkans as “the prime spot for trouble” as the farewell and the foreign policy legacy
for the incoming administration.472 Since Clinton had promised to focus on domestic affairs, at
the outset of his term he was reluctant to use military force to resolve already ongoing Balkan
conflicts.
In 1991, Secretary of State James Baker said of the Balkans that "we don't have a dog in
this fight."473 That was the mood in Washington. Bush had decided that Yugoslavia had become
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less vital to the United States because the Cold War was waning or it was over.

474

Thus, Bush

and especially General Colin Powell were initially reluctant to get involved militarily in Bosnia
when reports of ethnic cleansing appeared.475 Americans were not yet willing to engage in any
military conflict where they could not complete it fast, then return home.
Clinton was reluctant to get involved in the coming conflict as were the Europeans. As a
result, there was no leader to muster an alliance for the Balkans. According to Chirac “the
position of leader of the free world was still vacant.”476 American makers of foreign policy
expected the EU to take more decisive steps. They initially did so in Bosnia, but Europeans alone
almost came “to the greatest collective failure of the West since 1930s.”477
The EU, after signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, had not yet reached the necessary
political unity.478 But more coherent post-Cold War NATO cooperation was also not achieved.
In retrospect, American Ambassador to Yugoslavia Warren Zimmermann explicitly noted that
more decisive and sooner American or NATO action could have prevented three years of
outright bloodshed.479
Bush and Baker had decided that Yugoslavia was a problem best left to the Europeans.
Americans were delighted when the European Community attempted to mediate, with the
support of the UN Security Council, what they turned out to be ill prepared for.480 What the half
decade long European efforts proved was the diminution of NATO and the EU.
The new Clinton policy gave the new impetus to NATO. The new NATO was implicitly
created through common transatlantic action. Therefore, the necessity of the alliance was doubly
confirmed for Americans and Europeans. Madeleine Albright recalls that the resolution of the
Balkan crisis was a possibility to prevent another Munich moment.
In 1938, Neville Chamberlain had described the Munich agreement as “how horrible,
fantastic, incredible it was that Britain should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here
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because of a quarrel in faraway country between people of whom we know nothing.”481 Well,
just a year from the Munich moment Chamberlain learned that because of the mistake allies
made, the British had to dig trances and wear gas masks. So did Americans as the European
conflict affected their security too.
Then came a substantial change. From 1994 until 1995 Clinton took necessary steps to
ensure peace accords: decisive NATO action upheld by diplomatic activities where even
Russians became a decisive part of the Bosnian crisis solution. Therefore, NATO in the postCold War proved to be necessary and the United States leadership indispensable.
By 1995, Richard Holbrooke noted that “the United States had become a European power
in a sense that goes beyond traditional assertions of American commitment to Europe.”482
American foreign policy was robustly changing. As NATO enlargement seemed probable, the
Baltic States made membership their sole foreign policy goal.
Since the completion of Bosnia and reaching of Daytona Accords in 1995, Clinton’s
administration departed on a crucial foreign policy pivot. As NATO became a crucial platform
for cooperation in terms of resolving the Bosnian crisis, the argument was that “Warsaw, Prague,
and Budapest had every right to the same level of prosperity and security enjoyed by Bonn,
Paris, and London.”483 The same pundits who argued for the enlargement of NATO by accepting
Central Europe, also addressed the Baltic perspective when it was clear that NATO would
enlarge. The only question was where and when.
The Baltic States remained among the most controversial geopolitical conundrums. By
1997, the pro-enlargement pundits proposed that NATO enlargement would enhance the
strategic interests by accepting the Baltic States. Russian sensitivities should be respected. Thus,
the enlargement had to be pursued in compliance with minority issues and border disputes with
Russia.
There were some arguments that focused on general defensibility or indefensibility of the
Baltic States. In the meantime, if the enlargement were to take place, Kaliningrad would become
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a geographic island inside NATO’s territory.484 All in all, the Baltic States had to adopt a stance
where their presence in NATO would be beneficial. But, again, it was not up to the Baltic States
to decide their fate. If that was the case, they were NATO members already in 1991.
NATO enlargement and partnerships depended on security environment and institutional
arrangements. The Bosnian crisis proved that new partnerships were necessary. Thus, in 1994
Partnership for Peace (PfP) allowed for Latvia to participate in the peace-keeping operation in
Bosnia. Russians saw PfP as a substitute for NATO membership. So did some American pundits.
Nevertheless, such policy makers as Madeleine Albright recall Kissinger inaccurately describing
PfP as a substitute for NATO expansion. He had suggested wrongly that Americans granted
Russia a veto over NATO enlargement.
The American administration forged a consensus within NATO, and neither Russia nor
any other non-member had a veto over the enlargement process. Americans noted, however, that
they were insisting that candidates be ready to undertake the obligations of membership, just as
we and our allies must be ready to extend our solemn commitments to them.485
Subsequently, since signing of the PfP and re-establishing Latvian National Armed
Forces, Latvia was participating in the Bosnian peace-keeping missions.486 Moreover, uniform
and common Baltic peacekeeping platoons were tested in Bosnia-Herzegovina since 1998. The
United States and NATO gave a possible reason for enhanced regional cooperation among the
Baltic States.487 In that way they could prove themselves capable multi-national defense
participants.
Apart from Baltic cooperation alone, strong emphasis was placed on broader regional
cooperation efforts. Deputy Secretary of States Strobe Talbott announced the Northern Europe
Initiative (NEI) in January, 1998. The goal was to work through existing institutions to
encourage integration among the nations of the Nordic and Baltic region. It was the United States
484

Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, “NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States,” ed. Philip H. Gordon,
NATO’s Transformation: The Changing Shape of the Atlantic Alliance (Lanham, Boulder, New York, and London:
Rowman&Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), 158-159.
485
Madeleine K. Albright, “Misplaced Misgivings: We are Leading the United Nations, Not the Other Way
Around,” The Washington Post (March 17, 1995).
486
See “The Participation of the Latvian National Armed Forces in International Operations,” The Ministry of
Defence
of
the
Republic
of
Latvia:
accessed
on
11/01/2016,
http://www.mod.gov.lv/~/media/AM/Aktualitates/Publikacijas/Informativie%20materiali/Informativas%20lapas/Fak
tu_lapa_so_2006_ENG.ashx.
487
See “The Baltic Defense Co-Operation, Main Joint Projects,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of
Latvia: accessed on 11/19/2016, http://www.mfa.gov.lv/en/security-policy/co-operation-with-nato-member-statesand-candidate-countries/baltic-defence-co-operation-main-joint-projects.

171
government effort to bring together Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Denmark, Finland, Iceland,
Norway, and Sweden as well as German, Polish and Russian areas that border the Baltic Sea or
the Baltic republics.
The NEI specifically sought to promote US-Russian cooperation in regional bodies,
particularly Nordic ones, whose decisions affect Northwest Russia. There was a hope that Russia
would increasingly participate in cooperative regional endeavors politically, economically, and
also promote security.
“If Russia can come to see the Baltic States not as a pathway inward for invading armies
or as a buffer against imaginary enemies, but as a gateway outward to the new Europe of which
it seeks to be an active part, then everyone will benefit - your countries, mine, Russia itself, and
the Euro-Atlantic community as a whole,” recalled Talbott.488
American leaders started addressing the Baltic States more explicitly and frequently, not
as separate states but as parts of broader regional security. Thus, Baltic involvement in NATO’s
peace-keeping operations, if not significantly contributed to the peace in the Balkans, then at
least promoted Baltic visibility within the alliance. Since political contacts between BalticAmerican leaders intensified. On her visit to Lithuania in July, 1997, former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright's expressed support to the Baltic States by saying that "Europe cannot be
whole and secure without you."
During the visit, she also voiced some of the more salient Baltic challenges such as the
need to improve Baltic military capabilities. For the first enlargement round exactly the military
capabilities were used as the major hurdle to the membership by the United States Defense
Secretary William Perry.
Albright also warned against nationalist tendencies in the Baltic States, underlining the
importance to respect minorities.489 Despite pointing at the Baltic weaknesses, since the
restoration of the independence the Baltic States have received financial aid from the United
States for military buildup, educational training, and improvement of military export controls.490
When it comes to governance and minorities issues, apart from American funds for the
NGO activities, the United States explicitly contributed to improvements of the democratic
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governance. Not all democracies have been allies of the United States, but all autocracies have
been enemies.491 Here, too, the United States assisted Latvia. From 1990 until 1999, the United
States obligated $54.3 million in aid to support the democratic transition in Latvia. 492
By the time the first enlargement took place, the United States had significantly
contributed to the Baltic integration in the Euro-Atlantic community. In fact, leaders like
Albright emphasized that “together we will do everything we can to ensure that no new lines are
drawn across Europe and not between NATO's first new members and the Baltic States, not
between the Baltic States and your neighbors to the east. That includes Russia.”493
The Congress this time had taken a different stance. In April, 1998, some Senators, like
Warner, Moynihan, and Wellstone, expressed concerns that NATO enlargement to include the
Baltic States would sharpen relations with Russia.494 It was not that the United States leadership
ever neglected the Russian NATO enlargement opposition. Madeleine Albright recalls Yevgeny
“Primakov’s warning how the world would end if the Baltics ever entered NATO” and how
Yeltsin was downplaying her role as he specifically mentioned that NATO enlargement was the
subject for the two presidents to decide 495
When the Russian president kept urging and nudging Bill Clinton to abstain from
admitting the Baltic States, the answer from the American counterpart was that it was also for the
American Congress to decide. The congress, however, was a staunch supporter of NATO
enlargement. It was made clear to Russians that NATO enlargement was not for them to decide.
It would take place with or without their consent.
1998 was turbulent domestically and internationally in the United States. With all the
domestic scandals around the president, Clinton recalls that the only bright spot on the world
horizon in January of 1998 was the White House’s signing of the partnership with the Baltic
nations. Even if it was the bilateral American-Baltic Charter, Bill Clinton dubbed it as the
NATO-Baltic partnership.
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Speaking at the signing of the charter on January 16, 1998, Clinton emphasized that the
charter “furthers America's commitment to help Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia to deepen their
integration and prepare for membership in the EU and NATO.” At the same time he noted the
salient importance of an accord between all NATO members. The American position alone “of
course, can be no guarantee of admission to the alliance,” said Clinton.496
As recalls Clinton, the charter was designed to formalize security relationships and
reassure the ultimate goal of all the Baltic nations, the full integration into NATO and other
multilateral organizations.497 The charter thus far has been amongst the most important bilateral
agreements between the United States and the Baltic States. The United States’ active political
support in NATO at the time of the signing of the charter was joined by Denmark. They both
became the twofold Baltic-NATO membership lobby.498 Apart from them, there were very few
allies that were ardent supporters of the Baltic admission before the first NATO enlargement in
1999 took place.
After the 1999 enlargement, NATO turned out to be necessary in Europe once more.
Since 1992, Americans had stood firmly behind the Kosovar self-determination rights in the
volatile Serb-Kosovar dispute. Despite the unclear involvement of Albanians and Serbs in the
escalation of the conflict since 1998, the United States, in conjunction with its NATO allies,
undertook a military intervention on behalf of the people of Kosovo, a region of Serbia 90
percent of whose population was Albanian Muslim.499
In terms of Kosovo, the United States again wanted to avoid another Munich and
Slobodan Milosevic ominously reminded Madeleine Albright of the Munich mindset. The
NATO mission of 1999 was profound for several reasons. By siding against Serbs and
Milosevic, the United States severed relations with the Russian Federation.
When Yevgeny Primakov, the former Russia’s Prime Minister, learned about NATO’s air
campaign on behalf of Kosovars while he was en route to Washington, he ordered his plane to
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turn around.500 Furthermore, bad coordination almost brought Russian and NATO forces
dangerously close to direct military conflict over control of an airport in Kosovo.
The Kosovo crisis and the NATO enlargement by accepting the Czech Republic, Poland,
and Hungary made the already uneasy partnership with Russia more complicated. Furthermore,
while the summit room was full of smoke because of the Balkan wars, the membership action
plan was announced at the Washington NATO Summit in 1999. Without explicitly mentioning
Latvia or any of the Baltic States specifically, membership criteria were laid out. This stance
implicitly signaled that additional members would be accepted.
The aspiring members in the Baltic Sea region were, of course, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania, since all others either have not stated any wish to join NATO (Russia, Sweden, and
Finland). Implicitly the United States President made it clear with the words expressed by the
French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman five decades ago that “NATO's fundamental aim was
not to win, but to avoid wars by becoming strong together to safeguard peace."501 Broader
alliances had proved themselves beneficial in Europe, and many aspired to join.
The summit for Latvia was significant from many aspects. One was the possibility for
political participation. The former President of Latvia Guntis Ulmanis echoed decisions and
statements of Washington’s Summit by explicitly welcoming “commitment to NATO`s active
open door policy including the newly announced Membership Action Plan.”502 The former
president emphasized Latvia’s ongoing commitment to NATO’s peace-keeping efforts in the
Balkans as well as Latvia’s adamant willingness to continue “setting an example for other
regions of the new Europe.”
Before the Prague Summit of 2002, Secretary of State Collin Powell assured the already
next President of Latvia Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga that “Russia will never be given a veto over who
is or is not part of NATO, and we will examine each country in accordance with the conditions
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and standards put forth.”503 The important aspect was that membership for Latvia was already
formalized and more NATO members from Central Europe since 1999 supported it politically.
In terms of American-Russian relations, the events around NATO policies and Balkans
had severed Clinton-Yeltsin relationships. At the end of 1999, Yeltsin had changed. He attacked
the West for sermonizing on Russia’s aggression in Chechnya. Russia stated that the Americanled aggression against Yugoslavia “deprived Clinton to lecture Russia on how it should deal with
territories within its borders.”504 When the confrontation with Russia seemed to reach its
pinnacle at the outset of the Kosovo-NATO operations, only some kind of de-escalation of
tensions could remedy or avert Russia’s anti-NATO and anti-American policies. There was a
need for a change.
It was a time for the new leader - Vladimir Putin – to direct new relations with the United
States. Shortly after Bill Clinton was replaced by George W. Bush, the United States came under
attack on September 11, 2001. Vladimir Putin was the first leader to call his counterpart in the
White House to offer assistance. It was an unprecedented move in the same way as the new
enemy was intangible and required for coordinated action. There seemed to be a possibility to
overcome growing disagreements.
American attention ever since the terrorist attack started shifting, the new policies were
reminiscent of what had happened more than a decade ago when the American military led a
coalition to deter Iraqi expansion in Kuwait in the 1990s. American military was relocated from
Europe to the Middle East then. This time, it was the United States led NATO that shifted
battlefields and diplomatic purposes to the desert sands of Middle East.505 Afghanistan, the
Taliban base-country of the 9/11 attacks, became the new target.
Russia initially supported American endeavors in Afghanistan. It also did not object to
the next round of NATO enlargement so vociferously, at least in relations with Washington. The
Baltic States could be admitted to NATO and there was no power to hinder the enlargement.
America was bold and decisive. Post-September 11 was the era when the unipolar
moment came to its pinnacle. Ever since an exhausted Soviet Union called off the Cold War, the
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center of world power had been the unchallenged superpower, the United States, attended by its
Western allies.506 There were nations that ardently supported the United States and NATO. There
were some that were drifting apart even from the Western alliance. Thus, there emerged a split.
Americans could be bold for there was no power to stand in their way. Thus, the next
NATO Summit in Prague gave an explicit formal invitation to start accession talks with Latvia.
NATO’s Secretary General mentioned in 2002 that “in 1989, a NATO Secretary General could
not receive diplomats from Central and Eastern European countries in his office,” but in 2002
new members were invited to join from the region to address new "out-of-area" challenges that
lay ahead.507
NATO allies were in Afghanistan under the United Nations mandate. The United States
adapted the new foreign policy after the terrorist attacks of 2001. Under the Bush doctrine, the
United States became a liberal leviathan that “could not remain idle while dangers gather - the
only option was to act preemptively and strike an enemy as it prepares to strike.”508 Americans
launched a comprehensive assault on terrorism in the broader Middle East region. Latvia was
willing to be a part of the alliance like it was in the Balkan operations.
In the run up to the Prague NATO Summit in 2002, the United States and Europe had
developed the “transatlantic power gap, hard and soft.” It threatened to tear NATO in parts;
Americans were involved in a dialogue with power while Europe was preoccupied with order in
times when the “big bang” enlargement threatened to be an end to NATO rather than its
renewal.509 There were significant strains placed on individual countries and alliances.
Since 9/11, the United States was tacitly or not preparing an alliance for a mission in Iraq.
The ousting of Sadam Hussein and the crafting of the coalition of the willing for the invasion in
Iraq in 2003 created cleavages among the transatlantic partners within Europe and
internationally.
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The United States foreign policy loadstar had become to promote democracy as
“America’s vital interest and deepest beliefs to support the growth of democratic movements and
institutions in every nation and culture with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world.”510
Russia, on its part, became a part of the alliance of unwilling that consisted of some
major European powers. The transatlantic alliance seemed to be splitting apart. Putin might have
thought that the alliance was in dismay. Sequentially, Russians did not oppose NATO
enlargement that was scheduled in 2004.
There was an opportunity for those who wanted to closer align with the United States by
joining NATO. Already formalized relation between the United States and the Baltic States
could be concluded after the summit of 2002. The accession of Latvia to NATO during the
second NATO enlargement was jubilantly completed in 2004.
Two years after the 2004 enlargement, the United States President addressed participants
of the Riga NATO Summit in 2006 by stating that “as NATO allies, you will never again stand
alone in defense of your freedom and you'll never be occupied by a foreign power.”511 The
speech and the new policy when American prestige was suffering crisis internationally was
warmly welcomed in the Baltic States. The 2006 was the time when the alliance was
transforming with its doors yet open. The period could be seen as the effort where the United
States redeemed Latvia from the Russia’s dominance.
Conclusion
In Latvia, the historic lessons and experiences are remembered well. According to
Zbigniew Brzezinski, the NATO expansion Eastward even in retrospect, today looks like an
option for the countries that did not want to be a part of the Soviet bloc, to maintain better
relations with Russia.512
One must ask if Estonia would not be in Georgia’s position when it removed the Soviet
occupation monuments from the center of its capital. Furthermore, would not Latvia become like
Ukraine when it signed its membership agreements with the EU? Both organizations for some
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time have not been pragmatic partners for Russia. NATO and the EU are rather blunt adversaries
today. NATO membership for Latvia means a possibility to escape the predicament it faced
decades ago in 1940.
In a broader regional context, any alternative to a stronger and more active NATO would
have meant something different for Europe. A United States led NATO is the only guarantee for
a peaceful Europe as we know it today. Conversely, the creation of a separate European military
union would separate European states from NATO and would become nonsense. That is the
outcome Russia much desired, to see a fragmented Europe that is detached from its major
security guarantee across the Atlantic Ocean. As a result, there is every reason for Europe to be
interested in closer cooperation with the United States.
On the other hand, America’s interest is to be the guardian of the EU. One of the reasons
the United States supports the enlargement was that the EU’s growth makes Europe even for the
United States. It is also the union that significantly contributes to the welfare of the United
States.
In terms of Baltic membership in the EU, since the Atlantic interest required such a
decision, the EU had to respect it.513 As a result, the United States implicitly promoted the
enlargement of the EU. Latvia experienced substantial American efforts to bolster its democratic
institutions. American foreign policy was aimed at promoting Latvia’s adherence to the EU’s
standards.
Considering past lessons, there has been a significant shift in American foreign policy
towards Europe since D-Day. Until that moment the United States chose to approach Europe
normatively. It made America a remote partner for Europe and Europe a threat to itself. The
result of the Paris Peace conference in 1919 did not contribute to transatlantic cohesion. It rather
created American and European policies that turned out to be rather malign. Since there was an
absence of cooperation, there could only be relative cooperation before World War II in such a
necessary security area. The transatlantic partners had to bear the resulting implications.
The eventual policy change came when there was a change in the security environment.
Security matters were altered by two revisionist powers in Europe. First, it was Nazi Germany,
then the Soviet Union. The keepers of the status quo in Europe, France and the United Kingdom
were not able to withstand the revisionists without assistance from the United States. American
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foreign policy saved the Western half of Europe. To the Eastern half the United States could
offer only benign sympathies. To do otherwise would require an all-out confrontation with the
Soviet Union.
The Soviet Union had denied membership in the Euro-Atlantic community to Latvia, like
it did to Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968 or Poland since 1956. Only the demise of the
Soviet Union itself marked change in the international environment. It offered a possibility for
the United States and the Russian Federation to forge closer ties. Until 1995, closer cooperation
between Washington and Moscow in the framework of the Bosnian crisis resolution offered such
tendency to be realistic.
Nevertheless, since 1995 both countries have been incrementally drifting apart. It
happened mostly so for diverging views on how the European post-Cold War order should look
like. The NATO mission in Kosovo and the subsequent first enlargement of NATO drove the
United States and the Russian Federation even more apart. This moment allowed the Baltic
States to join the transatlantic security structures since they were far more willing to align with
the United States than with the Russian Federation.
In retrospect, it would be wrong to think that the twofold enlargement was simply a
Western European philanthropic investment. It brought two essential benefits to the EuroAtlantic community as well. The first was the security and the United States solemn commitment
to new members in Europe. The two enlargements brought new members that became
contributors to the collective defense structure. Furthermore, the new members of the EU also
became an extension of the European market. It was an investment in more affluent European
future.
Ever since the Napoleonic wars, the United States has implicitly or explicitly
acknowledged the importance of stability and absence of domineering powers in the Baltic Sea
region. By enlarging NATO, it was possible to purse the twofold Euro-Atlantic community’s
enlargement process and extend the reciprocal benefits to new nations. As a result, the heeling
influence became increasingly felt on the both sides of the Atlantic.
For Latvia, the historic narrative suggests that the irreversible independence is possible
only when it is underwritten by a strong military alliance. America’s diplomatic declarations
were benign support for Latvia’s independence, but they never made the independence
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irreversible. Only by admitting the Baltic States into NATO, did the American foreign policy
makers redeem Latvia from the historic predicament and Russia’s influence.
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CHAPTER VI
LATVIA’S PREDICAMENT: RUSSIA’S SHADOWS

Introduction
The relations between Latvia and the Russian Federation are not easy. One reason is the
huge asymmetry in size. Russian territory stretches across eleven time zones while the line that
can be drawn between the two most distant points in Latvia is less than 450km (280mi) long. In
terms of population, the Russian Federation is approximately seventy times larger than Latvia,
too. Then it is necessary to consider the aggregate resource endowments and overall capabilities
of each. In the end, there are more disproportions between the two countries than balance.
Furthermore, Latvia’s extremely complicated history with Russia makes bilateral
relations even harder. Latvia has struggled twice to rid itself from the shackles of the Russian
imperial and the Soviet Union yokes. From 1918 until 1920 Latvian freedom fighters were
expelling the Russian/German combined forces from the Latvian territory. Since the situation
became more complicated after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Latvia needed international
assistance to rid its territory from Russian military units from 1991 until 1995. Whenever the
country has been in the Russian/Soviet clinch, Russification at the expense of all Latvian
traditions has been one of the loadstars of the Russian/Soviet policies.
The Russian empire and the Soviet Union never disguised their objective to assimilate
Latvians. Before the Soviet Union occupied Latvia for the first time in 1940, the operation called
“Latvian Nation” was already launched on November 30, 1937.514 An order was signed by the
deputy head of the state security structures (NKVD) Mikhail Petrovich Frinovsky that aimed at
the deliberate execution of the anti-Soviet elements in Latvia by destroying nationalistic
organizations and cultural elements, Latvian intelligentsia and institutions. Before, but especially
so during the Soviet period, it was considered a crime to be a Latvian.
The most recent Soviet program was far from just cultural invasion. According to the best
Stalinist traditions, it aimed at executing people who ostensibly could be considered as bearers of
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the Latvian identity. Such facts have been revealed by partially opening archives of the Soviet
security structures. Even after Stalin, the ethnic problem was not gone from the political mindset
in Moscow.
The legacy of especially the Soviet occupation period is very much felt in Latvia even
today. Since Latvia is small and the heir of the Soviet Union is the largest country in the world, it
is very hard for Latvia to alternate from the political suspicion and the historically bread
animosity to something called good neighboring relations. Latvia would have liked the Russian
Federation to be like the unified Germany has been toward Poland. In this relationship, Latvia
has very few options to make the Russian Federation treat it like Germany does Poland. Russia is
different and it treats Latvia differently.
To outline what the Russian – Latvian relations have been thus far, this part of the
research will focus on answering the question of how exactly Russia treats Latvia individually
and regionally. The research focuses on how Russia has developed its foreign policy toward
Latvia. Since Russia went through vast changes when Latvia regained its independence in the
1990s, the author will focus on the salient aspects in Russia’s foreign policy. Part of the chapter
will touch upon the ideological foundations of Russia’s foreign policy. Then the author will
focus on practical elements in Boris Yeltsin’s and Vladimir Putin’s policies. The final part of the
chapter will outline some distinct features in Russian – Latvia bilateral relations.
The Origins of Russia’s Foreign Policy Ideology
In Russian history during the 20th century, there have been various periods monarchism, totalitarianism, perestroika, and democratic paths of development. Russian legacy
has determined its future prospects. The former Russian President Boris Yeltsin a couple of years
after the collapse of the Soviet Union noted that each stage had its own ideology. He continued
by saying that during his term “we have none.”515
Well, that might not have been absolutely true. For a country with a long history and deep
traditions, there can be no absence of any ideology. Even Latvians, and they will not be alone,
will not deny that Russia’s history and traditions are rich and deep, especially before Stalin’s
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surge to power. After Stalin, the future of Russian intellectual thought at some point became its
past. In this section the author will outline some of the salient Russian foreign policy origins that
have shaped Baltic destiny.
When the Soviet Union was gone, Yeltsin faced the necessity of formulating what his
country was and how it would relate to others. Considering the vast historical geopolitical
luggage Yeltsin received at the outset of the post-Cold War era, it was not an easy task. The
Soviet Union was gone. In its stead there were multiple newly independent states around
Russia’s borders that were formerly incorporated into the communist empire, including Latvia.
Yeltsin had the option to reconcile some important past foreign policy ideas, reinvent new, and
enhance some emerging aspects. The task seemed to be clear cut, but it was never easy.
The Soviet historian and foreign policy expert Boris Shtein wrote that “not everything
about Russian diplomacy from the end of the nineteenth to the beginning of the twentieth
centuries should be crossed out.” George Kennan, one of the most famous American
Sovietologists wrote that “the history of Russian statesmanship and diplomacy, including that of
the Soviet period, has been marked by striking elements of continuity.” The last foreign affairs
minister of the Russian Empire, Sergei Sazanov, wrote that “no reform called forth by
contemporary demands should be permitted to create a sudden break between the past and the
present.”516
Russian foreign policy traditions have been intimately bound with its past ideas.
Traditions play a significant role in the formation of the external view in Russia. However,
Russian self-perception or Russian ideas have often been a conundrum to the outside world. The
United States Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman noted in 1945 that the Soviet program
was “an establishment of totalitarism ending all personal liberties as we know and respect
them.”517 Russian self-perception and policy ideas always bear a sense of mystery for the others.
Misunderstood by the West, the Russian polity seemed to be doomed to fail long ago.
Even in the distant past, when Russia emerged from World War I as the first Marxist state, many
of the ablest political observers in Europe and America were convinced that it could not survive.
Conversely, most Russian pundits thought the same about the West. Today we see that the
forecast of both groups was wrong.
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In the end, the West must ask if the Russian foreign policy is going to be belligerent or
benevolent. It was not until the communist coup d'état in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin
blockade in 1948 that the illusion of peaceful existence with the Soviet Union was finally
dispelled.518 In the more distant past, imperial Russia had tried to restlessly preserve itself by
force from within and without. Those past self-preservation traditions have strongly influenced
foreign policy traditions. Only when the Russian/Soviet empires were weak, could new states
emerge. Whenever the Russian/Soviet empires were strong, smaller states around their borders
have faced existential challenges.
The most recent independence for the Baltic States was possible in 1990s. They were
quick to start renewing what was lost to the Soviet Union in 1940. Inside Russia, however, joy
over the farewell to communism was not uniformly shared. Such Russian communists as
Gennady Zyuganov saw his country deceived and betrayed. First, by Mikhail Gorbachev and his
immediate cohorts, who, while promising needed reforms, destroyed the Soviet Union. Then by
Boris Yeltsin, who finished the job under the cover of idle talk about “democracy” and “market
economy.”519
Profound questions about Russian future remained. There were multiple domestic groups,
such as communists, who viewed the future Russia differently from Yeltsin. The overarching
question was if the Russian leaders still considered their first objective to be the start for world
revolutions or make their primary task to turn Russia into a bastion from which to launch an
assault on the capitalist world?
On the other hand, did Russian leaders begin to modify their global ambitions and bend
their energies to build a Russia where citizens could enjoy the high standards of living which
Russian skills or resources entitle them to? Another option was for Russia to begin to reconstruct
its lost imperial glory.
After communism, Russia was like the Russian traveler Ilya Muromets who was standing
at the intersection of three roads. One road, if followed, could transform the entire country into
vast Chechnya. Since Russia was a composition of multiple ethnicities, such a possibility must
be seen as always present. Only by force could Russia maintain the unity of multiple ethnicities
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within the coercive polity. This road would mean the return to the Russian neo-imperial
traditions.
The second road could lead to the transformation of Russia into a magnified Colombia
where the politics and the mafia converge. Considering the narrow loop of elites and historically
experienced and assumed vicious fights for power, such a possibility could not be eliminated.
Then Russia must be ready to engage in oppression of internal opposition at home and
demonstrate willingness to use military blackmail outside. This road would lead to the return to
the Soviet neo-communist traditions.
The third road calls for democratic development on the basis of Russia’s national state
philosophy, high spiritual values, and a tradition that could accommodate the past and the
present.520 Even if democratic development seems to be the most appealing and sane idea for the
future Russia, it must be tested in front of imperial and communist traditions. The third road
requires Russia to be tolerant. For the political elites and society to be united in shared an
institutional framework. The democratic path would allow for Russia to stay different, but at
least partially understood by the West. Such traditions in Russian history are absent yet.
According to the philosopher Ivan Ilyin, Russia has been “an organism of nature and
spirit.” In the words of another philosopher, Konstantin Leontiev, Russia is “doomed by history
to grow, even despite itself hence its territory was considered as the terrestrial habitat of national
spirit and historically given and accepted pasture of the people as a sacred space.” If more
democratic polity becomes the objective, then Russia must face the challenge to not be a prisoner
of the past. It must define what the Russian people and territory mean in a way that does not
eliminate democratic principles in front of the nature and spirit applied to territory and
population.
In terms of population, one of the most incontrovertible theses is that Russia retains a
deep sense of Slavic identity. It is a possible to maintain so-called Slavic values by defending the
rights of the Russian diaspora in the former Soviet Union and recreating in some form or other a
“Slavic Union” with Ukraine and Belarus. There is another possibility of promoting pan-Slavist
solidarity with “kin” people in Southern and Eastern Europe.521
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If Russia’s identity is centered on notions of exclusiveness and the Slavic spetsifika, then
the issue of pan-European-ness in contrast emphasizes the principles of commonality and
inclusiveness, based on democratic principles. As a result, Russia can delineate itself from the
West on the basis of spetsifika. The essential question for the West is how Russia will build its
polity. It can became a defining aspect in relations with the West. On the basis of exclusiveness,
Russia can stay culturally different. On the basis of regime, it can develop something in common
with the West.
If Russia decides to emphasize its kin people, however, then it automatically proclaims
specific rights to intervene in domestic affairs of foreign countries. In such circumstances foreign
policy signals the return of neo-imperialism or neo-communism compounded with the Russian
curse to grow and expand. The Russian identity must not seek influence beyond Russian its
borders if reciprocally benevolent relations with neighbors are sought by Moscow.
Here is one salient obstacle that derives from Russian self-awareness. There has been
overwhelming historic evidence about the popular and elite views being tied to the preservation
of the Russian greatness. While Russians would acknowledge that every country is unique, they
tend to believe that their country is more special than the others.522 Russians as a nation tend to
place themselves in upper echelon that henceforth becomes doomed to experience a clash with
the others.523 Other nations will oppose such a position, at least on their own territory since
nobody can deny such ideology for Russians in Russia.
During the Soviet period, Russians never disguised such beliefs. In Latvia, the
declaration of the “Helsinki 86” revealed some gruesome realities for Latvians in terms of their
language status, for example. Russians were laughing at Latvians when they were asked to learn
Latvian. They responded by calling Latvians nationalists fascists and insisting that they should
not learn the language of dogs because their language is principal and international.524
Despite the fact that hardly any Russian schools taught Latvian, unlike the thousand or so
Latvian schools which taught Russian, when Latvia became independent, the condescending
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Russian position continued.525 Rooted in Russian culture, neo-imperialism and neo-communism
have become an ideological-political guard of the cultural traditions for the Russians at the
expense of titular nations living in Tallinn or Riga.
Russia’s history, diverse traditions, and ideologies have rooted their identity. Becoming
like a vast assimilator-mixer, the Soviet Union looted Russia’s name and engaged in a vampirical
relationship with Russian traditions and sentiments – exploiting them cynically while at the same
altering them substantially.526 While some pride still persists, the search for Russian identity in
relations with other nations is a hard cultural, social, or political task.
The definition of Russian identity and state becomes easier for others. In the past, Russia
has admitted that it is better defined from outside. For example, Fyodor Dostoyevsky noted that
“In Europe we are Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans.”527
Many historians believe that Russia reaches its territorial unity by geographically
achieving national unity that consists of the union of Great Russians, Ukrainians (Little
Russians), and White Russians (Belarussians).528 In this Slavic union Russia can still pretend to
be an empire. According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, without Ukraine, Russia is no longer the
empire it once was, especially if one looks at Russia from the West.
The West, however, hints at some significant traits that causes additional ambivalence.
According to Henry Kissinger, the “imperialism has been Russia’s basic foreign policy as Russia
has expanded from the region around Moscow to the shores of the Pacific, the gates of the
Middle East and the center of Europe, relentlessly subjugating weaker neighbors, and seeking to
overcome those not under control.”529 Only stronger opposition has stopped Russia from
expanding.
Russians have reacted ambiguously and were bewildered and heartened at the same time
when Charles De Gaulle came up with the axiom about “Europe from the Atlantic to Urals.”
They indulged the idea that Russia was included in Europe, but they never doubted that Central
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Asia and the Caucasus lay outside the sphere of European culture, and they could not see why
Siberia and the Far East were to be separated from European Russia.
From another perspective, without the Baltic States and Ukraine, Russia could no longer
be predominantly Slavic-European, but would have increasingly an Asian face.530 Thus, Russia
does not want to see those countries escaping Moscow’s political dominance. This bridge or
window to Europe has strongly enhanced Russia in the past.
For most Europeans, Russia’s geography and culture make it more Eurasian and to
Europeans it means “not one of us,” as Václav Havel has admitted in the past. The Russian
empire has included Asian and European borderlands, but her possessions in the West, such as
Poland, Finland, and the Baltic States, have been more politically, economically, and culturally
advanced than the core Russian lands. It is no surprise that the Soviet military invasion and
armed annexations exposed the Baltic people to what they took as an overwhelming Eastern
force - backward, alien, and culturally inferior.
For example, if Soviet troops brought electricity and irrigation to Central Asia, then for
the Baltic natives Soviet Russia brought troops who had never before seen wristwatches or flush
toilets.531 If Russia was appealing in Central Asia then some former Soviet territories were held
together only by a large army, pervasive governmental bureaucracy, rather than reciprocal
interests.532
Russia is a cultural and historic mixer that does not allows to cross out the possibility that
the Soviet Union, the Russian Empire, and the Russian Federation traditions can converge. Leo
Tolstoy once noted to Averell Harriman, that if one wants to understand Kremlin, he must first
understand Kremlin of Ivan the Terrible and Peter the Great.533 In Stalin’s days, everything
Russians did was for the future – budyet (it will be). That was the theme of the Stalinist
propaganda and of the hundreds of anti-Stalinist jokes that circulated around. The Kremlin has
served as a strong bearer of the past ideology.
For example, one of the first tasks that Putin did was the reinvention of the Soviet anthem
for the Russian Federation in 2001. Apart from that, he also placed the Russian imperial eagle on
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the Russian Federation’s tricolor flag. The imperial and soviet tradition were quietly enhanced
notwithstanding Yeltsin’s protests. Fifteen years since, Putin has built the first monument for
Ivan the Terrible, while there are others devoted to Stalin. By most westerners, those figures
from Russia’s past are seen as criminals against humanity.534 It is a signal that Russia finds neoimperialism and neo-communism strongly appealing. It can be underlined by the fact that
Yeltsin’s democratic experiment did not succeed.
Boris Yeltsin’s critics had compared him unfavorably with Boris Godunov, the first nonRurik tsar from 1598 until 1605 and the notorious de facto Russian regent during the time of
troubles.535 In this instance, the death of the last tsar of the Rurik dynasty was followed by
uprisings, invasions, and widespread famine before the establishment and consolidation of the
new Romanov dynasty. The rule of Boris Godunov was a period of weakness. Yeltsin’s
democratic experiments are viewed similarly.
The question for the future is if Vladimir Putin will become like Ivan the Terrible or Peter
the Great. If so, will Putin subsequently introduce a period of greatness? And if so, is Russia
going to assume a mix of neo-imperialism and neo-communism? For the Baltic States, Putin
signals the return of the historical predicament where Russia knows only the austere and
adamantine realism perfected in an intellectual space in which the voices of liberal thinkers are
muffled or heard more audibly outside Russia than within.536
It seems that Putin today is standing at the same intersection Ilya Muromets was
yesterday. Today, however, bridges for the democratic development are inflamed by the neoimperialism and neo-communism traditions. Russia is becoming like Colombia and Chechnya.
The possibility to detour to something understandable for the West seems less likely with the
man at power in the Kremlin. It is also harder for Putin himself to abandon the traditions that are
historically familiar to most Russians. Since those traditions have been endorsed by the Kremlin,
there is a need for elite and regime changes. Only then can Russia opt for another ideology and a
different, less autocratic regime.
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The Foreign Policy of Domestic Affairs: Yeltsin
Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika introduced profound changes in the Soviet Union,
but few expected so sudden an end to the Soviet empire. On August 23, 1991, Yeltsin signed a
decree that dissolved the Communist Party. The next day, he recognized the independence of the
Baltic States. In light of those events, Ukraine’s Supreme Soviet immediately declared the
country independent. That was a fast, but decisive final blow to that signaled end of the Soviet
Union and Gorbachev’s final attempt to refurbish the union with perestroika and glasnost.537 The
Baltic States became instrumental in the further elevation of Yeltsin’s political status in Moscow.
Conversely, for Yeltsin’s opponents the Baltic States became scapegoats blamed for the
collapse of the Soviet Union. The Kremlin’s security structures had often taken the xenophobic
stance that domestic discontent was foreign-inspired and that nationalist groups were especially
vulnerable to subversive anti-Soviet organizations abroad.538 Thus, there had been multiple
attacks on Lithuanian and Latvian groups for ostensible religious or ethnic rebellion.
The Baltic States were different not only in terms of their ethnic or religious affiliation.
Their cultural and social traditions have been different. The imported Russian-speakers were
lagging behind the Baltic titular nations also practically. For example, even if the working
equipment in Estonia and Latvia was similar, the results of habituation of personnel of the
region, due to number of concrete historical circumstances, contributed to significantly higher
accuracy and care in their work.
Such traits made the Baltic States more productive and affluent. When the Soviet Union
was on the verge of disintegration, the significantly better Baltic economic performance was seen
as something menacing. The Baltic States were becoming increasingly different from the Soviet
core, yet they differed from Europe too.
When the Baltic divorce seemed imminent, the Soviets argued that the Baltic States
would never supersede Europe in terms of development. Moscow emphasized that the Balts
would always be poor. There was an envious fear that since Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania would
grow richer, the success of the Baltic States would undermine the unity of the Soviet empire. 539
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This goes back to the ancient slavery paradigm where one slave cannot stand to see another slave
become free.
When the Soviet Union naturally collapsed, owing to better conditions, the Russianspeaking immigrants found themselves better off in the Baltic States than in renewed Russia.
Even if at the outset some political rights were denied, the Baltic Russians were materially better
off than their fellows in other former Soviet republics.
They also preferred the relative calm in Latvia over the uncertainty in Russia.540 Those
Russian speakers who had lived in Latvia for many years felt themselves socially different from
the Russians living in the Russian Federation. They were different from the Baltic titular nations,
too. The political liberties, however, gave a possibility for the Russian speakers in Latvia to
organize into political movements along the lines of the Swedish People’s Party in Finland. They
could launch their individual ventures or nourish their cultural traditions.
Notwithstanding myriad external challenges, at the outset Yeltsin had profound problems
at home. The Russian political establishment was overwhelmed with the elbowing between
diverse lobby and political groups. There were groups that represented financial capital interests,
raw materials and natural resources, agrarian groups, the military-industrial complex,
manufacturing lobbyists, and regional elites.541
All were fiercely fighting for their interests to be respected in the new political
environment. Some favored closer ties with the West. Some, like the military industrial complex,
were among the most zealous market liberalization opponents. Closer rapprochement with the
West for the hardcore militarists meant that they would no longer be necessary since there would
be less conflict. For some industries in Russia, it also meant a natural end to their existence.
Some areas could not compete with the West on the basis of equality.
Such internal fighting created the political chaos and low approval ratings until the
Parliamentary elections of 1993. Before and after the election, the salient objective in Moscow
and internationally was to keep communists away from power in Russia. Thus, Yeltsin’s foreign
and domestic activities were tailored to the preservation of his power. Based on shared interests,
the United States became the most important partner for Yeltsin.

540
541

Saleniece and Kuznetsovs, 255-257.
Shevtsova, Yeltsin’s Russia: Myths and Reality, 52.

192
After the 1993 election, despite the Duma consisting of belligerent groups, Yeltsin
managed to play rivaling interests against each other elegantly. Gennady Zyuganov’s communist
bloc had scored 12.4 percent of the popular vote while liberal nationalists led by Vladimir
Zhirinovsky had managed to obtain 22.8 percent.542 Out of the political chaos and vivid political
oppositions, Yeltsin crafted his own power in Russia based on shared interests of diverse
economic groups. Since Russia stabilized, the result in 1994 was a delusional calm in Moscow.
Since the democratic transition was an objective, it required reform to take place.
Communism had destroyed much of civilian society leaving something that was as close to a
social and moral vacuum as is conceivable in a complex, relatively advanced industrial
society.543 Since democratic traditions were alien to Russians, nationalism was the most plausible
and easily available candidate for filling the emptiness.
A part of Russia still believed that the collapse of the Soviet Union took from them
superiority and status in relations with other nations. They saw the Soviet victory over fascism as
the most profound reason for national pride. Russian views about the success of the past
communism decades, however, were diverging.
There were three types of nationalism in Russia. One was civic nationalism, a trait of
western liberal values. The next one was imperial nationalism, a patriotic, liberal version or
aggressive nationalistic form. The third, a share of society wavering between civic and imperial
nationalists, both willing to pursue a reform path.544 The leadership and institutions could seize
an opportunity and direct society in most favorable direction.
Russia’s choice was a possibility to shape external relations in two ways. One could
intensify the cooperation with the West. The democratization at home would be an indicator. The
other was rooted in “the true national interests” where the political class leans toward the
reliance on military power.545 Inside Russia there were groups that favored both options.
However, Russia had started using foreign policy as a tool to disguise domestic problems by
diverting attention to external issues.
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When Russians constructed an external challenge, they located it outside, in the
neighborhood.546 Thus, very few took an alarmist view and failed to see an extreme nationalism
in Muslim and Caucasian communities as a coming challenge at home. Conversely, Estonians
and Latvians initially attracted far more Russian hostility, as indeed they did from elites in
Moscow. In terms of Russia’s relations with the West, Russians saw domestic economic reforms
as potentially dangerous in the long term. The majority thought that democratic and market
reforms would make Russia dependent on the West.547
None in the West wanted the bygone communist-capitalist confrontation to return, but
Yeltsin’s political survival required Western assistance. However, no à la Marshall Plan was
offered to Russia. Instead, Bill Clinton and American makers of the foreign policy tacitly
supported the rising cohort of newly made billionaires. Russia was developing a form of “Wild
East” capitalism that was opaque, involved levels of corruption and patronage unanticipated by
Washington.548
The democratic transition took a toll inside Russia. In return for political campaign
contributions, Yeltsin promised rising numbers of oligarchs’ shares-for-loans deals. It was made
possible to cheaply buy Russian assets. The newly made oligarchs, such as Boris Berezovsky,
head of Logovaz (one of Russia’s largest holding companies which had controlling shares or
interests in media outlets, including the Russian television station ORT, the newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and the weekly magazine Ogonyok), Vladimir Potanin, the president of
Uneximbank (Russia’s third largest bank in terms of assets), Mikhail Khodorkovsky, head of the
Menatep-Rosprom financial industrial group, Pyotr Aven, a former Russian minister turned
banker, Mikhail Fridman, the president of Alfa Bank and Alexander Smolensky, the head of
Stolichny Savings Bank, became Yeltsin’s allies.549
The fragmentation of formerly a monolithic political establishment into multiple
domestic interest groups made diverse ministries willing to focus on a myriad of interests,
especially in the Russia’s near abroad. The result of such group diversity was often apparent. The
lack of unanimity among senior officials was echoed at the middle level. When implemented,
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policies failed to match top-level declarations.550 The system attempted to maintain the
centralized character of the Soviet system, but it had obviously lost the organizational capacity.
In relation to the Baltic Stats, one such institutional failure became public in April, 1994.
Yeltsin’s office, without consulting the Foreign Ministry, announced that Moscow intended to
maintain one military base in Latvia even if Russian military withdrawal from Latvia was almost
completed. Such announcements, even if dismissed as mere technical errors, caused one
embarrassment after another in international affairs and eroded Moscow’s relations with the
Baltic States.
Out of domestic interests, some kind of foreign policy consistency started to emerge in
Russia. In the aftermath of the post-Cold War, Russian unintentionally went through three phases
of transformation. Owing to the domestic political reformist surge around Yeltsin, the first phase
was one of more or less unqualified Westernization. It favored closer ties with the West and the
democratic transformation of Russia.
The second phase was initiated and supported by myriad industrial groups in Russia.
Some wanted to uphold cautious market liberalization and preservation of the post-Soviet
economic space through protective tariffs and more interventionist economic policies since the
Russian economy was far from competitive. Since 1992, neo-communists, nationalists, and
statists (pragmatic nationalists) had been strongly embracing such policy. They supported the
political reintegration of the former Soviet space, centered on Moscow. The group caused
domestic political fracturing between liberal Westernizers and pragmatic nationalists.
The beginning of 1993 signaled the victory of pragmatic nationalists. They were
determined to defend Russia’s interests in the Russia’s near abroad vigorously in relations with
the West.551 The foreign policy results were played out as delays with troop withdrawals from
Latvia and Estonia. The decision to withhold, abrogate, or reverse the removal of Russia’s
military remnants from the Baltic States were upheld by the pragmatic nationalist groups.
Russian commanders knew about the economic conditions and the practical absence of
housing in Russia. They also enjoyed less than a tacit support from the Russian military
command in Moscow. When Yeltsin heralded Russia’s commitment to withdraw military
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remnants from the Baltic States, Commander Colonel-General Mironov announced that they
would boycott any decision to pull out.552
When Boris Yeltsin signed military withdrawal agreements with Estonia and Latvia, he
did not stipulate from where tens of millions rubbles would come for the reception of migrants
arriving in Russia.553 As a result, the Russian officers assembled in the Baltic States and
petitioned the Russian parliament.554
The result was the announcement of troop withdrawal suspension from Latvia and
Estonia in 1993 by the former Defense Minister Pavel Grachev. The withdrawal was
nevertheless tacitly continued. Yeltsin was in an urgent need for the Western financial assistance
which was made a condition by the West for Russia’s good behavior in the Baltic States.
On the other hand, Russia presented requirements to the Baltic States as a condition for
the troops to be withdrawn. The Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev spelled out needs to grant the
legal status to the Russian military in the Baltic States during the withdrawal period, accept
temporary presence on the Baltic soil of some of Russia’s military-strategic installations, drop
compensation claims for the occupation, help construct housing for the Russian officers in
Russia, guarantee transit rights to Kaliningrad, provide compensation for the ex-soviet military
installations to Russia turned over to the Baltic States, guarantee pensions and human rights to
the retired Russian military officers, alter laws that infringed upon the political and economic
rights of Russian-speakers, and drop demands for the return of territory annexed to Russia after
the Soviet invasion after 1940.555
No matter how disconcerting the demands were, in order to secure the troop withdrawal,
Latvians paid pensions to former colonists (the Russian officers). The foreign military on Baltic
soil was still seen as an occupying force. The Baltic governments also conceded to some other
demands to guarantee border agreements in the future. In Latvia concessions and the fastest
withdrawal of the Russian military was seen as the most profound task.
The intimidation, disrespect and blunt violation of the Baltic sovereignty that the Russian
military presence inflicted was quite spectacular. While withdrawing, the Russian troops were
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modernized and made better suitable for combat operations. Such mechanized units were
stationed close to Riga and Tallinn. From the perspective of Latvia and Estonia, they were a
threat to sovereignty. Furthermore, the Baltic on-site inspectors were never let close to Russian
military installations. Conversely, Russian military units crossed Baltic borders as they pleased
to service Russian military bases. Quite frequently there were conflict situations between
Russian military units and Baltic border guards.
Moreover, Russia argued that it needed to deploy additional military personnel to the
Baltic States in order to complete the military dismantling process. Even if the Baltic States
conceded to such requirements, in many instances the actual numbers Russia sent to the Baltic
States were multiple times higher than officially requested. Furthermore, Russian military
personnel never shied from publicly inappropriate behavior which Russian army spokespersons
denied as “deliberate disinformation” about the Russian military.
Apart from bilateral, territorial, military, economic, social, cultural, and ethnic unresolved
disputes, Moscow launched international confrontation with the Baltic States. Russia urged the
United Nation to grant special rights for future peacekeeping missions into former Soviet
republics to defend the rights of the Russian-speaking immigrants.556 The right was denied but
the Russian rhetoric contributed to further belligerence.
By the time when Russia had almost completed the troop withdrawal from the Baltic
States, it stood in front of some profound choices. Conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and
Transdniestr could be initially written off as rogue, spontaneous acts plotted by disobedient
Russian military commanders. However, since 1993 such behavior by the Russian Federation
had to be formalized.
In the short period of time, Yeltsin’s administration was never able to decide whether it saw the
world as benign or hostile. As a result, it gave out signals that were confused and confusing.
Yeltsin admitted two years after the Soviet collapse that the Russian state was yet trying to
assume a worthy place in the world community.557
Russia had to choose between being an empire or a democracy. Zbigniew Brzezinski in
1994 pointed at the growing assertiveness of the Russian military in the effort to retain or regain
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control over the old Soviet empire.558 Since Russia had agreed to remove its conventional forces
from former Soviet territories, it included also enclaves around Moldova and Georgia. As the
future events showed, it failed to do so before submerging into military confrontation with the
neighbors.
The international community did not remain static while Russia was soul-searching. The
United States re-invigorated NATO when American makers of foreign policy directed European
allies to resolutely complete ethnic conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Russia was a part of the
international affair. However, after the resolution of conflict, it was made clear that NATO
would not be dissolved. Since Russia was opposing broader and bolder NATO, it changed its
foreign policy track toward West.
Around its borders and especially in terms of the former Soviet Union territories, Russia
was rather quick to define its role. Russian political elites acknowledged and emphasized
Russian interests and political rights in the near abroad (which others had to respect). The
economic dependence on Russia of its former Soviet parts (including the Baltic States) was
perceived as a justification for Russia to push for the re-integration of the post-Soviet space.559
Some states embraced Moscow’s proposal. The Baltic States, however, were united in
considering Russia’s economic and political influence as the biggest threat to their national
security and sovereignty.560 Thus, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania already at the outset opted for
closer ties with the West.
With its neighbors to the West, Ukraine explored the possibility of setting up BalticBlack Sea defense cooperation.561 With the exception of the Baltic States, however, no other
country has succeeded with abandoning Russia’s political and economic dominance thus far. The
argumentation dwells in the fact that countries to the West from Ukraine have been hesitant to
forge closer ties with Ukraine in order to offset Russia’s dominance.
Also Moscow’s efforts to reassert itself in its near abroad were less successful than
initially thought. Russia exaggerated its success with the Commonwealth of Independent States
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(CIS). There was a profound inability to implement basic agreements and commitments since
Moscow could not fully decide on its role. There was the usual dichotomy between the urge to
reassert Moscow’s domination while on the other side the presence of the CIS format was
exactly designed to offset such assertion necessity.562
The Baltic States set their sights on memberships in the EU and NATO early. Georgia
initially refused to join the CIS, and Moldova and Azerbaijan initially agreed on becoming
associate members of the CIS only. Ukraine, the most important of the other former Soviet
republics, joined the CIS but clashed with Russia over dividing the former Soviet Black Sea
Fleet in Sevastopol. More symbolic, less practical, was the initiative to create the GUUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova) group. It was a regional effort to bring
those CIS member countries out from under Moscow’s privileged dominance.
The CIS region was turbulent and, it pulled Moscow into the political fray. Armed
clashes flared between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno Karabakh. Across the border from
Azerbaijan, Georgia fought with two of its autonomous regions, South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In
Moldova, violence erupted between forces loyal to the new government and the secessionist proMoscow Transnistria region. General Alexander Lebed, commander of the 14th Army, burst into
the national spotlight with his efforts to separate the sides and secure Russian military
installations and weapons stockpiles in Moldova. In places and regions where democratic
traditions were unknown and adherence to Russian dominion was seen as beneficial, like in
Central Asia, even Tajikistan fell into a civil war.
Rather than becoming a coalition based on reciprocal appeal and equality, Russia did its
best to retain whatever leverage it could in the turbulent CIS. In the Caucasus, Russian
operatives and weaponry were used in conflicts and coups against perceived anti-Russian
leaders. Economic pressure was deployed against Ukraine and the Central Asian states in a
variety of disputes. A Moscow encouraged Crimean independence movement impinged on
Ukraine’s claims to the Black Sea Fleet. By September 1995, the CIS had become the priority
area for Russian foreign policy.563 Since the introduction of the NATO enlargement, Moscow
made the former Soviet territories a foreign policy priority.
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The Russian foreign affair persistence was soon transformed into the coercive domestic
unity insistence. It was not long before Russia’s domestic weakness profoundly challenged its
unity. Russia was soon forced to direct its scarce resources to new burning problems. The most
vivid challenge came from the South of Russia.

On October 11, 1994, so called “Black

Tuesday” unexpectedly brought economic-financial and consequentially political crises to
Russia. As a result, Yeltsin faced another domestic issue.
Regions such as Chechnya and leaders such as Dzhokhar Dudayev since 1991 had not
hidden their intention to secede from Russia. Even if Moscow had given tacit political approval
to Dudayev, hoping to receive his political allegiance in exchange, from the beginning he had
been pushing for independence.
Dudayev reminded Russia what it was even after the collapse of the Soviet Union. If Chechnya
could separate, Moscow would be forced to consider additional secession efforts. Chechnya was
not the only one willing to gain more autonomy from Moscow.
Reminiscent to Gorbachev’s actions against Lithuania’s aspirations for independence in
the early 1990s, Yeltsin forged a political opposition against Dudayev to overthrow the unwanted
incumbent and replace him with a leader loyal to Moscow. When a puppet government with the
involvement of the former KGB was created, pro-Moscow ill-equipped forces were marching to
Grozny on November 26, 1994. The subversion failed since the pro-Russian forces were
promptly routed by the Chechen troops that were loyal to Dudayev. The military campaign
meant to be a blitzkrieg turned into a nefarious confrontation for Moscow that had
underestimated the Chechen mentality and warfighting skills.
The crisis of unity quickly turned into an all-Russian political crisis. Yeltsin soon
thereafter issued a decree which ordered all Chechens to disarm and disband their military
formations. Of course, Chechens had no such plans in mind. And, of course, Yeltsin did not plan
to resolve the Chechen embarrassment democratically through reconciliation.
Instead, Yeltsin ordered his military generals to plan and execute a military campaign. On
December 2, air-strikes hinted that a broader Russian military campaign could happen. On
December 11, three military columns moved into Chechnya four days before Yeltsin’s ultimatum
to Chechnya expired.564
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The result of the campaign was the surge of anti-Russian hostility in the Caucasus and the
sharp drop of Yeltsin’s popularity in Russia. All this complicated Russia’s ostensible democratic
transition and Yeltsin’s odds to stay in power. Yeltsin’s actions ominously resembled the Soviet
crackdown on Hungary in 1956. Chechnya became as alienated and belligerent as Hungary,
Poland, Czechoslovakia or Latvia since and before 1956.
Just as there would not have been political divisions over Hungarian oppression in
Moscow in 1956, none of Dudayev’s political machinations would have been possible without
strong Chechen political support in the Kremlin. Political groups in Chechnya had their
protectors and connections in Moscow. The illicit Russian-Chechen circles shared common
interests. Dudayev was selling oil without any kind of regulation or restrictions from Moscow.
The so called “black gold,” even with oil prices low, created remarkable profits.565
The war in Chechnya was not only a sign of badly executed military operations. It
increasingly fragmented political elites. The Russian federal parts were becoming politically
stronger. The political crisis threatened to challenge Yeltsin countrywide. Russia was still weak
economically and could not provide for all its federal parts and interest groups equally.
The re-election of Yeltsin depended on the resolution of the war in Chechnya. Yeltsin’s
infamous public appearances where he appeared intoxicated, for example his visit to Germany on
August 30, 1994, where he conducted an orchestra deepened the vast domestic political crisis.
Communists seemed to inch closer to regaining the political control in Moscow. In the 1995
Duma elections, communists had doubled their support by gathering 22% of the vote.566 It was
an indicator that Yeltsin could potentially lose the upcoming presidential election.
It seemed that Chechnya and the political situation in Moscow were the end of the
Yeltsin era. Activities in Chechnya led to broader regional repercussions, too. Georgia’s Eduard
Shevardnadze expressed his support to Yeltsin, but he perceived the war in Chechnya as a green
light for his own campaign in Abkhazia. He hoped that Chechens would stop supporting their
fellow Muslims in Abkhazia.
Kiev, on the other hand, could stop territorial secession and abolish the nascent
presidential institution in Crimea. Moscow’s actions played into the hands of other multiethnic
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states, such as Azerbaijan and Moldova.567 The consequences in Central and Eastern Europe
were more profound. If up until the war in Chechnya the security or demilitarization arguments
might have suggested otherwise, the NATO and the EU enlargements were justified even more
than before.
The novel repercussions of the war in Chechnya were also played out inside Russia. On
June 15, 1995, in Russia’s Budennovsk town, Samil Basayev’s terrorists seized a local hospital
and took hostages, many of them sick patients. The anti-terrorist operation was led by Russia’s
Prime minister since Yeltsin was in Canada for a state visit. The antiterrorist campaign was
unsuccessful and caused significant civilian atrocities. Terrorists used hostages, especially
women, as a human shield to ward off Russian anti-terrorist efforts.
As a result, Russians were forced to negotiate. It was seen as the Chechen success that
brought Russia to its knee. After the campaign, popular support for the counteractions surged.
The political credibility of then Prime Minister Chernomyrdin decreased, but Yeltsin’s political
approval surged. The incumbent seized the opportunity to curb the parliament’s power by saving
Chernomyrdin. Yeltsin again brought all political groups together to negotiate potential
solutions. By doing so, he eliminated his political opposition.
The resolution of the Chechen conflict was important for Yeltsin’s reelection in 1996.
However, political agreements were inconceivable since interests were so diverse. One side
wanted a complete separation while the other adamantly insisted on keeping the Russian
Federation whole. The terrorist attack on Russia and Moscow’s military activities in Chechnya
did not bolster confidence between the two sides either.
Nevertheless, an agreement was necessary and made. Two generals, one Russian
Aleksandr Lebed and the other Chechen Aslan Maskadov, reached an agreement on August 31,
1996. It was perceived as a victory by both sides and therefore was criticized at the outset by
such political figures in the Kremlin as the liberal Chubais, the federalist Luzhkov, and the
communist Zyuganov.568 It was a short-term solution, but, nevertheless, it helped Yeltsin
preserve his power and win the 1996 election.
Yeltsin’s Russia was testing the tenuous limits of Russia’s unity. The country was
economically and politically weakened and depended on Western aid. Russia needed a new
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ideology, democracy alone was not enough. Since 1996, Yeltsin had attempted to create the
“Russian idea” (Russkaya ideya), but came up empty-handed. Around the same time, various
other groups also took up the task, including a collection of conservative Russian politicians and
thinkers who called themselves “Accord in the Name of Russia” (Soglasiye vo imya Rossiya).
They turned out to be more successful than the incumbent.
Their critical thoughts gained more traction. After all, Yeltsin had showed no success in
foreign or domestic affairs and Russia was weak. NATO enlargement was not excluded or
postponed. The CIS cooperation was pale and the latest Kosovo affair in 1999 only contributed
to domestic anxiety. It seemed that the country was becoming more dependent on the West.
The domestic problems and soul-searching did not allow Russia to be assertive in the
near abroad or with the West. Moreover, from the perspective of Russia the expanding West was
coming ominously close. For most Russians, Yeltsin’s time was a time of weakness, poverty, and
uncertainty, of disorder (bezporiadok), a time to which Russians were determined not to
return.569 There was a need for a political change even if Yeltsin was politically well established.
At the end of the new millennium came the political rotation when Vladimir Putin was
introduced as a new man in the Kremlin.
Putin in Near and Far Neighborhoods
Putin came into the Kremlin with the foreign and domestic policy legacy baggage left by
Yeltsin. Few things were in good standing. Most had to be changed although Russia was
exhausted by past reforms, different orders and regimes, and the necessity for additional reforms.
Most Russians just wanted stability, order, and their salaries to be paid on time.
What shackled Russia again on the doorstep of the new millennium were apartment
building bombings in Russian cities in September, 1999. At the time, Russians believed that only
Chechens could plot something so atrocious. The facts about who was responsible are quite
opaque. Nevertheless, since the country was strongly united, Putin could launch the second
Chechen War. He had tremendous political support in Russia.
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Within a short time, it appeared that Putin had an agenda of “saving Russia”, from itself,
terrorism, and separatism.570 Saving Russia at the time meant strengthening the state apparatus,
challenging oligarchs for control, combatting organized crime, and getting the economy in order.
Saving Russia also meant winning the Chechen war at all costs. Putin wanted to finally come to
terms with international organizations, such as the EU and NATO, without becoming subservient
to the West.
Against the backdrop of the sad situation in Chechnya, the president and Kremlin agreed
on and passed the budget. That was the first peaceful procedure in the history of relations
between the president and the legislature in the post-communist Russia.571 The budget was
passed without bribing Duma deputies and tortuous discussions. It was realistic and appropriated
60 percent to the center and 40 to the regions. The money going to donor regions was slashed by
a third, so there was some discontent in the richest parts of Russia.
Since demands were mounting but the budget was thin, everything possible and
impossible was squeezed out of the budget leaving it with an 8 percent deficit. On top of
domestic commitments, Moscow owed the Paris Club of international creditor countries $14.5
billion, but it had allocated only $5.3 to service the debt. The government hoped to borrow $5.3
billion from the International Monetary Fund.
The future financial forecasts for Russia looked very dismal. It was estimated that
Russia’s external debt would be $48 billion in 2002, but the payments to service the debt would
be $17.5 billion, one half or Russia’s budget. Russia depended on the Western financial support
immensely so improvements in relations with the West were a necessity for Putin.
Furthermore, the Second Chechen War required military reform to take place. In May
2000, on Putin’s initiative, seven new “federal districts” were established, all but identical with
the country’s military districts.572 Putin launched regional and military reforms simultaneously.
There was more to that. To ensure the compliance of the military, he started paying salaries to
army officers and troops and managed to keep the military obedient.
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No military reform had taken place since Yeltsin took power. There was an urgent need
for reorganization. No more could Russia afford communist-type military service with the
disproportionate role that the military-industrial complex used to play in the Soviet Union. The
term “reasonable sufficiency” was introduced.573
To consolidate his power in Moscow, Putin decided to take control over hitherto free
media. One of the most respected Russian TV channels, NTV, owned by Vladimir Gusinsky
before the takeover was 46 percent owned by the state monopoly, Gazprom. In April, 2001, not
without Putin’s consent, the last independent television channel, NTV, passed into the hands of
Gazprom. Apart from the well-respected TV channel, the magazine Itogi, the newspaper
Segodnya, and the radio station Ekho Moskvy all passed under Gazprom’s control.574
The same pattern continued and the Russian television station ORT, the newspaper
Nezavisimaya Gazeta, and the weekly magazine Ogonyok, belonging to Boris Berezovsky,
ceased to exist as independent media outlets.575 Disloyal journalists from Russian media outlets
were purged. Individuals loyal to the regime were installed as members of editorial boards. Strict
broadcasting guidelines were introduced. It was farewell to the free media in Russia.
At the beginning of the new millennium the mysterious man in the Kremlin brought some
stability and order. It was now possible to depart from Yeltsin’s foreign policy and domestic
affairs. Thus, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin came up with a refined foreign policy doctrine.
Since Russia was weakened, he had to strengthen relations with foreign countries and
institutions. Russia’s foreign policy concept in the new millennium still emphasized rewarding
competition between Russia and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia where the indispensable
condition remained the respect of the Russian interests, including the key question, the respect
for the rights of the Russian-speaking population.
In relations with the Baltic States, Moscow tried to directly resolve some issues with
major international actors. The Kremlin emphasized that international organizations should not
engage in “entirely subjective evaluations of Russia’s actions in Chechnya while they, according

573

Yevgeny Primakov, Russian Crossroads: Toward the New Millennium (New Heaven and London: Yale
University Press, 2004), 25.
574
Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, 176-177.
575
Hill and Gaddy, 28.

205
to Russia, stood idly while human rights and the rights of ethnic minorities were violated in
Latvia and Estonia.”576
Since Russia found the West to be a complacent defender of the Russian-speaking
population in the Baltic States, Russia took it as its own mission. The former Foreign Minister
Igor Ivanov noted that Russia could not sit calmly “by as many countries (Latvia, for example)
forbid groups of people to speak their native languages, or deny them citizenship or employment
based on ethnicity.”577 Whenever Russia went on the offensive against Latvia, it was the United
States and European countries that called on Latvia and Russia for a compromise.
From the perspective of Russia, the world continued to suffer from the fascist threat
causing xenophobia, militant nationalism, and ethnic and religious intolerance. Russia was still
living in its historical fantasies, victories, and missions. Consequently, Russia assigned itself the
right to correct all wrongs, like it did when the Red Army marched toward Berlin. It was not a
new rhetoric. Putin had not changed Yeltsin’s fundamentals yet. With the West, however,
Russia’s relations approached a fundamentally new turn.
Just after the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, Putin was the
first foreign leader to call George W. Bush. He expressed his sympathies and offered a
partnership. Putin did not hide his allegiance where he explicitly placed Russia on the level of a
junior partner in the same category with Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, or France.
Furthermore, Bush’s idea of the “axis of evil” impressed the Russian president who had
spoken about the “arc of instability” first.578 Putin’s own surge to power was efficiently
enhanced after the September 22 bombings in Russia in 1999. There was something Putin could
share with Bush and offer to the United States. From the perspective of Russia’s foreign
relations, Putin had made wise and humane steps.
However, Putin did not like two things about the axis of evil policies. One was that the
“axis of evil” included some of the former Soviet allies. The second was the United States
omnipotent and unilateral action. Nevertheless, Putin did not disguise his readiness to cooperate
with the United States, even in the event of military invasion in Iraq, and especially so if Russian
economic interests would be taken care of, Putin expressed his vocal political support. By
making it explicit, Putin signified that he did not want to repeat the Yugoslav syndrome where
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Russians found themselves pitted against the United States in 1999. On the domestic front,
however, his anti-American, anti-NATO opposition went loud.
Not all supportive measures were easy for Putin. Russia quietly conceded to the United
States’ military presence in Central Asia and Georgia, Putin’s acquiescence to NATO
enlargement, and his reluctant agreement to the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty abrogation. Those
were essential cornerstones of Russian security and political interests.
It seemed that Russia had given much in exchange for nothing. As a result, Putin was
soon overtly criticized in Moscow even by pro-Western groups. The Bush policy toward Russia
was benign neglect. American attitudes toward Russia were nothing like during Clinton’s reign
when Russia was the priority of the American foreign policy. There were also few salient
conditions that contributed to the detachment between Russia and the United States. Russia was
descending while the United States was ascending. One needed the other more.
Bush, however, managed to soften some of Russia’s anxieties by approving the Strategic
Offensive Reduction Treaty on May 24, 2002. The United States and the Russian Federation
celebrated the treaty for different reasons. In Washington it was seen as a possibility to reduce a
nuclear arsenal while in Moscow it was seen as a possibility to maintain nuclear parity with the
United States.
Bush did not meet all of Putin’s expectations. However, international experts had started
discussing the Bush-Putin axis. American foreign policy aimed at integrating Russia into the
international community without transforming it. It was a continuation of Clinton’s strategy.
Furthermore, even the European Union started playing a more significant role as well. Thus,
Putin was slowly inching closer to the West.
Since Bush had failed to recognize Russia as a market economy by granting the most
favorable nation status, Romano Prodi’s arrival to Moscow on May 29, 2002, did just that. The
EU recognized Russia’s market economy status and Washington quickly followed. Putin even
started discussing single economic area, but the EU pushed back and presented demands like
Russian legal adherence to the EU norms, approximation of tariffs on energy in accordance with
global prices, and opening of its markets.579 Not all was acceptable to Putin due to lack of
competitiveness.
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Some of the EU demands threatened domestic industries that were unable to compete on
equal terms with the West. On the other hand, the EU could not accommodate some of Russia’s
inquiries since those were the subjects of the EU membership only. What the West solitarily
could do for Russia in exchange for compliance in some areas was grant membership in the G-8
and provide substantial financial guarantees linked to Russia’s further disarmament. Western
euphoria was in the air in Moscow.
The honeymoon was in full swing. Even if in May of 2002 Putin saw multiple threats on
his doorstep, such as the Baltic accession to the EU and NATO, he may have disapproved them
privately, but ignored in his discourse with Washington.580 The year when the EU and NATO
enlarged was an election year in Russia, too. Some attention was devoted to domestic affairs.
Kremlin saw its foreign policy tasks differently at the time. Since Putin had altered his
foreign policy in favor of closer ties with the West, he had to assure Beijing, the CIS, and some
individual countries like Belarus and Ukraine, that Russia’s Western orientation did not mean
abandonment of the previous ties.581
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Moreover, before the “big bang” EU and NATO enlargement in 2004, Putin could sigh in
relief. The price for fossil fuels such as oil and other raw materials was starting to surge (see
Figure 4.1). It gave Russia an unprecedented and unexpected possibility, apart from
incrementally building up the military from 2007-2014, to also increase payments to domestic
constituents. For Putin, there were novel international possibilities, too.
In the summer of 2006, Moscow finally paid off the last of its debts to the Paris Club.
Putin had already paid off his debt to the IMF in January, 2005.582 The result was that Russia had
effectively unchained itself from financial shackles to foreign countries and international
organizations. No longer could finances be used as a way of leveraging Russia’s policies as in
the case with the Russian troop withdrawal from the Baltic States.
More resources and more international leeway allowed Russia to further refurbish international
strategies. The liberal, Anatoly Chubais, who headed the Putin’s team in 2003, espoused an idea
of a “liberal empire” where Russian energy pipelines, electricity transmission lines, and Russian
companies purchases of major foreign economic assets like refineries would replace the Red
Army as Russia’s means of moving back into Europe, consolidating its ties with its old
neighborhood, and new political support.583
Since Putin had eliminated the last remnants of the Yeltsin’s team by seizing economic
assets of major strategic companies in Russia, such as Mikhail Khodorkovsky’s Yukos, he could
adapt new foreign policy tools to uphold Russia’s geopolitical interests more effectively that they
had been since 2004.
If one hypothetically questions if Ukraine were to surrender its gas transit systems to
Gazprom or Serbia were to abandon its European course, the geopolitical challenges might shift
in an unpredictable direction. Russian elites were not non-strategic, risk averse, or naïve. They
were ready to pay handsomely in the short term for the outcomes they would score in a long run.
Of course, Russia’s soft coercion rooted in economic means and hard diplomacy had to be tested
against Western to expand their geopolitical clout.584
From the very first day of the existence of the CIS, economic partnerships were
embedded in historic partnerships to create a common space socioeconomically, militarily,
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strategically and in transportation.585 For those who wanted to escape Russia’s dominance, like
Latvia, the economization of Russia’s foreign policy placed significant strains on the already
strenuously inherent political establishment. Russia’s influence was based on soft coercion:
influence that is indirectly coercive, resting on covert methods (penetration, bribery, blackmail,
and greed).586
Even the West seemed less disciplined than anticipated, especially when the 2008/2009
financial and economic crisis visited Europe. The crisis multiplied economic opportunities for
Russia. When large shipyards in France were at a standstill, or Western oil companies were
increasingly looking for new fields, Russia could offer support. Of course, in exchange for some
important concessions. Russia attempted to acquire not only much of the former Soviet Union’s
assets, it even started buying companies in the United States.
Since the crisis shook Europe’s economic confidence and solidarity, Russia could resort
to economic coercion through companies like Gazprom. The Kremlin used threats of gas cutoffs
and embargoes, potential inspections, court cases, fines or other measures hanging over foreign
governments and companies. Putin could adapt the divide-and-rule principle when institutions of
even the EU were increasingly challenged.
The United States and Russia were slowly inching toward confusion and ambiguity.
Bush’s omnipotence, especially after the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003, was
instrumental for Russia to underscore its own universal rights to participate as an equal in the
pan-European matters of significance. Since the war in Kosovo in 1999 and Clinton’s policy of
NATO expansion, and even more so after 2003, American relations with Russia suffered.587
Putin was ready to ignore the past when relations seemed to improve, but he was not ready to
repeat the past for protracted periods.
Russia understood that there could be no security in Europe without Russia. According to
Moscow, relations with the EU and NATO must develop on the basis of equality.588 The move
by the United States and NATO to expand the alliance right up to Russia’s borders, in blatant
disregard for Russia’s national interests was a clear wake-up call for the Kremlin.
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The period of an overt, idealistic, pro-Western orientation in Russian foreign policy was
relatively short-lived. It went to a natural end. Russia quickly learned the appropriate lessons.589
Even if the EU was not yet seen as a menace, Russia was perplexed that it had to reconsider all
relations with the newly accepted states due to the 2004 big bang enlargement.
On the top of double NATO and the EU enlargements and revolutions in Georgia and
Ukraine, it was not clear to Moscow what the United States intended to accomplish in those
small, viewed as failed, states in Russia’s backyard. They could not comprehend America’s
“Freedom Agenda” and Washington’s fixation on Georgia as the major element in United States
foreign policy in the period up to 2008.
Putin was looking at George W. Bush with a jaundiced eye since he perceived America’s
actions in no other way than directed against Russia.590 In 2006, Vice-President Cheney had
denounced Russia’s anti-democratic position and condemned Moscow’s gas supply cut off to the
Ukraine in 2006 over a gas pricing dispute. Putin responded proportionally since he viewed the
Western intrusion in the Russia’s near abroad as significantly disconcerting. Ominous and
reciprocal rhetoric started to escalate.
Since the Orange Revolution approached the Ukraine, which for Russia was
geopolitically more significant than Georgia. Moscow had to become more active. To get
Moscow’s favorite candidates elected, the Kremlin pursued a two-track policy. It dispatched the
best public relations officers to the Ukraine to campaign for the politician Victor Yanukovich.
Furthermore, Moscow offered a series of political and economic concessions to convince the
Ukrainian public of the importance of cooperation with Russia.591
Putin made his candidate known in Washington, but Yanukovich lost (after the poisoning
scandal of his opponent was revealed and another election round took place, owing to revelations
of the Western NGOs). “Managed democracy” did not always work. Western influence was
blamed on losing Russia’s candidate in Ukraine. Ever since Putin was ridding Russia from the
Western influence by expelling American and European NGOs, journalists, business ventures or
organizations that Kremlin found potentially unfriendly.
By 2005, Vladimir Putin heralded the collapse of the Soviet Union as the greatest error.
According to him, millions of Russians now found themselves residing outside of the Russian
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Federation beyond the protective reach of the motherland.592 With the remark of the Soviet
collapse, Putin explicitly emphasized the importance that Russia attached to the economic and
political coherence of post-Soviet space. Putin did not disguise his willingness to elevate
Russia’s status to the historic Cold War level.
Putin previously had enjoyed warm relations with Britain’s Tony Blair, France’s Jacques
Chirac, and especially Germany’s Gerhard Schröder. Ever since 2003, those same countries, with
the exception of the United Kingdom, had been partners in the anti-American “coalition of unwilling”, countries that opposed the war in Iraq. A new election cycle in Europe had brought new
leaders and Putin was trying on new partnerships.
He was not as successful with major partners as before. During the 2007 EU-Russia
Summit, Putin invited Angela Merkel to get down to business and sort things out between Russia
and Europe. He believed that individual countries could reshape the EU. Markel made it clear
that bilateral deals with Russia would not be possible by saying “she is not the queen of
Europe.”593 This was a setback for Putin. He started viewing Germany as diminished power.
Putin posed relations with Germany more. When he replaced Medvedev as a president in
2011, he did not hide that such an agreement had been made before. It made Merkel particularly
displeased. Moreover, German intelligence units revealed that Russia’s “sleeper agents” had
become active again. In 2012, German intelligence services presented a report which illuminated
Russia’s organized crime circles in Germany and Europe.
Downward spiraling of Russia’s relations with the West were also expressed vocally. In
2007, Putin made his position clear at the Munich Security Conference. For Putin, the NATO
enlargement, that had reached Russia’s borders, reduced mutual trust since it was not clear
against whom the enlargement was intended. For Moscow the important aspect was not intent,
but NATO’s capability to threaten Russia. While Russia had withdrawn its troops from Europe,
NATO bases in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and the Czech Republic had filled the void.
Russian forces were still outside of its borders in places like Georgia and Moldova and
created protracted conflicts. Those particular countries hoped to ride the euphoria and join
NATO as soon as possible. When President Bush visited Tbilisi in May, 2005, he proclaimed
that “I am proud to stand beside a President who has shown such spirit, determination and
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leadership in the cause of freedom. Georgia today is both sovereign and free, “a beacon of liberty
for this region and the world.” Americans might have implicitly over-encouraged Georgian
leadership.
Georgia invested efforts to transform and reform itself to better suit the democratic
standard up until the Bucharest NATO Summit in April, 2008. What Bush had not made public
and explicit was the warning to Mikhail Saakashvili not to let Russians provoke him and not to
use force to take back the regions, Abkhazia or South Ossetia. It was made clear that the United
States would not rescue Georgia if it made any mistakes.594
Inspired by the 2007 Bucharest Summit messages, Saakashvili did just that. A
membership action plan was not granted to Georgia. The hot-headed leader might have perceived
that the decision was based on Georgia’s unresolved territorial disputes with South Ossetia and
Abkhazia. Consequentially, Saakashvili ostensibly perceived the military solution to be the most
appropriate way to resolve the protracted conflicts and qualify for NATO membership. Well, that
was not the case and Georgia was exposed to a brief Russian military attack after it provoked
Moscow to defend the warring territories.
The NATO enlargement euphoria was gone as soon as the short war was over. The world
was shocked about the conflict that broke out in the post-Cold War era between two sovereign
countries. One of the pundits who had argued for NATO to enlarge by accepting the Visegrad
and the Baltic States, referred to the war as the little war that shook the world.
Even if the military conflict lasted only five days with relatively few casualties, “it broke
the cardinal rule of the post-Cold War that borders should never be changed by force of arms.”595
Even if not all agree with Georgia’s position in the August war of 2008, many would agree that
the tragedy revealed to the United States and European leaders' their myopic and reckless
inattention to the gathering clouds of war.596
The question about exact and appropriate Western actions remains hinging in the air. The
demonstration of force might have led to all-out war with Russia that the West would not risk.
For Putin, the five-day conflict was a war against the further NATO enlargement in which
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Georgia was effectively made an example to demonstrate Russia's “privileged interests” in the
near abroad.597
The Russian military did not acquit itself particularly well in Georgia. The year 2008 was
not the year Russia’s military was put to the test. However, the war changed Russia’s military
policies. The former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in his inaugural address spoke of
“blunders” in the operation that needed to serve as “highly serious lessons” for the military
leadership.598 Notwithstanding the military outcome, geopolitically any feasible arguments for
NATO enlargement were postponed indefinitely. Russia continued pivoting on another foreign
policy track.
On April 27, 2007, Estonia was the first NATO country that experienced a Russian
cyber-attack. While a hack of an information system is very hard to prove and there was a
Russian denial, the facts speak against the Kremlin. A closer examination of the cyber
environment in Russia contradicts the Russian government’s denial of its involvement.599
In July, 2007, Russian announced the suspension of the Conventional Forces Europe
(CFE) treaty. Again, it signaled to Russia’s neighbors a return of the historical predicament. As a
consequence of the abrogation of the treaty, the removal of Russian military forces from
Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Moldova could be postponed or neglected.
The CFE treaty provides the cooperation through which Russia can ensure predictability
in the levels and locations of NATO forces, as well as means for inspecting these forces against
the information that NATO provides.600 So can NATO. The possibility of the abrogation of the
treaty could have profound consequences on the security of Europe since it would be no longer
possible to ensure on-site military inspections and exchange of military intelligence.
Since 2007, Russia has been more militarily active around NATO borders. In June, 2009,
Russia launched a large scale military exercise that was aimed at deterring a NATO attack on
Belarus. The drill ended with a simulated nuclear attack on Warsaw, Poland. The military excise
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called “Zapad I” was attended by Russian President Medvedev and Belarusian Lukashenka.601
Four years later in 2013, Russia organized another military exercise “Zapad II” in Kaliningrad to
enhance anti-terrorist operations capabilities. The exercise was paralleled by the mobilization of
around 100,000 men inside the Russian Federation, close to the Baltic Sea region borders.
Even if the drill was labeled as a counter-terrorist exercise, the military activities were
aimed at fighting the conventional armies of the Baltic States. The comprehensiveness and scale
of the military exercises pulled the Russian military activities close to Finland’s borders. Since
Finns had plotted a national military exercise of their own in the past, strategic bomber flights
took place along the Finnish eastern border close to their firing ranges in the Barents Sea.602
Russian military generals had chastised Finland before for carrying out military activities near
Russian borders. It was the moment for payback.
Similar exercises and activities continued (see Figure 4.2.). The Russian military display
and disposition of military objects even to the person who knows little about the strategicmilitary planning makes it clear that Russia is not developing a defensive strategy. In fact, Russia
has been overly aggressive ever since 1938 when it started preparing for the offensive military
campaign in Europe in partnership with Germany.603 Then Russia removed all defensive
obstacles that could impede the offense in Europe.
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Russia became more assertive and aggressive, especially around the stable EU and
NATO borders in the Baltic Sea Region. Since 2004, growing oil prices had given economic
means to Russia to be more assertive. However, especially after the Georgian war in 2008 and
Crimean annexation in 2014, Russia improved its military arsenal and was regularly testing
NATO’s reaction time, strategy, and constraint.
Russia had also pulled its military bases closer to the Baltic and Nordic borders. In case
of a military attack on Russia, those military bases located close to the Baltic and Finnish borders
could be promptly lost. Since Russia never believed such an attack could take place, locating
military bases close to NATO borders had not been an impediment.
The character and frequency of the military activities poses questions about Russia’s
intentions. Such activities as long-range strategic bomber flights, airspace violations, a “friendly”
bombing exercise on Swedish, Danish, Latvian, or Estonian civilian targets, regular appearance
of reconnaissance planes, rhetorically offensive doctrines where military, intelligence, and
information operation are coordinated closely, bullying of civilian aircraft in international
airspace, abduction of security officers, projection of politically unacceptable demands, spying
scandals, and rogue financing information campaigns do not contribute to sound neighboring
relations. What is especially interesting is the fact that most such activities have been aimed at
Sweden and Finland.
For some time, Russia has launched a “guerrilla geopolitics” - in the light of international
order, the Kremlin finds increasingly irksome powers and alliances with greater raw military or
political and economic power. As a result, the new tactics focus on the enemy’s weaknesses and
avoid direct and overt confrontations. 604 Such activities were applied against Ukraine.
There were local mutinies in Ukraine against the pro-Moscow’s government that severed
ties with the EU. Local protests quickly turned into a profound political crisis in Ukraine. Then
President Victor Yanukovich turned away from the EU and toward Russia. Enticed by a $15
billion loan and cheap energy supplies, he caused sharp public reactions and protests that led to
the occupation of Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) by protesters.
Despite an attempt by the EU and Russia to broker an agreement between the government
and the protesting opposition, President Yanukovich fled to Russia on February 24, 2014. A
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transitional government was installed, which Russia condemned as illegal and extremist. On
February 27, Russian Special Forces, supplemented with local activists, took over government
institutions in Crimea, as well as Sevastopol, the home of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet, and other
parts of Eastern Ukraine.605 To legitimize the military effort, a secession referendum was staged
in Crimea.
In his speech, Putin called it a historic and democratic moment. At the presence of the
Russian military in Crimea, the local population had executed a referendum where 94 percent
percent of the Crimean population voted for the secession from Ukraine in favor of the Russian
Federation. The activity was quite tantamount of the Soviet-day voting conformity where
political choices were underwritten by the military presence.
The Russian Federation’s military adventures did not stop in Crimea. In fact, the Russian
military activities in the Eastern parts of Ukraine surged. The former Swedish Foreign and Prime
Minister Carl Bildt noted that Russia changed from a “strategic partner” to a “strategic
problem.”606 In 2008, the war with Georgia had demonstrated Russia’s willingness to defend its
zone of special interests against NATO. In 2014, the annexation of Crimea and the resulting
cyber-warfare in Ukraine was already the countermove against the EU.
2014 marked one more significant change. Putin began altering Russia’s extreme
nationalism. Chechens, who fought Moscow in the 1990s and 2000s, were now fighting on
behalf of Russia in Crimea, against anti-Kremlin Ukrainians. They were proof that Crimea was a
matter of Russia’s statehood, not just a narrow ethnic dispute for Russia and Russians
(Ukrainians were traitors of the cause).607 Using opaque tactics, bribing, and unconventional
methods, Putin had managed to convince Chechens to side with Moscow.
Furthermore, Russia’s new military bullying and geopolitical guerilla tactics were not the
only novel traits of the refurbished foreign policy. When Putin started seizing Russia’s free
media in 2001, he strongly enhanced the Potemkinization of his foreign policy. It was the
administration’s use of major policy statements to convey an impression of unity and sincerity
that were fundamentally at odds with the real nature of the foreign policy.608 During the Soviet
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era, the five year plans had been the most obvious cases for such policy, aimed at controlling
society, not reaching any economic goals.
In foreign affairs, Americans had accumulated some public diplomacy experience from
the Cold War years. The Soviet propaganda organs were dumping the worst kinds of vilifications
on the United States despite all the nice things Russians were saying in Washington. Russia’s
deception was nothing novel since the Stalinist-type propaganda was already in vogue in the
Soviet Union. The best response to the deceiving media campaigns, recalls Richard Nixon, was
to tell Russians that if they did not stop telling lies, then Americans might start telling the truth
about Russians.609
It became a game in which Putin was in charge of events: he controlled the facts and the
“stories.” Others, inside and outside Russia, were forced to deal with someone who was a master
at manipulating, suppressing and creating pseudo-information.610 Russia’s media empire started
highlighting only those facts that it found important, it hushed all critics domestically and
overwhelmingly repeated messages that made external threats more salient.
Such Russia does not respect a commitment to objective reality. It rather integrates
distorted facts into historic narratives according to political necessities. Russia asserts moral
superiority and status as a role model at home since others want to paint it as a victim.611 In
2015, Russian has become “the firehouse of falsehood” because of massive messaging and
shameless willingness to disseminate partial truths or outright fictions.612
One of the most salient tools for its information campaigns has been Russian-speakers
abroad. The Kremlin could always muster ways to accuse local populations for failing to respect
human rights, dignifying living conditions for ethnic minorities, minority language and cultural
norms, or a simply ostensibly anti-fascist stance.
The profound interest to defend Russian compatriots abroad is nothing else than a foreign
policy instrument. While Yeltsin’s team was in charge of the Kremlin, not a single official visit
was organized to inspect living conditions or simply meet Russia’s compatriots abroad. It was
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Putin who personally in late 1999 was said to be the first one to visit the Russian diaspora in
Uzbekistan.613
In fact, Russia has failed for many years to provide any, even the most rudimentary
assistance to compatriots living abroad.614 The way the Russian Federation dropped the question
of Crimean local autonomy in 1997 to facilitate the conclusion of the 1997 bilateral treaty with
Ukraine shows how unimportant the Russian diaspora actually was.
Russia has rhetorically threatened to use the most severe sanctions, meaning economic
embargo against Latvia if the rights of the Russian speakers will be violated. However, the
Russian ambassador to Latvia, Alexander Udaltsov, declared in February, 1997, that only
Russia’s Foreign Affairs Ministry cares about these people. In reality, no one does.615
Furthermore, the member of Russia’s Presidential Commission on Citizenship Issues,
Victor A. Pechenev, has noted that “Russia has never had any true policy on the Russianspeakers.” The ostensible human rights violations were merely used to discredit the Baltic States
internationally.
Russia’s ties with the West were worsening for diverse reasons. Since Putin’s return to
his presidential seat in 2011, relations with the West were eroding more rapidly. Thus, Russia
began three new foreign policy pivots. The first was to itself (by means of the
“sovereignization,” internal and external strengthening); to Eurasia (by means of integration of
the Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union); and to Asia (by means of development
projects in Siberia and Far East and an outreach to leading economies in the region, starting with
China).616
Already at the outset the Kremlin faced constrains. As much as Russia would like to
forge closer ties with China, only its military kept the relationship in balance. China was growing
in all areas, Russia only militarily. In 2004 Russia spent 3.4 percent of GDP on its military. In
2015, the figure climbed to 5.4 percent. In the same time span, Russia’s actual military spending
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has gone from $37.8 to $91 billion.617 In 2016, however, due to economic decline, Russia is
estimated to spend on its military around 25 percent less (in real terms $66 billion).
Since the prices for fossil fuels are decreasing, Russia appears to be too complacent about
China’s rise with whom it’s the lengthy shared border was demarcated only recently, in 2005.618
This fact indicates that those relations have been far from perfect. However, Kremlin chooses to
ignore the obvious threats and the relationship imbalance. Instead, it rather pretends that the
relationship is on a solid strategic foundation while only the military actually maintains parity.
Since Putin in 2016 overtly proclaimed that Russia’s borders are boundless and the
Russian hacking experts have proved to be involved in the United States presidential campaign,
Moscow and the West are on totally different tracks.619 Since there are clear indicators about
neo-imperialistic or neo-communist resurgence of Russia, even the West faces some limited, but
well known policy options.
While Kennan called for counterforce as a deterrent, he warned against applying Western
power to try to change the Russian government itself. Such an approach would not only
overreach in terms of the West’s actual capacity to influence events within Russia, but would
certainly galvanize support among proud Russians for continued confrontation with the West.620
It is necessary to let Russia sort things out while the West remains vigilant and resilient in
relation to what is happening around Russia’s borders.
It is clear. Russia is back: a bully to former Soviet holdings in Europe, a challenge to the
United States and its European allies, and one of the self-proclaimed leaders of an alleged post-
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Western World.621 While living in neo-imperial and neo-communist fantasies, Russia has not
marked one important fact. It is entering a stage where Russia’s faith will be challenged.
It is clear that Ukraine has entered a period of growing belligerence with Russia since the
surge of military activities that only Russia denies are not instigated by the Kremlin. In parallel
to Russia’s more assertive military activities, it is also rebuilding monuments devoted to Stalin
and Ivan the Terrible. Those actions are at serious odds with significant numbers of domestic
constituents. In that way Putin is investing efforts to weld imperial and soviet glories together.
Putin believes that even Belarus must participate in Russia’s military response to
NATO’s activities on the Eastern flank. Conversely, in this regard even Belarus is becoming
more anxious. Apart from political-security concerns, Russia and Belarus can no longer agree on
previously simple permanent trade issues, restrictions of Belarusian goods in the Russian market,
gas prices and the incomplete delivery of oil to Belarus from Russia, as well as the sudden
introduction of controls on the Belarusian-Russian border.622
Belarussian pundits share some alarming hypothesis that the large scale military drill
“Zapad/West 2017” can turn into overt occupation in case Belarus disappoints Russian
geopolitical interests. Russian military units have been on the Belarussian territory for some
time. However, the Belarussian analysts explicitly outline the fact that Russia’s confrontation
with NATO on Belarussian territory “generates sovereignty, independence and national security
risks.”623
There are reasons to believe that the Kremlin is preparing Belarus as a flashpoint for
future confrontation with the West. Moreover, the Kremlin has started applying the same
propaganda tools against Belarus that Moscow has already been using to discredit the West for a
long time.624 Both, Russian and Belarussian media with strong Russian ownership are used in
information campaigns against Lukashenka’s government. In response, Belarus has recently
opened its borders to eighty countries, among them thirty-nine European, to uphold tourism and
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exchanges.625 This luxury has been previously denied to Belarussians and foreign travelers. It
seems that Russia is incrementally losing even its last Slavic partner on the Western front.
Russia in Latvia
Normal relations between Russia and Latvia are hardly possible for one profound reason.
The interpretations in Riga and Moscow of what normal relations mean are in stark
juxtaposition. The Russian-Latvian relations are based on vast historical biases. Russia seems to
perceive Latvia as its privileged zone of interest, or as post-Soviet territory. There is a prevailing
assumption in Moscow that the Russian Federation is entitled to something of a special right in
relations with Latvia.
On the other side, Latvia has never disguised its repulsion and willingness to escape
Russian political dominance. As a result, the bilateral relations have been quite ambiguous and
confrontational with little consistency. The interaction has been based more on issues than on
coherent process or firm paradigms.
Latvia has not been a trend setter in relations with Russia since it is a tiny power. On the
other hand, Russia has hardly ever had any consistent foreign policy toward Latvia, or the other
two Baltic States. Dmitri Trenin had noted that Russia has no Baltic policy couple of year ago.
Moscow wants to settle the fate of the post-Soviet space in direct relations with the major
players.626 Moreover, as recalls Madeleine Albright, not any foreign counterpart was significant
enough for a common business to Russians. Boris Yeltsin always insisted that his only partner in
the United States was Bill Clinton.627 Putin is not different. The most recent election in the
United States served well to underline this paradigm in 2016.
Nevertheless, the major powers not always have embraced Russian interests in the Baltic
States. In relationship with other powers, Russia has always believed that the status of the Baltic
States is completely different from the status of Poland, to say nothing of Finland.628 Other
powers have attached other meanings to the Baltic States.
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The first thing that the others have denied to Russia is the prevailing assumption of its
exceptional status and privileges. In relations with the West, Russia has more or less consistently
followed its own official foreign policy declarations and documents. With the near abroad in
general and Latvia in particular this has seldom been the case. The Baltic States have always
been treated differently.
Notwithstanding the absence of foreign policy coherence and tangible substance, there
are several important aspects on which the Russian-Baltic relations have evolved. Moscow has
tried to use several factors as the means for reintegrating the Baltic States into Russia’s political
space. It has invested resources to establish financial-trading groups, joint banks, and the
“Russian-speaking business” in the Baltic States.
Russia’s economic presence has led to political repercussions. No country will neglect
the existing reciprocity between economic and political interests. As a result, Moscow has
searched for the Baltic political elites that would be “politically realistic” in Moscow’s eyes
(those elites that are in favor of pro-Moscow and less or anti pro-EU or pro-NATO).
Notwithstanding changes in international order, Russia’s relations with the Baltic States have
been strongly embedded into its geo-strategic and geo-economic thinking.
While the Baltic States would be foolish to neglect the attractiveness of Russia’s huge
consumer market as compared to the three Baltic States, the dilemma for the Baltic States is how
to accommodate security and economic interests in their relations with Russia. Russia has always
used economic cooperation, political influence, and ethnic issues as the power triangle in the
Baltic States.
Russia has attached significant importance to compatriots living abroad. Despite
profound doubts about the genuine care Russia attached to people, in the middle of 1996 Yeltsin
spoke of support for ethnic Russians and approved a new policy using a phrase “Russian
speakers.”629 Most ethnic minorities from the post-Soviet space use Russian as their primary
means for communication with the exception of the Baltic nations. One of the inroads into
Latvian political and economic affairs for Russia has been the so-called “Russian-speakers”,
mostly ethnic Russians, but there is a share of people from the other Slavic countries like
Ukraine or Belarus (see Table 4.3).
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Table 4.3: Citizenship and Ethnicity in Latvia (millions)630
1995
Ethnicity

Citizens

2005
Non-

Total

Citizens

Citizens

Non-

Total

Citizens

Latvian

1.4

0.03

1.43

1.4

0.002

1.402

Russian

0.3

0.5

0.8

0.35

0.3

0.65

Belarussian

0.03

0.09

0.12

0.04

0.06

0.09

Ukrainian

0.01

0.07

0.08

0.01

0.04

0.05

Polish 0.06

0.08

0.14

0.09

0.04

0.13

0.77

2.57

1.89

0.442

2.332

Others

(mostly

and Lithuanian)
Total

1.8

The majority of the Russian-speakers are ethnic Russians and most were non-citizens of
Latvia in 1995, almost a half were still non-citizens of Latvia in 2005 (one year after the EU and
NATO enlargement in 2004). The salient precondition for Latvia’s integration into the
EU/NATO community was the citizenship issue.
In 1998 all obstacles for naturalization were removed, making Latvian citizenship one of
the most liberal objectives in all of Europe. Even though the requirements for citizenship include
rudimentary language and history skills as well as the pledge to be loyal to Latvia, the number of
non-citizens in Latvia has decreased by only one third in a decade from 1995 until 2005.
One of the reasons is that the non-citizen’s passport makes it possible to travel to Russia
and the EU without a visa. The number of non-citizens is the indicator that signifies how many
residents in Latvia still mentally live in the space that no longer exists – the Soviet Union, the
source of privileges to the Russian-speakers in the past.
Using those power leverages, Moscow has tried to impose its policies on Latvia. Russia
has adamantly pushed for more rights in political, economic, or social affairs for the Russianspeakers. It has requested more liberal conditions for obtaining the citizenship. That would
eventually remove any obstacles for Russian-speakers to obtain Latvian passports.
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In another area, Russia has overtly blamed Latvia for denying crucial rights in education.
This issue has become a bilateral bargaining matter between Latvia and Russia. On the way to
the EU and NATO, the citizenship issue was the most important impediment for Latvia to
become member of the Euro-Atlantic community. The citizenship issue was resolved in 1998,
but during the citizenship referendum Latvians committed to reform the educational system, too.
It was decided to make Latvian language as the primary means for instruction in education by
2004.
When the moment came, there were protests where Russians chanted “Hands off Russian
Schools” (Ruki Proch ot Ruskih Shkol). Latvians have never tried to influence Russia’s
educational system, but when it comes to financing education in the Russian language with
Latvian taxpayers’ money, it is not clear why Latvia should commit to upholding the post-Soviet
legacy in Latvia. Reforms in education have contributed to the short-term domestic rifts, but the
reform itself should contribute to long-term coherence.
Along the ethnic lines, there is little social discord between Latvians and non-Latvians.
By 2006, 56 percent of Latvians and 61 percent of non-Latvians fully agreed with the idea that
they have no problems in making contacts with people from the other group (34 percent of
Latvians and 33 percent of non-Latvians gave the answer “mostly agree”). Only 8 percent of
Latvians and 6 percent of non-Latvians disagreed entirely.
Most ethnic Latvians and non-Latvians consider ethnic relations to be satisfactory.631
However, only 9 percent of respondents agreed with the statement that “all in all, the society in
Latvia is consolidated and integrated” while 65 percent gave the negative answer to the
statement. A comparatively high percentage of respondents (27 percent) said that it is difficult to
tell.
Most discord between Russian-speakers and Latvians derives exactly from the realm of
education. A significant majority of Latvians (77 percent) support the education reforms in
minority schools, while a majority of non-Latvians oppose them (only 26 percent of Russians
and 35 percent of people of other nationalities support the reforms).
Furthermore, only 19 percent of Latvians support the idea that Russian should be made
Latvia’s second official language, 87 percent of Russians and 75 percent of people of other
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nationalities support this idea.632 Making Russian as the second official language would also
mean allowing for Russian-speakers to qualify for government jobs, use Russian in public and
official communication. It would make the Russian language as mandatory for Latvians.
Russia has overwhelmingly abused the rights of Russian speakers in citizenship,
education, and the status of the Russian language in Latvia. It has restlessly chastised Estonia
and Latvia for violating human rights, but the United Nations and the Council of Europe have
always refuted such allegations as false.633
However, Moscow still perceives ethnic Russians abroad as a policy tool and the issue of
the Russian-speakers has haunted Latvian-Russian relations for long. It seems like both countries
have reached a dead end. The issue is often talked about, but there is little any side will achieve
in the future. Nevertheless, in its relations with Latvia, Russia will always emphasize the
Russian-speakers. It has been a trend since 1996 when the Russian Duma approved a resolution
calling for economic sanctions against the hostile regimes in Estonia and Latvia. The resolution
was never implemented.
In September 1996, the quite nationalistic-patriotic Russian Political Research Institute
anticipated to decrease Russia’s transit through the Baltic ports in order to achieve more rights
for Russian-speakers. In November, the institute concluded that such an approach had strong
limits. In 1997, the deputy chairman of the Russian government commented on Foreign
Minister’s Primakov’s statements about sanctions and human rights in the Baltic States that these
ethnic and economic issues should be viewed in parallel, not in direct correlation with each
other.634
Even if Russia kept rattling the Russian-speaker sword to remind to the Baltic States that
economic embargo, pressure, or niche economic warfare was always possible, no serious
sanctions were implemented. The inability to wield an economic weapon indicates that there are
significant interests for Russia in the Baltic States. One of the most salient economic sectors has
been the transit. Here Latvia, and the other Baltic States, can use their ports and railways in order
to engage in international business ventures. The Baltic States have become competitors with
each other.
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In this sector Russia could politically divide the Baltic States. The most friendly and
obedient Baltic countries have always been rewarded. They became the priority transit hubs for
Russia and Moscow has always been able to take advantage of the competition for Russia’s
business. The Baltic States have always allowed Russia to do so. Since 2000 one more port in
Lithuania was opened for operation.635 The competition for Russia’s attention was increasing as
Finland and Sweden were becoming important parts in the struggle for the transit business.
The Latvian-Russian transit cooperation has grown rapidly. By 1996 the transit sector
was growing 1.4 times faster than the aggregate economy. 55 percent of foreign direct
investment was in transportation and communication sectors the same year. Furthermore, it
would be only a slight exaggeration to say that Latvian Railways (the state-owned Latvian rail
company) has made its living from servicing the transit of goods among the Baltic States and to
the West only. Latvia has never shied away from establishing itself as a hub between East and
West.
Only about 5 percent of the physical volume of all cargo transported in 2005 was local
transportation and the bulk (84 percent) was transit through Russia. About half (49 percent in
2005) of all cargo handled by the Latvian railroad was transited from, imported from, or
exported to Russia.636 The rest of the cargo went to other places, but through the Russian
Federation since the rail system is strongly integrated with the Russian rail system. Thus, Russia
always had a total control over Latvian transit. It could always use border issues, technical
caveats related to infrastructure repairs, or decreases in transit volumes to impede transit from
Latvia.
On the other hand, as Russian exports to the West increase, the volume of cargo transited
via the Latvian transit system has grown. The same pattern applies to the Latvian ports and
railways. Between 1995 and 2005 the total volume of commercial cargo almost doubled.
Moreover, when Russia suffers economically, the tendency is for transit through Latvia to surge.
In times of crises, Russia tries to extract and sell all it can to bolster the budget revenue.
Even though there have been economic sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014, Latvian
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government has ceased to report the reciprocity of economic sanctions on transit.637 Experts have
noted that apart from the political decisions, supply and demand saliently dictates rises and drops
of cargo flow through Latvia. None of the sides were interested in dropping the economic
benefits.
Apart from just doing business with Latvia, Russia has never hidden its objective to
control Latvian business. In terms of selling natural gas to Latvia, Russia controls gas
transportation infrastructure through its subsidiaries Gazprom and Itera Latvia (a subsidiary to
Gazprom). Both subsidiaries control JSC Latvijas Gaze (a gas distribution monopoly in Latvia).
As a result, no other company can enter the gas market without Russia’s consent.
It makes Latvia economically vulnerable. There are options to cut off gas supplies to
Latvia and the other Baltic States since the focal point of the gas transportation infrastructure
goes straight through Latvia. Russian officials have denied Baltic allegations regarding the
political nature of the gas business. However, there are instances that hint at the opposite.
The Nord-Stream project – a gas pipeline that links Russia and Germany - has pointed to
Russia’s diversification strategy and determination to reduce its dependence on Baltic transit and
consumption. In terms of the Nord-Stream pipeline, according to Gazprom, “it would be a
mistake to say that Russia chose a more expensive kind of gas pipeline.” The construction of the
offshore pipeline only increases building, operational and maintenance costs. However, it allows
avoiding payments for transit and trans-shipment costs to the Baltic States.638
Even if Latvia’s extensive underground storage capacity allows assuring steady gas
deliveries to consumers in Latvia, neighboring Baltic countries and northwest Russia in the
winter period, the construction of the Nord-Stream pipeline gave a possibility to deny gas
exports to Latvia at any moment. In times of crises, even potential liquefied natural gas imports
are complicated since the transportation infrastructure is controlled by Gazprom and its affiliates.
Latvia never had alternative gas supply sources. That is one of the reasons why Russia
easily acquired gas distribution assets in Latvia. In other transit areas such Russian companies as
Gazprom, Lukoil, and Yukos were interested in acquiring Latvian business ventures at the
moment when the Soviet Union dissolved.
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Most Russian companies quickly became the largest clients for Latvian transit companies
and ports. Instead of being just clients, Russian business was eager to buy out strategic transit
assets early. In 1997, the Russian government made a decision to buy the shares of the company
which controls Liepaja port.639 Russia’s Lukoil expressed the will to privatize the Ventspils Nafta
Company that controls Ventspils port. Both ports are operational through the year
notwithstanding severe maritime conditions in winters.
The privatization of the Ventspils Nafta Company was denied. The company played a key
role in Latvia politically (major coalition political parties were sponsored by the company).
However, during the economic crisis in Russia from 1998-1999, oil transit was decreasing
through the Ventspils port. Then the decision was made to offer 25% participation share to
Lukoil in 1999, but Lukoil showed no interest.640 Rather than becoming a minor partner,
anything short of a controlling package was of no interest to Lukoil. Russia slowly started
reorienting its transit routes elsewhere while Latvia accused Sweden and Finland with looting the
transit business from Latvia.
Economic relations with Russia are not limited to purely trade aspects. Increased Russian
investments and economic activity also contributed to broader political influence. What would
have happened if instead of building the offshore Nord-Stream from Russia to Germany,
Moscow had decided to build the Amber pipeline to the same destination through the Baltic
States? Would not that be the end of political sovereignty of Latvia if such Russian business
interests would be present?
Russian business has been closely tied to politics. In the past, Russia developed sound
strategies to yield significant political pressure in order to uphold its economic interests. The
political groups and business ventures linked to the Kremlin were dubbed as Mrachkovski
enterprises: the network of commercial undertakings organized by the Russia’s secret services
(for example GRU, KGB, NKVD, Tcheka, NKGB, among others) to acquire assets and money
for the maintenance of influence abroad.641 Marriage between politics and economics have been
possible and served well to increase the opportunities for Russian oligarchs and mafia structures
in Latvia.642
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The presence of such interests in Latvia have made transparent cooperation impossible.
For example, regarding the salient transit issues, Latvian official structures failed at the outset of
their independence to organize any substantial inter-state visit. Even though the Latvian
transportation ministry tried to get involved in high-ranking political affairs, only private sector
companies in Latvia could accomplish such goals.643
All in all, there have been high and low points in the Latvian-Russian relations. The most
salient moment when the factors of Russia’s influence in Latvia were welded together was a
crisis. The first and the most profound political-economic crisis between Russia and Latvia
started in 1998. Then the Latvian foreign ministry denied the Russian ambassador in Latvia
permission to lay flowers in front of the Monument of Communist Victory over Nazism while
under construction. The Russian side took it as an insult.
Conversely, the permission was given to commemorate the Latvian soldiers who died
fighting in the Nazi German uniform against the Red Army in front of the Monument of
Freedom in Latvia. The commemoration of the Latvian Second World War Veterans, who fought
on the German side, caused a serious interstate crisis in March, 1998.644 Latvia was portrayed as
a neo-nazi state. The making of Latvia as a scapegoat was also motivated by the political and
economic crisis inside Russia. Thus, Latvia could be used as a way to distract attention from
domestic problems.
Latvia experienced an overwhelming Russian media, political, and economic offensive.
Russia’s transit through Latvia was significantly decreased. Such Russian oligarchs from team
Yeltsin as Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky launched a comprehensive information
campaign in Russia against Latvia. Radical political forces, such as the former Moscow Mayor
Yuriy Luzhkov and the radical nationalistic political figure Vladimir Zhirinovsky, unleashed the
most furious political rhetoric.
Owing to already ongoing economic decline in Russia, sanctions against Latvia for
ostensible human rights violations were applied. Latvian banks that had significantly invested in
the Russian short-term securities suffered significantly. Some enterprises in Latvia went
bankrupt and some suffered economic repercussions. One day before the referendum on the
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citizenship law the former foreign minister Igor Ivanov announced that the objective was to
achieve “international intolerance” against Latvia. Goaded by the United States and European
partners, Latvia quickly adapted a new citizenship law which anticipated liberal amendments on
October 3, 1998.645 In this response, Latvia showed the willingness to build relations that would
be free from historic biases.”
In conclusion, even if Latvian-Russian relations are not limited to the aspects outlined
above, these are all serious milestones that determine relations between Latvia and Russia even
today. Russia still is a significant transit partner and the only natural gas supplier to Latvia.
Furthermore, Russian business groups are a strong influence in Latvian politics. Strongly
entangled with the economic realm, political influence will echo the economic cooperation.
On the bright side, there is little social conflict between diverse ethnic groups in Latvia
unless politically motivated. The Latvian and non-Latvian communities live harmoniously until
Russia starts abusing ethnic relations for political gains.
March and May every year have become two focal points for social rifts. March is the
month when Latvians who died fighting in the German legion are commemorated every year.
That is the month when Russia unleashes its anti-fascist information campaigns against Latvia.
Those events are attended by lesser numbers of participants since the number of veterans is
dwindling. On the other hand, the commemoration of the communist victory attracts masses of
young people on May 9 every year. Kremlin propaganda still lures many young people in Latvia
to support communism for reasons beyond understanding by ethnic Latvians.

For ethnic

Latvians the victory of communism meant the introduction of five decade occupation.
Conclusion
Foreign relations with Russia have been the primary point of frustration in Latvia. It is
endowed with good neighbors to the North, South, and West. The Eastern front has turned out to
be the most complicated.
Russia has been misunderstood by itself and by others. Like Ilya Murometns, who stood
at the intersection, Russia has never made a choice for the future. Thus, the future has slowly but
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incrementally become the hostage of the past. Thus, the ideology that Moscow nourishes is
rather disturbing.
The introduction of imperial and communist symbols by Putin at the outset of his reign in
the early 2000s was a disconcerting fact to Yeltsin. Putin continues to display such symbols after
the invasion of Georgia and Ukraine. The Kremlin is rebuilding monuments to criminals against
humanity like Ivan the Terrible and Stalin. The Russian public seems to approve it since Putin’s
domestic ratings are high.
Under Putin, Russia is drifting away from some kind of a democratic model where the
Russian idea and the country would serve its people. Conversely, Russia continues to nourish its
past traditions. With the economic conditions worsening and political controls becoming more
oppressive, Russia becomes like Chechnya and Colombia. Here the overarching question is how
long will domestic society tolerate domestic oppression or when will come moment of Russia’s
next external military campaign come?
If until 2004 Russia was not overtly menacing, then ever since 2007, the Kremlin has
demonstrated profound assertiveness in the Baltic Sea region. Russia’s political rhetoric is
ominous, and domestic transformation and resurrection of communist and tsarist symbols are
worrisome. Even Zhirinovsky praises Putin by calling him a tsar. It sounds rather menacing and
uncomfortable probably no less to the outside world than to his political opponents. Even the
Slavic core like Ukraine and Belarus are looking at Russia with more than suspicion.
Thankfully, Latvia is the member of the EU and NATO. Notwithstanding a sound
defense shield and European institutional umbrella, Latvia is still domestically vulnerable and
sensitive. Differences between Latvians and non-Latvians regarding the accession to the
European Union and NATO have been related to consumption of mass media and support for
political parties.646 It would be possible to mitigate domestic risks by mitigating social and
political divisions. Nevertheless, like Latvian and Russian relations, ethnic relations in Latvia are
rooted in historic biases that probably only time can cure.
Among those issues are the diverse perspective on the occupation of Latvia, the outcome
of World War II, the annexation of the Abrene district that Latvia gave back to Russia in order to
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secure the ratification of the border treaty in 2007647, the status of the compatriots living beyond
Russian borders, and the procedures for obtaining citizenship and minority education issues.
Economic relations in this cocktail seem to be the most pragmatic. Nevertheless, all areas are
intertwined.
Until 2004, Russia failed to use these factors to impede Latvia’s path to the EU and
NATO. After membership, the bilateral relations gained a new pace. It could be characterized as
a cold stalemate where Russia is more involved in discrediting Latvia as a neo-fascist country
than developing long-term beneficial relations.648
After Latvia entered the Euro-Atlantic community, Russia tends to build political and
economic interest groups in Latvia. Those groups can serve as a political leverage over Latvia.
The reviving Russian economy, driven by high energy prices, gives Russian politicians tools for
influencing neighboring areas. While the opposite should relieve Russia’s political pressures, it
has historically used external adversities to disguise domestic problems. As a result, no matter
what Russia’s international or domestic trajectory is, it has never ceased to be menacing for the
Baltic States even though they are parts of broader defense and regional cooperation alliances
now.
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CHAPTER VII
THE BALTIC STATES IN EUROPE

Introduction
The European part of the Euro-Atlantic community would not be possible without the
European Union (EU). It has grown strong from the initial institutional cooperation framework
that the United States offered to Europe in the post-World War II era. The American-offered
Marshall Plan was instrumental not only for relieving postwar socio-economic pressure. It also
created conditions for major European powers to set up institutions for closer cooperation as a
way to avoid future conflicts and enhance prosperity. Nascent at the outset of the Cold War and
adolescent at the time when the Rome treaty was signed, those same institutions form the
contemporary political composition, the political union once the Maastricht Treaty came into
being.
The Maastricht consensus occurred at a time when the European political union was still
nascent. It became adolescent when the common foreign and security policies were agreed upon
and set in motion. The first task was the completion of Ostpolitik by unifying Germany. It was a
process that was strongly supported by Americans. There was nothing to which the Brits or the
French could object. Nobody, except Germans themselves, could deny their unity and social
coherence.
The German unification cannot be viewed in isolation from the European integration
process. It was already clear to such European integrationalists as Jean Monnet that for the
“German Question” to be resolved, a peaceful solution must be found within the community
whose aim was not to make coalitions of states but, instead, unite the people.649 In that sense, the
European community’s immediate recognition after the Soviet collapse of the three Baltic States
was that which was extended to the kin people. The effort to institutionally take the Baltic States
back into Europe only confirmed this, as was the case with Germany.
The acceptance of the Baltic States was nevertheless different. The German and
European unifications were milestones during which the common foreign and security policies
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rose from nascent to adolescent. However, any further enlargement, as well as the consolidation
of Europe, depended on major powers that were acting in a new environment. The major
European powers-Germany, France and the United Kingdom-did not demonstrate an immediate
and zealous willingness to accept the Baltic States into the European community. Their initial
focus was on their own regions and challenges.
Even more, public opinion regarding Latvia’s membership in the EU in France and
Germany was rather negative. In France, only 20 percent supported, and 60 percent opposed,
Latvia’s membership in the EU by 1996. After all, the French public was ostensibly not even
aware of where Latvia was on Europe’s map. Even if the German public was less opposing than
the French, the split was still 37 percent for and 44 percent against Latvia’s entry into the EU.650
From the three major European powers only the United Kingdom was evenly divided. Thirtyfive percent of Brits supported and 36 percent opposed Latvia’s membership in the EU.
The explanation for such dissent and neglect towards the Baltic States lies in the fact that
they were unknown before. Their interaction, cooperation and integration were forced toward
Moscow and the East, not Brussels and the West. Even after their independence the Baltic
countries-Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania-were much more dependent on exports to the old Soviet
trading club, Comecon, (representing 30-40 percent of the GDP) than were the Central and
Eastern European communist countries (representing 4-15 percent of the GDP).651
The historic economic cooperation contributed to the social and political cleavages and
consequently affected the policies of major European powers and the European community at
large. There was a latent social fault line in Europe that could be erased only through closer
cooperation and integration. To answer the question of how Latvia returned to the European
community, considering all the impediments it faced at the outset of its independence, it is worth
assessing the position of major powers as well as distinct European regions and actors-all of
which were more or less responsible for shaping the policies of and the conditions for the Baltic
State return to Europe.
In the aftermath of the Cold War, the EU was influenced by economic integration,
France’s fear of falling behind, a general concern about Germany’s dominance, the potential for
a Franco-German leadership, British skepticism and the small states syndrome embedded in a
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fear of rising hegemony.652 Thus, at no time was there a clear understanding of what European
integration really meant.653
Notwithstanding the interpretations of roles and definitions of the integration, the debate
about the potential enlargement eastwards had already begun when communism fell.654 The
enlargement process was prompted by the association process and the introduction of the
common foreign and security policies when the Maastricht Agreement was reached. However, it
was up to major powers such as Germany, France and the United Kingdom to set the
enlargement trends and define limits. Only those actors who were endorsed to act as agents of
enlargement could play any significant role.
Germany: Reluctance
German unification reminded the Baltic States of their historic predicament surrounding
the geopolitical presence on Europe’s outskirts. At the outset of this new era, the United States
and Europe set the unification of Germany as their primary objective. Any action on behalf of
the Baltic States was put aside. “If the German unity does not come, it will endanger the stability
of Europe,” the counselor to the United States Secretary of State Robert Zoellick said when
German unity was considered.655
The priority segregation was practically played out with Lithuania at the very beginning
of the 1990s. Since Lithuania was the first to denounce its ties with the Soviet Union, Gorbachev
sent in the Soviet military and imposed sanctions to keep the empire together. In response,
encouraged by President George H.W. Bush, Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand, there
was an effort to defuse the crisis by sending a joint letter on April 26th to the Lithuanian leaders
asking them to suspend their declaration of independence.
In Washington, Gates, Blackwill and Rice opposed the effort to dissuade the Baltic States
from seeking independence. Scowcroft, Baker and Ross, however, believed that Americans
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could send an “indirect” message to Lithuanians.656 A delicately worded Kohl-Mitterrand
message was delivered by a third party emissary and was accepted by the Lithuanians. On the
other side, the Americans convinced Gorbachev to call the Vilnius surge encouraging, but also
encouraged him to abstain from the further application of force. Europeans and Americans
mitigated the crisis, since German unification had to be fully completed before other challenges
were addressed.
Regarding the further enlargement prospects, the so-called “European core”- France and
Germany-strongly supported a coordinated policy. Germany preferred not to act alone in Eastern
Europe for primarily political and historical reasons. France advocated an active common
Ostpolitik to balance a potentially dominating German role in Eastern Europe.657 For France, it
was a possibility to construct Europe from the Atlantic until the Urals. The question was how
Germany foresaw the enlargement. For geographic and historical reasons alone, it was a pivotal
time for the enlargement to include the Baltic States.
Germany bears a long history of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. During the Roman
Imperial era, Rhineland commercial links with the Baltic Sea area and central Asia helped to
finance the imperial holdings.658 The Christianization of Scandinavia intensified trade exchanges
in the eleventh and twelfth centuries until the inauguration of the Hansa trading league that
brought the cooperation to new heights. Based on shared Scandinavian, Prussian and British
interests in the common trading area across the Baltic Sea, cooperation surged.
It was the German initiative that created Riga as a trading outpost and regional order in
1201 in the Baltic. As the region surged in terms of commerce, even Bismarck needed to defend
itself from Russia’s growing influence on the Baltic littoral, as well as the increasing British
expansionism in Central Asia, to guarantee stability around the Polish and German borders on
the Baltic Sea.
When Latvia became independent for the first time in 1918, the British and German
commercial rivalry helped to pull the Baltic States out of Russia’s enhanced dominance.659 When
the Cold War ended, Germany had an opportunity to explore the Rhineland commercial links
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around the Baltic Sea area again. The Baltic States saw Germany as the major force that would
bring them back into Europe.
In the EU integration context, there was a notion that trade can foster parallel political
cooperation and economic liberalization. The notion was especially strong at the time of the
East-West split in Western Germany. As a result, Germany firmly believed that closer
cooperation with Eastern Europe could strongly support stability and security in the East.
In 1993 the share of total imports from Eastern Europe (excluding the Baltic States) to
Germany were 58 percent, while exports to Eastern Europe accounted for 53 percent. In
comparison, the two-way import and export share for France was only eight percent, but for
Britain it alternated between six and seven percent.660 The overarching question was whether the
Baltic States were becoming a part of the German Rhineland commercial area.
Germany saw its future as inextricably historically bound together with some adjacent
nations in Europe. The overwhelming majority of its political elite agreed that German-Polish
relations must never again be subordinated to German-Russian relations. Germany's endorsement
of the eastward enlargement of NATO indicated that politicians had dropped the bad habit,
adopted in Cold War Ostpolitik times, of worrying how hawks in Moscow would react.661
Leaders from Central European states never shied away from reminding the European
core about the legacy. Jiri Dienstbier, the former Czech Foreign Minister, evoked the analogy of
Munich to remind Western leaders that cowardice would not win in the face of adversity in
1993.662 He reminded them that Western powers owed a debt for their historic misgivings and
deeds.
Furthermore, Germany became the advocate for the post-nationalist policies in Europe. It
rose as a civilian power, where the objective became to mirror processes and institutions with
civilized politics and societies domestically to the international level.663 The concept of civilian
power is encapsulated in two aspects-peace and democracy.

660

See “Trading Partners, 1993: EC trade with Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and
Slovakia,” Eurostat Rapid Reports, No. 1 (1994).
661
Dominique Moisi and Michael Mertes, “Europe's Map, Compass, and Horizon,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 74,
No.1 (January, 1995), 122.
662
Henning Tewes, Germany, Civilian Power and the New Europe: Enlarging NATO and the European Union
(Palgrave, 2002), 172.
663
Henning Tewes, “How Civilian? How Much Power? Germany and the Eastern Enlargement of NATO,” ed.
Sebasitan Harnisch and Hans W. Maull, Germany as a Civilian Power: The Foreign policy of the Berlin Republic
(Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 2001), 10, 19.

239
Thus, in terms of NATO enlargement where it was the most controversial, Germany was
guided by the principles of democracy toward Eastern Europe and by the principle of peace visà-vis Russia. In terms of the EU enlargement, German institutions became actively involved in
advocating the extension of peace and democracy to the East. Germany locked its policies into
the Kantian triangle of peace vis-à-vis the transatlantic community, which was embedded in
democracy, peace and trade endorsed by institutional cooperation.
Germany’s macro-regional strategies seemed to provide tools that were new, innovative
and flexible enough to pursue German interests through institutions.664 The normative equality
and institutional power was supported in Germany. The result was that Germany became an
advocate of smaller EU states like the Benelux states and Denmark, Sweden and Finland, which
had been members since 1995. Germany implicitly gave voice to those small member-states.
From the perspective of France, it appeared that Germany would also gain more allies in the EU
through closer ties with the countries to the East. 665
However, even though Volker Rühe was the first, in 1993, to propose the enlargement of
the Euro-Atlantic community by accepting the Baltic States in NATO, he became an advocate of
smaller enlargement, as initially proposed by the American administration. This may have been
important in mitigating anxiety in France-Paris, always worried that Germany could too rapidly
become significantly more influential.
On the other side, to dilute the German power, France proposed and supported the
enlargement that would also include Mediterranean powers, or at least Romania and Bulgaria.
Furthermore, the American support of NATO enlargement meaning initially accepting only
Visegrad was significant for the EU as well. Apart from the enlargement concerns within the
Euro-Atlantic community, Berlin was willing to mitigate the anxiety in Moscow. In response to
growing dissent in Europe, across the Atlantic and with the German chancellor, the German
foreign ministry led by Klaus Kinkel stayed neutral.666
Initially, Germany contested cautious policies toward Eastern Europe. Only the German
Länder, like North Rhine-Westphalia, Lower Saxony and Brandenburg, were interested in
immediately steering Germany toward the East. The Länder strongly altered domestic political
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priorities to favor a federal Europe, with Brussels becoming the decision-making focal point.667
The federalization prospects were strongly compounded with German pro-atlanticism. Berlin
saw NATO as the primary guarantee for security in Europe. Thus, Germany implicitly endorsed
Brussels and Washington as the drivers of the enlargement process.
Nevertheless, Germany developed policy patterns that were directed toward peace and
democracy in accordance with the Ostpolitik traditions. The result was that the new BonnMoscow axis emerged between 1989 and 1991 and dominated Germany’s policies throughout
the first post-Cold War decade. Such patterns unquestionably represented a problem for the
Baltic States.668 They found themselves sandwiched between two major powers in Europe. One
of them, Russia, was considered alien to Europe by at least the Baltic States.
Nevertheless, German moral and historical legacies did not allow it to leave the Baltic
States completely unattended. The German Chancery was the primary maker of German foreign
policy, focusing on Ostpolitik and, therefore, Russia. The responsibility of the foreign ministry
became the Baltic States. It was the secondary actor that defined German foreign policy. The
foreign ministry’s activities were a way to keep the Baltics on board, while the Ostpolitik
remained the German priority.
In terms of the EU enlargement, German foreign policy could not focus solely on
Moscow practically and on the Baltic States formally. Since many Central and Eastern European
states had applied for EU membership and the association process had begun in 1994, the debate
about the best enlargement option came to the forefront in Germany.
Here, the chancery explicitly favored the “group model,” having in mind the Visegrad
states. Conversely, the German foreign ministry favored the “starting line model,” where
membership negotiations would start with all those who had applied for the EU membership.669
That included Latvia and the other Baltic States.
The foreign ministry saw the all-inclusive option as the least discriminatory against the
Baltic States and the least geostrategic approach to address the enlargement. The sides came to a
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compromise. The “stadium model” anticipated that all applicants would become contestants that
entered the race for EU membership. Some states were invited to start accession negotiations
while less prepared states had to wait. Since the political agreement was reached among the
major powers, the German foreign ministry started tacitly lobbying the model in Brussels.
There was little doubt in the Baltic republics that Germany was the key for EU
membership-geographically, politically and, most certainly, financially. The Baltic States started
tacitly working with the German federal offices since the position of German chancellors had
always been colder. The former Estonian foreign minister Siim Kallas pointed to the fact that
Germany was the Baltic advocate in the EU in 1996. If Germany is against something, he
acknowledged, then there is no point in insisting on it.670
In addition, the former Latvian president Guntis Ulmanis recalls Clinton noting that the
Baltic States in times of hardship must address Helmut Kohl as a reliable American partner in
Europe regarding the Baltic States.671 However, by 1996 Kohl’s first official speeches ruled out
the possibility for even one of the Baltic State to join the EU.672
In Germany, the foreign ministry became the true partner for the Baltic States. In 1996, to
alleviate the Baltic concerns, the former foreign minister Kinkel and his Danish counterpart
declared that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania must become members of the EU. They actively
lobbied for Baltic membership. Invited by Kinkel himself for a meeting the same year, the Baltic
foreign ministers listened to the priority that the federal ministry had set to anchor all three Baltic
States in the European institutions.
There was a bout regarding the Baltic admission to the EU and to NATO inside Germany
and between its federal offices. The former German chancellors Helmut Kohl and his successor
Gerhard Schrӧder were keeping their Baltic pronouncements quiet. Their priorities were linked
to Moscow and refined form of Ostpolitik. As a result, the Baltic States risked becoming pawns
in power games, as well as the possibility of being forced to remain in a grey zone should the
position of the chancery prevail.
The emergence of dissent in Germany made the Baltic membership in the EU quite
unrealistic. When the EU-Madrid summit was held in 1997, Germany shared reservations about
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the strong wording on the final communique on the membership prospects for Romania,
Slovenia and the Baltic States. Germany was also skeptical about the NATO membership action
plan proposed by the United States administration and other European allies in 1999.673
The Chancery’s neglect and dissent was diluted by the German foreign ministry. It had
incrementally elevated the Baltic EU membership to new heights. Estonia had started accession
talks in 1997. Slower initial transformation and adaptation in Latvia and Lithuania led to a
belated start of accession negotiations two years later.
At a time when the Baltic States were taking small steps toward EU membership, Kohl,
made his first visit to the Baltic States, not in the capacity of a state official but, rather, to discuss
business regarding the Baltic Sea region

and to meet with Russia’s Prime Minister

Chernomyrdin during the Council of the Baltic Sea States meeting. The German chancery
abstained from addressing the Baltic States as well as their EU integration prospects.
Just after the election in 1998, Schrӧder explicitly noted that some states were cradling
“wrong impressions” about the enlargement prospects.674 He also assured Yeltsin that Germany
was not going to forfeit Russia at the expense of the Baltic States. Even if the European
Commission (EC) promoted Latvia as the next country to be invited to start accession talks
during the Vienna summit in 1998, Germany shared reservations. Had Germany thrown its
weight behind Denmark and Sweden, the two staunchest lobbyists for Latvia, negotiations would
have begun.
Then, only Lithuania would still be waiting. Both Lithuania and Latvia were invited to
begin accession negotiations in 1999 during the EU-Helsinki meeting. Joschka Fisher, the former
German foreign minister, supported the stance that all three Baltic States should join the EU
together. Schrӧder visited the Baltic States in 2000. He did not promise anything other than
Germany’s assistance in fulfilling acquis communitaire requirements.675 Instead of just quick
enlargement, Germany would affirm only the one that was slowest, demanded the most reforms,
and thus was more complicated, but successful.
That was the truth, no matter how bitter it sounded to the leaders of the Baltic States. In
1999, the former Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga recalled that Latvia’s closest European
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partners explicitly noted that it was just the start of a long road to adhere to acquis communitaire
and close multiple negotiations rounds.676 Only then would EU member states vote on Latvia’s
membership in the EU. Consensus in Europe on the Baltic membership had to be reached. By the
time Latvia was invited to launch accession talks, Germany’s position toward the Baltic States
had significantly changed.
The Kosovo crisis, the United States support of the Baltic States and the surge of the
second Chechen war had significantly contributed to the change. Germany supported the Baltic
membership in the EU. Russia remained silent, but hoped that Germany would remain its voice
in the EU. The enlargement significantly altered German foreign policy perspectives in the
future.
Ostpolitik came to an end after the “big bang” enlargement in 2004. Germany took an
initiative during the German EU presidency by drafting a new EU-Russia partnership agreement
along the lines of the irreversible links between Russia and Europe as a new Ostpolitik in 2007.
The initiative quickly faced difficulties with Germany’s eastern neighbors, particularly Poland.677
Lithuania turned out to be the one to block it diplomatically during the EU presidency year.
In terms of Russia, the EU became a composition of diverse political groups: Trojan
horses (Greece and Cyprus), strategic partners (France, Germany, Italy and Spain), friendly
pragmatists (Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Hungary, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal,
Slovakia and Slovenia), frosty pragmatists (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Ireland,
Latvia, the Netherlands, Romania, Sweden and the United Kingdom), and new Cold warriors
(Poland and Lithuania).678 The mix made the EU rather ambivalent, but Germany was
significantly restrained.
What was important for the Baltic States was the different context within which they had
been placed since 2004. The EU membership offered Latvia membership in the European
community so that it may enjoy its institutional protection. On the other hand, on issues of
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significant importance, it could obstruct EU decisions like Poland and Lithuania did with the
Germany’s policy initiative toward Russia in 2007.
Today, Germany is emerging as a geo-economic power that extends beyond the
traditional framework of European cooperation or even of cross-Atlantic cooperation in the area
of security.679 However, the EU institution gives significant leverage, even to small EU member
states, to tame German power. It is better for small states not to obstruct Germany too often. The
credibility of the EU significantly depends on German power and such actions are irritating, at
best. Germany is not the only power in the EU. It has influential partners, like France, that the
small states in the EU must consider. The EU remains a potent cooperation platform. But without
the leadership and commitment of the major states, the institutional cooperation can be
significantly weakened.
France: Ambivalence
As the major EU founder, France has inherited the mindset of a world power with neither
the reach nor the means for one-it is a mid-size power with special links across Africa. Yet,
France retains a pivotal role in the EU alongside Germany. It is still a hostage of the Charles de
Gaulle foreign policy initiatives-the debilitating wound was inflicted on the European integration
in 1965 (when France vetoed Britain’s membership), on the transatlantic cooperation with the
withdrawal from NATO in 1966 and the creation of a nuclear force.680 France has denied
memberships, frustrated transatlantic alliances and rose to nuclear power status, but not to the
status of a global power. However, France possesses the ability to remedy crises in European or
transatlantic relations when they occur through the EU institutions. Thus, it, without doubt,
exerts a global influence through the EU.
The European ambivalence and the Gaullist gridlock was broken by François Mitterrand.
French policy during Mitterrand’s term, conversely to De Gaulle’s ambivalence, fully embraced
European integration and adopted the goal, long-term at last, of a federal Europe. Mitterrand
from De Gaulle took the determination to commit to certain policy goals. This time it was the
European integration that was still rooted in French domestic interests and bargaining.
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For example, in practice, the French commitment to Maastricht’s goals of monetary and
political union were tempered by persistent, sometimes fierce, displays of national interest.681
Those who opposed the treaty of Maastricht, however, did not oppose European integration
prospects. Even if there was a significant French opposition against the Maastricht Treaty, the
neo-Gaullists casted their “no” vote against the federal Europe, not the unified Europe.
By and large, the European integration objective for France has been to contain
Germany’s economic strength by locking it into European institutions. The Maastricht process
offered France some possibilities but took others away. The integration incrementally but
imminently meant that France would become like “the others” in exchange for benefits like
currency stability, low inflation, competitive exports, political gains from common diplomatic
pan-European structures and a permanent seat by Germany’s side. Politically, France has always
sought to minimize disadvantages from reduction of national sovereignty by decreasing
Germany’s unilateral political capacity. By giving up hers, France could take some of Germany’s
powers. In that way France could maintain parity with Germany.
Furthermore, France has also aimed to support the common agricultural policy for
farmers in which a producer, not a consumer, is the priority. The German taxpayer, rather than
the French, subsidizes the common agricultural policy that benefits France. France attaches
cultural meanings to the production and output and Paris is inclined to support rules that allow
for the protection of French cultural products.682
For the French, the overarching issue was how to stay French and change at the same
time. One of the major challenges for their language was how to maintain its status in the face of
overwhelming Anglo-Saxon dominance. The whole challenge for the “la Franchophonie”
emerged in the period of de-colonization, and increased when the Soviet Union collapsed and the
EU enlargement prospects multiplied the effects of the globalization.
All those processes challenged geographic areas where French was spoken as the mother
tongue, where the language was used as a means for communication or official purposes, or
where the diplomatic institutions were built on profoundly French traditions. In addition to the
cultural challenges, there were political dilemmas.
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Without the United States, France could not create a substantial security alliance in
Europe. European unity, on the other hand, would not be possible without Germany. With
Britain, however, France could be an effective counterweight to Germany’s economic superiority
or to an overwhelming American political dominance. France is a European nuclear power that
keeps a finger on the nuclear trigger of major powers.683 When acting alone, France is far from
omnipotent.
On the regional level, France shapes French-British and French-German relations-each of
them separately and all of them together can be a remedy for crises in Europe or in transatlantic
relations. Together with the major global powers, France shares a seat at the U.N. Security
Council. With those power leverages, it has always aimed to maintain the status quo in Europe.
France’s place in Europe, in the world, and in relation to her nearest neighbors, Britain and
Germany, was a shadow of greater powers-an issue that had been bitterly debated.684
For France, the disintegration of the Eastern bloc confirmed the West’s feeling of
superiority and of correctness, even though what came after in some of those countries was
nothing less than ruthless capitalism. Inside France that was the moment when the last bits of
communism lost their political credibility.685 The issue of Eastern Europe, until then, was absent
from French preoccupations, or was perceived in a purely derivative manner.
The Baltic States or “the other Europe,” in broader terms, was seen either as a way to
foster channels of communication, as a means to reinforce détente on an economic basis or as a
potential obstacle to détente with Moscow.686 There was never a pattern in Eastern European
countries of reversing regimes’ rhetoric. In the past, even after the coup of 1980-1981 in Poland,
or the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, France insisted on keeping economic issues separate from
the political and military ones. France has previously insisted on building relations with Russia
on non-ideological basis.
Nevertheless, in the other Europe, France saw some opportunities, too. Owing to the
French fear of Germany’s rise, Paris saw the enlargement as a possibility to further dilute
German power. Since there was a possibility for the emergence of intra-union blocs, France
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strongly supported the EU enlargement to include Romania and Bulgaria. Those countries lagged
behind Central and Eastern Europe in terms of democracy standards or transformation. France, in
terms of the EU and NATO enlargement, was proposing broader enlargement since the Frenchpreferred candidates were always on the bottom of the aspiring list of countries. As a result,
France, at all times, has implicitly supported Latvia’s road to the EU and NATO.
At the outset of Latvia’s way to the EU, there was little interaction between Latvia and
France bilaterally. However, France has not shied away from facilitation of Eastern European
affairs or from giving advice. Former President Guntis Ulmanis explicitly named Mitterrand as
the Western leader who demonstrated the most profound interest in Baltic affairs.687 In 1994, he
advised Ulmanis to react rapidly regarding Russian troop removal since the domestic political
change in Russia could become unfavorable. Kohl, nudged by Mitterrand, had urged Latvians
and Russians to commit to troop removal agreements as soon as possible.
France has also extended support to the Baltic States. It supported the idea that countries
seeking membership in the EU should begin accession talks sooner than Germany had
anticipated. Paris had promised to act as Lithuania’s advocate on the route to the European
Union in 1996.688 It helped to alter the EU stance in a positive way for the Baltic States.
By that time Greece, and EU-Nordic states had stressed that Estonia should be the first to
start accession talks. The Netherlands urged that accession talks should start only with Estonia,
while Finland and Germany supported the argument that Latvia and Lithuania would gain from
Estonia’s accession experience. France was instrumental in rounding up the Baltic States as a
package deal for EU enlargement. As a result, the position of the German foreign ministry within
the EU was also explicitly enhanced by France.
For the Baltic States, one of the key impediments for the EU membership has been
Russia. As recalls the former Latvian Ambassador to France Sandra Kalniete, the French were
concerned that Latvia would bring the baggage of quarrels with Russia inside the EU. Moreover,
Latvia was a distant country and very few in France knew of it. The public was also not
inherently inclined to sacrifice much for Latvia.
The ice was broken and the situation changed when, in 1998, Latvia elected Vaira VīķeFreiberga as the Latvian president who, with her eloquent French and knowledge, charmed
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Chirac, senators, deputies, ministers, intellectuals and even journalists.689 Only then could the
French allow for such sympathies to enhance their political support of the Baltic States even if
there were some practical reservations. It was only France that could afford for such sympathies
to alter its political stance since it was a special country in Europe.
By advocating on behalf of the aspiring members, France risked giving away some of its
important national traits. Many French politicians believed that the EU had changed from a
project that was designed partly in France's interests. For example, the EU was a way of getting
German taxpayers to pay large chunks of subsidies to French farmers. With the enlarged
community, the French saw the EU as potentially acting against them. New members could
jeopardize some policies that were important to France, like the common agricultural policy, or
render EU payments thinner to French recipients.
France had not always enjoyed control over initiatives that it had politically launched in
the EU. For example, the Maastricht treaty that paved the way for the single currency was largely
the brainchild of Mitterrand, whose price for accepting German unification was Germany's
abandonment of the D-mark in favor of a single currency over which France hoped to have more
control.690 Despite the fact that it was possible for France and like-minded European countries to
rid themselves from the D-mark burden, none could claim to be in control of the common
currency.
Furthermore, France was most afraid of additional Anglo-Saxon traditions being brought
in the EU. The EU had been based on the Franco-German engine from the outset. With every
new enlargement, French cultural traditions were undermined.

Before the “big boom”

enlargement, pessimism about the cultural intrusion could be alleviated by the relative welfare
and optimism that reigned in Europe. On such a positive wave, France, among other European
powers, indulged in a little bit of philanthropy and the Baltic States became members of the EU.
Ever since, there have been French cultural days celebrated in Riga on a regular basis.
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The United Kingdom: Reforms
Initially, the United Kingdom stayed outside European communities due to its national
interests, or at least the government’s perception of its natural interests. At the insistence of the
British foreign minister Earnest Bevin, NATO or the transatlantic alliance was created. It was
perceived as Britain’s priority. It was initially led by the Brit Lord Ismay, who laid out the
objective for the alliance to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.691
When the foundations for the European Coal and Steel Community were laid, the
participants of the founding six sent the highest-ranking officials, while the United Kingdom sent
a low-ranking “observer.” This clearly outlined how much importance Britain attached to the
European cooperation at the outset.
In the meantime, the United Kingdom shared no less interest in keeping the Germans
down, Americans in and Russians deterred in Europe. Initially, the United Kingdom assumed
that relations with the United States might be enough to keep Americans in. It took some time for
the United Kingdom to realize its asymmetry with the United States and the profound interests it
shared with European countries.
By the time Britain decided to join the EU, De Gaulle saw British membership as a threat
to France’s dominance and promptly thwarted it.692 When Britain, after several obstructed
attempts by France, joined the EU in 1973, Europe fell into an economic crisis.
In the 1980s Europe’s economic legacy and political union was on the rise when France
and Germany returned to the European driver’s seat. The Brits saw the EU potentially becoming
a super-state and Britain became a significantly reluctant participant in the EU. In the same way
as the former EU commissioner Jacques Delors was a European federalist, Margaret Thatcher
and the Brits were fervently anti-federalist. They did not want to dilute the British
exceptionalism inside the EU institutions.
In Britain, the public has always been concerned about the EU as a sort of super-state that
gobbles up the British sovereignty and identity-both are intimately bound together with the
United Kingdom’s satisfaction with its cultural and historical singularity.693 British political and
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cultural intellectuals have found it difficult to return to the European identity that those in the
eighteenth century took for granted, and that nineteenth century Britain progressively abandoned
as the empire expanded and the German industry pushed British goods out from the continental
markets.
Among the essential questions was always who governs Britain-Westminster or Brussels.
Since the United Kingdom was seen as the reform-minded addition to the EU, Europeans have
tended to be perplexed over the question of whether Europe is good for Britain. The EU can
potentially alter the British liberal capitalism that holds more affinity with the United States than
Europe. The convergence of Anglo-Saxon traditions with Franco-German traits would mean that
the identities would converge and change forever. It would also mean that Britain would be in
the heart of Europe and Europe would be in the hearts of Brits. 694
Culturally, it has been the British preoccupation with monarchy and simple traditions,
and Britain’s heritage that has contributed to “the glamour of Royal backwardness.”695 When
asked how proud West Germans, East Germans, Spanish or Brits are with their past, respondents
answer eight percent, 10 percent, 26 percent and 50 percent affirmative, respectively.
Britain has always looked from a distance at Europe. It has indifferently sided with the
weakest power to maintain the continental balance of power while only in alignment with the
United States can the global balance of power be possible. The United Kingdom historically and
mentally resides outside the EU’s Franco-German engine. Nevertheless, it is no less bound to the
transatlantic cooperation than to the European links.
Brits have continued to exhibit the arrogant idea that Brussels’ bureaucrats could teach
the Englishmen nothing.696 There has been a broad belief that the disentangling of the British
economy from the regulations imposed by Europe allows for the British enterprise to produce
more cheaply. Since becoming a member in 1973, Britain’s European priority has been mired in
economic merits, as confirmed by Thatcher’s success in gaining a rebate from the EU.
Thatcher recalls that her primary task in the EU was to “seek to limit the damage and
distortions caused by the common agricultural policy.” In the 1980s, Thatcher succeeded in this
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task, which became her loadstar achievement. In 1983, when Thatcher got the rebate from the
EU as a compensation for the ostensible economic losses, Mitterrand smiled and said, “Of
course, Madam Prime Minister, you must have it!”697
Had the United Kingdom and Germany been the founders and drivers of the EU, the
union might have been more market oriented, with much less significance attached to farming
and cultural issues. From the time the Brits expressed interest in joining the EU, the French never
missed an opportunity to remind them about their creation, based on French interests, traditions
and culture. Therefore, it has been an objective for the United Kingdom to reform the union and
transform it according to the liberal market principles.
As a reform-minded member then, the United Kingdom saw three important aspects that
the EU enlargement eastwards would bring, apart from the enhanced security and stability
achieved by eliminating the grey zone to Europe’s east. One was immigration. British society
had already become diverse so that many people constantly interacted with strangers-feelings of
solidarity became diluted, creating a threat to the continuity of a welfare state.698 Second was the
opportunity to broaden the community and postpone or avoid the deepening of it indefinitely.
The third aspect was the broadening of the common market and merit economically.
Before the eastward enlargement, Brits were worried about potential immigration effects
from the new member states. Since, for example, wages in the western part of Poland were
around six times lower, and ten times lower in the eastern part of Poland than in Germany, there
was a possibility that Polish workers could take some of the British jobs.699 A 20 percent
unemployment rate in Poland at the time and five percent in the United Kingdom spoke in favor
of such immigration prospects. The influx of labor from Eastern Europe was seen as potentially
affecting social, labor and immigration policies of the United Kingdom. Sweden, Ireland and the
United Kingdom kept their labor market unrestricted with very few obstacles for labor
immigrants from the new EU members.
The United Kingdom also saw additional economic opportunities. Baroness Hellen
Liddell of the United Kingdom noted that the EU enlargement meant 100 million new customers
for British businesses and enormous commercial opportunities in the countries preparing to join
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the EU.700 Indeed, most of the Central and Eastern European countries were lagging behind in
terms of development and therefore were easy targets for much more advanced British
companies and investments.
The British political leaders from both parties recognized the importance of enlargement.
It was perceived that the new member states, having thrown off the deadening grip of the Soviet
Union, would be unlikely candidates to favor any irksome interference from Brussels.701 New
members were perceived as the pragmatic British and Scandinavian brothers and sisters with
their preferences strongly bound to looser, more varied and multispeed developing Europe.
Historically skeptical countries like Britain and Denmark adamantly supported the enlargement
in the hope that the process would slow down political unification.
The delusional sense of distance from Europe was broken soon after the Soviet Union
collapsed. When Black Wednesday of 1992 and the resulting British pound crisis proved how
intimately bound the United Kingdom was to the European market, the British changed their
stance. The British voters favored closer ties with Europe. Upon Tony Blair’s victory in the
national election, his labor party vigorously worked to place Britain in the heart of Europe.
Notwithstanding the salient partnership with the United States, the distinct European policy was
no less appealing inside the United Kingdom.
Even if Tony Blair was more enthusiastic about the EU integration, the commonality of
the Franco-German relationship bound Jacques Chirac and Schrӧder together in a way that
excluded Blair from the privileged partnership.702 In contrast to the increasingly Europhobic
position adapted by the conservative party, the reestablishment of Britain’s position in Europe
was one of the first priorities that the Blair government established after the 1997 victory.703
Since Britain remained outside the euro zone prospects, Blair admitted that the United
Kingdom could not punch with its full weight in the EU until it adopted the euro.704 To achieve
more influence, the Blair government supported deeper integration up until the war in Iraq in
2003. By inching closer to the EU core, the United Kingdom could become a more influential
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player in parallel with the Franco-German engine. At some point even the introduction of the
euro seemed possible in Britain.
The United Kingdom was a staunch supporter of enlargement from the outset. Security
reasons were the direct motivator, while the economic benefits and reforms were seen as indirect
gains. John Mayor noted that “the United Kingdom has, from the beginning and under successive
governments, been a constant advocate and supporter of early EU enlargement.”705
Even if Germany appeared to have a preference for the three Visegrad countries to be
admitted first (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland), the United Kingdom was willing to
accept the most successful, based on the relative performance of each of the applicants.706 In that
way, the United Kingdom gave an early fighting chance to Latvia and the other Baltic States.
When compared with the geopolitical approach of France and Germany, it was the United
Kingdom that favored the open race perspective.
The United Kingdom was important in binding major powers together when it was
necessary. Germany and Britain wanted similar things in the EU. First was a reduction of their
payment for the enlargement since the handsome cost was already well learnt during the German
unification. Both also wanted a reformed common agricultural policy. There, France was in stark
opposition and clung to the historic foundations of the EU each time the issue was disputed. In
tandem with France, it wanted Germany to finance a British rebate and French-farming
aspiration.
There were also areas where the British and German interests differed. The United
Kingdom always wanted to defend the rebate, while Germany was looking for ways to defend its
reduced share.707 In the spectrum of financial donors to Europe from 1990 to 1995, Germany
stood out as the most salient donor. Conversely, the United Kingdom was always looking
forward to getting out more and paying less in the name of the European project.
Germany was the source of funding in the EU. It was contributing 30 percent more to
Central Europe than the United States, 19 times more than Britain and more than two times more
than France.708 Despite the huge disparities over the budgetary and enlargement costs, all major
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donors agreed to keep the EU budget within 1.27 percent of the aggregate EU GNP level over
the period 2000 to 2006.709 Thus, it was possible to agree on accepting poorer states without
increasing payments to them by the richer ones.
In terms of the enlargement, the United Kingdom was America’s voice in Europe. Since
the United States was a partner to the United Kingdom and Germany, both countries supported
the enlarged community in 2004. The United Kingdom helped to bring the United States NATO
enlargement prospects in the EU enlargement debate. Furthermore, the United Kingdom pushed
for the EU reform. The enlargement prospect was a way to achieve, at least partially, the British
objectives in Europe.
New and Auxiliary Actors
The bargaining and discourse between the major three powers-Germany, France and the
United Kingdom-gave birth to rising actors in the enlargement process. Since the Maastricht, the
EU rose as a political union and a more influential player. The political weight of the union could
ascend or descend, depending on how much authority major powers assign to the EU. Since the
major powers endorsed the union, the commission could become a more influential facilitator of
the enlargement process.
The elevation of the EU’s status happened quite quickly as the international situation
changed. In 1988 the United Kingdom, West Germany, France and Italy had approved
commercial loan packages of one billion, 940 million, 300 million and 400 million British
pounds, respectively, to the Soviet Union (Eastern Europe at the time). Only a year after at the
insistence of Americans, the Head of the European Commission Jacques Delors, who had sound
personal ties with German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, French President Francois Mitterrand and
United States President George H.W. Bush, brought the issue of the aid to Eastern European
states, such as Poland and Hungary, to the G7 level at the beginning of 1990s.710
The Maastricht process signified what share each of the major powers would contribute
to European political unification. France pledged to Eastern Europe 6.7 percent of the aid, while
contributions from Germany were 17.8 percent, and from the United Kingdom 0.9 percent
709
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between 1990 and 1996. At the very outset Britain embraced the stance, “yes to credits, not to
charity.”711 It was Germany and France that covered the most. The practical contributions to the
EU showed the commitment to the supra-national structures for the European policy execution.
Indirectly, it also illuminated how much each of the states were ready to move toward the federal
European Union.
In terms of potential members, the major powers did not always share a political
consensus on which states should be admitted to the European project. The EC, however,
summed up the views and presented them to the major powers and candidates. As a result, the
EC became the major broker of the enlargement. It also removed some of the political fabric
from the enlargement process.
Apart from highlighting the stance of the major powers, the EC also provided information
on the progress toward adaptation of the aspiring members. For example, the Delors commission
prepared responses and made compromises possible; it slowed down forerunners and allowed for
laggards to catch up. The enlargements process was implicitly making the accession a package
deal. The Balkan crisis that reached the summit in 1999 before the 2004 enlargement disqualified
Romania and Bulgaria, to the disappointment of France.
The adaptation process was a gift for small states that had sufficient political will to adapt
when necessary. For example, by 2001 Poland was clearly lagging behind in terms of slow
adherence to the acquis communitaire laws. It had closed 18 pre-accession chapters, the same
number as Latvia, while Cyprus had closed 23, Hungary 22, the Czech Republic and Slovenia
21, Slovakia 20 and Estonia 19.712 Despite Poland’s obscure performance until 2001, it was
inconceivable that the enlargement would exclude the country. From the outset, it was a part of
the reconciliation with Germany. Since smaller states could make themselves better suited than
Poland had been, they could not be easily dismissed from further enlargement prospects.
The enlargement was necessary to uphold region-wide security and stability. Since the
Kosovo crisis in 1999, the enlargement had to be pursued with the member states that were the
most stable. Instability could potentially spill over from other turbulent regions. The aspiring
members of NATO and the EU tried to differentiate themselves from the Balkan-like states and
associate with Westerners.
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For example, Romania tried to politically detach itself from the Balkans while Lithuania
compared the CIS with the Balkans. Lithuanian Ambassador Stankevicus noted that the Baltic
States’ return to the West meant a return to their natural community despite a five-decade
occupation. The commission supported the adolescent foreign and security policy and presented
the enlargement as a package remedy for the potential instability. The commission, from the
perspective of the European political unification, played a crucial role.
Apart from the institutional aspects, there were some real, persisting relations between
the emerging East and affluent West. For Lithuanians, for example, the Eurasian union
represented by the CIS was foreign. Conversely, the possibility to return to the West was said to
be the major reason for the endurance of Baltic national identities.713 Past economic relations
were evidence of genuine bonds. Foreign direct investment usually results from past economic
success and it, in turn, strengthens future economic success.
Between 1989 and 2003, the Czech Republic attracted $3,700 per capita in foreign direct
investments, Hungary $3,400, the three Baltic countries $1,000-$2,400 and Poland $1,300. The
investment inflows per capita to the Ukraine and Moldova were only $128 and $210,
respectively, in the same period.714 The economic relations signified that the Baltic States were
different from those that initially, and not without struggle, became members of the CIS.
Small states in Eastern and Central Europe saw small member countries as their
advocates in the EU. At the same time, small member countries were always interested in
maintaining balance between the major powers. Benelux countries wanted the United Kingdom
to act as a counterweight to France and Germany.715 But small member states also wanted more
small states in the EU. Even if the Netherlands was concerned about its large payment share and
the possibility of being pulled into the broader community since it was sandwiched between the
EU engines already-Germany and France-it was interested in having more allies in the union.
Benelux was interested in expanding the community to dilute the profound roles of France and
Germany.
Historically, there has been a strong opposition against expanding the EU grants and
budget to the aspiring poorer countries. The concern was always shared by the poor states that
were already members of the EU. Before the 2004 enlargement, the poorest- Spain, Portugal and
713
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Greece-instead of zealously supporting the Central and Eastern European aspirations, raised the
EU bar higher for those who wanted to become members. Thus, the aspiring countries, before
becoming EU member states, implicitly had to become better than the laggards of the EU in
terms of governance, democratic principles and adherence to the EU principles.
In the same way that the economic conditions created obstacles, the historical relations
became instrumental for successful integration. Latvia shares common interests with the
Visegrad states (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Poland) and the Nordic countries
(Iceland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland). They have been strongly involved in Latvia’s
Euro-Atlantic integration process, but each of the regions played different roles.
Since the EU enlargement in 1995, Scandinavian states strongly supported the Baltic
integration in the EU. It was underwritten by public support (See Table 4.4). The Nordic states
also wanted to have their grey-zone hinterland eliminated. Even if most Scandinavian states, the
dubbed Scandinavian neutrality ghetto, were EU members, their interests for the Baltic States to
be secure and stable were the most salient. That was especially true when the first package of the
grey zone was added to NATO in 1999. Ever since, even if they were outside NATO, their
efforts to promote security in the Baltic region were adamant.

Table 4.4: Public Support for the Baltic-EU Membership in 1996, %
Country

Finland

Sweden

Denmark

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

No

Estonia

69

19

65

14

57

34

Latvia

63

23

64

14

58

33

Lithuania

63

24

64

14

57

34

Source: “EU Public Opinion on Enlargement to Eastern Europe, 1996” (Eurobarometer,
No 45, 1996)

By having the Baltic States secure, there was an opportunity for economic interaction.
Trade relations with the Nordic countries have strongly upheld Baltic integration prospects.
Germany (15 percent), Sweden (12 percent), Denmark (nine percent), the Netherlands, Estonia
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and Finland (eight percent each), the Russian Federation and the United States (seven percent
each) were responsible for the overall foreign direct investment in Latvia by 2004.716
Scandinavian states, notwithstanding their smaller size, were the biggest investors in the Baltic
States. They wanted to see their assets secure and stable in the long term.

Table 4.5: Trade with Latvia in 2014 (mEUR)
Region

Country

Exports

Imports

Visegrad

Hungary

45

105

Visegrad

Slovakia

57

96

Visegrad

The Czech Republic

127

57

Nordic

Finland

185

708

Nordic

Norway

247

61

Nordic

Denmark

344

239

Nordic

Sweden

501

336

Visegrad

Poland

623

1390

Source: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Latvia

Moreover, the Nordic states were salient trade partners to the Baltic States (see Table
4.4). Finland, Sweden and Denmark, members of the EU by 1995, became strong supporters of
the Baltic membership. Until 1996, Denmark was the most arduous proponent for the dual Baltic
EU and NATO membership. In 1996, Sweden took over the relay from Denmark and became
the leading lobbyist until 2004. Within the Nordic region, the comparison of attitudes deserves
additional attention in the cases of Denmark and Finland.
Both Denmark and Finland were interested in having the grey zone eliminated and
security and stability enhanced in the Baltic region. Thus, their common objective became to
eliminate the Soviet geopolitical legacy. Denmark could support the Baltic States in NATO and
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the EU since it was a member of both. Finland, however, could support the Baltic membership
from the perspective of the EU, since it joined the EU in 1995.
Denmark promoted the Council of the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) cooperation, with the
support of the participating newcomers Finland and Sweden as well as the European
Commission.717 Even though the Baltic cooperation was initially led by Denmark, around 1996
Sweden overtook the leadership role within the CBSS framework and invited Richard Holbrooke
to be a part of the council advisory board.
Thus, the EU side was supplemented by NATO’s hardline security role within the
council. Moreover, Denmark financially, and in kind, assisted all three Baltic States with
establishing their first common military unit-BALTBAL-the Baltic battalion. It was used to
uphold peace prospects in Bosnia, the first NATO post-Cold War mission. Here, the Baltic States
had an opportunity to prove their applicability to common regional challenges.
Of all the Nordic states, Finland was the most ambivalent and narrowly oriented. It
supported membership for particular countries like Estonia. In comparison with Denmark,
Finland did not keep the Baltic membership in the EU as a package deal. Latvian former
President Guntis Ulmanis argued in 1997 that, “if Finland’s support for Estonia benefited all
three Baltic countries, it cannot be denied that in practice Finland supported Estonia more than
Latvia.”718 Apart from suggesting to the Baltic States that they become like Finland without the
NATO’s umbrella, some Finnish leaders raised some profoundly disconcerting political
demands.
The former Finnish Foreign Minister Tarja Halonen went as far as to demand that Latvia
adopt the Russian language as the second official language in 1999.719 Halonen argued that
Finland had approved Swedish as the second official language since nine percent of the
population in Finland were ethnic Swedes. Then, newly elected former Latvian President Vaira
Vīķe-Freiberga gave a succinct answer-Latvia would follow suit when the share of Russians in
Latvia was the same as in Finland.
In terms of minority issues, since France and the United Kingdom were inclined to
support individual rights over group minority rights, they became Latvia’s defense against
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Finnish demands.720 To the disappointment of Russia, Germany also joined in order to offset the
Finnish position. The Finnish perspective perplexed the minds of the Baltic pundits. It initially
acted more as a divider, not a unifier of the Baltic integration efforts. Nevertheless, Finland’s
position soon converged with that of the rest of the Nordic states.
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia were on
their way to the EU together. However, the Visegrad countries became strong supporters of the
Baltic membership in NATO when they acceded the alliance in 1999. Even if the Baltic States
had no interest in joining the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) that was the
only economic cooperation forum covering the whole Visegrad before the EU enlargement in
2004 in which security interests were genuinely shared.721
With the exception of Poland, in terms of trade more so than commerce, but more for the
commonly shared history and sense of adversity, there persisted the commonly shared stance
against the potential rising Russian neo-imperial or neo-communism. Thus, the Baltic-NATO
membership from within the alliance was strongly upheld by the members from the Visegrad
region. The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland joined Denmark and the United States to
support the Baltic States in 1999.
In 2000, Vaclav Havel invoked the West as a regional, “Euro-Atlantic community of
values,” to which the post-communist countries that had been previously torn out of the Western
community by force naturally belonged.722 No matter how well such voices resonate for the
Baltic States, they still had to prove that the cooperation between the three of them was possible
before they could enter a larger community. The Baltic States had to prove to be worthy
participants in broad and narrow cooperation realms in international affairs.
Here, the Baltic cooperation was nothing short of a failure. Owing to diverse relations
with the Nordic countries, there were historic temptations to emphasize the Nordic identity by
Estonia. No matter how uneasy relations had been with Poland, Lithuania strived to enhance
links with Central Europe. Latvia has always been in the middle, not just geographically, and the
Baltic coherence has never been easy.
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Indeed, former Estonian Foreign Minister and President Toomas Hendrik Ilves did not
hide the fact that Estonia should aim to become “just another boring Nordic country.”723 No
matter how uneasy it was to hear from the American pundit with Polish roots, Zbigniew
Brzezinski toyed with a genius idea in which Poland could become a protectorate for Lithuania
in NATO, but Estonia would come under Finland’s custody and a part of the complacent Nordic
neutrality ghetto.
Had it happened, Latvia would have proudly stood alone in the middle as a toy for
Russia. In 1999, the former Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus, spoke sarcastically during a
press conference about the prospect that Latvia, not Lithuania, would be invited to join NATO
by saying that, “in that case he would send a bouquet of flowers to Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga.”724 He
ostensibly knew that Poland did indeed strongly support Lithuania’s NATO aspirations.
The Baltic unity had been more like chimera, less a reality. Latvia had been in protracted
quarrels over sea borders with Lithuania where it was assumed that oil stocks might be found.
The sea border with Estonia has been a bargaining chip since it affected fishing rights in the
Baltic Sea.725 The Baltic States were never able to forge any substantial defense alliance in the
interwar period. It wasn’t until 2016 that Lithuania and Latvia started procuring the defense
equipment together, making their military infrastructure more compatible.726
Estonia has always politically leaned toward the Nordic countries. Lithuanians, however,
tend to emphasize their bond with Poland. In terms of language, Latvian and Lithuanian are only
two of the Baltic languages, while the Estonian language is closer to Finnish and Hungarian.
Conversely, Latvian and Estonian statehood roots are much closer. There are many differences
between the small Baltic States.
What they share is the strong willingness to not be portrayed as post-Soviet countries.727
They have urged the German media to stop referring to them as such. Otherwise, even Germany
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could be labeled a post-Soviet country since it also was a part of the Soviet Union. Furthermore,
the United Nations have recognized the Baltic States as a part of the Norther Europe.728 These
particular identities of the Baltic States have always propelled them toward a return to European
aspirations.
It is likely that the EU and NATO were the only post-Cold War factors that kept the
Baltic domestic transformation on a common track. When Estonians learned that they alone were
invited to launch accession talks with the EU, the newly appointed Foreign Minister Toomas
Hendrik Ilves did not hesitate to note that “Estonia, not the Baltic States, will be the touchstone
of EU enlargement” to attain the cooperation evident between the Nordic states.729
When Estonia advised Lithuania about the best way to adapt to the EU, Lithuanian
foreign minister Algirdas Saudargas explicitly stated that the Lithuanian-Polish cooperation
would propel EU integration in the best and quickest way possible. In the midst of the EstonianLithuanian competition, the joys in Riga were sincere when Latvia overtook the forerunner
Estonia even though it had started accession talks two years earlier.730 The race for the EU and
NATO membership brought all three Baltic sisters closer. Denmark, Sweden and the United
States were the glue that held them together in their dual EU-NATO aspirations.
The EU was also helpful. It kept the Baltic States on the same track. The former
Commissioner Jacques Santer informed a Latvian audience that the EU would continue liberal
cooperation with each candidate country. In December 1997, the EU launched the “accession
process” monitoring and screening process to highlight the progress that the candidates had made
with the acquis communitaire adaptation. It was made explicit that each country would be
assessed according to its merits.
Notwithstanding the diversified negotiation, the enlargement process, at the outset,
included both groups of countries. One was the group that had launched accession talks-the
“ins,” such as Estonia. The other group was waiting for the accession negotiations to start-the
“pre-ins,” such as Latvia and Lithuania.731
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The failure to adhere to the EU standards would disqualify any of the countries. All three
Baltic States shared a common fear of being left in the Baltic ghetto alone, characterized by
regionalism and isolationism.732 Therefore, they were motivated by the healthy competition and
the common objective that kept them on the integration path together.
Even though there were a significant number of forces pulling the Baltic States apart,
since the Baltic States felt threatened by a single enemy, they worked together.733 Moscow used
diverse leverages to obstruct the Baltic integration in the EU and NATO. It was Moscow that did
not object to the West coming closer to its borders. Russia was rather more concerned that the
West was forcing “the strategy of pressure,” where the Baltic States would be dragged out from
under Moscow’s agenda and influence.734 If Moscow was associated with the strategy of
pressure, then the Baltic States were truly lured back into Europe without coercion. They never
disguised their shared objectives to abandon the post-Soviet identity, economy and political
influence of Moscow.
Conclusion
The process of Latvia’s integration into the EU shares some common traits with its path
to NATO. The United States implicitly influenced the EU integration process. It was not Latvian
foreign policy that made Germany, France or the United Kingdom willing to accept the Baltic
States in the EU. The contrasting or converging interests between the major powers were
synchronized by the United States in the 1999 NATO expansion, the Kosovo crisis and Russia’s
war in Chechnya. Membership in the EU was possible, as it was not explicitly in conflict with
interests of major EU member states, but implicitly the enlargement upheld some important goals
for major powers.
In the immediate post-Cold War period, the major powers like France, Germany and the
United Kingdom were no less ambivalent regarding the ambiguous situation in Europe than the
United States or the Russian Federation. It was clear that the comfortable bipolar order had come
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to an end. Then, in the same manner as the EU integration formula was applied to Germany, the
Baltic accession to the EU became a possibility, but it depended on diverse and changing factors.
The incremental adaptation to novel conditions in Europe set some patterns and trends in
motion. The unification of Germany was the interest of the German people. It was a domestic
German issue. Conversely, the German regional incremental convergence with Central Europe
was Germany’s interest, which grew into German support for the Visegrad states to be admitted
in the EU.
German foreign policy toward the Baltic States was initially ambivalent. The German
foreign ministry supported, but the German chancery opposed, the Baltic membership in the EU.
The chancery was the most influential player in international affairs but Gerhard Schröder, the
chancellor from 1998 to 2005, shared profoundly warm personal ties with Vladimir Putin and
even called him a “flawless democrat.”
Schröder even took Germany off the nuclear path by signing the Nord Stream gas deals a
few weeks before the chancellor lost the election. In 2005, Russia provided 35 percent of
Germany’s oil imports and 39 percent of the natural gas imports.735 Schröder created a mutual
dependency between Germany and Russia. It is no surprise that he was later invited to become a
part of Putin’s spy empire as Gazprom’s Nord Stream committee member.
Germany, until the signing of the Baltic-American charter, the Kosovo crisis and the
outbreak of conflicts in Chechnya did not explicitly support the Baltic membership in the EU.
The implicit German support came from the German foreign minister. In 1999, the German
chancery more silently opposed the Baltic membership prospects and the stance of the ministry
and the chancery eventually converged. The German support was crucial to the Baltic States for
political, economic and geographic reasons.
In the EU enlargement, France saw a possibility to dilute Germany’s influence by
extending the EU institutions further east. Even if France did not see the Baltic States as a means
for its security, by and large Paris was interested in a safer and more secure Europe. In relations
with France, Latvian or Lithuanian leadership helped to offset an initially negative public
opinion about the Baltic States entering the EU. The French factor became instrumental in
keeping the Baltic membership prospect a regional package deal.

735

Tyler Cowen, “A bit of context on Trump, NATO, and Germany,” Marginal Revolution (January 17, 2017):
accessed on 01/18/2017, http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2017/01/bit-context-trump-nato.html.

265
The United Kingdom wanted to reform the EU. The Baltic States were seen as an
extension of the Nordic states and a positive addition to the culturally French and German
Europe. Britain was willing to make the EU regulations shallower and more market oriented.
Since the United Kingdom was already significantly multi-cultural, there was a fear surrounding
the immigrant influx from Central and Eastern Europe. However, the United Kingdom saw
multiple possibilities, too. It became the American voice in Europe and supported the Baltic
journey back to Europe and to the EU.
Some important players in the EU and across the Atlantic contributed to the convergence
of European major power interests. The Nordic states, with the exception of Finland, strongly
upheld the Baltic membership in the EU and NATO early on. Denmark and the United States
were especially zealous supporters of the Baltic Euro-Atlantic integration. When the Baltic
States were evenly prepared for EU membership, the position of all Nordic states, including that
of Finland, converged in robust support from within.
Since the introduction of the Maastricht treaty, the EC had played a more significant role
as a rising actor. It made hard compromises possible and progress reviews available to all
integration process participants. It set forth the dialogue between those that were concerned
about the readiness and applicability of the Baltic States. Moreover, the EU made those concerns
available to the Baltic States. The EU institutions and the integration objectives kept the Baltic
States united until 2004.
The integration process proved that the Baltic States can undertake hard tasks if
objectives are genuinely desired. The EU trinity-Germany, France and the United Kingdom-to
which Britain does not belong institutionally anymore, allowed for the enlargement to take place.
Implicitly, by supporting NATO enlargement, the United States set a political background for the
double enlargement to happen. Washington removed all security impediments to the Baltic
integration in the market-based union, the EU. On the other side, NATO membership was
implicitly linked to membership in the EU as a standard for democratic transition. The criteria
for new NATO members were primarily set by the EU.736
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CHAPTER VIII
LATVIA AND THE EURO-ATLANTIC COMMUNITY: A JOURNEY COMPLETE?

Introduction
Chapter Three, A Small State, Latvia, outlined major sensitivities and vulnerabilities for
Latvia from international, regional and domestic perspectives. It also explained how the historic
learning process has influenced Latvia’s international orientation. The author does not claim to
have explored all major conditions that Latvia as a small state must consider. However, the
existing literature on small states and Latvia at present and in the past allows us to consider a few
important issues.
First, there are sensitivities and vulnerabilities that derive from non-alignment and
international interaction. They make small states more sensitive and vulnerable than larger ones.
The non-alignment means that small states must operate within their own limits such as small
populations, economic sectors and military capabilities. Here, the international viability
challenges as described by both realist and liberal schools of thought must be taken into account.
Thus, a part of this chapter will focus on how Latvia’s integration in the Euro-Atlantic
community has or has not allowed it to offset international challenges faced by small states.
Second, the literature on small states suggests that it is possible to offset or at least
mitigate external challenges by having strong democratic consensus and social cohesion. The
democratic consensus depends on how consolidated the political system and society are. Here,
the author will outline some significant traits about Latvia. The political system mirrors social
coherence, interests and values of most states. Only explicitly authoritarian countries will lack
such capability. Thus, by focusing on Latvia, it will be possible to conclude whether there are
political and social aspects that hinder social coherence.
The third part of the chapter will focus on some essential issues related to small numbers
and resource endowments. Small states mostly operate within the limits of their small
populations. Latvia is among those smallest states in Europe. Thus, the quality of human
resources is a decisive factor. It is important to assess the population and human resource trends
in Latvia.
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It will be possible to outline the demographic and humanitarian factor limits and
possibilities in Latvia. International experts have argued that small states can offset small
numbers with high social advancement levels. Highly developed societies can at least partially
offset myriad political, economic, social and cultural challenges. In some instances, even a
decreasing population can be a minor challenge in the short-term if truly capable individuals
place a small state on a developmental path. In the long-term, those states that will serve their
constituents well, and will also experience positive demographic trends.
To outline the trends above, the author will divide the chapter into three parts. The first
will be devoted to the EU and NATO membership aspects. It will be possible to outline how well
Latvia has adhered to the Euro-Atlantic community as well as whether the desired membership
in the Euro-Atlantic community has allowed it to offset salient security challenges. The second
part will be devoted to the political system in Latvia. It will decide whether the society in Latvia
is united. If not, what are the reasons for social fragmentation? The third part will single out
some significant trends for the Latvian population and humanitarian development. The major
focus will be on the educational system in a comparative perspective. It will determine whether
the social development trajectory for Latvia is positive. If negative, then what are the reform
challenges that must be urgently addressed to revert negative trends?
NATO and the EU
During the NATO Summit in Washington in 1999, Latvia’s membership prospects in
NATO were implicitly acknowledged. Its membership was explicitly announced at the NATO
Summit in Prague in 2002. During her historical address at the summit, Latvian president Vaira
Vīķe-Freiberga spoke about the decision to enlarge the transatlantic community as a brave step in
eliminating the resulting patterns of the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact, Tehran and Yalta
conferences.
She noted that the enlargement was a historic moment for Latvia since NATO’s door for
membership was finally opened. Apart from Latvia, six other small states joined NATO. The
former president of Latvia, Vīķe-Freiberga, explicitly stated that from the moment when Latvia
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becomes a member of NATO, it assumes the duty not just to contribute to the strength of the
alliance, but to uphold the principles shared within the alliance. 737
She said that Latvia will also uphold the shared values of liberty and justice that should
apply to all. With NATO membership pending, Latvia began bracing for the commonly shared
commitment to contribute two percent of gross domestic product (GDP) to the national defense.
The expenditure grew through 2002, it increased incrementally until 2006, but the share for the
defense expenditure has dropped ever since (See Figure 5.1).

In 2004, Latvia and the other six small sisters that were quite evenly wealthy (or not)
gained membership in NATO. By doing so, they closed the gap and gobbled the area that was
previously dubbed as the grey zone or no man’s land, the land between Russia and Germany, a
condition that has caused many European wars in the past.738
Latvia and the other small members of NATO acquired the desired security. From the
contemporary perspective of 15 years ahead, Latvia should be thankful, considering the
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resurrection of Russian aggression in 2008 and 2014 when it invaded Georgia and Ukraine.
Those were some of Latvia’s sisters that were left outside the alliance, whose door has been
closed since 2008. Even if Georgia and Ukraine has kept spending at a rate much higher than
that of Latvia, the geopolitical conditions do not suggest that further enlargement will happen in
the foreseeable future.
In the post-Cold war era, Latvia was searching for the security as a salient shelter from
Russian aggression in no other way than did Georgia or Ukraine. It reached the objective in
2004, but, before and after the membership, it never committed to the major two percent
spending rule. In comparison, Estonia has been spending the two percent on defense since 2003.
After Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, Latvia and Lithuania agreed to raise military
spending to reach the two percent target by 2018.739
Each member state is required by the gentlemen’s agreement to commit to the informally
agreed upon military spending rule. The idea about deterrence and collective defense is rooted in
commonly shared military capabilities. Only by committing to the realpolitik principles of
defense can the members of the alliance enjoy the idealpolitik values of liberty and peace. As a
NATO member, Latvia has neglected the principle, but it has acquired the security even if it has
not yet practically paid for it. Thus, Latvia has eroded the basic principles of the alliance.
It is not Latvia’s aggregate or actual contribution that makes NATO more or less
efficient. If Latvia contributed all of its yearly budget to the defense capabilities alone, it could
buy three aircraft carriers, ten F-16 fighter jets (coordinated from ground bases), ten F-35 jets
(part of the aircraft carriers’ crew) and one submarine.740 If Latvia pledged the two percent GDP
annual share the same year for defense, it could buy three F-35 jets, nothing else. If Latvia ever
decided to act accordingly, there are some caveats that must be considered.
If all of the Latvian annual GDP was spent on military equipment as suggested above,
then Latvia would be left without any resources for personnel training and remuneration, ground
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forces, public services and even essential resources for subsistence of the population. In the end,
the military infrastructure and equipment without the functioning state would be worthless.
If Latvia alone is not essential for aggregate NATO military capabilities, it can be useful
for niche missions. It has developed specific capabilities that are instrumental for NATO’s
overall objectives. Latvian military units serve as parts of NATO’s military units during
international peace missions. However, in practice, Latvia harms NATO since it undermines the
sole principle that makes NATO institutionally stronger. Solidarity among allies is essential. It
upholds the institutional credibility of NATO that is primarily backed by the United States,
rather than other stronger allies of the alliance.
The institutional cooperation allows to combine diverse military capabilities and
resources of multiple member-states. As a member, Latvia is a part of a broader community that
has sufficient military equipment and personnel for the common defense. Thus, Latvia enjoys the
condition as if it had three aircraft carriers, 20 jets and one submarine. Even more, NATO has
much broader ground, air and naval forces than listed. Therefore, it is a significant deterrent to
potential Russian aggression.
Here, however, all allies must be willing to pledge sacrifices in the event of a military
attack on Latvia knowing that Latvia has never paid its two percent for the common defense.
Before the enlargement took place, the Baltic States had to prove that they would be seriously
committed to defense and would not be “free riders” and “consumers” of security.741 The lack of
solidarity and unwillingness to make sacrifices for the security of one member state can be an
acid test for the survival of NATO’s alliance.
Notwithstanding myriad challenges, the Baltic States have tried to prove themselves
useful. Since before their membership, the Baltic cooperation played a significant role. They had
to prove that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania would be useful allies, not weak points on NATO’s
defense chain.
Like all NATO allies do, the Baltic States are improving and adapting their national
military capabilities to better adhere to the overall NATO challenges. The attitude in the Baltic
States regarding which country is the weakest point in Baltic security is quite telling (See Figure
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5.2). This perception explains how the Baltic States see each other from the regional cooperation
perspective.

Here, Latvia is considered the weak point in the Baltic defense structure. The smallest
among the Baltic States is Estonia, but it has committed to the two percent spending rule since
2003. Thus, it has been seen as the smallest challenge to Baltic security. Latvia and Lithuania,
even if they are larger in terms of their populations, are still considered, even by themselves, to
be weaker points. Estonia’s adamant commitment to NATO’s principles is a lesson for the rest of
the Baltic States that inspires a sense of regional security even for the smallest among the three
members of the alliance.
Even though the defense expenditure is the condition that Latvia has failed to fulfill thus
far, the society in Latvia feels rather safe in front of surging Russian military adventurism. In
2017, 85 percent of the population felt safe in Latvia. Only 15 percent felt that Latvia has not
gained the necessary security after the 2004 NATO enlargement.742 NATO’s membership
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delivers to Latvia the relative security from Russia when compared to those former Soviet
countries like Georgia or Ukraine. Russia has not taken the risk of undermining any NATO
member state even if it has not abstained from upholding its geostrategic interests in the nearest
proximity.
The enlargement of the transatlantic community provided Latvia with another
opportunity. It was a chance to join the European community, or the EU’s common market. In
2003, there was a referendum in Latvia asking the society if it supports Latvia’s entry in the EU.
From all respondents to the referendum in Latvia, 67percent supported it while 33 percent
opposed it.743
The majority of Krāslava, Rēzekne, and Daugavpils districts, where mostly Russian
speakers reside, opposed the membership (Eastern regions of Latvia). The rest of the population
strongly supported the EU membership prospect. In 2017, only seven percent say that the EU
membership has not been beneficial to Latvia, while 93 percent of the respondents support the
stance that Latvia is benefiting from EU membership.744 To better assess where Latvia stands in
the common market, it is necessary to compare Latvia in a few distinct areas.
In 2015, the median GDP per capita in countries that were members of the EU before
1995 (like Austria, Sweden or Finland) was $43,825. In countries that were not members before
1995 (that includes European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) frameworks like Eastern Partnership,
Union for the Mediterranean Partnership and Black Sea Synergy), the median GDP per capita
was $5,740.745 The beneficial character of EU membership looms high, but membership in the
EU provides an opportunity for convergence of economic performance.
When compared with the two groups above, GDP per capita in Latvia in 2015 was
$13,649. The economic performance was almost three times better in countries that joined the
EU before 1995, but Latvia is almost three times wealthier when compared with the group of
countries that joined the EU with Latvia, have partnerships with the EU in the ENP frameworks
such as Eastern Partnership, Union for the Mediterranean Partnership and Black Sea Synergy.
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Latvia, in comparison with the initial economic forerunners from Eastern Europe like
Hungary, which joined the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in 1996 (20
years before Latvia) has caught up significantly, from being 44 percent below the Hungarian
GDP per capita in 1996, to just six percent below in 2015.746
Despite the economic improvement, experts are divided and mention that it may be 10,
25 or even 50 years before Latvia reaches the average income levels and the standard of living of
the EU. There is a broad consensus, however, that the economic success of Latvia will depend on
its domestic ability to utilize advantages offered by international markets. With regard to the EU,
Latvia and Hungary are the biggest laggards today. They are the worst two utilizers of benefits
offered by the EU institutions and market.747 At least in terms of the institutional adaptation,
there is much Latvia could do to utilize available opportunities.
Apart from the economic performance, one must ask what transformation Latvia
experienced before and since becoming a member of the Euro-Atlantic community in 2004.
Membership itself depended on Latvia’s ability to adhere to certain criteria. Furthermore, it is
reasonable to assume that the presence in the Euro-Atlantic community significantly lifted Latvia
to the profile of the Euro-Atlantic community. Thus, it is realistic to expect latent relations
between Latvia and the Euro-Atlantic community as such.
Latvia started its independent journey to the EU and NATO once the Russian military
parts were gone in 1995. It became a member of the EU and NATO in 2004, a little less than a
decade after the complete Russian military withdrawal. The adherence from 1995 until 2004
would underline the transformation to membership, while the period 2005 to 2015 would outline
how the Euro-Atlantic community has changed Latvia and how Latvia has transformed itself
since it became a member of the Euro-Atlantic community.
For this analysis, the author will compare two groups of states. One will consist of the EU
and NATO members before 1995. Formerly neutral states like Sweden, Finland and Austria were
affluent and relatively safe and stable countries when they joined the EU in 1995. The other
group will consist of all those states that braced for the Euro-Atlantic membership thereafter.
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The criteria that the author will use for the analysis will be GDP per capita as an indicator
for economic development. To measure the human factor, the author will use education data as a
criterion for social advancement. The foreign direct investment will outline how a country is
perceived by external actors. Investors will tend to place their money in countries with sound
past and future cooperation perspectives. Last, but not least, life expectancy is an indicator that
shows how well the domestic structures and resources are attuned to guarantee sound living
standards for a population. From the author’s perspective, those traits or values are indicators
that unite the affluent and safe Euro-Atlantic community.
To highlight latent relationships, the author will apply the multivariate regression
analysis. This analysis delivers a model that, at an 80 percent748 rate, outlines the latent
relationship between those that joined EU and NATO before and after 1995.

For the

transformation comparison, the author sets three different benchmarks. In 1995 Latvia started its
journey, by 2005 it was a member, but in 2015 Latvia could claim to have some insider’s
experience.
The equation for each of the respective years allows for the user to adapt output to any
respective country. In the case of Latvia, it is possible to conclude that in 1995 it matched the
Euro-Atlantic community’s profile at a rate of six percent (+/- 1.2 percentage points, considering
the 80 percent significance of the model).749 Only one year after Latvia joined the EU in 2005,
the country matched the Euro-Atlantic community profile at 19 percent rate (+/- 3.8 percentage
points).750 It was still 25 percentage points behind the latent profile of the Euro-Atlantic
community (+/- 5 percentage points) in 2015.751
The adjusted R2 for the regression models for each of the respective years are 1995=0.78 (80%), 2005=0.79
(80%), 2015=0.76 (80%). It means that there are only 20% independent variables that are not included in the
analysis to completely explain latent relationships between the EU/NATO members and non-members. Considering
the fact that no country is perfectly aligned to the EU/NATO profile, the model is highly significant.
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It is possible to conclude that Latvia was strongly adapting to EU and NATO
membership since from 1995 to 2005 Latvia grew around 13 percentage points closer to the
Euro-Atlantic community’s profile, while in the years 2005 to 2015, there was only a six
percentage point increase. When Latvia joined the EU and NATO, it also became more
complacent regarding its transformation.
It is possible to outline how well Latvia compares with its neighbors. Initial conditions
for the Baltic State development were similar, if not the same. Economic success depends on
how well Latvia compares with its neighbors in terms of the business environment. The character
of the business environment will affect economic opportunities. The business environment for
any country depends on the health of a state’s institutions, administration practices and domestic
policies, among other things, and their ability to uphold entrepreneurial activities.
In terms of the friendly business environment, Estonia is the salient leader, followed by
Latvia, but Lithuania is rated as the third (See Figure 5.3). The perception of the business
environment will shape the flow of investments and business among the Baltic States and also in
a broader international perspective.
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The Baltic States have witnessed a healthy competition en route to the EU and NATO.
Despite the fact that they tend to see themselves separately, they rank an enhanced NATO as
their primary priority, closer Baltic cooperation as their second priority and an enhanced EU as
their third priority.752 It means that the Baltic States see their own cooperation as a salient
condition for their success in the Euro-Atlantic community.
The regional competition has tied all three states together since their sights were set on
the EU and NATO membership in the early 1990s. On their way to the EU and NATO, the Baltic
States have been rather united when domestic or international challenges must be overcome.
Even today, 65 percent of the Baltic residents view the Baltic States as being united in the face of
significant external or internal challenges.753 It is possible to conclude that reciprocal challenges
for the Baltic States are unifying factors.
The Euro-Atlantic community has allowed for all Baltic States to offset orthodox realist
and liberal challenges that primarily derive from the military weakness, but secondarily from the
economic realm. Moreover, neorealist and neoliberal schools of thought name institutions as
significant tools that major powers use to influence smaller states. Here, too, Estonia, Latvia and
Lithuania managed to escape unwanted Russian institutional influence. At the outset of their
journey to the Euro-Atlantic community, none of the Baltic States wanted to join those
institutions that were led by Russia.
Since 2004, Latvia has placed itself in a different institutional framework where Russia
must approach Latvia through the EU and NATO rather than bilaterally. Notwithstanding the
institutional shield offered by the EU and NATO, Latvia must continue transformation processes
to fully politically, economically and socially utilize the Euro-Atlantic community’s benefits.
The next part of the chapter will outline some domestic impediments that hinder the institutional
adaptation.

752

Author’s data based on targeted survey in the Baltic States. The 162 surveyed foreign policy and security experts
listed enhanced NATO, closer Baltic cooperation, and enhanced EU as three top priorities for the Baltic States. They
were asked to rank such priorities as better relations with Russia, closer Baltic cooperation, closer Baltic-Nordic
cooperation, closer Baltic-Visegrad-East European cooperation, closer Baltic cooperation with the EU’s Eastern
Partners, better relations with the United States, enhanced EU and NATO.
753
Author’s data based on targeted survey in the Baltic States. Among the 162 surveyed foreign policy and security
experts, 104 respondents gave an affirmative answer to the statement that societies on the domestic level are united
when profound domestic or international challenges must be overcome.

277
Latvia: Domestic Coherence and External Inroads
Russia has always tried to emphasize bilateral relations with all EU and NATO members.
It is an option to weaken and split the Euro-Atlantic community. It has used political, economic,
social or cultural inroads to weaken member states domestically or internationally. In the case of
Latvia, the political system has been an effective tool to split Latvia apart from the Euro-Atlantic
community. It has been possible since the political system still bears a significant legacy from
the five-decade Soviet occupation. As a result, Latvian society has grown rather divided.
There has been little social-civilian activity in Latvia. In 1998, around 80 percent of the
population did not belong to any organization. That includes ethnic Latvians and non-Latvians.
However, by 2004, 60 percent of Latvians and 63 percent of Russians did not participate in any
religious, professional, political or cultural organization. Even if the civic activism was still
profoundly low at the time Latvia joined the EU and NATO, there was a significant
improvement.
The absence of, or low-level, civic activism can be explained with the fact that the trust in
voluntary associations remains low. In critical situations only one percent of Latvian or Russian
communities would ask for help from associations to which individuals belong. In comparison
with other societies in Europe, the social passivity is shared among the post-communist societies.
It is the legacy from the years of communist occupation. Since 68 percent of Latvians and
Russians are pessimistic about their ability to influence government decisions on the importance
of national or regional matters through civilian organization, the indicators for social coherence
must be sought in the political realm.754
As there is little social trust in civilian associations, the reason for social unity or
fragmentation must be sought elsewhere. The political affairs, or at least the critical political
junctions in Latvia, have been underwritten by bold social activities of the past and present. The
struggle for independence against the Russian or communist influence has been one important
factor.
Quite noticeably, Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated signs of civic activity early,
but became increasingly active in 1988. By then, the society in Latvia was divided into two
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groups: one favored independence while the other opposed it. Those two groups were split in
four distinct identities: Latvians who favored independence and those who opposed it, as well as
Russian speakers who favored independence and those who opposed it.755 In the end, most
Latvians favored independence from Russia while most Russian speakers opposed it.
The incremental fragmentation of the Latvian society started early, but came to a pinnacle
at the beginning of the 1990s. The communist party had complete control over the Supreme
Soviet, the major source of power in Latvia, until May 4, 1990. Then, owing to the splintering of
the Latvian communist party, 138 deputies from the 197-large Supreme Soviet supported
independence from the Soviet Union.
Among the 197 deputies, 11 were women, 180 had tertiary-level education, and only six
were under the age of 30. The most common professions were engineering (23), law (16),
economics (13), journalism (12) and medicine (9). The ethnic composition was also diverse.
Among the deputies, 138 were Latvians (70 percent), 42 were Russians (21 percent), eight were
Ukrainians, three were Jews, two were Byelorussians and one was each was a Pole, Greek and
German. The outcome of the vote for independence dovetailed with the ethnic division in the
Supreme Soviet and the communist party.756 One hundred and thirty-eight voted for Latvian
independence. There were 138 ethnic Latvian deputies in the communist party and in the
Supreme Soviet on May 4, 1990.
The independence vote became the base for the political-social consolidation in Latvia.
After the vote, the support for unconditional independence grew among Latvians from 55 percent
in 1989 to 95 percent by March 1991. The division among Russian speakers was more
ambiguous. In June 1989, only nine percent supported complete independence while 38 percent
supported the complete rupture of ties with the Soviet Union by March 1991.757 Strong roots for
political consolidation were mired in the ethnic division and the attitude regarding Latvian
independence.
It is no surprise that the Latvian political system is not based on liberal, social,
conservative, republican or democratic principles. To join the EU, however, Latvia was required
to become a post-modern polity. It meant a polity where all social groups could represent their
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interests and none would be discriminated against. Such requirements did not exclude the fact
that political parties in Latvia could not represent interests of distinct ethnic groups. In fact, the
political realm developed and was strongly influenced by ethnic issues.
Among the most significant issues in Latvian politics became the Russian and Latvian
language status. Some political parties urged the elevation of Russian to the level of second
official language. Ethnic Latvians saw it as a menace since it would be done at the expense of the
Latvian language.
Some political parties saw automatic citizenship to all Russian speakers as a human right.
From the perspective of ethnic Latvians, it would have meant furthering political rights of former
colonists. Some political parties insisted that minority schools should choose their own language
(Russian, for example) and traditions (Orthodox, for example) for instruction. From the
perspective of Latvians, it would mean the extension of the Russian traditions at the expense of
the Latvian.
Some political parties insisted on granting voting rights to non-citizens in local
municipalities. From the perspective of Latvians, it would mean granting more political rights to
those who see themselves as alien to Latvia, and closer to Soviet Union citizenship, a nonexisting polity today.758 It would mean that Latvians who work at local municipalities would be
required to learn Russian.
Whatever the political issues, the vote for independence was cast in May 1990. The 1922
Constitution of Latvia was reinstated on August 23, 1991. The continuity of Latvian statehood
was emphasized. Then, the Latvian communist party was declared unconstitutional. The decision
to make the communist party illegal destroyed the major political construction for the Slavic
community.
From that point onwards, the Russian speakers or Slavic community in Latvia organized
themselves around issues they found important. Those political parties, born out of the
communist party, were far from united around any particular issue. There were a good deal of
diverse interests within the political community based on issues, personalities and vested
interests.
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The Latvian Socialist Party was the unofficial heir of the Latvian Communist Party. It
was led by the charismatic, ethnic Latvian communist Alfrēds Rubiks. It was founded in 1994
and explains why Latvians do not embrace the socialist principles. The name socialism was
regarded as communist even if socialist principles carry no communist ideology. The former
communist choice to use the word in their political party name only underlined the bias.
The political movement did not have a stance on ethnic issues per se; however, it denied
that Latvia was ever occupied by the Soviet Union. The 1940 events were seen as the communist
revolutionary change of the time. The political party advocated that the Latvian referendum of
2003 regarding membership in the EU be made illegal. It thus proposed the withdrawal from
NATO and the EU at the moment Latvia got inside. At the outset, the political party was seen as
a radical anti-independence movement.
The Equal Rights party was built by the people who were the most reactionary elements
of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic. From the outset, their goal was
to defend the rights of non-citizens and ethnic Slavs. The party supported unconditional
citizenship to all permanent residents of Latvia, closer links to Russia and the rejection of the
fact that Latvia was ever occupied by the Soviet Union. Like the Latvian Socialist Party, this
movement advocated for Latvia’s withdrawal from NATO and the EU.
Its leader, Tatyana Zhdanok, was elected as a member of the European Parliament in
2004 and has not left the post ever since. At the outset of the nomination, she publicly called for
the establishment of a pan-European Russian party. With deputies from five other countries, she
signed a manifesto in Prague and established such a political party. The objective of the political
force became to defend the rights of the Russian speakers and enhance the status of the Russian
language in all EU member states.759
Recently, she cast a vote against the EU strategic communications plan to limit Kremlin’s
misinformation activities in Europe760 and went on a bilateral visit to Syria. On the sidelines of
the visit, she spent 1.5 hours discussing events with Bashar al Assad at the end of 2016.761
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Zhdanok acknowledged that the conversation with Assad was very warm since there was an
accord between the politicians on many issues and values.
Conversely, there is little doubt that the Latvian foreign relations sector approves any of
the activities of the deputy. However, there is little they can do, as the election of the deputy is a
democratic choice. While there will be sufficient public political support to this candidate, the
political force will endure. Through a diverse civilian organization, the political candidate
receives financial support from Russia.
In 1995, the Russian Party was founded by members who were also the most reactionary
members of the Supreme Soviet. Like most parties that defend interests of Russian speakers, it
advocated automatic citizenship, the elevation of the status of the Russian language, the absence
of reforms in minority schools in favor of instruction in Latvian and voting rights to all noncitizens in local elections.
Their position, however, was aimed at strongly delineating ethnic Russian interests from
the interests of the Russian speakers. For example, they insisted that ethnic Russians should be
responsible for educational programs in ethnic Russian schools where the Orthodox Church
traditions, for example, would be strongly enhanced. They opposed the idea that Russian
speakers would act on behalf of ethnic Russians.
Another entity, the Motherland, or the Unified Social Democratic Workers Party,
promised to uphold social principles related to resolving practical problems of the simple people.
It was profoundly populistic and said that it aims at distributing EU and Latvian resources in
favor of the most deprived groups. This political force has emulated Vladimir Putin’s political
party in Latvia.
Its most valuable asset is its leader Yuri Zhuravlov, a person who does not have any
qualms about making controversial public pronouncements. The leader is an owner of a radio
station that has not shied away from violating election laws and campaigning principles. The
political force was founded in 1999 and managed to gain seats in the Riga City Council in 2005.
Apart from the political actors mentioned above, there were and still are some radicalnationalistic, even occasionally racist, political movements such as the Latvian National
Democratic Party. In 1998, the party was called “Russian National Unity.” They named
themselves “Berkashovites” after the extreme right-wing Russian politician Alexandr Berhashov.
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It became an active defender of the Eastern Slavic rights in Latvia. Owing to the activities
and ideas of the political movement, official registration was always denied. No information has
been available about their members. The activities of the political movement are based on
several persons such as the leader Yevgeny Osipov and Yuri Petropavlovsky. The movement is
mostly active in the port-town Liepāja. Nevertheless, it is a part of a broader network and has
links to the political party alliance, For Human Rights in the United Latvia. Even though Eastern
Slavic political parties seldom share the same political priorities, they cooperate and coordinate
and are rather consolidated.
For Human Rights in the United Latvia alliance was a home for several political forces. It
was like an umbrella organization for the Equal Rights, the socialist party and the Harmony, as
well as some non-registered political forces. The coalition of the Slavic political groups shared
some distinct objectives while in some areas they were in conflict. Nevertheless, they gained
political representation.
In the Fifth Parliamentary elections in Latvia, 13 seats went to the Harmony, and the
Equal Rights got six seats. They collected a 12 percent and 5.8 percent, respectively, share of the
popular vote in 1993. Just after the election, however, both political forces started fragmenting
into smaller groups and between existing political forces. The Slavic political parties were far
from stable and united, but the alliance initially became the network that kept the Slavic groups
together.
Within the political party alliance, some political forces were stronger, some weaker, and
some more and some less popular. The Eighth Parliamentary elections in Latvia were a success
for the alliance since it collected 19 percent of the votes. Nevertheless, the Harmony alone
collected disproportionally more than the others.
In 2003, the party decided to withdraw from the alliance. The decision was justified by
the fact that the Harmony could not find a common ground with the socialists and leaders from
the Equal Rights movement such as Tatyana Zhdanok.
Owing to this ongoing political fracturing, even the Harmony lost some support. As a
result, its leader Jānis Jurkāns, the first Latvian foreign minister in the 1990s, resigned in 2005.
He had supported pragmatic relations with Russia from the outset. Pronouncements in favor of
all-inclusive citizenship prospects and the willingness to keep some sensitive issues with Russia
(like border disputes) off the table in negotiations with Kremlin became anathema to his career at
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the Foreign Service (even if intellectually he was one of the most apt candidates for the post). He
was replaced by a young journalist, Nils Ushakov, as the leader of the political party.
The Harmony had one profound difference. Its members and ideology were never antiindependence. Some of its members were active participants in the Latvian National Front.
Although the Harmony insisted that relations with Russia must be improved, it did not oppose
Latvia’s membership in the EU although it opposed its membership in NATO.762
Furthermore, the political force has been less provocative in other areas, as it supported
and ushered a naturalization process. It supported giving voting rights to non-citizens on the
municipality level. The Harmony has not voiced a position on the status of the Latvian language
even though it has insisted on giving a broader role to the Russian language in education. The
political force has been successful in Latvia as it managed to get Nils Ushakov a seat as the
mayor of Riga City since 2009.
During the municipal election in 2013, the alliance of the Honor to Serve Riga and the
Harmony gained an absolute majority of votes (58.54 percent of the popular vote in Riga district)
while Nils Ushakov alone received 111,000 votes during the election.763 The election signified
the dwindling of the ethnic division in Riga. Many Latvians saw the political force, and
especially the leader, as an appealing political choice for Riga, a home for 700,000 residents or
almost half of the overall Latvian population.764
It is a remarkable accomplishment that every seventh voter of Riga voted for Ushakov
since 2009, not only for the leader and the political party in Latvia, but implicitly for Vladimir
Putin’s influence, whose United Russia party has a cooperation agreement with the Harmony.765
This fact, according to Nils Ushakov, is an asset. According to him, it allows strengthening of
ties between Latvia and Russia.
With the significant exception in Riga and a few other localities where deputies have
enjoyed their time at the European Parliament, Slavic political parties have not managed to gain
political power at the national election. It is not because Slavic parties did not come up with
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proposals for legislation. Those political parties that have been supported by the Latvian
electorate have always denied Slavic parties the ability to participate in decision-making.
The political parties that thrive from ethnic Latvian support have reasons to be vigilant
with the Slavic political groups, which are sometimes too close to the Kremlin. In 1999, the
umbrella alliance collected signatures aimed at reverting the citizenship and education laws that
came into force in 1998. Moreover, there has been an adamant advocacy for the minority
education to be conducted in the minority language. Apart from those disconcerting activities
and demands, political forums such as the Baltic Forum were launched to discuss LatvianRussian relations. Those events brought the most controversial Russian and Western politicians
together in Latvia.
When the already approved language reforms of 1998 in education had to be reintroduced
in 2003, the Slavic political alliance established a headquarters. The aim was to defend the
Russian schools in Latvia. Not officially registered, the headquarters received support from
Russia. The head of the headquarters, Aleksandr Kazakov, later became an assistant to the
deputy chairman of the Russian Duma Dmitry Rogozin.766
The movement and the headquarters were efficient in Latvia as they brought together a
ripple of around 10,000 people who protested in front of different decision- making bodies. As
disconcerting to Latvians as it could be, concessions were made. Language reforms in education
were altered and postponed. Ever since the concessions were made, the movement waned, but
the latent Russian influence has not.
The Eastern Slavic political parties have not gained much leverage over decision- making
in Latvia. To a degree, the reason for the exclusion is rooted in the fact that the political
participation for Latvian elites in the communist party was restricted in the past. This is a
backlash from the times when the share of Slavs in the Communist Parties of the Baltic States
significantly exceeded the population of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Lithuanians accounted
for 69 percent, Latvians for 39 percent, and Estonians for 52 percent in communist parties of
their respective countries.767
To a degree, the result dwells in the broader social adversity against the Russian/Soviet
influences. Those, mostly represented by Slavs, regimes are aimed at assimilating and diluting
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the titular ethnic group in favor of the Slavic ones. As a result, the politics in Latvia or Estonia,
have been very closely linked to ethnic relations and traditions. In a country with a plural
political system, it is no surprise that such group interests will persist and endure.
The ethno-political relations have left a substantial mark on the social coherence in
Latvia. There are political groups that are defending citizens of Slavic origin, yet there is a
substantial share of non-citizens. Around 12 percent of the total population or 247,104 residents
in Latvia still held non-citizen passports by mid-2016.768 Even though there is a significant drop
in the numbers of non-citizens, this is a profound social challenge in Latvia. This group can be
mobilized for reasons unknown.
The political participation, the voting right, for the group is denied, but the Latvian noncitizens enjoy more liberal travel conditions than citizens. They can visit the Russian Federation
and the EU without any restrictions. It is a sign that there is a socially and politically alienated
group in Latvia with close contacts in St. Petersburg or Moscow. The existence of alienated
social groups results in social and political fragmentation in Latvia.
The Latvian Parliament has been the most visible cause of these social cleavages. On the
national level, the Slavic parties never gained any political representation. Even though Latvian
politics is strongly embedded into ethno-political relations, there is another denominator to
consider. The political parties that are said to represent ethnic Latvian interests have been willing
to engage in close business relations with the Russian Federation.
Since the restoration of independence, there was a political consolidation with effects still
felt today. The factor of the three As, or the presence of the three oligarchs in Latvia-Aivars
Lembergs, Andris Šķēle, and Ainārs Šlesers-has been a direct inroad for the Russian transit,
cargo and banking sector interests in Latvian politics.769
Political and business interests have been extremely entangled in Latvia. Considering the
argument that the Slavic groups favor closer ties with the Russian Federation anyway, the
presence of such oligarchs signify that the Latvian political elite is not dispositioned against the
Russian influence either.
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Aivars Lembergs, who was elected as the mayor of the port town Ventspils in 1994, is
not only a currently active politician in Latvian political life. He is also accused of convicting
especially heavy corruption crimes in Latvia. The informal head of one of the most influential
political parties in Latvia, the Greens and Farmers Union, he has led the political group in Latvia
since 1992. The political party has been heavily involved in governmental affairs. By holding
multiple important political posts, he is an important part of the Latvian government.
At the outset of the independence, and assuming more power in the port-town Ventspils,
Lembergs became the chair of the Ventspils free port. Transit and political interests of the
municipality, its port, and the political establishment on the national level were closely linked to
transit and cargo business from Russia. Jānis Jurkāns, the former foreign minister and the leader
of the Harmony political party until 2005, was the head of the Baltic association “Transportation
and Logistics.”
Two people representing transit and cargo interests of Ventspils, Oļegs Stepanovs and
Olafs Berķis, had especially close relations with the Baltic transit association.770 As a result, the
ethnic-Russian and ethnic-Latvian political forces ended up working quite closely in terms of
their shared business interests. The business became the source for the subsequent financing of
political parties.
Andris Šķēle was the prime minister from 1995 to 1997 without any political affiliation.
In 1998, he founded his own political force, “The People’s Party.” Before assuming the prime
minister’s duties in 1995, Šķēle was active in the privatization process in Latvia.
The political force won the 1998 parliamentary elections, and Šķēle became the prime minister
in 1999 and remained in office until 2000. The political party was forced out but it led the
government again from 2004 to 2007. Aigars Kalvītis took over the leadership, but, owing to
corruption and political scandals, the government fell in 2007. The power in Latvia was taken
over by the political party alliance consisting of the Latvian First Party and the Latvian Way.
Around this time, Šlesers, the third oligarch, becomes known among the public. He was
the head and the main sponsor of the Latvian First Party from 2002 to 2007. A businessman, he
donated to the political force generously. However, among the financial supporters of this
political party were shareholders from the bank “Rietumu Banka” like Leonids Esterkins and a
partial owner of the gambling industry in Latvia, Jānis Dāvis.
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Additional sponsors of Šlesers’s political force were the two other oligarchs. Financial
contributions, not completely transparent and hardly known, originated from financial
institutions and business ventures that were closely tied to Russia, or even criminal circles.
Furthermore, the three oligarchs have been supporters of the Slavic political parties, too.
They did not shy away from joining the coalition with them. For example, Šlesers became the
vice-chairman of the Riga City Council in 2009. He was ranked second in power, behind Nils
Ushakov, the mayor of Riga City from the Slavic Harmony political party.
These three political forces have been rather successful at controlling politics, business
and even news.771 Latvian society has never critically assessed public information-a legacy from
the communist period and the third awakening of the Latvian society. There is a history of trust
in public information because Latvian critics of the Soviet system were instrumental in the
mainstream media.772 Subsequently, media in Latvia is trusted, but the fact that the oligarchs
control the news allows them to manipulate public opinion.
The oligarchs may be more or less publicly visible, but their political influence
transcends from one political force into another until this day. For example, Aigars Kalvītis was
ousted when the financial and economic crisis hit Latvia before 2008. Before the crisis, he was
the prime minister from the People’s Party (founded by one of the oligarchs). After his ousting,
Kalvītis went behind the political scenes to work on such business-political projects as the
resurrection of the Latvian ice-hockey club “Riga Dinamo” in Russia’s Continental Ice-Hockey
league.
Seduced by the past glory of the club and the desire to see ice-hockey surge, Latvian
society has not coherently objected to the team being sponsored by the former Soviet
intelligence-led “Itera Latvia” and Gazprom-owned JSC “Latvijas Gaze,” among other sponsors
with similar political subtext. Some complaints surface about higher energy prices in Latvia,
compared to Estonia or Lithuania, even if the neighbors receive Russian gas supplies from
Latvia.
Those gas retail and distribution companies serve as the direct Gazprom subsidiaries in
Latvia. They allow for the Russian political influence to be financed from the business ventures
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in Latvia. Presently, Kalvītis is the Chairman of JSC “Latvijas Gaze,” but he also became the
chairman of the newly established JSC ''Conexus Baltic Grid'' in 2017.
The new gas distribution company was established to separate the gas distribution and
storage from the supply and retail functions in Latvia.773 The foundation process of “Conexus
Baltic Grid” was pursued in Latvia to comply with the EU energy market liberalization
requirements. For Latvia, a more liberal energy market means lower energy prices and less
Russian political influence.
However, since shareholders of the new company remain the same, the normative
requirements will be fulfilled, but the gas market will stay under the control of the same business
groups and leaders. Even though it is clear that the major supply source of gas to Latvia will
remain Russian, at least in the short term, in the case of political crises even the delivery of the
liquefied natural gas from Lithuania can be hindered politically.
The liquefied gas, even if it can be more expensive, could be delivered from Lithuania in
the case of gas supply disruptions to Latvia. The necessary liquefied natural gas infrastructure is
available in the Klaipeda port,774 but the distribution and storage will still be decided by those
same vested interests so closely tied to Russia’s Gazprom.
It is possible to conclude that the Latvian society has been split in two distinct ways. The
first is along ethno-political lines. One cluster of political parties serve Russian speakers while
the other serves ethnic Latvians. The other aspect divides Latvian society between political elites
and constituents.
In Latvia, the vested interests have contributed to low social trust and high corruption
levels. The present Latvian political system places the country in front of two distinct paths.
First, if public institutions are embedded in social structures, then Latvian society can expect for
a country to be set on potentially the development path.775 As evidence suggests, this is the least
likely scenario at the moment.
The political elites are corrupt and there is a gap between political elites and society.
Thus, Latvia is on the predatory state path. The predatory condition derives from the fact that
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there is no benevolent reciprocity between constituents and the state, social agency and social
goods, taxes and self-interest of a ruler.776 Even though the country is a democracy, it is still
ruled by just a few political groups. Thus, the democratic structures are abused for the benefit of
a few.
Considering the character of the Latvian political system, it is possible to conclude that
the ethnic division will not be overcome any time soon. Only benign and attractive polity will
contribute to the social cohesion, ethnically and politically. The persistence of the existing
political culture will only contribute to a broader ethnic division and gap between political elites
and society. The social division can be mitigated by eliminating the communist legacy, the
corruption and persisting ethnic disputes.
Just over 25 years since Latvia completely disentangled itself from the Soviet Union on
August 21, 1991, one of the Latvian independence movement leaders, Dainis Īvāns, gave an
interview on the occasion. He emphasized that the contemporary politics in Latvia is
worrisomely reminiscent of the days when the communist party was fragmenting in Latvia at the
beginning of the 1990s.777 Right now, however, the process sometimes seems to go in reverse,
according to the leader.
Small Numbers Amplified
Small states differ from larger ones in that they must always cope with small numbers. A
small population size means a limited pool of leaders, small economies and/or limited military
capabilities. Those factors discern small and large states in a big way. Being one of the smallest
in terms of population, Latvia is among the forerunners in facing these problems in the EuroAtlantic community.
Latvia has always faced the challenge of rebuilding the population counts lost during
World War I, World War II and the Soviet occupation period. Moreover, the dominant Soviet
Union and the Russian Federation influence on the Latvian social and political areas has made
the task of rebuilding Latvia from a cultural perspective quite complicated (See Figure 5.4).
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Before 1914, there were 2.5 million ethnic Latvians. After World War I, there were only
1.58 million left.778 By 1939, the total Latvian population had increased to almost two million.
Owing to World War II and, later, Soviet deportations, there were 1.4 million ethnic Latvians at
the outset of the Cold War.779
At the outset of the occupation, the Soviet Union replenished the lost cadres by sending
650,000 Russian speakers into Latvia. In 2005, the situation was the same as it was at the outset
of the Cold War. There were 1.35 million ethnic Latvians while the Soviet- imposed ethnic
blending left around 0.8 million, some of them citizens, some non-citizens.780
While the overall Latvian population according to the count of citizens was around two
million, only 70 percent of them are ethnic Latvians. The challenge of maintaining the Latvian
language in the face of a Russian influence is a difficult one. This is dependent on how Latvians
themselves treat their state and their culture.
The dividing line between the two groups is the language. Around 77 percent of the
population considers the presence of the Russian speakers a challenge (the number dovetails with
the share of ethnic Latvians and Russian speakers in Latvia), while only approximately one half
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would respond in Latvian if addressed in Russian.781 More than a half, however, would respond
in Russian, but very few would use English. The attitude against the language will determine the
faith of the language. At the moment, most ethnic Latvians are inclined to use the minority
language in public communication.
The decreasing population is not the only challenge. The continuous reduction and aging
of the population, as well as high immigration and low fertility rates, pose a serious threat to the
social and economic development in Latvia. By 2016, around 370,000 Latvian citizens lived
abroad.782 Most of them spoke at least one foreign language and could be considered better
educated since the group could compete for jobs outside Latvia. It is clear that not all of those
abroad will return.
The demographic and immigration trends threaten to aggravate some significant
challenges in Latvia. This may lead to a growing demographic burden and cause an imbalance in
the social budget and pension system. A resulting shortage of resources for education can impair
business activity and even further undermine human resources, entrepreneurial activities and the
social system in Latvia. The present demographic and immigration challenges only aggravate
these additional, looming challenges in Latvia.
When combined, there is a potential for deep social, economic and political crises. A
whole range of actions must be taken now for the improvement of the social and economic
situations in the future. Among these urgent tasks might be different types of governmental
support aimed at increasing birth rate and decreasing immigration, as well as strategies targeted
to attract immigrants.
There is a risk that the labor force in Latvia may scale down by 20 percent within the next
20 years and by 45 percent by 2050. The number of children may decrease by 20 percent within
the next 20 years and by 35 percent by 2050.783 The task to revert these negative trends can be
accomplished with strong social coherence and political leadership. The present political elites
do not speak, nor do they act explicitly or implicitly, to address these challenges.
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Even if there is currently a large social class (like pensioners or disabled persons who
cannot take care of themselves for various reasons), it is possible to uphold the social system
with the help of a capable and educated private sector as well as a versatile and benevolent
public sector.
Even if at the outset of independence the education system was left at the mercy of liberal
markets (almost no funding to education was prescribed),784Latvia does not perform poorly
today. The Organization for Economic and Social Development (OECD) suggests that in terms
of readings skills, Latvia ranks as 30 (Estonia ranks as 13, and Lithuania as 40). In terms of
mathematics skills, Latvia ranks as 36, just one place above Lithuania, while Estonia ranks as 17.
In the case of science skills, Latvia was 31, while Estonia was nine, and Lithuania was 33. The
report has assessed student performance in reading, mathematics and science.
The report included OECD member and partner countries in 2013.785 Here, however,
Latvia can conclude that Estonia is outperforming Latvia and Lithuania. Thus, there are lessons
to learn from Estonia. The most likely drawback in Latvia is the continuous lack of reforms.
More mobile towns (center) are performing much better than regions (countryside or periphery).
The center outperforms average OECD educational ratings while Latvian student research results
are better than in Singapore in those distinct areas of comparison.786
The society in Latvia admits the need of reforms. The author’s survey only underlines the
concern about the political system since 45 percent of Latvian residents consider corruption and
Soviet-style leadership, economic and social development, lack of reforms, absence of a credible
political entity/actor, lack of domestic solidarity, absence of tangible political elites and
direction, depopulation and immigration trends, lack of future vision and development trajectory,
populism and media, small population and markets as the most important challenges for
Latvia.787
Most challenges in Latvia can be addressed at home, but one condition hinders immediate
reform prospects. The corrupt political system is still the communist legacy that does not allow
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for new political figures to emerge. There are few political figures that are qualified for
leadership roles in Latvia.
As a vivid indicator, only 0.5 percent of respondents considered the present Latvian
president (in office since mid-2015) Raimonds Vējonis a credible leader. In comparison, 60
percent considered former Latvian president Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga the Baltic leader. On the same
issue, around 25 percent viewed Toomas Hendrik Ilves, and 13 percent viewed Dalia
Grybauskaitė as two Baltic leaders. Two percent of the respondents viewed recently elected (in
mid-2016) Estonian president Kersti Kaljulaid and the former Lithuanian president Valdas
Adamkus more favorably than the present president of Latvia, Vējonis.788
If around 40 percent of the Latvian population view Estonian and Lithuanian politicians
more favorably than their own, then it is not hard to conclude that there is a strong leadership
problem. Two respondents from Latvia, when asked to provide their deliberate alternative
answers about leaders in the Baltic States, named the brave Estonian reformer Mart Laar and
Lithuanian foreign minister Linas Linkevicus as two Baltic leaders.
Without the strong outlier, like the outstanding former president of Latvia, VīķeFreiberga, Latvia would be in an even worse situation in terms of perception of leaders. VīķeFreiberga is not only a past Baltic leader, she currently chairs internationally important thinktanks and organizations, participates in international debates and was nominated for the United
Nations Secretary General post in 2006. Her candidacy was vetoed by Russia in the United
National Security Council. However, it never diminished social support for the former president
in Latvia and the Baltic States.
It is possible to conclude that those small numbers share strong reciprocity in Latvia.
Without strong leaders, society cannot be united. Without social coherence and strong
leadership, a political system cannot be stable. Without stability and trust, there can be little
development and improvement in living conditions and socio-economic trends. Without all these
aspects, demographic and migration trends will remain negative. Only stable and prosperous
future perspectives in Latvia will motivate families to expand and stay in Latvia.
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Considering the narrative about the political situation in Latvia, it might just be necessary
to wait until the post-communist corrupt traditions and elites leave the political stage. Then, new
cadres that will share no affinity with the past political traditions must take over. It is possible to
revert negative demographic, migration, social and economic trends, but since there is a need for
strong leadership to organize domestic structures, reforms must first be undertaken in Latvian
politics.
Conclusion
Membership in the Euro-Atlantic community has allowed for Latvia to offset some
profound sensitivities and vulnerabilities. However, some of Latvia’s inherit weaknesses can be
remedied only by domestic adaptation and reforms. Membership in the EU and NATO does not
mean a farewell to all communist legacies, challenges, sensitivities and vulnerabilities that pull
Latvia back into Moscow’s dominion.
The most salient challenge for small states has been the military one. Despite the fact that
Latvia has hardly ever contributed to the informally agreed upon two percent spending rule for
national defense, it has gained relative security by joining NATO. The examples of Georgia in
2008 and Ukraine in 2014 can serve as vivid case studies. Even higher military spending in those
countries did not deter Russia from using military force to accomplish its geopolitical objectives.
Even though Latvia has never spent two percent on its military, even less than Georgia or
Ukraine has done before, Latvia has not suffered from overt or covert Russian military
aggression.
Membership in the EU comes with the opportunity to join the common market. In terms
of economic advancement, the country has been rather successful. However, Latvia must pursue
further adaptation and transformation. Estonia, according to Latvian respondents, is more
attractive for business. The better business environment will lure some of Latvian or Lithuanian
enterprises to Estonia since all Baltic States share the same EU common market where people,
capital, money and knowledge move freely.
Moreover, Latvia still represents 25 percent of the profile of the Euro-Atlantic
community and from 2005 to 2015 it was rather complacent in adapting to new conditions. In
comparison, the pre-membership transformation was rather robust. Closer ties with the EU
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institutionally, economically and politically will eventually improve Latvia’s market possibilities
and as a result, socio-economic conditions.
Most sensitivity and vulnerability risks in Latvia are of a domestic character. The EU has
provided the opportunity to utilize common market opportunities. How Latvia manages all these
opportunities depends on how developmental or predatory the country will be. Right now, the
post-communist elites pose a significant challenge to development in Latvia. Those political
groups that rose out of the Soviet Union still bear the same political culture and traditions and are
responsible for creating adverse development conditions in Latvia.
If Latvia can develop into a sound welfare state, to the disappointment of Russia, then
ethno-political division will wane. Until now, those political groups that lean toward a Slavic or
Latvian electorate are rather attuned to the Russian influence. The Latvian political system and
economic interests allow and even invite Russian influence, not the opposite. For Russia, those
inroads in Latvian politics remain the only ones to influence decisions in Latvia.
It is hard for Latvia to revert the present political trends immediately since the old leaders
do not feel comfortable in the Western environment yet. Their ideology, ideas, and language in
many cases are closer to Slavic traditions and language. Only new political elites can overcome
the discomfort that Latvian political elites share in their relations with the Euro-Atlantic
community. To conclude, social change in Latvia is a difficult challenge and it will take time for
new practices to evolve. The Euro-Atlantic community has set decisive pre-conditions for
benevolent change to take place.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSION

The research about Latvia’s path to the Euro-Atlantic community raised four major
questions. The first three were related to Latvia’s international constraints while the last was
about the Euro-Atlantic international process that offset sensitivities and vulnerabilities in Latvia.
All research questions focused on limitations small states face in international relations.
The first was about the role of small states in international affairs and concerned Latvia’s
ability to successfully guide itself independently of major powers. Such constraints are shared by
most small states. Latvia in particular, at least in the region to which it belongs, cannot claim any
feasible power, soft or hard. In fact, it must rather focus on diverse risks stemming from the
actions of major powers.
The second question explicitly described how a major power, the United States,
determined the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community. Based on this research, America’s
foreign policy has been assessed as a contributor to the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic
community in general, and the Baltic accession perspectives in particular. Mostly instrumental to
NATO enlargement, American foreign policy implicitly altered the European consolidation as
well.
The third research addressed the assumption that converging and diverging interests and
identities played an instrumental role in Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration process. First, the way
which Russia approached the Baltic States was a significant criterion for the enlargement of the
Euro-Atlantic community. Second, even if the United States was and remains an influential
power in Europe, the decision to enlarge the EU was based on European consensus.
Thus, the way that the Baltic States were seen in Europe by major global and regional
powers had a strong effect on Latvia’s membership prospects. This part of the research broadly
focused on shared interests and identities in Europe as a precondition for the institutional
enlargement of the European community.
The result of Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration was its dual membership in the EU and
NATO. Until it joined both organizations in 2004, Latvia had to undergo a significant adaptation
process to adhere to mostly the EU’s, but also NATO’s, membership criteria. The memberships
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signified that Latvia had successfully completed the required adaptations. Nevertheless, the
Euro-Atlantic institutional umbrella does not guarantee that small states will be completely free
of sensitivities and vulnerabilities.
As suggested by small states research and Latvia’s intrinsic properties, the fourth
question asked if the dual membership was able to offset its major sensitivities and
vulnerabilities. The focus of the state of the research was on selected, but extremely important
domestic areas in Latvia.
The path to the Euro-Atlantic community started when Latvia adapted its own foreign
policy strategy for the period from 1995 to 2005. Beginning only when Russian troop withdrawal
was complete, the strategy made the enhancement of Latvia’s sovereignty and independence as
top national priority. To uphold this objective, Latvian policy makers set forth a few important
tasks.
The first priority aimed at bringing Latvia into the European and transatlantic complex, as
well as other international organizations. The EU and NATO stood out as two focal points for
Latvia’s integration. The second priority was the enhancement of the cooperation between the
Baltic States. The third identified the major European powers (France, Germany, and the United
Kingdom) and Russia and the United States as critical to Latvia’s interests.789
As an integral part of foreign policy success, the strategy identified the development of
parliamentary democracy, enhancement of domestic stability, and endurance of economic
reforms as three major tasks. At the beginning of its journey, Latvia outlined the groundwork
that practically affected integration in the community. The strategy acknowledged Latvia’s
domestic compatibility with the Euro-Atlantic community as a pre-condition for membership in
the EU and NATO. Notwithstanding domestic efforts, the integration process depended on major
powers.
At the outset of Latvia’s independence, the United States was recognized as the most
important bilateral partner. American foreign policy had undergone three distinct stages toward
Latvia. The first stage was rather malign. It was a stage where the United States after World War
I decided to approach Europe normatively. Apart from diplomatic contacts, little closer practical
cooperation existed. In relations with the Baltic States, the United States rather reluctantly
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recognized the existence of Latvia as an international actor. Belatedly, when Soviet Russia and
Europe had already recognized Latvia, Washington also diplomatically acknowledged the
existence of the three Baltic States. The years from 1919 to 1940 demonstrated a lack of general
American interest in the Baltic States.
However, by the end of the interwar period, when two of the major regional powers in
Europe signed the secret clauses of the Molotov Ribbentrop-Pact on August 23, 1939, the United
States issued a statement, denouncing the illegal incorporation of the Baltic States in the Soviet
Union. Thus, Washington committed to work with the Baltic exile governments. During World
War II and the Cold War years, without risking an all-out war with the Soviet Union, there was
nothing the United States could do to liberate the Baltic States from communist grasp.
The alternative would have meant a war with the Soviet Union, played out between
NATO and the Warsaw Pact alliances. Therefore, for more than five decades Washington upheld
the normative existence of the three Baltic States. Latvia’s exiled government was allowed to
uphold statehood principles and celebrate Independence Day in the United States throughout the
Soviet occupation period. Not much else was possible or done. It was a benign approach, but the
only one available at the time.
During Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost as well as the immediate aftermath of the
Cold War when the Soviet Union was dissolved, American foreign policy makers were still
cautious, reluctant, and hesitant supporters of cooperation with Eastern Europe. There were
debates about NATO’s future and America’s commitment to transatlantic cooperation. These
institutional defense structures were the glue that kept the United States bound to Europe. On the
other hand, The EU had substantially grown. It had become a contributor to America’s welfare.
Thus, it was a worthy partner to defend. The U.S. Congress urged the White House to strongly
uphold the transatlantic cooperation, even with the Baltic States.
As a result, the United States subtly and adamantly upheld its European ties. At first,
American foreign policy concentrated on Germany. German unification could potentially
jeopardize or promote a “whole and free” Europe. If unification failed, there could not be
consolidation of Eastern Europe. Peace in Europe depended on the stability delivered by
democratic regimes. Here, the Balkan conflicts became a test for Europe and the United States.
When European powers failed, stronger American involvement was more necessary than ever.
When acting alone, European powers threatened to undermine the accomplished Western
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European stability and unity. Thus, Washington soon resurrected NATO for new missions in the
Balkans as a peace dividend for Europe. Willing European powers followed.
The year 1994 heralded a new life for NATO, as well as a bolder engagement of America
in Europe. Initially, even Russia became a potential partner for the refurbished NATO as a PfP
participant. For Latvia, the new NATO partnership heralded an opportunity for redemption.
American absence from Europe in the years from 1919 to 1940 had been malign. American
presence through the Cold War and in its immediate aftermath in Europe had been benign, and it
was not sufficient for Latvia to escape Russia’s shadow. The redemption of previous policies
started when new NATO partnerships were announced and the Russian military left the Baltic
States with the assistance of Washington in early 1995.
The White House could finally carry out what Congress had urged President Bill Clinton
to do since Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union: to raise the flag of freedom high in
the Baltic States and end the legacy of the Tehran, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences in Europe.
NATO was set to enlarge. The question was where and when. Washington presented reform
requirements to the Baltic States. In the meantime, it also provided myriad assistance to improve
their militaries, build democratic institutions, and engage civil society.
All of these reforms were essential pre-requisites not only for NATO membership, but
also EU enlargement. Washington harvested its foreign policy fruits by concluding the BalticAmerican Charter in 1998. With the charter signed, the Baltic-NATO membership prospects
were officially announced. To practically conclude the most solemn defense relationship with the
United States, the Baltic States had to join NATO.
Ever since the first NATO enlargement in 1999, the Baltic States had had additional
political support inside NATO. The Washington NATO Summit announced further enlargement
prospects, setting criteria in 1999. This event marked a low point in relations between
Washington and Moscow. The Kremlin had strongly opposed NATO enlargement by accepting
the Baltic States. By doing so, the West jeopardized its ties with Russia even more.
Nevertheless, the leadership change promised to improve relations between the United
States and the Russian Federation. In 2000, Americans elected Republican President George W.
Bush, who took over the White House in 2001. Boris Yeltsin, upon his departure from the
Kremlin in 1999, nominated Vladimir Putin as his successor. Before both leaders were given an
opportunity for rapprochement, there came another shock which altered the international order.
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A few months after being sworn into office, Bush was forced to deal with an
unprecedented crisis. The terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on September 11,
2001, strongly affected American morale and the country’s international future. Among all of the
allies, Putin was the first leader to call and offer his sympathies and support to his American
counterpart, in the post-9-11 aftermath.
For the Baltic States, Russia’s closer alliance with the United States put forward the
possibility of joining NATO. Putin still opposed Baltic membership in NATO, but he did not
voice his opposition in relations with Washington anymore. Thus, in 2002, during the Prague
NATO Summit, all three Baltic States received their invitations to start the accession process.
There was no power in hindsight to challenge American support to the Baltic States.
Besides the American-led NATO anti-terrorist mission in Afghanistan, no power could revert
Washington’s choice to launch another war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 2003. American
foreign policy makers probably did not foresee that the mission in Iraq would spell the end of
their unipolar fantasy.
Despite the growing transatlantic divide over the war in Iraq, NATO grew again with
further enlargement in 2004. The United States was bold and the American freedom agenda was
on the rise. Russia was perplexed since it could not find a role for itself in Washington’s agenda.
The Baltic States finally joined both NATO and the EU. The Euro-Atlantic community expanded
almost overnight, and there were yet more states willing to join.
Georgia embraced Bush’s freedom agenda and democratic values early on. In response,
American foreign policy supported the democratic transition in the Caucasus. Conversely, it was
not clear to Moscow what America’s intentions in the region closest to Russia were. Convinced
that the United States would come to defend democratic Georgia if attacked, Mikhail
Saakashvili, after not receiving a NATO membership action plan during the Bucharest NATO
Summit in 2007, launched a military campaign against Georgia’s breakaway regions. Saakashvili
had thought that Georgia’s territorial disunity disqualified the country from receiving the
membership action plan in Bucharest.
Nothing was more likely to provoke Russia’s military response. Putin taught a lesson to
the hot-headed Saakashvili that small states never provoke major powers. The result was that any
prospects for future NATO enlargement would be postponed indefinitely. By that time,
Washington’s and Moscow’s relations were already suffering, as reflected in Putin’s 2007
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speech at the Munich Security Conference. At the conference, he “could skip excessive
roundabouts of political politeness and diplomatic phrases, and challenge the United States
unipolar moment, underwritten by excessive military actions and unilateral decisions.”790
Russia continued drifting farther from the West. It searched for its own regional and
global role. It could not find one in Bush’s freedom agenda. Against this backdrop, European and
American leaders were trying to resolve the dispute on behalf of Georgia with Russia. They
came back from Moscow empty handed.
In terms of security, the Baltic States were now out of Moscow’s military reach. Russia
withdrew its military forces from the Baltic States by 1995. It was not a deliberate choice by
Yeltsin. The Russian Federation was so weakened by the collapse of the communist regime that
it desperately needed Western financial assistance. Assistance to Russia was made on condition
of its good behavior in the Baltic States. Later, owing to growing fossil fuel prices and surging
budget revenues, Russia became more assertive in its foreign relations.
By 2005, Russia had reached financial sufficiency and domestic stability, an
unprecedented condition during Yeltsin’s era. After the Euro-Atlantic community enlarged,
Russia was confused and confusing, especially in the years from 2005 until 2007. It was in
search of a new identity, its international role, as well as a formula for relations with foreign
countries, both remote and proximate. In addition, radical forces inside of the country had grown
stronger. Consequently, Russia had started acting as an international bully, especially in the near
abroad, and against the Euro-Atlantic community in 2007.
In the Baltic Sea region, Russia has violated international rules by ignoring national
boundaries. Russia has launched diverse military exercises aimed at particular states. Several
media campaigns have sullied the image of particular countries in the Russian-speaking world.
All in all, Moscow has conducted itself in a nefarious way. The Kremlin had become a
powerhouse of falsehoods and propaganda by 2007, if not before.
The Kremlin has heedlessly altered public information to manipulate local societies in
Russia and internationally. In addition to those disdainful methods of influence, Russia has also
abused its economic assets for political influence. For example, Germany, the EU, multiple
countries in Europe and elsewhere heavily depend on Russia’s gas exports. It makes some
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partners extremely vulnerable to Russia’s influence. Past gas cutoffs to the Ukraine and the
decrease of transit through Belarus serve as reminders of the predicament.
The Slavic core, Russia (great Russia), Ukraine (small Russia), and Belarus (white
Russia), has been the cradle of Russian culture and identity. However, economic, political,
social, and cultural disputes have recently grown into broader diplomatic skirmishes, even
military aggression in the case of the Ukraine.
Thus, one by one, Russia is losing its allies even from the historical Slavic core. For those
reasons, Belarus plans to open its borders to the West. Minsk overtly condemns military
exercises against NATO on its soil. Even there, Russia could extend military exercises to the
point of violation of Belarussian sovereignty.
As a result, Russia is gradually becoming less European and more of an Asian power. It
strives to find its ideological place in the international community, but it ominously pivots
toward the bygone imperial or communist ideas and actions. The resurrection of past symbols
and ideology only increase the anxiety among Russia’s neighbors.
Those European countries that are geographically remote will be less concerned about the
ideological path and policy in Russia. Countries with no shared borders with Russia, will
embrace business opportunities. Those that share borders with Russia will try not to sell
important aspects of sovereignty by creating political inroads to Moscow in exchange for more
“exports of cottage cheese or sprats” to Russia. Russia has demonstrated the ability to politically
divide Europe and particular nation states.
Meanwhile, in the EU, when the unification was successfully complete, Germany faced
demands from its closest neighbors to do the same as West Germany did to East Germany. The
Visegrad and Baltic states adamantly sought an opportunity to join the EU early on. The latter
was more distant from Germany, caused additional concerns in relations with Russia, and was
less popular in Europe in general. Even Germany became divided in terms of Baltic integration
into the EU.
In the scheme of priorities, the German Chancery placed relations with Russia before EU
enlargement. It continued Ostpolitik, based on closer links with Moscow. German chancellors
such as Helmut Kohl (1982-1998) and Gerhard Schröder (1998-2005) never disguised their
foreign policy priority to uphold relations with Russia. When they could, both chancellors
omitted the Baltic States from political agendas, stayed rather neutral regarding Baltic
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membership prospects in the EU, or excluded them from enlargement prospects in general by
giving priority to the Visegrad states.
Conversely, the foreign ministry of the Federal Republic made Baltic membership in the
EU a top priority. Although the Chancery often prevailed in foreign affairs, gradually foreign
ministers such as Klaus Kinkel (1992-1998) and Joschka Fischer (1998-2005) pulled the Baltic
States slowly into Europe’s institutional frame. Thankfully so for the Baltic States, the European
Commission of Jacques Delors echoed the German foreign ministry’s efforts and slowly brought
the Baltic States into the European community.
Even if Britain and France did not have a firm stance regarding the Baltic States per se,
they favored enlargement. Owing to warm relations between particular French and Latvian
leaders, France was supportive. Paris was willing to see German economic power tamed in a
broader EU. Thus, EU enlargement offered some political benefits to France. Considering the
overall demand to join the EU, France favored broader enlargement to include even Romania
and Bulgaria. Those were a few laggards in terms of adaptation. If Romania’s and Bulgaria’s
integration was supported, then France had to support the reform forerunners like the Baltic
States.
The United Kingdom maintained a strong ambivalence toward the EU. It still placed its
special relationship with the United States first, but distinct European policy was no less popular
in London. In relations with the Baltic States, Britain saw a possibility to bring in like-minded
countries. London aimed to make the EU politically shallower and encourage reforms to lift
disturbing normative limitations for free markets.
Even if the United Kingdom saw immigration as a challenge, it also valued the
enlargement of the market as well as additional investment options. All in all, the United
Kingdom did not hide its support. Moreover, the United Kingdom proposed for that enlargement
be without political prejudices. Prospects for membership had to be available to everyone. It had
to depend on the compatibility of aspiring countries with the EU.
Two distinct regions in Europe strongly enhanced Latvia’s Euro-Atlantic integration. One
group pulled Latvia into NATO. Led by the United States, the group had consisted of Denmark
and the Visegrad states since 1999, minus Slovakia. The Nordic states, such as Denmark,
Finland, and Sweden, supported the Baltic path to the EU. All those states wanted to see the
Baltic States safe under the Euro-Atlantic umbrella.
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Despite some controversy within those regions, less so among the Visegrad states,
American foreign policy positively influenced the major European states. The stance of the
Nordic countries converged in the resolute support for all Baltic States early on (even if Finland
initially preferred that Estonia be first). The democratic criteria for NATO membership became
EU membership. The dual integration was important for the community to eventually enlarge
and Latvia to join in 2004.
Even if Latvian foreign policy tasks for 1995 to 2005 were fulfilled in 2004, it is not hard
to confirm the first research hypothesis. As a small power and state on the outskirts of Europe,
Latvia did not influence its Euro-Atlantic integration. There were too many other influential
countries that made decisions instead. For Latvia, the major task was to keep up with domestic
reforms and the requirements of major powers.
It is possible also to confirm the second hypothesis. The United States determined
Latvia’s journey to the Euro-Atlantic community. Owing to the Baltic-American Charter, refined
NATO, and Russia’s own second war in Chechnya, even the initial opposition inside the German
Chancery waned. It was all the result of bold American foreign policy in the post-Cold War
period.
The third hypothesis can also be confirmed. The enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic
community occurred at the moment when most interests and identities of major powers in
Europe were in harmony. Moreover, EU enlargement served as a democratic criterion for NATO
enlargement. As the EU enlarged, so could NATO, and vice versa. Even Moscow did not overtly
oppose the enlargement of the Euro-Atlantic community until 2005.
The fourth research question was not related to major powers, but rather how
international integration affects small states from within. The Euro-Atlantic community grew in
2004, allowing to offset essential sensitivities and vulnerabilities of Latvia. It made it possible
not to worry about realist and liberalist core principles anymore. Latvia became a part of NATO
defense alliance and EU trading regime. As a result, it escaped Russia’s military challenge and it
could utilize EU’s economic and institutional benefits as of 2004.
Nevertheless, Latvia has never paid for its security the agreed two percent share from
GDP on defense. On the other side, Latvia is still far from the advancement levels of those
countries that were members of the EU or NATO before 1995. In 1995, Latvia matched the
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Euro-Atlantic community’s profile at 6 percent rate, 19 percent in 2005, and 25 percent rate in
2015.
Notwithstanding additional reform options offered by dual memberships, Latvia has been
rather complacent in terms of adhering to the Euro-Atlantic community. The consequence for the
slow pace of reforms is slower economic advancement. Estonia, the reform forerunner, has better
economic performance indicators than Latvia. This is in part because of Estonia’s better
adaptation to international markets. Latvia has much to learn from Estonia’s policies to improve
its business environment.
Latvia’s inability to reform partially stems from the lack of democratic consensus.
Society is split in two distinct ways. One is the ethno-political division. Latvia has managed to
set up universal democratic structures but it has not overcome ethnic divisions in politics. There
are ethnic and political groups that uphold ethnic Latvian or ethnic Slavic interests even if there
is no practical conflict between those groups in daily life.
The second factor that divides Latvian society is corruption and alienated political elites.
These aspects stem from too close an alliance between political and economic groups. Such
political conditions serve the interests of narrow groups. If the interests of the broader society
remain unattended, the gap between the ruler and the constituents will increase. This political
trajectory sets Latvia on a predatory state path.
An obstacle to the developmental path in Latvia are the actions of a few oligarchs with
strong business interests in Russia. These companies influence transportation, financial services,
and the distribution and retail of gas. All this has allowed for the Kremlin to maintain political
influence in Latvia. Latvian political and business elites have permitted Moscow to abuse the
aforementioned key economic sectors. Thus, Russia’s factor in Latvian business and economic
life remains strong.
Those political-ethnic aspects have a strong impact on social relations in Latvia. Instead
of robustly building a welfare-state, Latvia faces a few profound domestic challenges dealing
with demographics and emigration. While demographic challenges are hard to address in a
predatory polity (a legacy from the Soviet Union), emigration of young Latvians stems from free
movement of people in search of developmental polities (a result of EU membership).
Those economic, social and immigration risks can be mitigated with a highly advanced
and consolidated society. All challenges, related to population advancement and size, share a

306
significant reciprocity. They can lead Latvia into simultaneous and prolonged political, economic
and social crises. The labor drainage can cause the social system to become unsustainable and
lower educational levels can cause undermine economic efficiency.
Notwithstanding these present challenges, sound leadership could alter the political
framework and direct the country in a better way. To build a better polity, there could just be a
need for a generation change. The average age of a deputy in the Latvian Parliament is 53.791
Only 15 percent of the deputies were born after 1980. This means that only 15 persons out of the
100 deputy large Parliament, had a chance to study foreign languages before entering the
Parliament. For the remaining, such possibilities were denied since the soviet educational system
did not offer foreign languages, except Russian, which is a foreign language to Latvians. This
means that the Latvian legislative shares less knowledge about the West, based on language
skills only. Thus, there can be less convergence, less reciprocal interaction and understanding
between Latvia and the community to which it belongs.
To direct the present political class in Latvia, there is a need for strong leaders, such as
former Latvian President Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga. Around 60 percent of Latvia’s population
consider her as the Baltic leader while 40 percent name Estonian and Lithuanian leaders as
significant for the Baltic States. One out of 160 considers the current Latvian president
Raimonds Vējonis as a credible leader. It is an appalling situation where Latvian citizens view its
leaders as weak. This perception perpetuates negative political conditions and affects social
coherence.
It is possible to conclude that Euro-Atlantic integration has not offset all of Latvia’s
sensitivities and vulnerabilities on the domestic level. The lack of democratic consensus stems
from a few important areas. First, Latvia is not politically coherent. Social coherence can
vacillate between liberalism and socialism but not preferences of ethnic groups or oligarchs.
Furthermore, the influence of Russian business-political interests in Latvia create strong
fault lines between elites and the ruled. Even if Latvia is a member of the Euro-Atlantic
community, part of it is still residing in the past. Latvia lacks strong leaders who are capable of
bringing Latvia culturally and socially deeper into the Euro-Atlantic community. For only these
reasons it is possible to falsify the fourth hypothesis.

791

See “Deputy Profiles of the 12th Saeima,” The Latvian Parliament: accessed on 02/10/2017,
http://www.saeima.lv/lv/par-saeimu/saeimas-darbs/deputati.
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As a result, institutional adaptation has not offset all Latvia’s major domestic sensitivities
and vulnerabilities. It still depends heavily on imports of Russian fossil fuels. This makes Latvia
vulnerable in face of potential delivery obstructions. Latvia is still socially and politically
divided. It allows abuse between social groups and causes instability in Latvia. These challenges
aggravate reform fatigue and political trust crises. Latvia has been in the Euro-Atlantic
community since 2004, but it still must work hard to adapt to it.
In conclusion, Latvia must remain vigilant and resilient in the region to which it belongs.
For some time already, major Western powers seem to rush somewhere, nobody knows where,
but everyone wants to get there first. Some elements of the Euro-Atlantic community in the
United States and Europe even start contemplating alternative directions. The result of such
trends have aggregated into simultaneous crises in European and transatlantic relations.
Thus, there are reasons for caution and reforms in Latvia. The transatlantic link has
offered security to Latvia. Considering Latvia’s past, the solemn relationship with the United
States must be treated with the utmost respect by pledging two percent or more from GDP on
defense. Even if Latvia will not alter the aggregate military capabilities of NATO, it will respect
the collective defense principles. The crises in Georgia and Ukraine should serve as reminders to
all allies that NATO must not be taken for granted. Thus, the transatlantic solidarity rooted in
commonly shared defense responsibilities must be respected.
What Latvia will make out of EU membership depends on its adaptation to and utilization
of commonly shared market benefits. The rush to membership in 2004 proved that Latvia can
robustly reform itself. After membership, reform processes have rather stalled, also in some other
parts of the EU. Nevertheless, the EU has not lost its global position as the largest consumer
market, followed by the United States, according to population size. Here, the EU itself or in
partnership with the United States could create a trading regime to remedy the crisis in Europe
and transatlantic relations.
For multiple decades, the existence of strong a Euro-Atlantic community has delivered
sound and regular benefits to its members. Some members have forgotten how dismal the future
would be without the institutional framework that keeps both sides of the Atlantic together. But
there is a stance that all could agree on. Even if too many present leaders seem to forget those
historic reasons that still justify the necessity of the Euro-Atlantic community, a glance outside
would justify the argument for better conditions inside.
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